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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines a certain philosophical assumption
that meanings and mental states have to be attributed to
speakers conjointly in attempting to gain an
understanding of their behaviour, linguistic and
otherwise. It is shown that this attributive view of mind
and meaning cannot do justice to the full range and
character of our knowledge of language. Linguistic
knowledge is a property of individuals and any account of
it must draw upon a psychological theory of their
linguistic abilities. The possibility of a descriptive theory
of meaning eschewing all mention of cognitive
psychological facts is considered and rejected. The
conclusion is reached that theorising about language that
accommodates speakers' knowledge goes well beyond the
brief of the a priori theorist's project of interpretation or
description and points to the need for a more substantive
treatment of the nature of mental states.
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Chapter One
A Philosophy of Mind and Language
1.1) A Priori and Empirical Conceptions of Psychology
I begin with a prevalent philosophical conception of mind and
language, which could be called, rather broadly, a Davidsonian view. This
is the view that the study of mind and meaning should be reserved for
philosophy alone. While it will be conceded that the empirical facts
studied in the cognitive and brain sciences make possible and sustain our
intentional phenomena, it will be the claim of this conception that no
investigation of that empirical domain can cast light on the form and
character of minds and meanings. Theories of mind and theories of
meaning are philosophical theories, unilluminated by scientific
explanations. The beliefs, desires and meanings they study are fully
characterised and also constituted by the philosophical theories that
describe them. This is the view I mean to challenge.
The a priori claim will be that because we ordinarily know the minds
of others, we ordinarily know what minds are. Philosophical reflection
will show that our ordinary reasons for supposing ourselves to have
knowledge of other people's minds provides our only access to an
understanding of the mental. Proponents of such a view will suppose that
we attribute minds to others when we judge them to be agents and assess
their behaviour in rational terms. The principles of assessment must be
the a priori principles by which we interpret others, and so the concept of
mind will be exhaustively characterised by the formal and empirical
conditions on our methods of interpretation. I shall call someone who
thinks like this an attributionist; where an attributionist is one who thinks
the beliefs and desires we attribute to rational agents are not the objects of
the interpreter's inquiry, but the products of it.
An attributionist about the mind must also be an attributionist about
meaning, given the intimate link between minds and meanings.
Meanings, too, will arise in the context of interpretation; in particular, in
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that part of interpretation that addresses people's linguistic behaviour.
The meanings of their words, like their states of belief and desire, will be a
matter of attribution. They result from the precise application of the
semantical and psychological categories we have devised to classify and
evaluate people's behaviour.
There is a certain modesty in this stance: it presumes that our ordinary
ways of thinking are good enough to tell us all there is to know about
minds and meanings. However, the philosophical theory that reflects on
these "ordinary ways" leads to a flagrantly metaphysical picture of minds
and a degenerate conception of meaning as a result of its commitments to
a number of counter-intuitive consequences. It is one thing to give
prominence to the notion of commonsense in philosophy, but quite
another to propose a philosophical conception of it. And it is with respect
to the second of these strands of attributionism that we must test the
doctrine.
I shall argue that there is something altogether faulty in such a
conception, and that its puzzling consequences result from trying to stick
too narrowly to commonsense to tell us what sorts of creatures we are and
what linguistic and psychological resources are available to us. We need a
less protectionist account of the complex phenomena of mind and
language that give rise to, and give form to, the visible properties of
speech and thought. Commonsense itself tells us that not everything we
want to know about the world and our place in it can be discovered from
the armchair. I shall suggest that the concept of mind and the concept of
language are like the concept gold in having both an everyday and a more
technical use, without being ambiguous. A full understanding of the folk
notion of a language, say, is not taken to require knowledge of the more
technical use made of it by a linguist; and yet if we want to know in precise
terms what it is for something to be a language, or to be this or that
particular language we should turn to the experts. The same would go for
our use of the concept of mind, although in that case, as was once true of
'gold', we are still in the process of developing a more theoretically precise
understanding of the concept. This is the phenomenon Hilary Putnam
calls 'the division of linguistic labour'. It neither dispenses with our
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ordinary, folk understanding of a concept (or expression), nor denies the
importance of theoretical refinements to it. This is the model I have of the
relation of folk psychological notions to those of linguistic and cognitive
science. The notions of mind and language are open to both ordinary
reflection and scientific inquiry. What is needed, therefore, is a way of
combining philosophical reflection with empirical investigation of our
distinctive linguistic and cognitive capacities; a way which does not lead
us into philosophical error. We need a conception of mind and meaning
that is consistent with a more substantive account of psychological
explanation; this will mean accommodating semantics and psychology in
an explanatory framework where intelligent behaviour is explained by
reference to cognitive facts which are at once both genuinely mental but
beyond the ordinary interpreter's reach. Thus it will not be by deploying a
cognitive theory that the interpreter is able to know what he does of other
people's minds and meanings, but rather it will be by his satisfying such a
theory. He will not have to know of the presence of these complex
cognitive states, he will have to be in them. In this way, I shall prise apart
the roles of commonsense reasoner and psychological theorist, denying
the purported a priori link between the ordinary epistemology of minds
and explanation of the mental.
The case I shall focus on is our knowledge of language and its role in
explanations of linguistic behaviour. I shall draw upon recent work by
Noam Chomsky that suggests that an account of our knowledge of
language is the study of a complex cognitive structure; one module of the
mind. Knowledge of language is a complex mental phenomenon which
most of us possess. It requires detailed empirical study at more than one
level of cognitive organisation; and for these reasons I shall argue that the
nature and structure of that knowledge is not simply a matter of what we
attribute to speakers, ordinarily, when we try to make sense of their talk;
nor is it, less simply, a matter of rational reconstruction of their linguistic
practice under the guidance of certain a priori theoretical principles. It is a
substantive property of the human mind, not merely an attributed one; it
is sustained by a complex organisation of cognitive states whose influence
on our behaviour is owed to their being neither simply reasons nor causes
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of that behaviour. The effect of these states on linguistic practice is owed to
the nature of mental representations which participate in the mental
processes that result in the production and comprehension of speech.
Specific mental representations are invoked when we give content-using
explanations in computational psychology. These are neither physical
explanations of a speaker's output, nor the folk psychological explanations
of the ordinary interpreter, and for this reason we must invoke an
intervening level of cognitive psychological organisation to which the
mentioned states and processes belong.
It is not my intention to claim that this intervening level must replace
the ordinary intentional levels of description and explanation, rather the
scientific cognitivist's claim is that facts about the underlying cognitive
states and processes helps to explain and illuminate the form and
character of the behaviour we can characterise in those intentional terms.
The cognitivist will insist that a full explanation of the intentional
phenomena must make reference to the cognitive psychological structures
that subserve them.
The above claim is intended to steer one clear of a potential
misunderstanding of my project. To claim that certain facts about a
speaker's cognitive apparatus underpin his ability to use a language is
quite consistent with claiming that the contents a language user can
express are not entirely constituted by facts internal to the linguistic
processor. There is no immediate threat here of a Cartesian retreat to
solipsism. The contents of a person's speech and thought depend on his
contact with a social and physical environment. But his ability to retrieve
the significance of information he encounters there depends in part on his
psychological make up. The full task of the project I want to make room
for would have to explain how it is that creatures with the relevant
cognitive apparatus make their minds and meanings available to one
another in a public language. My contribution will be to show that neglect
of the empirical study of the cognitive component leaves one with an




Now, before we go any further, I think it is important to dispel one
looming misconception: that this is no longer a philosophical question. I
dispute this. I am not changing the subject, or reverting to a merely
empirical issue. The question of which empirical details bear on the
nature of mind and language is a philosophical question. As Donald
Davidson himself admits when discussing which creatures have
propositional attitudes:
The question is not empirical; the question is what sort of
empirical evidence is relevant to deciding when a creature has
propositional attitudes. (1982 p317)
I would add, that the question is also what sort of evidence is relevant
to deciding which particular propositional attitudes a creature has. So
long as we see things in this way, there is still room for an a priori,
philosophical dispute about the range of empirical conditions on
psychological ascription. This is still a philosophical dispute.
I shall argue that the underlying cognitive states and processes in
individuals shape the cognitive products they produce, and that by gaining
a clearer understanding of the precise nature of such processes, we shall be
in a position to learn something philosophically important about why we
may interpret someone's behaviour in the intentional terms that we do.
To this extent, the underlying contingencies, and not just the
philosophical descriptions imposed on them, give character and form to a
person's intentional behaviour.
I shall seek to establish the grounds for a more substantive account of
what it is to have a certain belief, to utter a sentence with a particular
meaning, or to possess a certain concept. The position I shall take for the
linguistic case is neatly expressed in the following remarks by the
psychologist of language, Herbert Clark:
What speakers produce is necessarily constrained by the
processes by which they produce what they produce, so theories
of language products must ultimately be constrained by theories
of language processes. To picture philosophy of language as
immune from empirical evidence is therefore a distortion of
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fact. The issue, rather, is what facts matter and how. (Clark
1986, pi7)
Knowledge of language is the subject of study for philosophers,
linguists and cognitive psychologists working together: its study is a
proper task of the cognitive sciences.
1.2) Psychological Attributionism
In striking contrast, the attributionist's view of empirical science is
unequivocal: the mental and the meaningful are constituted by the
intentional categories we impose on a creature to make sense of its
behaviour in rational terms. Lower levels of description reveal mere
contingencies about the internal workings of a creature and cannot hope
to explain the rational patterns of intentional ascription that bring the
(rational) mind to light. Thus empirical investigations of underlying
mechanisms, and the sub-personal states and processes that are causally
responsible for behaviour, can tell us nothing about the mental categories
for classifying it.
However, even on this a prioristic conception of the mental there must
be some relation between the higher level of intentional description and
the underlying empirical facts, as Davidson's remarks indicate. And it will
be in apprehending this relation that the attributer decides, when
confronted with the mere contingencies, whether to apply or withold his
mental terminology. So there will have to be some physical or
behavioural constraints on psychological attributions, and for the
attributionist, it is the project of interpretation that supplies all the
necessary links: it must provide the a priori means both to characterise the
intentional realm and to effect the transition from the underlying physical
level to the level of intentional characterisation. The project describes an
intentional structure bound by rational explanations of behaviour. Each
single attribution depends on a background of others and must belong to
an overall delineation of the thinker's psychological states; this total
scheme provides a conception of a thinker with reference to which we can
interpret his talk and explain his actions. An assumption of rationality is
6
Chapter One
built into this overall psychological conception. Rationality is conceived to
be constitutive of the range of application of the concepts of the
propositional attitudes, and so to a large extent the mental life of any
individual subject must be rational. Rationality is a normative standard of
the interpreter, an ideal he aims for in constructing an interpretational
scheme.
The idea that subjects must be to a large extent rational may seem to be
threatened by the idea that for the attributionist the propositional
attitudes, and the meanings of individual sentences, are constructs of the
interpreter, ascribed to people and their utterances to explain their verbal
and non-verbal behaviour. The idealisation may seem to miss the mark.
But it is in the nature of attributionist thinking to suppose that it is only
when someone's behaviour can be brought under the terms of such a
rational description that the person has any claim to mental life at all.
This is to see mental states as a matter of what intentional descriptions
can be given to a person's behaviour from the interpreter's point of view.
Thus mental states are forged from behaviour by interpreting it. And
although this makes them depend essentially on facts about third-person
interpretation, the mental states are given some life of their own by
describing them as states in the agent that cause his actions. At first this
may seem to contradict the attributionist's ideology. But strictly speaking,
what happens here is that there are internal physical parts of a person that
cause his physical movements, and it is when we can re-describe that
behaviour as intentional action that we are given licence to re-describe
those causally relevant inner states as beliefs and desires. Our right to do
so is secured by the philosophical thesis that reasons are the causes of
intentional behaviour: only in so far as we are entitled to describe people
as acting intentionally are we entitled to describe the causes of their
behaviour as mental states, and only in so far as behaviour is caused by
mental states can we claim it is intentional action. This thesis gives us no
prior route to the discovery of the cause or the nature of the effect: we
must simply work as interpreters to earn the right to impose descriptions
of intentional states and actions on physical causes of bodily movements .
The causes of physical change will be there anyway, and their subsequent
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intentional re-descriptions depend entirely on the possibilities of
interpretation at the higher level; thus intentionality has nothing to do
with intrinsic features of the states themselves. An event is only mental
because it is so described. Nothing in a physical cause accounts for its
intentional character; this remains in the eye of the interpreter.
Nevertheless, the intentional states we ascribe are ultimately physical
states: states of the world we describe in mental terms. The attributionist is
still a monist.
The pure attributionist thesis comes down to this: inner mental life, as
delineated by beliefs, desires, hopes and fears, is just that part of the
physical world that is answerable to an intentional taxonomy imposed
from the outside. The taxonomy belongs to a priori psychology: the
psychology of ordinary belief-desire attribution. The principles of
propositional attitude attribution are constitutive of this psychology, and
so constitutive of the intentionally taxonomised mental states themselves
I shall call this position pure attributionism, since a number of impure
versions of this doctrine exist.
An attributionist is one who believes that in a theory of mental states,
a theory of the external conditions for their attribution is prior to a theory
of what it is to possess them; indeed, he believes that theories of the
former kind provide the only route to the latter. But the pure
attributionist would find the question of what it is to possess a mental
state misconceived; at least misconceived if it was thought that there was
something independent of interpretation in virtue of which the
attribution to a subject of a given mental state was true. For the pure
attributionist there can be no substantive answer to the question, 'What is
it to possess a given belief (or concept)?' over and above being told, it is to
be apt to be ascribed that state of belief (or that concept) in an interpretation
that makes "the best total sense possible of the life and conduct" of the
thinker (see Wiggins 1980, pl99). On this understanding of the
attributionist, he believes that mental states can only be what we attribute
to a subject when we try to make sense of him in rational terms, and that
we make sense of people in accordance with certain principles of
interpretation considered constitutive of the mental. These principles are
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a priori: we do not test them by how accurately they characterise the mind
of another, instead our characterisations of people's mental life are tested
against the principles. They give our rational and only grounds for
making psychological ascriptions, and they exhaust the content of concepts
used in those ascriptions. For the pure attributionist there can be no gap
between the mind of a thinker and the best interpretation to be given of
him.
There are a number of impure strains of attributionism. One could
think, for instance, that while these attributions of propositional attitudes
pick out the mental phenomena we are interested in, the phenomena
themselves can be investigated in some other way. On another strain, one
might think of our attributions as giving us only the roughest guidelines
as to the real psychological phenomena they attempt to classify. Here,
propositional attitude psychology would supply a somewhat idealised and
only approximate guide to the nature of mental life. Lastly, and I think
least plausibly, there could be a position on which one supposes that a
theory of attitude ascription provides the only purchase we have on the
concept of the mental, while admitting that the real nature of the mental
would always outstrip our concepts of it. It is hard to make much sense of
such claims for the 'noumenal mind'.
All of these positions constitute impure forms of attributionist
thinking, but from here on I shall use the term 'attributionism' to denote
the purest strain only.
1.3) The Three Stances
In attempting to repudiate this philosophical stance, I shall argue that
facts about the cognitive psychological organisation and internal workings
of an individual, brought to light by empirical research, do tell us
something about the nature of his mental life and can provide more
precise conditions for saying what an individual thinks and means on
particular occasions. Establishing this would enable us to conclude that
scientific investigations of the underlying empirical phenomena do bear
on the very nature of what it is to think certain thoughts and to express
9
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them by uttering certain sentences. Clearly, such an explanatory stance
would threaten the treasured philosophical conception of these notions
with which I began.
However, it might have struck some that there are other ways of
denying the stance taken by the attributionist about mind and meaning
without having to abandon all hope of giving a purely philosophical
account of them. The thought here is that there is some fact about the
matter concerning what it is for a thinker to possess a particular concept or
to attach the meaning he does to his words, and that it is these facts that
we are describing when we interpret someone correctly. On this
conception, there is something about a subject in virtue of which an
ascription to him of a given concept, or a specification of meaning for one
of his sentences is true. A correct interpretation is answerable to these
facts; it correctness consists in giving a faithful description of them. We
could call this position the Descriptivist Stance. But now one will want to
know just what facts about an individual such a priori philosophical
theories are supposed to be describing? In the linguistic case, for example,
what is it about a speaker that confirms that he means this or that by a
given sentence? What shows that he has a structured as opposed to an
unstructured understanding of a sentence? If these are facts revealed by
empirical inquiry then the Descriptivist faces the same task as the
Explanatory theorist of showing how such facts bear on an a priori theory
about the speaker. But if they are facts to be described in a philosophical
theory of meaning, or mind, then the Explanatory theorist will want to
know whether they provide enough substance to answer the questions
they set out to answer, while the attributionist will want to know how
they can be independent of claims made from the Interpreter's stance and
yet still be relevant to the facts about minds and meanings.
Although we seem to have three stances, that of Interpreter,
Descriptivist and Explanatory theorist, I shall argue that the Descriptivist
occupies an unstable middle position oscillating between the other two. To
make out the suggestion that correct philosophical theories of mind and
language should describe facts about actual language users, one would
need to substantiate the claims for description as more than just the
1 0
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constitutive a priori claims of the interpreter, and as less than the claims
of explanation urged by the empirical scientist. I see no non-trivial way to
make out this suggestion without lapsing back into either of the other two
positions. In particular, where one's aim is to describe the significance of
someone's linguistic behaviour, I shall argue that there is no means to
correctly describe the significance it has for a speaker or hearer without
offering an explanation of how they come to have an understanding of it.
My brief will be to persuade the Descriptivist to chose the more
explanatory option.
1.4) The Involvement of the Mind in Speech: a Prior Assumption
I shall take it as a presupposition of all parties to this dispute that there
is an intimate connection between meaning and mind. To do this I shall
take a little space to set aside approaches to meaning which do not accept
this premiss, together with one approach which does but still proves
unsatisfactory for the project I have in mind. But first of all, let us consider
what it means to accept the presupposition.
The intimate connection between mind and meaning can be expressed
in a number of different ways. For instance, Michael Dummett expresses it
by claiming that meaning must be the object of a speaker's knowledge, and
that a theory of meaning for his language is, ipso facto, a theory of his
understanding. Davidson expresses the connection by stressing the
inextricability of belief and meaning, according to which we cannot fix
what someone means on any given occasion of utterance without
knowing a good deal about what he believes, and we cannot know very
much about someone's beliefs without being able to interpret much of
what he says. Yet another possibility is suggested by the Gricean
programme that seeks to reduce semantical notions to psychological ones.
Here it is not so much a matter of an intimate connection between mind
and meaning but a subsumption of the notion of linguistic meaning
under mental notions. Paul Grice seeks to analyse meaning in terms of the
beliefs and intentions of the speaker and hearer on a given occasion of use,
1 1
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and in terms of these occasion-meanings he tries to re-construct a notion
of the re-usable meanings which attach to well-worn sentences and
expressions over time. In what follows I shall not have the Gricean project
in mind, principally because it is an approach which neglects the structural
features of a language. A word about this is in order.
1.5) Setting Aside Grice
Grice wanted to analyse a speaker's meaning something by uttering a
particular sentence on a particular occasion in the presence of a hearer in
terms of the speaker's intention to get the hearer to recognise that the
speaker has a particular belief, and to get him to recognise this by means of
the hearer recognising that this is the speaker's intention in using that
sentence. Without going into detail about the further complexities of this
analysis, I think we can see reasons why such an analysis leaves out an
important aspect of linguistic understanding. The following example will
help. We could imagine a parrot who has learned to say "Polly's hungry"
whenever it wants some food and wants to draw to its owner's attention
to the fact that it is in need of some food. Here, the conditions for the
Gricean analysis are met. The parrot has the intention (we can say) to
inform its owner of its state of hunger, and to inform its owner by means
of uttering that sentence. Without stopping to argue about the plausibility
of otherwise of the parrot having complex, nested intentions, we can
already see that issues about how much intelligence the parrot has are
beside the point. The parrot might well intend its owner to recognise its
intention to inform her of its state of hunger by making that particular
sound, but what is entirely lacking is any good reason to think that the
parrot understands the sentence as a sentence of English, a sentence with
a subject-predicate structure. It is this lack of knowledge about the sentence
itself that should make us balk at any account of speaker's intentions as an
account of the meaning of items in a public language.
It is a recognisable fact about language, seldom discussed by Grice, that
different sentences uttered by speakers can sometimes exhibit common
structures and parts. These facts are usually recorded in systematic theories
1 2
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by clauses that specify semantic rules for the use of those recurrent parts,
and formation rules for constructing complex sentences and expressions
from semantically simpler ones. These rules will describe a huge variety
of permissible and interpretable structures in the language. Now, without
begging any questions at this stage, it is worth noting that any descriptively
adequate theory of language addressing itself to the range and forms of a
natural language spoken by a community of users must have recourse to
something like the range of structures described by such rules. To come
remotely close to describing the systematic complexity in a natural
language, at the level of syntax alone, a Gricean account must make appeal
to a formal apparatus that describes in detail the legitimate choices of
grammatical structures which can be called upon in making oneself clear
to another member of one's linguistic community. Moreover, our ability
to understand novel sentences suggests that we project meanings from
familiar combinations of words and structures to new combinations of
those words and structures. It is hard to see how the psychologically
reductionist programme can explain this. In short, the Gricean needs some
account of the compositional workings of the language.
Furthermore, even if a psychological account of content takes
explanatory priority over theories of linguistic content, as the Griceans tell
us it does, the available choices of some linguistically complex means of
communicating one's thoughts to another will, most typically, have to be
explained by adverting to those structural principles. Whether or not these
semantic and structural features are enough to determine fully what a
speaker means on a given occasion of use, they will play an important role
in identifying the sentence-type used to convey his meaning. It is more
than likely that we are looking for an individuation of a sentence-type in
other than purely syntactic terms. And so long as form is systematically
related to content, the principles of individuation, whatever they are, will
contribute to a precise articulation of the concepts which participate in
determining the content of the sentence he uttered. If we can argue for
such a systematic relation, the structured meaning of an utterance will be a
crucial factor on which the identity of what is communicated depends.
1 3
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So without yet pronouncing on whether or not a speaker's knowledge
or his linguistic abilities are informed by these structural features of the
language, a theory which marks the connection between meaning and the
mind still has to account for the range and complexity of the language
being used.
1.6) Setting Aside Model-theoretic Semantics
However we decide to construe the connection between meanings and
the mind, theorists who respect the connection differ markedly from those
who do not. Those who do not attempt to provide semantic
interpretations of natural language by means of a logical analysis of
language-world relations. Theorists of this sort view the semantic
properties of a language as wholly independent of speakers of the language
and their knowledge of it. I have in mind here formal semanticists like
Richard Montague, Saul Kripke, and David Lewis who attempt to analyse
natural language by means of model-theoretic or possible world semantics.
These formal semanticists begin by offering semantic theories for well-
specified formal languages. These languages are described by their
investigators as "abstract systems whereby symbols are associated with
aspects of the world" (Lewis 1975 pl70); although they are often related,
not to the world, but to the abstract structures of mathematics. The formal
semanticist constructs mappings from expressions in a language to
elements in a domain. These domains are abstract model-structures. The
semantic project is the construction of functions for assigning expressions
in a language to elements, or the properties of them in those domains.
But we should want to ask anyone engaged in this exercise how the
languages of mathematics are supposed to illuminate natural language
meaning? The formal semanticist's answer is usually an argument for one
of the following claims:
(i) Natural languages (or some fragment of them) are formal
languages




(iii) Natural languages can be translated into formal
languages.
Taking any one of these conclusions for granted for the moment, let us
consider how the analysis works. Consider model-theoretic semantics.
Principally, semantics of this sort have to do with the internal logical
properties of a formal language. The extensions of expressions in that
language are extensions in a model, and by making assignments of the
right kind to each category of basic expression, we can define the semantic
values of each well-formed composite expression recursively on the
complexity of that expression. However, more than one model will be
available for such languages since most semantic mappings will
determine the class of models up to isomorphism. In the class of
isomorphic models, the extensions of non-logical constants can differ. So
their extensions are not uniquely determined by the model-theory. Only
relations of consequence, compositionality, and relations of exclusion and
inclusion of extensions among the semantic values of expressions are
fully determined. These properties provide much of what is meant on this
approach by constructing a semantics for a language. The value of such an
approach is usually defended as follows. The class of models for a language
will place important constraints on the patterns of semantic assignments
we can make to linguistic items belonging to it. This is a logico-semantic
constraint on how we fix the extensions of linguistic expressions, not an
account of how we do that. The only way to fix their extensions is to find
some extra-theoretical means of deciding which model provides the
intended interpretation of the language. This depends on what speakers
really mean by those expressions. The task of finding this out is nothing
short of providing an analysis of meaning for natural language sentences,
and this is a project that stands in marked contrast to model-theoretic
semantics. So why not embark on that project from the beginning?
I suggest, then, that these formal approaches to mathematical
languages merely postpone the question of how the mind of the speaker
embraces a language with those properties. At very worst, they ignore it
altogether, at the cost of by-passing the project we are all supposed to be
engaged upon: viz. providing a semantics for natural language. At best all
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the tradition of formal semantics can do is to suggest that among all these
(potentially infinite) possible abstract mathematical systems there are
languages actually spoken by human beings. Perhaps facts about the
psychologies of individual speakers would then be put to use somehow in
deciding which of this huge range of potential systems were the ones that
speaker's usage actually realised, or conformed to. This would be one way
of redeeming the postponed promise to tell us something about actual
human languages. James Higginbotham puts such a case like this:
linguistic theory as I have characterised it is concerned to
answer the question which abstract languages are the languages
of human beings, and to explain how persons are able rapidly to
select a system from among those which are logically
conceivable on the basis of their experience. (Higginbotham,
1983 pi79)
Less psychologically relevant semantical projects would suggest that
the meaning-properties of languages are independent of speakers of those
languages. This project has the platonistic overtone that meanings are
independent of speakers but that somehow or other, speakers have
strained to become apprised of some of these standing facts. Higginbotham
does not tell us anything about the actual speakers' epistemology of
understanding, but he does aim to tell us how we the theorists can decide
which properties characterise a speaker's actual language, assuming that
we have already grasped some of the alternatives.
The less psychologically relevant project can begin with the seemingly
innocent point that not everyone can know in full the meanings present
in the language he uses. Consider this from Dowty et al.:
it is perfectly reasonable to say that no person really
completely "knows" the meanings (intentions) of all of his
language, despite the fact that he uses the language in a normal
way. (Dowty, et al. 1981 pi72)
But it often leads to the less innocent possibility that every speaker of a
given language could be in ignorance of the meaning of some term
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occurring in it. This is to suppose, as Dummett puts it, that we might
"systematically misunderstand our own language" (1976, plOl).
We might call this position metaphysically realist. This is the view that
the properties of our languages are fixed by facts quite independent of our
cognitive states. I call it "metaphysical" realism because it entails the thesis
that essential properties of a language are non-conceptual, non-natural
necessities. At least on Higginbotham's programme, the cognitive
properties of speakers explain why we possess the language that we do,
even though he believes that the facts about that language are platonic. I
find both positions deeply unsatisfactory. In the Higginbotham case, the
search space of possible linguistic systems would be cut down considerably,
if special interest could be taken at the outset in the natural languages
human beings actually use and understand. If we started with them first,
using whatever philosophical and empirical means there are to fix upon
and describe the actual language of a speaker, we could avoid an unguided
and potentially inexhaustible search through the logical space of
possibilities. Platonism is an unnecessary detour (Although it could be a
consequence of one's theorising!).
In the other case the dubiously coherent possibility is envisaged that for
some sentences or expressions of a community's language no member of
that community understands them. This divorce between meaning and
understanding should surely give us pause to wonder whether the formal
semanticist was really talking about the language actually used by those
speakers. If someone persisted in thinking it was, even when an account
of the meanings of its expressions diverged from every speaker's use and
understanding of them, one could reserve the right to by-pass such a
theory and start constructing an account of what speakers actually did
succeed in understanding.
I shall not consider possible world or model-theoretic approaches any
further, but from now on I shall mean by the term 'semantics' the
reference-specifying part of a theory of meaning for a language that also
serves as a theory of what speakers understand.
1.7) Interpretation as a Philosophy of Mind and Language?
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To return to matters of mind, the attributionist view I am opposing is
attempting to answer a hugely important philosophical question: How can
the facts about our mental lives and the meanings of our words fit into the
world of facts as described by the natural sciences? While I believe this is
an important project of inquiry, I do not believe that the attributionist
succeeds in showing us how the material world can accommodate minds
and meanings. To complete this project satisfactorily we need more
substantive notions of mental states and linguistic meanings. But before I
offer my alternative we have to look more closely at what the
attributionist can and cannot achieve.
The best way to gain an understanding of attributionism is through the
study of its methodology, and as I have indicated the guiding methodology
of attributionism is Interpretation.
The project of interpretation sets about introducing the mind of a
subject into our picture of the physical world on the basis of his observable
behaviour. It aims to fix the content of person's thought and action from
the beliefs and desires that give him a reason for acting. To do this, the
interpreter must first describe a person's behaviour in intentional terms,
explaining each episode in that behaviour in terms of a specific set of
reasons.
Most commonly, interpretation works simply by citing a belief, a goal,
or a value of an agent, which lies behind, in the sense of giving point to,
what he does. By citing a person's state of mind we both illuminate what
he or she does and explain why he or she does it. This sort of explanation
lies very close to the ordinary idiom of common-sense psychology. That
may be seen as being in its favour. But common-sense is not yet
philosophy and in transforming it into philosophy the metaphysical
picture that emerges to underpin it leaves one with a conception of the
mind in the eye of the interpreter, indeterminate of content and causally
inert. This metaphysical framework is far removed from common-sense,
not to mention philosophically dubious. We must look at it more closely
to see how these conclusions are reached, and we can do this only by
examining the fundamental tenets of interpretation.
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1.8) Advocates of Interpretation
As I said at the beginning, I shall be considering a broadly Davidsonian
view of the mental. I say "Davidsonian " and not Davidson's view
(although I won't always be so careful) because I want to render a certain
conception of these matters consistent and plausible, and I am far from
sure that one can render Davidson's own position everywhere consistent
and plausible.
It will be quite natural, in what follows, to have in mind also the
names of John McDowell and David Wiggins as exponents of this broadly
Davidsonian approach. At times I shall appeal to their detailed workings
out of some of the principles of this strategy, and other times to their
adjustments to it.
I should also mention at this stage that by my classification, Daniel
Dennett, the advocate of the Intentional Stance, also belongs to this list of
attributionists. However, he can be separated off from the others according
to an important distinction within attributionism between realists and
instrumentalists about beliefs and desires. I shall say more on this later,
once we have examined the method of interpretation.
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Interpretation and the Mental
2.1) Introduction
I shall begin by giving a sketch of the Davidsonian's impressionistic
thesis about minds. This is a subtle and complex position which I cannot
hope to do full justice to here; but a sketch will be enough to establish how
interpretation is supposed to serve as an account of the ordinary
intentional idiom. In defending this idiom from science, Davidson's
position seems to owe something to a style of philosophical thinking
found in the later Wittgenstein, but I shall do no more than hint at these
connections. Finally, Davidson attempts to depart from Wittgenstein in
thinking that the reasons for our actions are also their causes. But I shall
suggest that Davidson's explanations of behaviour can provide solely
rational explanations of behaviour, and this way of characterising the facts
of mental life fails to fulfil a legitimate desire for a fuller explanation of
those facts.
Central to Davidson's conception is the methodological strategy of
interpretation. Interpretation is a form of psychological explanation of
behaviour, but one which constitutes its explanandum. For interpretation
does not explain behaviour construed as physical movement, but
behaviour construed as action. To interpret an individual is to re-describe
some of his verbal and non-verbal behaviour as linguistic and non-
linguistic intentional actions, and to provide rational explanations of
these in terms of a background of beliefs and desires that make sense of
some of his utterances and give him reason to act. I shall now consider
this strategy.
2.2) The Strategy of Interpretation
When we interpret people we see them as acting intentionally and we
hear their utterances as questions, assertions, and commands. All of this
reveals their purposes and to that extent their minds. But how do we do
it? How do we discover the intentions with which they acted and the
sense with which they uttered? This is vitally important, for however it is
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done, to succeed is to see other people's behaviour as the embodiment of
rational minds.
Davidson will tell us that as interpreters all we have to go on is the
observable behaviour of what others say and do. But, of course, behaviour
as physically described is too slender a basis on which to draw conclusions
about (or even recognise) minds. What we need is some way of
transforming this into evidence of mental life, and we can only do this by
re-describing the observable data in intentional terms, linking these
descriptions in such a way as to present a rationally coherent and plausible
story about the course of experience of one who behaves that way. Now as
Davidson says: "we know how to do it without necessarily knowing how
we do it" (1987, p441). But where we seek philosophical clarification, we
need an account of what entitles us to claims to knowledge of other
people's minds. And for this we need a theory of interpretation that deals
explicitly with the third-person interpreter's methods for determining the
contents of an agent's mind from observing his behaviour. Such a theory
should reveal the nature of interpretation in general terms prescinding
from the limitations of any particular interpreter. Neither Davidson nor
anyone else has ever given an instance of a theory of interpretation so,
just as in a style of inquiry familiar from discussions in the theory of
meaning, questions are really being addressed to the form a theory of
interpretation should take. Our reflections are philosophical ones about
the value of such a conception in understanding the mental, and the chief
merit claimed on behalf of this view is that it helps us to understand how
mental notions can be introduced into our descriptions of the physical
world. Put in a less bland way, the claim is that on the interpreter's view,
there is no bar to our getting to know the facts about another's mind: to
specify the constraints on interpretation properly and to make the right




Let me just sum up this section by reminding you of the three things
there are in play:
(i) The thinker who acts and judges.
(ii) The interpreter who makes sense of the thinker.
(iii) The theorist of interpretation who elaborates the principles which
guide interpretation.
Davidson argues that there is no asymmetry between (i) and (ii): a
thinker must also be an interpreter of others, and, since the interpreter of
another must express in his own words what that other person thinks, or
does or says, he must also be a language user. The theory of interpretation
in (iii) is a philosophical account of what every interpreter knows. So the
pronouncements of that theory must not come apart from the judgements
of a well informed interpreter.
There is an important point here about the nature of mental
explanation on offer in Davidson. Although a theory of interpretation
prescinds from the limitations of any particular interpreter's practice and
addresses itself to the possibilities of interpretation in general, we must
think of the possibilities of interpretation as given in the conditions of a
possible human judgement (even if no-one ever fully occupies those
conditions). The mental states someone has will be the ones he could be
typically ascribed in interpretation that makes sense of his behaviour and
conduct; and, even if they are never realised by another interpreter, the
full extent of the possibilities for interpreting him will exhaust the content
of his mental life.
The relation between the theory of interpretation and the ordinary
interpreter depends how much of the theoretical apparatus needed to
implement the former is available to the latter. The way to decide this is to
produce some ground for a distinction between the theoretical concepts
that are related to the ordinary interpreter's practices, in some way or
other, from those which are purely theoretical, being merely artefacts of
the theory that explains the methodology of interpretation. This
distinction is central to the question of what is made available to an
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interpreter in interpretation; for an interpreter can know only what his
methods and materials for ascribing permit him to know. And to the
attributionist about minds, the question of what is made available in
interpretation will be at one with the question of what we can know of
others' minds and hence, what can be known of one's own mind:
What a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker
means is all there is to learn; the same goes for what the speaker
believes. (Davidson 1986, p315)
So my mental states will be the states of mind a possible interpreter
could interpret me as having. Indeed, as mere matters of description of
otherwise physical things, they are conditional upon the possibility of
giving such an interpreting description. The mind must be however it
would be seen in the eyes of a well informed interpreter. So it becomes
vital to know what interpretation can provide of the character of minds.
Before we can even begin to answer the questions just raised we have
to look more closely at the constraints and assumptions that are at work in
interpretation theory. This is what we must now do.
2.3) The Principles of Interpretation
Rationality plays the key role in Davidson's thinking about the mental.
It guarantees holism and the irreducibility of mental notions. We shall
come to these consequences in a moment but let us focus on the operative
role of rationality itself.
When we re-describe others' activities in intentional terms, rationality
provides an a priori link between beliefs, desires and behaviour, described
as intentional action; while other a priori links trace out the rational ties
between beliefs and further beliefs, desires and further desires. All of these
connections are drawn upon when we begin to interpret others. At the
outset, we have to find reasons for what they say and do given in terms of
what they think and what they want; and in doing so, we must also supply
reasons for their having certain beliefs and desiring certain outcomes. For
if we treat these beliefs and desires as the springs of their actions but find
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no reason to think they have such thoughts and urges, or worse feel that
there is reason to think they lack them, them we have failed to explain
their acting intentionally in this instance. So there is a constraint to be
given here on interpretations: the intentional re-descriptions the
interpreter gives to behavioural events must satisfy the a priori principles
of rationality.
These rational links are operative within the mental scheme, they
relate complexes of intentional notions so as to meet:
....conditions of consistency and rational coherence [which] may be
viewed as constitutive of the range of application of such concepts
as those of belief, desire, intention and action" (Davidson
1980, p237)
This does not tell us how to apply those concepts in actual cases, nor in
general terms does it relate those concepts to physical conditions, but it
does place a constraint on any putative re-desciption of a behavioural
event. In re-describing such an event, it does require us to relate the
mental concepts we apply to someone's behaviour to a range of other
mental concepts to which it is rationally tied. A word about this is in
order.
Attitudes like belief and desire are identified in part by their
propositional contents. These are the propositions towards which the
attitude is directed. The logical relations among these propositions account
for many of the links in the network of attitudes. One cannot have (be
ascribed) the belief that Mary lied in court without having (being ascribed)
the belief that Mary spoke in court, the belief that there are such things as
courts, and so on. Conversely, one cannot have (be ascribed) the belief
about Mary lying in court if one also has (can be ascribed) the belief that
Mary did not speak in court, or that courts are places where the use of
language is forbidden. The grounds for attributing one belief include the
grounds for attributing many others, to which it is logically related
through its object, and which help to determine its content. The same is
true for desires and other propositional attitudes. Meanwhile beliefs and
desires are connected to one another and to actions by the principles of
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practical reason. To act intentionally is to do what one believes will
achieve what one most wants at that time. Correlatively, if one believes
things are not as one wants and one has no conflicting beliefs or
countervailing desires one has a reason to act.
A theory of interpretation that provides redescriptions of people's
behaviour has, for any particular case, to massage these two requirements
of reason into a huge interlocking system of beliefs, desires, intentions and
actions that explain the reasonableness of the agent's behaviour given the
rational spread of his mind. He must be shown as acting in accordance
with his thinking on the basis of the things he wants. So we understand
people's minds on the basis of their attitudes and actions; attitudes and
actions we attribute to them as interpreters. And:
...if we are intelligibly to attribute attitudes and belief, or usefully to
describe motions as behaviour, then we are committed to finding,
in the pattern of behaviour, belief and desire, a large degree of
rationality and consistency" (Ibid)
Thus when I interpret someone's behaviour there is always a
presumption of rationality in his or her favour. This means that if we
find someone wanting in reason under one interpretation, we should try
to replace it in favour of a more penetrating description that preserves
that person's rationality. For it is only by finding a satisfactory set of
reasons that I can find the behaviour and speech of another so much as
intelligible, and only in so far as someone is rationally intelligible that
they have a mind at all. This is because Davidsonians believe that the
giving of such rational explanations is inseparable from the claim that the
person explained has beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and a set of values he
can act on. It is only when certain behavioural events stand in need of
rational explanations that we detect the presence of minds. In the physical
world, rationality makes room for minds: it allows us to gain sufficient
distance from the physical events by allowing us to describe the rational
structures of embodied minds:
In order for the intentional notions to make sense we must require
enough rationality to let our pattern of explanation be reason
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explanation rather than merely causal explanation. (Follesdal, 1982,
p312)
Causal explanations will still be operative but they will subserve
rational explanation. (I shall have more to say about this in a moment.)
Notice that action must be included among the intentional notions
defined a priori within the structure of the mental scheme. Therefore the
mind stretches, on Davidson's picture, to include actions. Actions are
observable moments in people's mental lives that can also be described as
events in their physical histories. This provides Davidson with an
observational foundation to mental notions and hence facilitates his
claims to knowledge of other minds. But notice too, that because we must
work our way back from these observable points of entry on mental life
into the interior of the rational mind to cite the reasons for action we are
also giving an interpretation of someone's thinking. We use rationality to
trace the links between someone's actions and his thoughts, his wants and
wishes, his hopes and fears.
In discussing rationality we should also note the force of its
constitutive claim on us, as thinking beings. We have acknowledged that
when and only when we are entitled to give explanations that treat a
creature as embodying a certain rational structure, can it be said to have a
mind. So when all attempts at providing reason-giving explanations of a
person fail, we must conclude that there are no grounds for ascribing our
subject any intelligible thoughts at all. The loss, or absence, of rationality
in you would lead me to conclude that you had literally lost your mind.
Only to the extent that I can treat you as rational, by sustaining a rational
explanation of you, can I find any grounds for your having a mind at all.
We now have an explanation for the presumption of rationality. We
expect to find people rational because those are the norms that
interpretations of their behaviour must conform to; and to have a mind,
or be an agent, is to be a proper subject for interpretation. So minds will
conform to rational standards just in case interpretation is governed by
rational norms. The interpreter will also try to see his subject as guided by
the principles of rationality, but that is because those are the principles that
guide the interpreter in giving interpretation to his subject's behaviour.
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There can be no gap between our knowledge of other minds and our way
of understanding them. The interpreter will view the subject as a rational
agent and will even try to capture that agent's rational outlook on the
world, but all of this will be constituted by an act of interpretation. This is
the short step the attributionist needs to the claim that rationality is
constitutive of mental life. It tells us what minds are. As Michael Root
puts it, in paper that gives a very sympathetic and favourable reading of
the line taken here:
...we owe our idea of the mental to our interest in explaining the
behaviour of others, and...our idea of of the mental is constituted by
the way we pursue that interest: we offer a rational explanation of
the behaviour. (Root 1986, p294)
The accommodation of the mental in the physical world is then aptly
expressed thus:
Other minds, on Davidson's view, are what we get when we
interpret the behaviour of others. Bodies are what we have before
we interpret their behaviour, (loc. cit)
The constitutive principles of mind are the a priori norms of
interpretation. They are normative because they say what a person
ascribed certain beliefs should think, and what someone with those beliefs
and accompanying desires should do; if they do not, the grounds are
inadequate grounds for their attributions. The principles are a priori
because the interpreter does not contemplate people's thoughts and
actions and measure his principles against these, instead he measures the
claims that people have thoughts and actions against the standards of
interpretation. Again, this adds up to the fact that the interpreter is telling
us what minds are.
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2.4) The Holism of the Mental
Another feature of the Davidsonian view is the holism of the mental.
We have seen how the attribution of one belief requires many others, we
make sense of beliefs only in so far as they cohere with others, and rule
out incompatible beliefs; the same for desires, and other attitudes.
(Interestingly, hopes and fears are often said to be less rational.) Moreover,
the beliefs and desires we cite in explanation of a person's action must
belong to this interlocking system. No simple belief-desire attribution will
serve the needs of interpretation on its own: it must conform to other
interpretive acts and it will impose requirements on them. These
interconnections are assumed as we begin to interpret others:
Beliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified and
mediated by further beliefs, desires, attitudes and attendings,
without limit. (Davidsonl980, p217)
Particular interpretations of events only serve in the light of all others
because their grounds depend on much else that goes on in the subject's
mental life, elsewhere and at other times. So:
..we cannot intelligibly attribute any propositional attitude to an
agent except within the framework of a viable theory of his beliefs,
desires, intentions and decisions. (Ibid., p221)
Even if the details of such a framework are never fleshed out by an
actual interpreter, they will always be assumed. The assumptions will not
consist in implicit assumptions about the background theory but in an
explicit assumption of the interpreter that the elaborations of the
background thinking of him and his subject are largely the same.
Davidson calls this the Principle of Charity:
No simple theory can put a speaker [agent] and interpreter in
perfect agreement, and so a workable theory must from time to
time assume error on the part of one or the other. The basic
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methodological precept is, therefore, that a good theory of
interpretation maximises agreement. (Davidsonl984, pl69)
But even where error is found, in the guise of false belief, the well
informed interpreter will still find it explicable error. It is in the same way
that a creature does not have to be perfectly rational either. This is
important since otherwise it could be assumed that it counts as an
objection to the Davidsonian conception of mind to point out that people
are not always rational. However, the interpretative approach does not
require people to be perfectly rational; it will simply insist that irrationality
only makes sense in terms for someone's going against a norm or
standard already operative in that thinker's mental life. In this way we can
contrast these failings of rationality with the cases where the standard of
rationality has no application at all (infants, animals, the insane). These
are non-rational animals whose behaviour is to given a causal
explanation, presumably.
But how much rationality is needed to insist on more than a causal
explanation of a creature's behaviour? This is hard to say. But Davidson's
use of the conditions of rationality looks rather too strong, and it seems
reasonable to think there might be room here for more flexibility.
Davidson thinks that in ascribing beliefs and desires, and other
propositional attitudes, to people we must respect the logical and semantic
properties of their propositional objects. Thus we should expect a good
deal of consistency (logic) and widespread agreement with the
environment (semantic) in the set of attitudes we attribute to a person. So
in interpreting an agent in conformity with Davidson's Principle of
Charity, we must maximise the number of truths the agent believes and
expresses, and make him come out as rational as possible. This seems too
strong, and others (Grandy, Wiggins, Follesdal) have suggested a less
strong but more discriminating Principle of Humanity. There are many
versions, but a good statement of what is required is given, here, by
Follesdal:
When ascribing beliefs, desires and other propositional
attitudes to a person on the basis of observation of what he does
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and says, do not try to maximize his rationality or his agreement
with yourself, but use all your knowledge about how beliefs and
attitudes are formed under the influence of causal factors,
reflection, and so forth, and in particular your knowledge about
his past experience and his various personality traits, such as
credulity, alertness, reflexiveness etc. Ascribe to him the beliefs
and attitudes you should expect him to have on the basis of this
whole theory of man in general and of him in particular.
(Follesdal 1982, p315-6)
Rationality, amongst other things, tells us that when we attribute
beliefs, desires and the other propositional attitudes to people we must be
careful to observe agreements and relations between them, to ensure that
the set of attitudes we are ascribing is consistent and sufficiently inclusive
to make sense of the attribution of any single attitude. This is what led us
to recognise the holistic character of interpretation. And as we now know,
it is a short step from here to the holism of the mental: an event is
intentional only as described, intentionality is the mark of the mental,
interpretation provides intentional descriptions of events holistically, and
so the mental is holistic.
It is this holism and the norms of rationality that give rise to it that
together frustrate any reduction on the intentional level to the physical
level, and dictates a holistic fit with the behavioural evidence. Fitting an
intentional description to a behavioural event requires us to locate that
description in a swirl of others in the mental scheme first, before
determining whether the total interpretation can be fitted to the
behavioural facts. The fit is holistic, but more importantly, irreducibly
holistic.
Now having said that, there must be some principles linking
interpretations to behaviour because otherwise the physical circumstances
would provide no constraint and all interpretations of people could be the
same rationally coherent description. Furthermore, we could not check
the fit, even holistically, if we could apply re-descriptions to just any piece
of behaviour. There are certain minimal conditions to be met before a
piece of behaviour undertaken deliberately by a person could count as her
deliberately slapping his face. The needed links will be a second set of a
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priori principles that connect the intentional level with the physical facts,
in the sense of constraining what can count as a behavioural
implementation of intentional action.
Together these two sets of a priori principles must pronounce what it is
for an interpretation to be correct. This is to be distinguished from
pronouncing that an interpretation is the right one. There may be more
than one correct interpretation of an individual compatible with all the
behavioural evidence there can be. In these cases, neither the principles
nor the the behavioural evidence can adjudicate, and these are all we
have. So in these cases, there is nothing to choose between them.
Finally, notice that Davidson's conception of mind provides further
illumination of the ultimate a priori status of the project of understanding
the mental mentioned at the very start of this thesis. There I said that the a
priori intuition was that because we know other minds, we understand
what minds are. This follows from the present conception because minds
are what we understand when we interpret people's behaviour.
Philosophical investigation can then illuminate theories of interpretation
that tell us what we understand when we interpret others and how we
come to do so.
Now that we have enough of an overview of this position, we must
turn to some of the difficulties with it and the necessary refinements that
must be made to it.
2.5) A Third-Person Perspective
At first, what is so surprising about Davidson's position is that it
assigns privileged access to mental life to the third-person, unlike the
more familiar Cartesian pictures of the mind on which first-person
experience secures certain knowledge of our own thinking. Davidson
believes that the mind is best known from the third-person standpoint. In
fact, for Davidson, this is the best way to secure knowledge of the mind.
But this interpreter-relative conception of mind might seem to miss some
essential features of a more agent-centred view. By making minds depend
on facts about the materials and methods of the interpreter, it is in danger
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of squeezing out the access we have to our own minds. Davidson is not
unaware of having made knowledge of one's own mind more
problematical than knowledge of other minds, but he is given to say:
sometimes I learn what I believe in much the same way someone
else does, by noticing what I say and do. (Davidson 1987, p441)
What are we to make of this? Surely, this perverts our conviction that
we have immediate awareness of ourselves, and distorts the facts about
self-knowledge? The reply would be, not necessarily. When I suppose
myself to hold a particular opinion, or to have a particular belief, I am
subject to the same standards of interpretation I would apply if I ascribed
this belief or opinion to others. I cannot attribute one belief to myself
without supposing there are a great many other things I am thinking
besides: individual beliefs depend for their content on many others. So I
cannot believe that that Mary lied in court without knowing something
about the practice of courts and truth-telling. If a body of beliefs I hold is
recognisably incoherent, I must give something up or abandon my reason.
When I change my beliefs I should be able to offer a reason, when I act
intentionally, I must have some view of my purposes. And over time, I
must find enough continuity in my mental life to be able to understand
myself fully at all. There are limits on how adjustments of my view of
myself are to be made, and limits too on how accurate I am. So when I
attribute belief to myself, the aptness of my attribution is judged by the
same standards I use to judge the aptness of making belief attributions to
others. For the Davidsonian, the difficulties to be overcome on the first-
person case are not as daunting as they first appeared.
2.6) The Narrative Character of Interpretation
Having a mind is a matter of making sense, but making sense to
whom; to oneself, to others, to all others? Davidson would try to ease the
idea of any discrepancy between these answers. One can only be made
sense of by anyone because one makes sense in general. But we have to
take the locution of "making sense of someone" very seriously on the
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attributionist's picture. We do not discover sense in people, we make
sense of them; or if one prefers, we discover the sense that can be made of
them. (Consider the Glaswegian reply to the accusation, "Are you trying to
make a fool of me?" which runs, "You don't make fools you discover
them." Something of the force of this reply is lost on the attributionist.)
Whatever the talk of discovery comes to, the attributionist will insist that
it is only in so far as there is a way of rendering someone's thoughts and
activities intelligible that they can be taken to exhibit mental life, or fulfil
the conditions for thought. Having a mind consists in one's behaviour
being intelligible from the standpoint of a judging subject who can
provide rational explanations of it. So having a mind is a matter of what is
available in interpretation. But now we need to know by which
interpretation(s) one makes sense. By what enlarged, or restricted standard
is one rational? Is there more than one way to construe the nature of
interpretation. The answer to this will be yes if we compare the ideas of
Freud and Davidson. What is illuminating here is not the differences
between these accounts of mind but their similarities in appealing to the
third-person methods of interpretation.
To interpret a person's actions is to provide reasons for her doing what
she does; it is to ascribe beliefs, desires, wants and wishes that make it
reasonable, by her lights, to do and say what she does and says. As an
interpreter, I express in my own words what she is thinking, and I cite
particular beliefs or values as an insight into the motives for her
behaviour. I report indirectly what she thought and intended, and what
she meant by what she said. And by giving the background of thoughts
and feelings which impelled her at any given moment I am describing the
reasons for what she does. But as an interpreter, I will always try to make
sense of someone in my own terms, which means trying to find them
rationally explicable by my standards. But I may not have the terms to
capture subtleties in another person's thinking, and I may find her
irrational by my standards. Have we the right to conclude that there is no
sense to be made of her, and that in failing, by my lights, to be in any way
rational, she lacks a rational mind and the capacity for thought altogether?
Surely not. We cannot draw conclusions from my limitations to the limits
33
Chapter Two
on her susceptibility to interpretation of any kind. It depends how far we
look for an explanation. The point requires some subtle handling.
Davidson will point out that it is not just up to me to describe the
contents of someone's thoughts, the meanings of her words, or the
intentions behind her actions in any way I choose, and yet how far should
I go, or how soon should I refuse to stop in trying to give reason-guiding
explanations of her behaviour? To interpret someone correctly, I must be
guided by certain standards of interpretation. As we have just seen, a
presumption of rationality is one of those standards. But it was also said
that I interpret someone by judging her thoughts and actions rational by
my standards and in my terms. So the question remains: why should my
standards and my terms be thought to be the right ones? Davidson's
answer to the first of these is going to be that in so far as I am a rational
being at all, my standards just are the standards of rationality: the standard
that applies to all humanly intelligible creatures. But on the second point,
Davidson will concede that he is not really concerned to examine the
peculiarities and limits of what is available to any particular interpreter,
but is more concerned with the conditions for interpretation in general.
The possibilities of interpretation, if they can be brought to light, will
provide the constitutive conditions for introducing minds into the world.
The possibilities will be given in line with the general principles of
interpretation. The principles are constitutive of the mental because we
can only regard as mental what conforms to these standards. But have we
got any very precise idea about how these standards apply, and where we
are being too charitable in interpreting someone, or not insightful
enough?
This is vitally important since success in interpretation makes for
minds according to Davidson. Illumination of both my mind and the
mind of another can be given by concentrating on the conditions for
making sense in general. I can understand another only in so far as I can
make sense of him, but my being able to do so supposes that I have the
means for making sense. But what if I lack the means for making sense of
others who can nevertheless be found intelligible in some way. Is this just
a failing of moral imagination on my part? Will just any way of
34
Chapter Two
attempting to make someone intelligible do? How far should we go?
Interpretation theory is supposed to tell us the answers to these questions,
but remember that interpretation theory must operate within the sphere
of possible human judgement providing us with a way of examining our
apprehension of others' minds. We need some ground rules here because
it is only by examining the way in which sense can be made of a subject's
experience and behaviour that the conditions for having a mind can be
brought to light. If there are no interpretation-independent facts to keep
faith with, do all convincing reconstructions of someone's thought have a
claim to authority? We need to consider this in the light of what I want to
call the narrative character of interpretation.
It should now be easy to see that on one reading of him, Freud's
psychoanalysis is a form of the Davidsonian method of interpretation we
have just been rehearsing. Here too, there is a desire to ascribe reasons to
people to explain their behaviour, even if underlying ones. The searching
out of reasons in psychoanalysis attempts to restore a kind of sense that
can be made of rather aberrant behaviour. It searches for a coherent
narrative that makes sense of an individual while being unique to that
case. In Charles Dickens' Great Expectations, we confront the sorry sight of
Miss Havisham. She has been jilted, she will never recover and cannot
accept that her bridegroom has deserted her and that the marriage did not
take place. But as she sits in her wedding gown, she is not waiting to be
wed, she is wasting away; not accepting, because unable to, the humiliating
rejection that denied her love. We tell the story about her experience,
about her unique cast of mind, and we say, "Now do you understand why
she sits there in her wedding weeds: life has deteriorated for her, she has
resigned herself to decay".
We provide an interpretation of Miss Havisham in order to
understand her strange behaviour, and by giving an interpretation we can
make sense of her. I think this brings out the narrative character of the
interpretive stance. But is interpretation just a narrative response to the
desire to understand someone's behaviour? Might there be many such
responses? In being externally imposed there is a danger of fictionalising
the facts about another's mind. If Davidson is going to give the central role
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in mental epistemology to the interpreter, he has to give us some reasons
for thinking that what an interpreter offers us in his descriptions of
another's mind is in fact correct, that it captures how things are with that
agent.
Is there any substance to the thought that a correct interpretation is also
an explanation, and that it may or may not correctly explain the course of
someone's behaviour? Well, it is of course a rational explanation: it has
coherence, consistency, it is a plausible account of a mental life. But is it
the correct account for this or that person? What does this mean here
beyond satisfying the internal standards of the theory?
A natural thought would be that there must be something about the
agent herself in virtue of which the correct explanation is true. To opt for
this intuitive suggestion is to turn interpretations into something more
like hypotheses, where we suppose that the theory-independent facts
about minds are there to be described by the correct interpretation; they are
facts against which interpretations must be checked. But this is just what
the interpreter denies, and his denial is the whole thrust of his case.
Someone might object that the attributionist can accept that there are
some facts which amount to the evidence for interpretive claims;
although these would have to be facts about behaviour. But this is
unsatisfactory: either such details have already been taken into account, in
conferring a prima facie plausibility on a suggested interpretation that
relates intentional descriptions to the prevailing behavioural conditions;
or else they are no more than the bare behavioural conditions, described
in such a sparse, physicalistic way that they could not support particular
attributions at all. Either way, Davidson, qua attributionist, is not
permitted to entertain the intuitive picture of a set of independently
constituted facts to which a correct interpretation is answerable. But what
other view of explanation can he give? What other way is there to
confirm that there is something right or wrong about a cogent description
of another person's thinking? The attributionist will see these persistent
questions as misconceived: what we must grasp is that the internal
standards on the rational coherence of any narrative interpretation
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provide the only view of what counts as a correct explanation of
someone's behaviour.
Yet still there is a strong inclination to ask, what is it that makes us so
successful, when we are, at giving sustained interpretations of people and
the language they speak? Failure to answer this leads us back to the fertile
analogy with the literary critic who goes on providing a number of
penetrating interpretations which may remain illuminating though
external to the mind of the author. I will return to this reading of
Davidson and Freud, but it is useful before doing this to remind ourselves
of the deep reasons why Davidson refuses to compare the rationally
coherent narrative of an interpreter with any confirming facts outside the
interpretation.lt is here that it is worth drawing out some of the
Wittgensteinian themes in the Davidsonian conception.
The reason for failing to look for further justification springs from the
thought that there is nowhere else to look for facts about the mind than in
the grounds given by the rational interpreter.
The difficult thing here is not, to dig down to the ground; no, it is to
recognise the ground that lies before us as the ground.
(Wittgenstein 1956, VI-31)
and so we have to resist the temptation to dig down below that level in an
attempt to find some ultimate justification for our claims. Wittgenstein
calls the level at which justifications come to an end, 'bedrock'. This is the
level at which people can be seen as behaving intentionally and using
language correctly. It is the most basic level at which minds and meanings
can be accommodated. Wittgenstein warns us not to dig below bedrock to a
level at which everything normative disappears from the picture. So for
Davidson, behaviour stripped of its intentional gloss consisting of bodies
that issue physical movements and utterance-sounds, and perhaps have
dispositions to behave, belongs below bedrock. No doubt these events are
related in interesting ways to what can be seen implementing at the level
of bedrock, but we can make no use of these relations nor gain any insight
into how things stand at the higher-level. So it is only behaviour
perceived as the intentional action and speech that constitutes the level of
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evidence that supports claims for particular attributions; but now we can
see that this sort of behavioural evidence belongs within interpretation, it
is a constitutive part of an interpreter's grounds for particular ascriptions.
It is only with reference to behaviour construed at the level of bedrock
that we can claim that the mind of another is revealed to a fully informed
interpreter on the surface of his practices. Even the Freudian could be
accommodated on this picture of bedrock and the surface of a practice.
Treating the Freudian picture in this way would introduce cases where the
possibility is left open that the analyst who supplies an interpretation, but
not the patient himself, has access to those facts. What we need here is a
picture in which what is "unavailable" to the subject can be brought to
light by the analyst by his finding the right means to describe the patient's
behaviour. The "inaccessible" intentional notions would still belong to
the surface of behaviour, though exactly how they applied to it is
something not known immediately but taking a bit of working out.
To accommodate Freud and Davidson, we see that the notion of the
surface of an agent's practices must be behaviour characterised in a richer
vocabulary of intentional descriptions. The surface must be seen by the
psychoanalytic or the rational interpreter as exhibiting the purposes of
others; it is not viewed by us, except with conscious effort, or determined
resistance, in the thinly described way offered above. The term
"behaviour" is simply ambiguous as between mere physical bodily
movement on the one hand, and intentional action on the other. Of
course, the former coincides with the latter at a time and place, and the
former implements the intentions of agents revealed by the latter. So
bedrock for us is the level of intentional behaviour of agents whose exact
motives have to be worked out in accordance with the principles of
interpretation. At bedrock, we have to treat the things people do, the bits
of their behaviour, as intentional, done for a reason and motivated by the
things they think and the things they want. We may describe people as
performing certain kinds of action, but in any particular case, our right to
that claim, and to the interpreting description under which we see the




What lies open to view on the surface cannot be illuminated in any
way by facts below that surface: below the level of bedrock. The possibilities
of giving genuine explanations are limited, but according to Wittgenstein,
we are none the worse for that. In fact, he never tired of reminding
himself that the need for an explanation in certain cases was
misconceived: "for someone worried by love, an explanatory hypothesis
will not help much".
However, it is difficult to give up the thought that the sub-bedrock facts
are intimately related to what goes on at the level above. As John
McDowell puts it it is hard:
to avoid acquiring a sense of what, as it were, lies down there: a web
of facts about behaviour and 'inner' episodes, describable without
using the notion of meaning. One is likely to be struck by the sheer
contingency of the resemblances between individuals on which, in
this vision, the possibility of meaning seems to depend, and hence
impressed by an apparent precariousness in our making sense of
one another. (McDowell 1982, p348)
While agreeing with McDowell that it is hard not to acquire a
conception of what lies down there, it is hard not to acquire a better
conception than this. It depends where below bedrock one is operating.
From detailed empirical investigation of the cognitive organisation of
language users and perceivers, it is less easy to be struck by the sheer
contingencies. It is only by looking at the level of physics or neuroanatomy
that this phenomenon and the sense of precariousness re-enters. In the
second half of this thesis I shall suggest a few ways in which we can gain
not only a conception of how things stand below bedrock, but also some
knowledge of the connections that must hold between lower and higher
levels to sustain complex intelligent activities like one's mastery of a
natural language. But this must wait.
Returning to Davidson, we confront the following problem:
an event is an action if and only if it can be described in a




But does he himself have anything more to say when faced with a
number of alternative narratives each offering to supply the agent with
different reasons for action, giving more or less penetrating descriptions of
what he is up to? Turning to the agent himself, as the Freudian will know,
may prove of limited value. Davidson notes that:
As observers we often describe the actions of others in ways that
would not occur to them. This does not mean that the concept of
intention has been left behind, however, for happenings cease to be
actions or behaviour only where there is no way of describing them
in terms of intention. (Ibid.)
But this does not help us with our question about which way we
should describe someone in intentional terms. As it turns out Davidson
does have more to say, and as it also turns out, he takes the same course in
narrowing the gap between narrative interpretation and explanation of
behaviour that Freud took. There are no interpretation-independent facts
about the mental, but there are non-intentional facts about the causal
history of someone's behaviour. This is the step that departs so radically
from Wittgenstein, ignoring his advice never to confuse, or conflate, a
conceptual question with a causal one. Wittgenstein's penetrating remarks
about Freud might seem at first sight to carry over to Davidson. But I shall
argue that Davidson does not succeed in intertwining the rational and the
causal explanations to any effect and that what we are offered in the end
are just narrative descriptions (rational explanations) of the mysteriously
regular but detached events in the causal swim. These must take a course




2.7) Rational and Causal Explanation
Both Davidson and Freud would accept that to make sense of someone
we must find application for a range of attributions of thoughts and
reasons for actions, and these interlocking beliefs, desires, intentions and
actions must conform to some sort of rational pattern; for these are the
patterns of the rational mind. (For Freud, the 'rationalising' mind, with
an intended pejorative tone.) Freud will attempt to draw on more
material in describing these patterns; he will seek underlying reasons
which help us to make some sense of the seemingly aberrant behaviour of
others; he will find a kind of intelligibility here, where the Davidsonian
can find none. But in all cases of action, Davidsonians like Freudians will
want to know the very motive on which a subject acted; in Davidson's
terms, we want to know the primary reason for acting. As the Freudian
points out this is not always clear. But nor is it entirely unproblematical
for the Davidsonian. Davidson offers us the case of Oedipus who had a
reason (a good reason) to kill his father, but who does not act on that very
reason when killing Laius on the road to Thebes. One may have a good
reason that would explain the action and yet that reason might not be the
reason the subject did it. So giving plausible explanations in terms of
actual reason is one thing, knowing on what basis the agent actually acted
is another. But what force is there in this thought that there is some
difference here? What factor makes one reason operative rather than
another? The answer Davidson will give is based on causality. Reasons
bring about the behaviour they explain because reasons are rational causes:
So when we offer the fact of the desire and belief in explanation, we
imply not only that the agent had the desire and belief, but they
were efficacious in producing the action the belief and desire
were causal conditions of the action. (Davidson!980, p232)
Yet a desire and belief might be the reason that caused Oedipus's action
without being sufficient, ie. explanatory for the correct interpretation:
Oedipus might be intent on cutting down every man in his path until he
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gets to his father. What Davidson needs to say is that to be the actual
reason that explains a particular action, it has to be the one that causes the
behaviour in the right way. This leads to problems we must consider a
little further.
The narrative character of interpretation plays a crucial role in fixing
the nature of the mental. Someone has a rational mind when there is
sufficient coherence in her activities to sustain a plausible description of
her mental life from the interpreter's standpoint: we introduce the
materials of mind when there are grounds for giving a rational
explanation of the person's behaviour. But what we want to know is
whether it is the right explanation of that person, and where this is a
genuine choice, Davidson will say the deciding factor is causality.
But the causal factor, if it can be made out, will take us beyond the
purely narrative conception of interpretation; some accounts but not
others will chart the causal course of events. This should be seen as a good
thing because the narrative conception threatens a deeply held intuition
about ourselves, namely, that we are the originators of our own meanings
and purposes. Were we not the authors of our own actions, and were the
facts about our minds entirely answerable to the decisions of an
interpreter, or exhausted by the possibilities of interpretation, we would be
left with a picture of the mind in which, like Hamlet, one would be in a
play full of purpose but with no purpose of one's own. Whereas to align
interpretation to the causal facts is to return some of the motive force to
the agent. This is not to deny attributionism, however. Rather, the idea is
that by linking the subjective conditions for thought about the mental to
the physical causes of agents' actions we give a complete account of the
objective reality of minds. The role of the interpreter is ineliminable - to
lose sight of this is to lose the observable foundation for knowledge of
other minds - but what the interpreter picks out is a feature of the agent
himself: a causal feature. We must now find a way to connect the third-
personal methodology with an ontology of inner states.
The obvious place to start is with action. Actions are episodes in an
agent's physical history in which he succeeds in embodying his mind in
his behaviour. But as events in the physical world, they have physical
42
Chapter Two
causes; while as bits of intentional behaviour we think of them as caused
by mental states. To avoid over-determination of these events we must
find a way of tying together the terms drawn from different types of
explanation: the rational and the causal. Davidson supposes we can do this
on occasions by treating the intentional and the physical terms as co¬
extensive: reasons are causes. The physical states which cause behaviour
must, at the same time, be intentional states if descriptions of them are to
enter into rational explanations of behaviour. And it is only when
intentional descriptions of physical states can serve in rational
explanations that the behaviour they are causally responsible for can be
deemed intentional action. Only then can we say that intentional states
cause actions: reasons are rational causes.
Here we have a picture in which, for any behavioural event, it is
describable as an intentional action if and only if there is a reason which is
at the same time its cause. Reasons we may supply might seem to cast
explanatory light but fail because they are not really the causes; while the
causes do not explain unless they are also the reasons. Nevertheless, being
the causes of behaviour does not make them the reasons they are, and
being the reasons they are does not make them causes. An intentional
event causes behaviour (physically described) in virtue of being a physical
event token identical with it. It is as a physical event that it falls under
causal laws. What we need for these causal sequences to subserve rational
explanation is a legitimate way of identifying a reason with a cause. This is
important to the Davidsonian because a reason is efficacious if it is the
cause of action, and explanatory only if it causes in the right way. This idea
marks Davidson's departure from the Wittgensteinian thread teased out
above. Wittgenstein warned against conflating conceptual questions with
causal ones. He would have denied that there was any way of tracing the
real reason for someone's acting as they did back to the way it was caused.
Now in the light of this Wittgensteinian criticism we should do well to
ask whether Davidson is entitled to the idea as he expresses it.
How is Davidson to account for the efficacy of particular mental states?
He tells us that "when events are related as cause and effect, they have
descriptions that instantiate a law" (Davidsonl980, p215). So do
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psychological states ever instantiate laws? The answer is: not under their
psychological descriptions. For Davidson, there are no purely
psychological laws, because psychology is not a closed system of
description. It relies on many physical conditions which could not
themselves come under psychological description. This just leaves open
the possibility of psychophysical laws, but as we shall see Davidson thinks
there are no laws of this sort either because of the irreducible and
normative elements in psychology. The only strict laws are physical laws,
those couched in purely physical vocabulary. So it is only when a pair of
events instantiate the antecedent and consequent of a physical law that
they are related as cause and effect.
In the light of this, how can Davidson equate the efficacy of a reason to
act with that reason's causing some intentional behaviour in the right
way? To succeed here, he would have to select the physical
underpinnings for the belief and desire states that serve as reasons and
then assess them in some way. But how can this be done? How do reasons
direct us towards physical causes? Surely, the only way to identify reasons
with causes is ineluctably holistic: it is a matter of finding it intelligible
(reasonable) to give an event an intentional description that belongs to an
interpretation scheme that has application to all other events in the
agent's behavioural history.
It is hard not to acquire a conception here of different types of
explanation running in parallel: there will be patterns of reasons and
actions rationally connected at one level, and neural and behavioural
events causally connected at the other. But parallel lines do not meet and
it is difficult to see how when two different reason-giving explanations
can be given roughly equal weight in accounting for someone's behaviour
it is supposed to be a causal matter which of them is actually responsible
for the outcome. Instead it is hard to resist the idea that the causal
sequences of physical events would have been just as they always were
anyway, whichever reason was operative, and that it is just a matter of
choice, within principled limits, of what rationally coherent narrative we
provide as an intentional gloss on those events.
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On this conception, the intentionality of a mental state is causally inert,
it merely accompanies the physical facts in an epiphenomenal way.
Reasons cannot cause in virtue of being the intentional states they are,
they can only be applied as descriptions to physical events that cause.
What Davidson needs to say is what it is to be able to describe a cause as a
reason. More precisely, by finding the conditions under which we can
interpret people's behaviour as intentional action we thereby earn the
right to re-describe the causally responsible inner states of them as the
beliefs and desires that provide the rational explanation of the causally
produced behaviour. But of course, as I have said, the conditions for
interpreting an agent in these rational terms depends on the propriety of
attributing to him all the surrounding propositional attitudes that it is
intelligible that he should have these reasons, and this can only be
determined in the light of his behaviour. Once again holism and
rationality show that it is the totality of intentional descriptions of
someone that license the attribution of a single reasonable action. So the
causal feature of the event will not fit with the relevant portion of mental
life in isolation from all others. Any description of causes as reasons
demands many other interlocking reasons subserved by other causes. The
fit is always holistic. What we need to know is when are we entitled to
apply a total scheme of intentional re-description to a physical creature?
The inner physical states of agents causally explain their behaviour
described in physical terms, and beliefs and desires rationally explain their
actions described in intentional terms. But when can we apply one scheme
to another? Not all human beings will turn out to be minded, but where
they do, we want to know why, and this question goes beyond the question
of what is it to have a mind. In effect it is to ask, why are we successful
when we are at describing people's behaviour in rational terms? We have
failed to discover any more tangible way of intertwining the rational and
the causal schemes of explanation, operating at the intentional and
physical levels of description, respectively, than by applying a total
interpretation scheme to a physical creature. So decisions about a person's
reasons for acting will be referred to the total schemes of interpretation.
Within any one scheme there should be a way of resolving competing
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explanations that rationalise the person's behaviour, and where
alternatives persist, the difference marks a boundary and a choice between
interpretation schemes. There can be no overdetermined outcomes in
intentional behaviour as far as the interpreter is concerned. Our
knowledge of people's reasons for action and hence our knowledge of
their minds is a matter of the choices between interpretational schemes.
The extent to which there is a genuine choice between them and we can
chose between them, is the extent to which we can know others' minds.
There is no more to the mental than the fully informed interpreter can
know; so psychological states are constituted in accordance with the a
priori assumptions that guide us in describing them and the conditions
that entitle us to apply our descriptions in actual cases.
For the Davidsonian, the intentional level is somewhat aloof, and
removed from the causal facts. That being so, he is required to regard
psychological explanation as a form of narration. This is what
interpretation of someone's mind, speech and action amounts to: a
superimposition of an intentional network of propositional attitudes,
speech acts and actions on the vast repertoire of a person's behavioural
output. Of course such an intentional re-description must be constructed
within principled limits and be subject to constraints of application. But if
we cannot find grounds in the internal states of the agent for his being a
believer or desirer of this or that, if there are no physical,
neurophysiological or purely behavioural grounds for applying those
terms to him, then we must treat it as only matter of our being able to
describe him intelligibly as a believer and desirer that he has mental states
with propositional contents. The form of our propositional attitude
reporting sentences will be the form of his thought. But the causes of his
behaviour will give no indication of this in themselves.
Is this the best we can hope for in terms of combining a causal thesis
with the psychological explanation of action? Davidson would say 'yes',
and he would add that this conception squares well with our common-
sensical scheme for describing and explaining actions. Just how common-
sensical it is is a question that must await discussion of what is made
available to the interpreter in interpretation, and in his choice between
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schemes. At the moment, however, I want to turn to the question of
whether there is any way of relating the psychological scheme more
closely to the underlying physical conditions, notwithstanding holism.
This is to raise the issue of reductionism. Holism and rationality bind
the intentional scheme of the ordinary interpreter that gives us, it is
claimed, our only understanding of the mind. However, the holism of the
mental is not sufficient by itself to establish the irreducibility of
psychology to physics. For physical concepts no less than psychological
ones can be defined by their place in a holistic scheme of explanation.
When we apply a physical predicate, as Davidson puts it, "each case tests a
theory and depends on one" (Davidsonl980, p221). There is holism in the
physical realm too. But although holism of the mental does not amount
to an irreducibility claim, it is a step in the chain of reasoning that takes us
there. As Davidson himself say, "Clearly this holism of the mental realm
is a clue both to the autonomy and to the anomalous character of the
mental." (Davidsonl980 p217) I shall now follow up his lead.
2.8) The Irreducibility of the Mental
Davidson's claim for the irreducibility of the intentional level rests
upon a second and more subtle application of the principle of rationality.
Rationality enters this time to guide the continuous adjustments and
revisions to an interpretation as more information comes to light. It
controls each stage of this revising process as a normative standard,
pulling the patterns of attributed attitudes towards the ideal of rationality;
leading the interpreter to alter his future decisions and to re-evaluate
those he made in the past.
Despite the delicacy of considerations concerning this appeal to
rationality, the argument which trades on them is quite straightforward.
The mental concepts constitutive of the intentional level are governed by
a principle of rationality. If no similar condition governs the deployment
of physical concepts, then conceptual incorporation, on which the
nomological reduction to the physical level of description depends, will be
frustrated. Let us reconsider the appeal to rationality.
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Rationality is constitutive of the range of application of mental
concepts, like belief, desire, intention and action. It requires that we must
give reasons for people's beliefs and actions which explain the presence of
those beliefs and the performance of those actions. Rationality is an a
priori principle of psychology; together with other a priori principles of
interpretation, it delineates the permissible structure of the psychological
realm. Thus the psychological realm is at least partly constituted by a priori
principles. But does this show that psychology is immune to the claims
advanced by empirical science? Not as it stands. The mere a priori status of
principles in psychology does not guarantee the irreducibility of the
mental. For a number of a priori principles govern the application of
physical concepts, too; as, for example, in the case of the concept of length
where judgements of the form 'x is longer than y' must respect the
transitivity of that relation. If we are going to argue for the irreducibility of
the mental to the physical we need to know more about the differences in
content between a priori claims in psychology and a priori claims in
physics. Davidson regards the difference as no less great than that between
philosophy and science; he concludes that the study of the mind is the
province of the former and not the latter. According to Davidson, we must
formulate our criteria of the mental in the vocabulary of the propositional
attitudes and when we do this we shall see that we must treat "Psychology
as Philosophy". This conclusion is Davidson's resting place; it serves to
constitute a defence of bedrock. What we need to know is how Davidson
reaches that conclusion.
The principles of interpretation which govern the psychological realm
are neither empirical generalisations, nor purely logical laws. They are a
priori principles which relate items within the psychological realm to one
another and to the empirical conditions of a subject's behavioural and
physical circumstances. If they operated within the psychological realm
exclusively, they would provide no behavioural grounds for the
attribution of mental notions. They would provide necessary and
sufficient conditions on rationality defined over sets of beliefs and desire
alone. And yet the strong intuition is that we must have some
behavioural expectations of creatures with particular beliefs, since not just
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any sort of behaving system can be accredited a range of complex thoughts.
The behavioural and physical conditions of a creature must place
constraints on how we interpret it (and the range of interpretations it can
be given)., and it will turn out that these conditions have to be specified in
the interpretive scheme itself. So the constitutive principles need to give
empirical application to intentional notions in such a way as to respect the
differences between subjects' physical and behaviour circumstances.
Clearly, this can be achieved without infringing their a prioricity, but there
is more than one way do this. One route is that taken by the logical
behaviourist who seeks to provide analytic definitions of psychological
notions in terms of complex empirical conditions on behaving subjects.
This route ensures an empirical application for mental terms by means of
principles that require no empirical support themselves, but it also treats
the sought after empirical conditions on behaviour as exhausting the
content of mental terms. This is essentially a reductionist thesis. If this was
the only way for a set of a priori principles to give the concepts they
govern an empirical application, we would be forced towards
reductionism. However, there is no strict requirement that a priori
principles should lack empirical content themselves, and that they should
be analytic rather than synthetic. The principle of rationality might apply
to physical creatures only if they meet some empirical condition
discovered by investigation. This whole issue of analytic versus synthetic
turns on whether these constitutive principles do treat psychological
concepts as exhausted by some complex empirical condition for their
application, as in the dispositional analysis of fragility; or whether they
merely make ineliminable reference to the empirical conditions of their
application, as in Kant's definitions of geometrical (and arithmetical)
terms. If the principles of interpretation are analytic they will give us
necessary and sufficient conditions for ascribing psychological states to
others, and hence something akin to logical behaviourism; whereas if the
principles are synthetic they will merely provide necessary empirical
conditions for psychological ascription, and a looser connection of
supervenience between the mental and the behavioural (or physical). Let
us now examine these issues.
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In characterising our understanding of mental terms, Davidson wants
to insist on an observability assumption:
There are conceptual ties between the attitudes and
behaviour which are sufficient, given enough information
about actual and potential behaviour, to allow correct inference
to the attitudes. (1982, p476)
Does observability entail behaviourism? This is far from clear. To begin
with, we cannot deduce someone's state of mind from a single
behavioural episode in isolation. The holism of the mental dictates that a
belief will show up in behaviour only as mediated by further beliefs,
desires, and other attitudes. To say that any piece of behaviour reveals a
belief, or is an action, is to say something whose truth and content rests
upon the existence of a structure of other beliefs and desires, themselves at
the service of other projects. They will interact with other beliefs, with
desires, and with intentional states of all kinds to give reasons for what
someone thinks and how he acts. So behaviour can exemplify particular
states of mind only given certain assumptions about other states of mind,
present and evident elsewhere. Correlatively, the same piece of behaviour
can manifest different and sometimes contradictory attitudes so long as we
make corresponding adjustments to the background reasons. All of which
shows that a very complex pattern of intentional attributions attends the
ascription of a single thought. And given that each item in this hugely
elaborate and interlocking system of propositional attitudes and actions
must show up somewhere in behaviour, this means that "a very complex
pattern of behaviour must be observed to justify the attribution of a single
thought" and that "unless there is actually such a complex pattern of
behaviour, there is no thought." (1982, p476). So the best we can hope for is
a holistic fit between a total interpretation scheme and a creature with a
considerably complex repertoire of behaviours, which would seem to
threaten logical behaviourism and analyticity.
However, holism of this sort only rules out a dispositional analysis of
individual mental states, and so, in effect only rules out the most
straightforward type of behaviourist reduction; it does not by itself
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guarantee psychological irreducibility. Could we not try to work out a
more sophisticated scheme of reduction, for instance, functionalism?
Davidson resists this suggestion but his reasons are hard to find. At
one point he suggests that as interpreters we could not observe the whole
complex pattern of a person's behaviour, so instead we must look for
"good reason to believe there is such a complex pattern of behaviour."
(Ibid). But what would "good reason" amount to here? One thing it isn't
is a prediction based on the physical facts to further physical facts about the
way someone will behave. Whatever it is, it must at least draw upon an
implicit conception of how someone must act so as to satisfy the
constraints we put on the interpretation scheme that we enter at that
point of attribution. Having good reason to suppose someone capable of a
range of intentional behaviours incorporates thinking of them as rational:
To have a single propositional attitude is to have a largely
correct logic, in the sense of having a pattern of beliefs that
logically cohere. This is one reason why to have propositional
attitudes is to be a rational creature. (Davidson 1982, p475-6)
Rationality is used initially to provide the ties for the holistic
connections that pervade and make for someone's mental life. But
Davidson argues for the irreducibility of the mental to (physical)
behaviour by a second and more subtle application of the concept of
rationality. His argument is that we can distinguish between the synthetic
a priori principles that govern the physical realm and those that govern
the mental, because unlike their physical cousins, the synthetic a priori
principles of psychology are not laws. When the interpreter speaks of
having "good reason" to attribute some mental state to a creature, his
reason cannot be formulated explicitly as a statement of "what evidence is
necessary or sufficient to determine the presence of a particular thought."
This involves Davidson's claim that "the way desire and belief work to
cause the action [they explain] must meet further, and unspecified,
conditions." Knowing these further conditions would enable us to predict
someone's behaviour and thought. But Davidson thinks these further
conditions cannot be specified and that prediction is always and in
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principle beyond us. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, we cannot
isolate the physical cause that is the precise reason for action. Secondly,
there are no psychological laws. And thirdly, there are no psychophysical
laws. And if we cannot make lawful predictions of physical consequences
from a psychological description of events, then we cannot fit psychology
into the nomological net of physical theory. The intentional level
remains irreducible.
Let us consider the three reasons and their inter-relations in this
argument. Firstly, we have Davidson's claim that there is no physical-
level means of expressing which reasons cause an action. This seems to be
because reasons are dictated at the rationally explanatory level. This is a
level at which one can know the reasons for action while knowing very
little about the underlying causes of the behaviour. To find the reasons for
someone's action is to find the cause: causes are the physical concomitants
of the beliefs and desires that serve as reasons. But this is not yet to show
that there is no way to isolate rational causes at the lower level; it is
merely to claim that we can pick out the relevant causes without a
scientific investigation of all the background conditions that could have
caused change:
Explanation by reasons avoids coping with the complexity of
causal factors by singling out one, something it is able to do by
omitting to provide, within the theory, a clear test of when the
antecedent conditions hold. (Davidsonl980, p233)
Although the singling out is done in intentional terms could we not
find some basis for a causal prediction from the physical cause; or a
prediction to it from other causal factors? It depends on what else must be
brought into the picture. If the intentionally described antecedents line-up
with neural or neurophysiological states of the system, then perhaps we
can. But what are the causal antecedents to action? Again we begin from
the intentional standpoint. When, in interpretation, we identify an action
with a physical or behavioural event we must make sure that the causal
history and circumstances of that event include every physical event or
state identical with any of the psychological states invoked in the rational
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explanation of that action, (see Davidsonl980 p254) But any intentional
state mentioned in that explanation owes its identity to its place in a
network of other propositional attitudes to which it is rationally tied. So
perhaps the best we can say is that the whole of the agent's psychology,
including that reason which is the cause of the action in question,
describes events in the agent, characterisable in physical terms, that
include the physical cause of his physical movements: a part of the total
mental life is identical with a part of the physical whole. But we have no
way of carving up these parts and wholes across the levels to make closer
and more local links between the mental and physical. A part of the
whole of a creature's mental life is at the same time a physical part of the
creature that causes this event in his physical history. (This is essentially
Jennifer Hornsby's conclusion in Hornsby 1980 and 1985). But can this
satisfy Davidson? What he is left with is the thesis that a whole system
behaving in these diverse ways is describable in terms of particular
thoughts and reasons for action, where we can find no closer links
between the physical causes and the reasons for particular actions.
However, to say that there are always inner causes for the behaviour of a
person who can be ascribed some explanatory reasons is too weak to
ensure that such reasons are the explanatory reasons for that behaviour.
According to Davidson, they count as the agent's reasons for performing
the action only if they cause it in the right way :
The point is not just any causal connection between the
rationalising attitudes and a wanted effect suffices to guarantee
that producing the wanted effect was intentional. (Davidsonl980
p78)
To explain an action in the right way the beliefs and desires must be
token-identical with physical states that must cause it in the right way:
What I despair of spelling out is the way in which attitudes
must cause actions if they are to rationalise the action (Ibid., p79)
A physical description of the causal process would be insufficient if it
left out the notion of a good reason for so acting, and an intentional level
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description conforming to this explanatory ideal merely returns us to the
notions whose role we set out to fix more precisely. How are the
intentional specified reasons to direct our sight to the relevant causal
process within the agent when it is causality that determines the
explanatorily operative reasons? Davidson seems to have drawn a blank.
And yet this was the place where we might have hoped for closer links
between the mental and the physical domains, and some guarantee of the
substantive nature of rational explanation. Davidson can only hint that:
In the analysis of action, mention of causality takes up some of
the slack between analysis and science (Ibid., p80)
At best, it is rather convenient for the a priori theorist that the causal
factors are so elusive; at worse to advert to causality is just wishful
thinking.
It is largely because we cannot see how to complete the
statement of the causal conditions of intentional action that we
cannot tell whether, if we got them right, the result would be a
piece of analysis or an empirical law for predicting behaviour
(Ibid. p80)
For it to be possible to complete these conditions we must be able to
enumerate the states that make up the subject's mental life at some time,
listing everything in that panoply of feelings, urges, thoughts, and fears
the person has. But this is not possible either. Here, we have the second
reason for being unable to specify the further conditions: the absence of
psychological laws.
What is needed in the case of action, if we are to predict on the
basis of desires and beliefs, is a quantitative calculus that brings
all relevant beliefs and desires into the picture. There is no hope
of refining the simple pattern of explanation on the basis of
reasons into such a calculus. (Davidsonl980, p233-4)
There is no way to make the psychological realm more deterministic
and more like the physical realm. There are no strict psychological laws on
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the basis of which we could make the reliable predictions; laws, that is,
couched in terms of psychological vocabulary alone. One reason for this is
because the psychological realm, unlike the physical realm is not a closed
system.
There couldn't be a closed system of the mental, because of the
endless ways in which the mental interacts with the physical.
(Davidson, 1985 - Vermazen and Hintikka p249)
The empirical generalisations we would need to predict someone's
mental life with any accuracy would have to include conditions which
could not themselves be described as mental. These would include the
environmental conditions of perception, and the thinker's behavioural
effect on his environment. But this is ruled out by our third reason: there
are no psychophysical laws. The psychological concepts employed in the
formulation of such laws must answer to one set of standards and the
physical concepts to another and wholly different set of standards. The
important difference in the standards for applying mental concepts is not
that the attitude or action ascribed belongs to a holistic pattern, the same
holds for the physical concepts; the difference lies in the nature of the
conditions placed on how the pattern is to be elaborated from the place at
which we first enter it.
Each interpretation and attribution of attitude is a move within
a holistic theory, a theory necessarily governed by concern for
consistency and general coherence with the truth, and it is this
that sets these theories forever apart from those that describe
mindless objects, or describe objects as mindless. (Davidsonl984,
pi54)
In short, the holistic structure of the mental is a normative structure.
The principles of interpretation give us a theory of mind and these
constitutive principles have normative force in the mental realm, telling
us what someone who is attributed certain propositional attitudes should
rationally think, and what someone who thinks like that ought rationally
to do and say. This is the normative structure of reason itself.
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The difference between psychology and physics rests on the idea that
the norm of rationality is constitutive of the range of belief, desire,
intention and action, and is an ideal to which revisions in the patternings
of these concepts must be continuously adjusted.
It is this normative ideal of rationality which sharply separates
psychology and the physical sciences, as John McDowell usefully makes
clear:
To recognise the ideal status of the constitutive concept is to
appreciate that the concepts of the propositional attitudes have
their proper home in explanations of a special sort: explanations
in which things are made intelligible by being revealed to be, or
to approximate to being, as they rationally ought to be. This is to
be contrasted with a style of explanation in which one makes
things intelligible by representing their coming into being as a
particular instance of how things generally tend to happen.
(McDowell 1985 p389)
The point to grasp about explanations in accordance with an ideal is
that where people are imperfect, the explanatory force of the ideal is in
pulling developing explanations into conformity with this standard. The
rational explanations of behaviour will be peculiar to an individual; they
will remain open-ended, partial and post-hoc interpretations. Any
empirical generalisation we try to coin as a result of success in interpreting
what an individual says or does,
merely states part of what we mean, in this context, by saying
an action is rational. The only empirical generalisation on
which the explanation rests is given when we describe [that
person's] beliefs and desires. (Davidsonl980, p267)
Davidson frames the non-predictive, responsive posture of the
interpreter like this:
....when we use the concepts of belief, desire, and the rest, we
must stand prepared, as the evidence accumulates, to adjust our
theory in the light of considerations of overall cogency: the
constitutive ideal of rationality partly controls each phase in the
56
Chapter Two
evolution of what must be an evolving theory. (Davidsonl980,
p223)
He calls this evolving process of interpretation "opportunistic
tampering". This lays important stress on the ex post facto element in the
interpreter's decisions as to what thoughts or feelings to attribute to a
person. The interpreter will look for revisions in the light of what best
explains the subject's behaviour as more of it becomes known. This
epistemological holism requires the interpreter to adjust each act of
interpretation to all others.
There is a useful contrast here between Davidson and attributionists
like Dennett who stress the predictive aspect of propositional attitude
psychology. For Dennett, intentional system theory is a rationality-based
intentional psychology with predictive laws rather like those of rational
decision theory. But he argues that such a theory describes an ideal that is
seldom (never) met. It serves as an heuristic for predicting behaviour in
terms of the beliefs and desires attributed, but it cannot explain because
our psychology is just not like that. So we do not have these well-
regulated beliefs and desires. This distinguishes Dennett's instrumentalist
stance on attributionism from Davidson's realist stance. Both believe that
the concept of belief is just the concept of an attribution made to someone
on the basis of his behaviour and in accordance with a priori standards. It
is in the attributing (or attributability) of mental states that they come into
being. (Contrast this highly metaphysical picture of the coming into being
of a mental state, courtesy of interpretation, with, in McDowell's
terminology, their coming into being as a matter of how things tend to
happen.)
People have mental states like belief and desire, if rationality, or the a
priori conditions require it. Dennett believes that in the world of human
experience, the ideal rationality conditions are not met and so people do
not have beliefs and desires. This is the source of his instrumentalism.
Davidson, on the other hand, thinks rationality does apply to human
beings and so people do have beliefs and desires. This amounts to
Davidson's realism about the attitudes. Both Davidson and Dennett
would agree that human beings are not ideally rational. So where do their
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differences lie? The answer is in their different understanding of the
concept of rationality. Davidson thinks the conditions of rationality are
fluid and flexible, in fact, much less rigid than Dennett's rational decision
metric. For Dennett the conditions are so stringent they have no
application to us. But with more flexible conditions, it is open to Davidson
to see the mental notions which rationality governs as having serious
application to us. The price Davidson pays for this flexible, attributionist
realism is the indeterminacy of the mental, which I shall turn to in the
next section.
Meanwhile, the irreducibility of the mental comes to this. There can be
no nomological reduction because this would require the conceptual
incorporation of psychological concepts within physical theory which is
impossible if physical theory cannot accommodate the normative element
of rationality. The fluid and normative notion of rationality has no echo
in physical theory.
If one were convinced by these conclusions but committed to the
naturalist project, one might think that the only hope for science would be
to embrace Eliminativism of the Mental; the sort of position adopted by
Stich and the Churchlands. It is a position which admits the irreducibility
in principle but cheerfully gives up the vocabulary of the mental
altogether. But this just isn't possible for us, as Davidson points out,
We cannot conceive a language without psychological terms
or expressions - there would be no way to translate it into our
own language. Of course there could be a part or fragment of the
language that lacked psychological expressions, provided there
was a (complete) language in which to incorporate or explain
the fragment. (Davidsonl980, p244)
So if one believes that there could be a science of the mental, one has to
resist both eliminativism and the Davidsonian position which serves as
its premiss. I shall continue to lay out the Davidsonian position, for it is
the one to repudiate if one holds out hope for a Cognitive Science with
room for mental notions. What follows in the next stages of exposition
reveals the shortcomings of the Davidsonian position. They are
consequences that its advocates have never seen as a reductio of the
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position, and maybe that would be to put things too strongly. But I suspect




Indeterminacy and The Mental
3.1 Introduction
As we have seen, according to Davidson, our interpretative
descriptions of people's mental lives are not based on psychological laws
governing their mental scheme, nor on psychophysical laws relating their
psychological states to physical behaviour and the environment. Instead
intentional descriptions are constructed, and revised, in accordance with
certain norms of interpretation. These include the a priori principles of
rationality, consistency and coherence governing the mental, together
with other a priori principles linking mental descriptions to behaviour. A
further set of principles will have to be given with specific application to
linguistic interpretation.
These principles of interpretation leave room for a good deal of slack in
giving mental characterisations. According to Davidson, there is no way to
formulate explicitly the types of behavioural evidence necessary or
sufficient for attributing a particular thought, depending as it does for its
identity on so much else. Part of the trouble is that there is "no fixed list of
beliefs on which any particular thought depends" (Davidson 1982, p475).
But what is the force of these claims? Is it just a fact about human beings as
interpreters that they cannot elaborate the whole panoply of thoughts and
beliefs that identify a particular thought? Could it be that there are facts of
the matter about the interpretability of an agent which fix the content of
his thought and action, making it the case that he has one rather than
another set of beliefs? Such a conception of facts about interpretability
would be strictly compatible with realism about attitude attribution and
would undermine any quick route to the thesis of indeterminacy of the
mental from the paucity of evidence available to the ordinary interpreter.
This is the correct line for a realist like Davidson to take, so we must look
harder for his justification of the indeterminacy claims. They must be
claims about indeterminacy in principle.
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3.2 Irreducibility to Indeterminacy
Let me just set aside another possible misunderstanding. There are
places in Davidson's writings where he seems to say that because there is
no single standard of rationality, and hence no unique way to capture
someone's frame of mind, this makes room for minds which are not
reducible to a complex of well-behaved physical facts. However, I think it
would be hopeless to argue that the mental occupies the gaps left open by
the fact that we can give no very precise behavioural specifications for
application of the terms for mental description. This would leave us open
to the charge that the terms picked out a loose set of behavioural
equivalences. This is not Davidson's intention. Instead he carves out the
autonomous realm of psychology and then points to an indeterminacy
there. We have to have a prior understanding of the mental terms before
we discover that their application to particular cases is indeterminate.
Some confirmation for this direction of argument is given in
Davidson:
...concepts like those of meaning and belief are, in a fundamental
way, not reducible to physical, neurological, or even behaviouristic
concepts. This irreducibility is not due, however, to the
indeterminacy of meaning or translation....It is rather the methods
we must invoke in constructing theories of belief and meaning that
ensures the irreducibility of the concepts essential to those theories.
(Davidsonl984, pl54)
So I have chosen to present the argument in the order that Davidson
acknowledges:
I did not argue from the indeterminism of psychological laws
to the irreducibility of psychology, but from the irreducibility to
an indeterminism in addition to the indeterminism of physics.
(Vermazen & Hintikka, p248)
But what is the argument from irreducibility to indeterminism of the
mental? The key lies in the fact that the methods for constructing theories
of belief and meaning are all we have to go on in fixing the contents of
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someone's attitudes and utterances (autonomy); and these methods will
not prove sufficient to render interpretation determinate up to the choice
of a unique scheme of assignments (indeterminacy).
We have already found support for the first step of the argument, so
we have to discover a way to get from that step to the claim for
indeterminacy. Let us look for this connection.
Firstly, there are no reliable predictions to be made about the mental.
Mental life depends quite extensively on non-mental conditions, so there
can be no purely psychological laws. Moreover, there is no hope of taking
these other factors into account for there are no psychophysical laws. And
so,
we have the Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental: there
are no strict laws at all on the basis of which we can predict and
explain mental phenomena (Davidsonl980, p224)
Anomalism does not straightforwardly entail radical indeterminacy.
For we should not be tempted to conclude that in the absence of
predictions from physical to mental conditions that there are no
worthwhile connections between the intentional and the physical levels.
Even in the absence of laws, there is still the method of interpretation to
provide connections - by means of a priori principles - between the mental
and the physical. However, in the absence of laws, the principles for
imposing interpretations on suitable stretches of behaviour provide the
only way of effecting the transition between the levels. What we need to
know is how determinate interpretation can be. For an ideally situated and
informed interpreter will know all there is to know about another
person's mind. And it matters none if few of us can ever be in such a
position, the point is one about interpretability.
But remember that interpretability must still be defined in terms of
what could be available in human judgement. It must not transcend the
point of view of a potential subject of experience, but merely extend it. So
the claim now is that everything that is necessary for making the
transitions from one level to another - everything necessary for picking
out the facts about minds and meanings - is made available to the
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interpreter on the basis of observing the behaviour of another. This is the
claim needed to defend the a prioristic approach to mental and
meaningful matters that provides the first step in the argument from
autonomy to indeterminacy. The claim will be that it is in making sense of
others that we give intentional patterns to their behaviour, and that all we
need to know about either minds or meanings is available, in principle, in
those patterns as imposed on people's behaviour. So in the idealised case,
it is the interpreter who effects the transitions from the lower to the
higher level, by bringing the primitive data under the principles of
interpretation. This is a conscious application of high level intentional
notions to the bare physical facts.
I shall go on to dispute this claim with particular focus on the case of
linguistic comprehension, insisting that it is not the speaker as interpreter
who effects these transitions but information processing devices in
speakers and hearers that accomplish it. In listening to speech in a
language we know, there is a transition from the physical sound to the
sentence understood. This process describes the speech chain from sound
to meaning. The information we receive is a continuous sound signal and
from that we must recover the syntactic structure of a sentence and, partly
on that basis, the meaning it conveys. These transitions are conducted by
special purpose, linguistic processes that take us from one body of
information to another, extracting at each stage, the crucial information
about phonemes, morphemes, syntactic structures, by chunking, ordering
and reducing the information passed up as the output of the level below
before handing on a product for further processing at the level above.
High level principles guide the extractions and relations between the
levels constrain the nature of information represented at each level. Not
everything on which this information process depends is available to the
rational interpreter or observable in a speaker's behaviour; nor can the
information processing be given a purely physical explanation. The
interpreter would have say that the process of linguistic comprehension
could be brought to light by rational reconstruction. But it will be a bone of
contention, in what follows, whether everything that we need to describe
is made available by an purely a priori investigation that neglects
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empirical research. I shall argue that no such pure inquiry can account for
our mastery of a language and that we need a more substantive account of
the empirical conditions that underlie the understanding and use of a
language than the attributionist can provide. Speakers are sensitive to the
essential linguistic features that in part define the particular language they
speak, but possession of this information is neither a matter of a speaker's
reasons for acting nor the physical causes he is subject to. There is a need
here to postulate content-bearing states whose contents are not available
for conscious reflection to the subject of experience. I shall suggest that
these states have a bearing of what a speaker knows. This will mean a re¬
setting of the boundaries between the conceptual and the empirical
domains, making scientific explanation in the cognitive sciences relevant
to the questions posed by the philosopher. But I anticipate.
Returning to rational interpretation, we are faced with the following
situation. The determinate physical world is captured in the nomological
net of physical theory. The anomalous mental realm cannot be so captured
because there is no reduction (no set of concepts in physical theory) which
can preserve the constitutive ideal of rationality that governs the domain
of the mental. Therefore physical conditions do not determine the
intentional cast of someone's mind:
Even if someone knew the entire physical history of the
world, and every mental event were [token-] identical with a
physical, it would not follow that he could predict or explain a
single mental event (so described, of course). (Davidsonl980,
p224)
The epistemic limits of interpreters are irrelevant here. No set of
physical facts can uniquely fix the list of beliefs on which the correctness of
any attribution depends. So the question is whether the normative
principles of rational interpretation which govern our descriptions of
other minds can do this. Do they themselves fully determine the
character of someone's mind?
Davidson's answer is that they do not determine a unique
interpretative scheme. It is wholly consistent that a given set of physical
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facts, together with the principles that guide interpretation should provide
more than one correct mental description of an individual. And given
that this is all there is to go on, there can be no further fact of the matter to
chose between equally adequate rival schemes. The mental is introduced
as a level of description of certain physical events, those descriptions being
licensed by the principles of interpretation. There is nothing else to draw
upon when considering the mental facts.
I shall consider how these alternative schemes arise presently, but first,
a few words about the consequences of this outcome.
Mental states are forged from behaviour by the principles of
interpretation: mental life is that complex pattern of attitudes and actions
by which the interpreter organises a person's behaviour and physical
circumstances in intentional terms. Therefore a creature enjoys mental
life just in case the categories of its intentional organisation are those of an
ideal interpreter's scheme of explanation. There can be no gap between the
best interpretation of an individual's total verbal and non-verbal
behaviour and the facts about his mental life.
The obvious corollary of this is that the best that can be done by way of
refining an interpretation is the best we can expect by way of degree of
discrimination within mental life. Any indeterminacy in interpretation
will be indeterminacy in the mental realm.
Just as in the case of holism, we can transfer properties of
interpretation to what is interpreted. This is legitimate, by the
attributionist's lights, since there is no gap between them. According to the
attributionist, it is wrong to conceive interpretation as a good method for
getting at the facts of mental life. It is not an epistemological thesis but a
constitutive one. Its principles do not answer to the reality of the mental
realm, they constitute it. These constitutive principles tell us what minds
are. So essential properties of interpretation will make for essential
properties of minds.
A special problem now confronts this picture: what are the essential
features of interpretation? Earlier we drew a distinction between the
conditions under which particular interpreters operate and interpretability
in general. Since the essential features of the mind answer to
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interpretability, we must beware of drawing general conclusions on the
basis of the facts about particular interpretations. Facts about
interpretability must be determined by reflection on the principles of
interpretation theory: an explicit and idealised account of what the fully
informed interpreter knows. But now a second danger confronts us. Not
every aspect of the theory of interpretation will be an aspect of the
interpreted mind. We must somehow distinguish between the aspects of
an interpretation that determine facts of the matter and those which are
merely artefacts of the theory that does the interpreting. For example we
may be able to provide a theory of interpretation in English for the total
life and conduct of a monolingual Frenchman. Nobody would want to say
that our subject really thought in English just because the interpreter was
an Englishman. This is a trivial example, but more testing cases will
emerge when we turn to the linguistic aspect of interpreting a subject.
Should every aspect of the formalisation of linguistic theory be seen as
displaying a property of the language under study? Davidson thinks not,
but as we shall see, the distinction between essential and arbitrary
properties of interpretation theory will be a very difficult distinction to
draw.
Part of the problem here is that there is just no clear separation
between theory and evidence for the interpreter. The evidence for an
attribution must itself be interpreted and so its description becomes part of
the constitutive claim that the agent has particular attitudes. The
interpreter cannot but transform the merely primitive data of an agent's
bodily movements into identifications of behaviour as intentional, even
though he cannot fix their precise character until he has made many more
intentional identifications. Either his total interpretations work out, or
they don't, but he can tell us no more about this. Furthermore, he believes
that no one else can either.
This is the least satisfactory part of the attributionist's project of
interpretation. For we can offer no non-interpretative reason why
interpretations work where and when they do. Officially, there is nothing
in the agent for a correct theory to latch on to, or to be keeping faith with.
The conditions for correctness are all to be found within the
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interpretational scheme. There are no facts interpretation is "tracking'.
With these worries in mind, let us return to the claims of indeterminacy.
Why should we accept these conclusions? Why not suppose this to be a
case of the underdetermination of theory by data? The Davidsonian
response to this challenge should be to produce an a priori argument in
the spirit of attributionism about the limit of intelligibility of mental
notions and their applications to behavioural cases. In this way the
indeterminacy claim would be a consequence of reflections on the nature
of fit between intentional notions and all possible evidence for them. I
find no such explicit argument in Davidson but I think we can help him
to one. It would go as follows.
The physical and behavioural circumstances of an agent do not
uniquely determine his intentional patterns of attitudes and actions.
Nevertheless, psychological descriptions of attitudes and actions
supervene on the physical and behavioural circumstances of the agent.
Supervenience in this context is the claim that there can be no mental
difference without a physical difference; so any differences between
individuals in their mental states demands that there be some difference
in their physical conditions. (The same point holds for differences in the
mental make-up of an individual over time.) Now consider the case of
creatures whose physical histories can bear more than one description in
terms of an interpretive scheme, so that events in their lives can be
described as the performing of particular intentional actions relative to
one interpretive scheme, and the performing of other intentional actions
relative to another scheme. If it is a fact about their mental lives that they
can be described by one interpretative scheme or the other, and by
supervenience, there can be no psychological difference without a physical
difference, then there can be no difference between these competing
interpretative schemes. Neither can claim to present the mental life of an
agent more accurately than the other. Either will do equally well at
capturing what is there to be described. This is what indeterminacy
amounts to.
This conclusion might seem to rest on too behaviouristic a reading of
Davidson: if two creatures share all the same behavioural dispositions,
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they will enjoy the very same mental life. It might be objected that this
Behaviourist Principle is not the correct interpretation of supervenience
since the supervenience here might not be local supervenience; that is, the
behavioural might not exhaust the physical. The physical differences that
could distinguish between two creature's minds might include their
relations to objects in their environments. But now the claim would have
to be that these external facts which causally impinge on the creature's
sense organs give them different thoughts about different objects and
hence lead us to give different interpretations of their thinking. However,
Davidson supposes that the degree of discrimination in someone's
thinking depends on the possibilities of discrimination which that
person's language admits of. So there must be some way to distinguish
between the words on one creature's lips referring to one object, and the
same words on the other creature's lips referring to a different object. But,
as we shall soon see, Davidson advocates an instrumentalist thesis about
reference, supposing it to be a theoretical relation without empirical
content. So where singular reference drops out of the picture the chance of
making such fine discrimination in thought has gone. There will be no
change in a subject's patterns of action or assent to sentences when one
objective referent is substituted for another. So the relations of thought or
reference to perceptual objects or referents in the subject's environment
cannot be the relevant physical differences with which to differentiate
between rival interpretations. ( But note that Davidson is now prepared to
endorse the points made by Tyler Burge about the dependence of mental
content on facts about the thinker's physical or social environment. If he
still holds to his instrumentalism about reference, then this marks a place
where I am unable to render his position consistent. See Davidson, 1987
and Burge 1982, 1987) The upshot of all this is that if interpretation is
indeterminate then so, to that extent, is mental life.
I have shown how one can argue from the indeterminacy of
interpretation to the indeterminacy of mental life. Now I shall go on to say
why there is apt to be indeterminacy in interpretation. Let us consider this.
There are two places to look for an indeterminacy in interpretation:
one is between schemes and the other is within a single scheme of
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interpretation. The first is an issue about the correct attribution of a set of
propositional attitudes, the second is an issue about the possession of
concepts.
Alternative, competing schemes of interpretation that are found
equally adequate by all standards of interpretation and all the available
evidence will make different attributions of attitudes to a single subject.
Although, as we have seen, indeterminacy of this sort may blur the
difference between these sets of propositional attitudes. So in terms of
psychological reality of mental life, these schemes will be two different
ways to specify the same intentional facts.
But there is also indeterminacy within any interpretation scheme itself.
This follows from general facts about interpretation together with
Davidson's thesis of the inextricability of belief and meaning: "In
attributing beliefs we can make very fine distinctions, as fine as our
language provides." (Davidsonl980, p238) But if we adhere to the
inscrutability of reference, then attributions of meaning, and hence
thought, will be much less fine-grained than we took them to be. This sort
of indeterminacy blurs distinctions within the domain of conceptual
thinking. Concepts as constituents of the thoughts expressed by whole
sentences become theoretical entities without empirical underpinnings.
The argument for this is rather involved, but I shall anticipate my
discussion of it by noting the fate of the words we often use to express
concepts; a use which provides one way of displaying our possession of
those concepts:
I suggest that words, meanings of words, reference and
satisfaction are posits we need to implement a theory of truth.
They serve this purpose without needing independent
confirmation or empirical basis (Davidsonl984, p223)
Now in so far as the conceptual articulation of a thought depends on
the semantic roles of constituents of the sentence that expresses that
thought, concepts - like words - will prove theoretically useful but will
correspond to no empirical condition of the thinker. This latter way of
expressing indeterminacy is extremely pernicious in Davidson's hands,
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because where there is no further refinement in our thought, and where
there is no scheme-content distinction (as Davidson maintains there
cannot be), there can be no gap between the world and our categories of
thought. Hence, indeterminacy reigns in the physical world too. This
brand of empiricism is very thin indeed.
Leaving this vast topic aside I shall now take the two degrees of
indeterminacy in turn. The first deals with different attributions of action,
belief and desire. The second depends on the indeterminacy of linguistic
interpretation and will involve us in issues we shall meet when
discussing the attributionist's handling of the theory of meaning.
3.3) Indeterminacy Between Interpretational Schemes
Indeterminacy between schemes leads us at first to think that within
any such scheme a good deal of the interpreted subject's mental life is
fixed. Relative to that one scheme of attributions we can say precisely what
our subject is thinking, but the choice between schemes remains, within
limits, somewhat arbitrary. This thought is sponsored by the model of
measurement in the physical sciences. Within any arbitrary scheme of
measurement a very tight set of connections holds. Thus the scale of
farenheit has very exacting standards, just as the scale of centigrade does.
But there is just no fact of the matter in the mean kinetic energy of
molecules to decide between the farenheit or the centigrade scales of
measurement: either is correct. Choice does not matter.
This is the sort of indeterminacy Davidson envisages between rival
schemes of interpretation:
Some choices among alternative systems of interpretation have
no empirical significance; there choices are like the choice
between metres and miles to measure distance ( Davidson, 1985
p252)
Now there cannot be complete freedom in the kinds of interpretation
schemes we apply to a person. There will be limits as to what sort of
behaviour counts as one's performing an action of a certain type. For
70
Chapter Three
example, certain minimal behavioural requirements have to be met
before we can call an event an act of striking someone in fury.
Nevertheless, as we move into the interior of the rational mind these
minimal requirements leave a great deal of room for manoeuvre. Here,
we have to decide which reasons are operative in the agent. And since
action is behaviour backed by mind, the purpose with which someone
acted will individuate the action more precisely. An intentional action is
individuated by the beliefs and desires it introduces. The content of the
intentional description under which an action was performed must be
rationally tied to the propositional objects of the beliefs and desires that
gave the agent his reason for acting. If we describe someone as humiliating
his colleague and suppose that it was his intention to do so, then we are
saying, in effect, that this was what he most wanted to do, that there were
no countervailing circumstances, or unresolved conflicting desires, and
that he believed that by doing what he did or saying what he said, he
would achieve the desired effect.
We say of someone who acted with a certain intention, that he acted
for a reason and spell out his reason by citing judgements, wants and
wishes. But notice that this sort of explanation can go beyond any
formulation of motive the agent can give of himself. As Davidson says:
As observers we often describe the actions of others in ways that
would not occur to them. This does not mean that the concept
of intention has been left behind, however, for happenings cease
to be actions only when there is no way of describing them in
term of intention. (Davidsonl980, p229)
From the interpreter's stance, someone's behaviour counts as an
intentional action, if and only if, what he says and does can be described by
the interpreter in intentional terms. These descriptions belong to that
huge apparatus governed by the interpretational theory of mind. And the
key point is this: in respect of someone's intention in acting there is no
one correct description to be given. We can change the description under
which someone's action was intentional so long as we make
compensating adjustments in our (holistic) attributions to him. Take the
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example given above, we can describe the agent as trying (somewhat
insensitively) to be funny, because he wanted to be and because he
believed (falsely) that the comment about her writing would amuse her.
Numerous such re-arrangements are possible. In fact, as many as we can
invent, subject to the requirement that we make good narrative sense of
the events in the agent's life, this in turn being subject to the constraints of
rational coherence and consistency on how we interpret and imagine the
person acting elsewhere. Obviously, a number of narrative possibilities
suggest themselves.
If we could pin down some of a person's propositional attitudes more
precisely then we should cut down on the number of available intentional
descriptions we could give of him. But we have already seen that there are
no necessary or sufficient conditions drafted in psychological laws or
psychophysical laws for an agent's having a single attitude. Furthermore,
the a priori relations between reasons and actions cannot come into
operation until we identify someone's actions more precisely, and we
cannot do this until we know more about the mental states that back them
causally. We need to make initial conjectures and them bring those into
conformity with the a priori principles. We are left with a certain amount
of theoretical slack in these reconstructions of a person's intention in
acting, and so the mind given to us via this theory is only interpretable up
to indeterminacy of belief ascription.
I agree with Davidson here to the extent that unless we can find more
discriminating conditions on what is is for someone to have a particular
belief, or mean something in particular by uttering a given sentence, then
we are subject to this indeterminacy between competing schemes. Where I
disagree with him is that I think there are more discriminating conditions.
But first, let us turn to the second way indeterminacy arises for Davidson.
3.4) Indeterminacy Within An Interpretational Scheme
Here we are not dealing with the unresolvable choice of which mental
states to attribute to a subject, we are dealing with indeterminacy in the
materials we have for making those attributions. This second sub-species
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of the indeterminacy of interpretation will involve us in considerations of
the linguistic resources for ascribing and identifying beliefs. The argument
is based on the interdependence of language and the propositional
attitudes, and it argues from the indeterminacy of linguistic interpretation
to the indeterminacy of interpretation; this will serve as a second instance
of a premiss for our modus ponens from the indeterminacy of
interpretation to the indeterminacy of mental life as a whole. Once again,
the attributionist move is made by treating properties of interpretation
theory as properties of the mental: if there is indeterminacy in the
descriptions the interpreter can give of the intentional contents of people's
attitudes and utterances, then to that extent, there is indeterminacy in the
contents of their attitudes and utterances. This is the correct conclusion for
Davidson since "an event is mental only as described".
This conclusion may well be the right one to embrace if you believe
that there are no further physical, neurophysiological or cognitive
psychological facts pertinent to determining what a speaker means by a
given utterance; and that one's theory of mind and language can dispense
with a theory of cognitive development and language acquisition
altogether. Given that view, where else could one look for connections
between mind and meaning but in the domain of the propositional
attitudes? As I said above, I shall propose a different strategy that does give
prominence to the sub-personal psychological details in examining a
speaker's linguistic abilities, but for the moment let us stay with the
attributionist, who believes that because ordinarily we have knowledge of
other people's minds and know what language they are speaking, we
know what minds are and know what it is to be speaking that language.
What matters to this picture, and to the conceptions we have, is what is
made available to us ordinarily in interpretation.
In a number of places Davidson has claimed that a certain degree of
complexity and sophistication in a creature's thought depends on its
possession of a language. (1985 p 250-252, 1982, and 1984 passim ). It is not
easy to state what degree of sophistication Davidson has in mind here.
Mostly, he expresses the point in general terms:
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We cannot hope in any case to cope with the full range and subtlety
of psychological traits without taking account of language, for the
finer distinctions among desires and beliefs, thoughts and fears,
intentions and inferences, depend on the assumption of a cognitive
structure as complex as that of language and cannot be understood
apart from it. (Davidsonl980, p225)
But elsewhere, he does give more specific examples. (See Davidson,
1982) The properties of thought required include: the subject's being able
to make a subjective-objective distinction; interpretation being sensitive to
the failure of substitution of co-extensive terms salva vertitate (strangely!);
and applicability of the apparatus of quantification to refining questions
about the ontology of the thinker's world-view. All of which,
unsurprisingly, add up to the distinguishing marks of belief contexts.
Davidson offers further conditions on being a believer. To have beliefs
is to have the concept of belief, which requires one to be able to apply that
concept to others. This he thinks is necessary if a creature is to grasp the
contrast between subjective and objective judgement. And since the
concept of belief arises in the context of interpretation, believers must also
be interpreters of others. Ultimately, there is no asymmetry in the roles of
interpreted and interpreter for the case of human beings. We are self-
interpreting animals who have to make sense of ourselves and others in
rational terms. What matters on this story are the categories for making
sense of mental life - only in virtue of making sense of ourselves and
others do we make sense at all. It is here that language plays a key role, as I
shall now explain.
For Davidson, the rational mind of an agent is open to public
determination by the well informed interpreter. He interprets others on
the basis of their linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour. Now, in asking
what is made available in interpretation, we are asking questions about
the linguistic abilities of both the interpreter and his subject.
In the first case, what is largely at stake is the degree of discrimination
exercised by the interpreter of someone else's mental life. This amounts to
a discussion of the possibilities of thought as mapped out by the
possibilities of language. As Davidson says:
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We identify and discriminate between beliefs, desires, and the
meanings of sentences by attaching propositions to them....In
trying to understand you, I match up my own sentences or
propositions with your utterances and attitudes. My sentences
are related to one another by logic, inductive and deductive, and
are hooked to the world in various ways. I cannot ignore these
properties of my propositions in interpreting you, since these
are the properties that individuate and identify propositions.
But given the multitude of considerations, and the richness of
the field of propositions, there will not be one best way for me to
interpret you. (1985, p252)
These are linguistic facts about the interpreter's materials for making
attributions, facts which will appear when he gives an interpretation of
another. But what about the language of the subject he is interpreting?
Well, this is precisely where the lack of asymmetry between subject and
interpreter is relevant. If the subject is a believer, then he must also be an
interpreter. And to be capable of interpreting others he must have the
linguistic means to mark discriminations in their attitudes: the attitudes
he ascribes to them. But of course the materials he has for making sense of
them will be the linguistically expressed concepts in which he makes sense
to himself: the linguistic means he has of making discriminations in
thought and judgement. So through interpreting his language we may
know his mind. But now remember that these points will apply to the
interpreter giving an account of this subject's language. The linguistic
resources he uses will reveal something of his mind, and so in
developing a theory of linguistic interpretation for the subject he is also
giving an account of the sense he makes himself. So an account of the
linguistic meanings of sentences in which a speaker expresses his attitudes
both interprets his mind and reveals the fine discriminations in thoughts
available to the interpreter on which the possibility of interpretation
depends. The project of linguistic interpretation might now seem to hold
out a promise of some general conclusions about the nature of mental life.
For the account of meaningful speech in terms of which the interpreter
can make sense of the mind and language of others will show him to
have the materials for making sense: that is, to be a creature with a
rational mind. So any account of the meaningfulness of another's
75
Chapter Three
language will be illuminating of what it is to make sense simpliciter. To
learn the language in which someone interprets others is to learn the
medium in which things make sense to that person, and to understand
that language is to know his mind. The sentences he uses in that-clause to
report the beliefs of others will be sentences in which he can express his
own beliefs. So to gain insight into people's minds we need to interpret
their language:
Indeed, our best route to the detailed identification of
intentions and beliefs is by way of a theory of language
behaviour. It makes no sense to suppose we can first intuit all of
a person's intentions and beliefs and then get at what he means
by what he says, rather we refine our theory of each in the light
of the other. (Davidson1980, p258)
But the same point applies to the interpreter too:
the only access to the fine structure and individuation of beliefs
is through the sentences speakers and interpreters of speakers
use to express and describe beliefs. (Davidson 1986, p315)
Notice in the following quote how easily Davidson slips from points
about the interpreter's language to points about the subject's speech,
exploiting the lack of asymmetry:
All the distinctions available in our language are used in the
attribution of belief (and desire and intention); this is perhaps
obvious from the fact that we can attribute a belief by putting
any declarative sentence after the words, "He believes that".
There is every reason to hold, then, that establishing the
correctness of an attribution of belief is no easier than
interpreting a man's speech. But I think we can go further, and
say that the problems are identical. Beliefs cannot be ascertained
in general without command of a man's language; and we
cannot master a man's language without knowing much of
what he believes. (Davidson1980, p238)
This puts paid to the thought that if the subject expresses his own
beliefs on occasion, then an interpretation of what he says might seem to
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provide a more direct route to belief-attribution than the one considered
hitherto. Speech is an intentional act and so it brings in its train the usual
host of beliefs, desires, intentions and actions we need to explain it. For
this reason, too, interpretations of speech must fit into a holistic scheme of
action-explanations where the ideals of rationality, coherence and
consistency have constitutive force.
There are also related reasons, more specifically linguistic, why
interpretation of a speaker's language is no more 'direct' a method than
the overall project of interpreting him. Explanations of speech acts cannot
be given in isolation:
Part of explaining such acts is interpreting them, in the sense
of being able to to say what the speaker's words expressed on an
occasion of use - expressed in his language of course. We have a
full grasp of what a man said when he uttered certain sounds
only if we know his language, that is, are prepared to interpret a
large number of things he might say To interpret a single
speech act, therefore, we must have a grasp of the speaker's
unrealized dispositions to perform other speech acts.
(Davidsonl980, p255)
And so:
We interpret a single speech act against the background of a
theory of the speaker's language. Such a theory tells us (at least)
the truth conditions of each of an infinite number of sentences
the man might utter ( Davidsonl980, p256)
The qualifications on this project now recapitulate those we looked at
for intentional psychology:
What is clear, however, is that such theory construction
must be holistic: we cannot decide how to interpret a speaker's
'There's a whale' independently of how we interpret his
'There's a mammal', and words connected with these without
end. We must interpret the whole pattern. (Davidsonl980, p257)
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This theory of the speaker's language must be embedded within an
overall project of rational interpretation of his behaviour; where the
interpretations given to the speaker's utterances must chime in with the
attributions of attitudes made to him in order to explain his behaviour
tout court. To meet this requirement, the interpreter must take many of
his subject's utterances to be sincere expressions of the subject's beliefs,
and he must find evidence for the speaker's possession of those beliefs
borne out elsewhere in his behaviour. Moreover, the explanations we can
give of a subject's actions will provide a necessary background when
explaining his linguistic actions; for here too we must be able to explain
the subject's speech act as intelligible in the light of the beliefs and desires,
that give him reason to assert. What we need is a way of extracting the
meaning and other intentional notions from episodes of speech; and for
this we need a theory that has application to every such episode.
Most illuminating of all, will be an account of how we can make sense
of someone from scratch without knowing either his language or his
beliefs. This is the imaginary case for which Davidson proposes the project
of radical interpretation: a procedure by which one aims to recover the
beliefs and meanings of a speaker starting with neither.
In order to interpret verbal behaviour, we must be able to tell
when a speaker holds a sentence he speaks to be true. But
sentences are held to be true partly because of what is believed,
and partly because of what the speaker means by his words. The
problem of interpretation therefore is the problem of abstracting
simultaneously the roles of belief and meaning from the pattern
of sentences to which a speaker subscribes over time.
(Davidsonl980, p238)
To a large extent the isolable beliefs, the intentions a speaker is taken to
be exercising in uttering, and the precise meanings we can attach to the
particular sentences uttered, are theoretical constructs that vary with one
another in a holistic structure of attributions. Such a scheme will comprise
those interlocking patterns of meaning, belief, desire, intention and action
that make best overall sense of someone's total life and conduct. All of
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which suggests that there are no such independent entities as the beliefs or
meanings described by such a theory:
What is important is that if meaning and belief are
interlocked as I have suggested, then the idea that each belief has
a definite object, and the idea that each word and sentence has a
definite meaning, cannot be invoked in describing the goal of a
successful theory. For even if...there were no indeterminacy at
all, entities such as meanings and objects of belief would be of
no independent interest. We could...invent such entities with a
clear conscience if we were sure there were no permissible
variant theories. But if we knew this, we would know how to
state our theories without mention of the objects.
(Davidsonl984, pi54)
But to say that the notions of individual sentence meaning and belief
are contaminated by theory, because they are essentially identified by
theoretical terms, is not yet to rob them of all empirical content. If the
principles that govern the theory specify conditions for their application to
behaviour under empirical conditions, then we can avoid the conclusion
that they are purely theoretical notions with no empirical content. This is
a very big issue which takes us back to the question raised above: which
aspects of interpretation theory are features of the objects interpreted and
which are mere artefacts of theory. Davidson starts out with the suggestion
that the notions of reference, words and word meanings are theoretical,
but as I shall argue he has no way of isolating his conclusions about these
from spreading to conclusions about belief and sentence meaning, at
which point common sense evaporates into undifferentiated wholes or is
transformed into a more discriminating theory. Neither of these positions
are entirely satisfactory, and Davidson has no retreat. What he himself
wants is a half-way house where he can distinguish between those
semantical notions which are theory-laden but have application to actual
linguistic practice and those which are purely theoretical and do not. All of
the relevant notions arise in the context of theory, so he needs some way
of deciding between those which really apply to a speaker or his language
and those which remain internal to the theory. What is not so clear is how
the attributionist can be entitled to draw this distinction.
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Before looking in more detail at this issue, let us just remind ourselves
of what Davidson has said about it. He regards many of the ordinary
features of a language like words, and word meanings, reference and even
sentence structure, as theoretical notions, articulated to implement the
theory, having no empirical content of their own. Notice that this shows
that Davidson believes there is still a question about what is to be found
in the interpreted empirical evidence.
Given Davidson's denial of substance to the intra-sentential notions, it
is as if, in the words of the poet Robert Frost, "A sentence is a sound in
itself on which sounds, called words, may be strung". These whole sounds
are the only evidential basis for fixing the empirical content of a theory of
linguistic interpretation.
Note that Davidson thinks that neither the interpreter constructing a
theory nor the incipient language user learning the language are ever "in
a position directly to learn rules for assembling...[words]., into meaningful
wholes." Instead the account should take the following broad outlines:
We start rather with the wholes, and infer (or contrive) an
underlying structure. Meaning is the operative aspect of this
structure. Since the structure is inferred, from the point of view
anyway of what is needed and known for communication, we
must view meaning itself as a theoretical construction. Like any
construct, it is arbitrary except for the formal and empirical
constraints we impose on it. In the case of meaning, the
constraints cannot uniquely fix the theory of interpretation.
(Davidsonl980, p256-7)
Once we have fixed the formal and empirical constraints we shall have
an adequate theory of meaning. And,
Guided by an adequate theory, we see how the actions and
dispositions of speakers induce on the sentences of the language
a semantic structure. (Davidsonl984, p8)
But the question now is what can such a theory extract from the
evidence, and more importantly as far as the attributionist is concerned,
what can it read back into that evidence? Let us consider these as separate
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questions, pace the attributionist, and answer them in turn. I want to
make a few remarks here about the former, and reserve the latter for the
next chapter.
The answer to the first question is not very hopeful. We start with the
cases of partially interpreted attitudes of a speaker: cases where, for some
sentence S, the speaker holds that sentence true. This is somehow
recovered from his behaviour without either knowing what he means by
S or what he believes about the prevailing conditions for holding S true.
We must suppose that this sentential attitude is manifested by assertion,
assent, or dissent. But even to re-describe someone's linguistic behaviour
to this extent is to have postulated two interlocking notions: what he
means and what he believes. It is our attempts as interpreters to solve the
simultaneous equations for these cases, subject to the formal and
empirical constraints, that lead us to ascribe beliefs to the speaker and
meanings to his words. Often we start with a defeasible assumption that
our subject believes what we do about what is taking place when he
assents to a given sentence. This is Davidson's appeal to the Principle of
Charity. Now because I attribute to a speaker a belief of mine about what is
the case, and I suppose myself to be knowledgeable about the prevailing
conditions, I can suppose him to take the sentence we hold true to be true
in these conditions. Thus my task as interpreter is to work out the truth
conditions for this and all the other sentences he holds true, and from
here try to project to all the other declarative sentences of his language.
Since each ascription of meaning necessarily involves an attribution of
belief, this linguistic project will interact with a theory of his beliefs. This
becomes an asset in mature interpretation. Once we have fixed a meaning
for his sentences - by a theory that enjoys best fit with the evidence of the
sentences he holds true and all other ascribable attitudes - we can, on a
future occasion, then we can interpret him as having a false belief about
what is the case, if he assents to a sentence which is false. Belief takes up
the slack between the interpreter's assignment of truth-value to a subject's
sentence and his assent to, or dissent from, that sentence. However, if
there is evidence to suggest that his belief about what transpires is
veridical, then we have to interpret him otherwise, as having attached a
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different meaning to one of the sentences than that given to it by other
speakers of his language. The point is that it is possible to choose to
interpret him one way or the other, and even once all the evidence is in
there may be no fact of the matter which allows us to chose between the
two options. This is as expected:
...belief and meaning cannot be uniquely reconstructed from
speech behaviour. The remaining indeterminacy should not be
judged as a failure of interpretation, but rather as a logical
consequence of the nature of theories of meaning (just as it is
not a sign of some failure in our ability to measure temperature
that the choice of an origin and a unit is arbitrary).
(Davidsonl980, p257)
I take it that it would be a failing, however, if we simply accepted that
this is all there is to say about temperature. The increased energy in the
molecules at constant pressure explains why we are likely to be measured
as increasing in temperature. Perhaps in the case of meaning, too, there
are facts at other levels of description to underpin our confidence that we
were giving the right ascriptions?
Why should we see something like Davidson's theory of interpretation
as the only way of approaching the nature of linguistic meaning and
understanding? Could we not begin to draw on existing empirical research
into natural language meaning and grammar to extract a more precise
account of what a speaker means? After all, Davidson is seen here as
saying that indeterminacy is a consequence of the theory of meaning he
adopts. And as before, we conclude that what is available to the interpreter
depends on the material and methods he can call upon.
Davidson's resistance to any such empirical, science-based alternative
comes firstly from his insistence on what he thinks of as the common
sense nature of his approach to mind and meaning, and secondly, by
supporting this claim where he needs to by the metaphysical tenets of his
attributionist position. It seems a plausible reading of Davidson to suggest
that his reasons for maintaining that there is no other theoretical level of
description and explanation to locate facts about meaning, in either the
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behavioural, brain, or cognitive sciences, are to be found in the philosophy
of psychology already reviewed. We shall see how well they stand up later.
We can now see how Davidson's claim about the theoretical status of
individual sentence meaning infects his theory of belief. Belief and
meaning are interlocking notions: unknowns that must be solved for
together since the choice of one informs the choice of the other. Now if
the best way of reporting what someone believes is by a comprehending
use of the sentence by means of which the subject expresses his thought,
then any indeterminacy in our interpretations of his sentences must lead
to that degree of indeterminacy in the thought we attribute to him; and,
where we are best placed to interpret him, this means a corresponding
indeterminacy in his thought. Where there is no means of saying precisely
who X is speaking about, there is no fact of the matter concerning who X is
thinking about. It is no good supposing that the speaker though not the
interpreter might know who he was thinking of, so that there would still
be a fact of the matter as to whom the speaker was referring to. For the
only materials that can determine whom he is thinking of are those of
belief-desire psychology in the rational theory of action, together with a
theory of linguistic interpretation. There can be no more to the mind of a
speaker than is available to a well informed interpreter, and the
interpreter can only interpret a speaker's use of a singular term by
specification of its reference in an interpretative truth-theory for that
speaker's language. Any limitations on the empirical content of truth
theories that serve as theories of linguistic interpretation will be
limitations on the rationally interpreted mind itself. Any indeterminacy
in interpretation is indeterminacy in thought. So it is now crucial to know
how much indeterminacy infects meaning: just which properties of
interpretation are properties of thought. I turn to this now in the light of




4.1) The Theory of Meaning: A Fregean Overview
Without the far-reaching and insightful work of Frege we should have
very little idea of what a theory of meaning looks like. Although it was
never fully worked out, Frege's model for the theory of meaning
provided one of the clearest attempts to isolate the project that a finished
theory of meaning would complete. Nearly all existing semantical
frameworks owe something to Frege's original ideas. So perhaps it would
be useful to provide a very quick sketch of this project before assessing
Davidson's version.
Fregean theories of meaning are based on three key notions, derived
from two key distinctions: force/sense/reference. Starting in the middle,
the notion of sense is what we need to explain what is said by a speaker
when he utters a sentence with assertoric, interrogative or imperative
force. We see a distinction here between sense and force because Frege
thought that the very same sense of an utterance, ie. what is said, can be
what is asserted, what is commanded, what is asked on different
occasions. So there can be sentences which express the same sense but
where those sentences are uttered with different forces. The sense of a
sentence (what is said) is not a property of the speaker of that sentence.
Unlike an idea, different thinkers or speakers can grasp the very same
sense on hearing a particular sentence uttered. To know what is said by
utterring that sentence, whatever particular force attaches to the utterance,
is to know something that is not the property of any one speaker's mind.
Sense is also distinct from reference. There is a difference between
what is being talked about and what the speaker says about it. When we
understand an expression we know more than just its reference; in
particular we know the way it is picked out by that expression. However,
in some cases we know much less than the reference, as in the case of
informative identity statements. Frege takes it that which objects and
properties we we succeed in speaking about depends entirely on what is
said; and so sense determines reference (the things talked about). The
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sense/reference distinction is operative at many levels in the theory. At
the word-level there is a distinction between the object referred to and the
way it is referred to; there is also a distinction between the range of things
a predicate applies to and the way of identifying the property they all have.
At the sentence level there is a distinction between the truth or falsity of a
sentence and what it typically asserts. Frege unified these different sense/
reference distinctions in a general account of these two notions so that
sense and reference became two distinct levels of meaning or content,
with sense determining reference quite generally.
In the general account, Frege propounded the principle of
compositionality. The sense and reference of complex expressions depend
on the senses and references of their parts, respectively. But the
dependencies are different in each case. At the level of sense, the overall
sense of a sentence contains the senses of its subsentential expressions as
constituents. While at the level of reference, the reference of a sentence -
its truth-value - does not contain the references of its subsentential
constituents. Instead the truth value is a function of the referents of those
expressions. Both the selection of reference-determining constituents and
the various functions from referents to truth-values depend on the
semantic structure of sentences. However, it should not be thought that
the semantic parts of a sentence could be given meaning (sense, or
reference) in isolation. Their suitability in building up complex
expressions was thought by Frege to be due to the semantic roles they
enjoyed in molecular sentence structures: they are atoms that always
occur bound in a molecule of meaning. This picture gave the sentence a
certain primacy in discussions of linguistic content. This thought was first
expressed by Frege in the preface to the Grundlagen in the form of a
methodological maxim: never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation,
but only in the context of a proposition. (Frege 1884, p x) Appearing as it
does in the Grundlagen it is produced before the introduction of the
sense/reference distinction. But it is evident that this primacy of the
sentence underpins Frege's whole thinking about reference, and in the
Grundlagen itself, it secures the role for his notion of reference in the
argument for the existence of numbers as the abstract referents of
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numerals. The maxim has since come to be known as the Context
Principle and any credible theory of meaning must comply with it. By
means of it, we can think of the senses and references of words in terms of
the stable contributions these recurrent items make to the senses and
references of whole sentence in which they occur. The senses of words are
suspended in the senses of whole sentences, and the reference of words
can only be known through grasp of their senses:
...the determination of the truth-value of any given sentence
goes via the identification of an object as the referent of each
proper name occurring in the sentence: guided by the senses of
these names, we first identify certain objects as their
referents, [and then] decide whether or not the predicate or
relational expression applies to that object or those objects.
(Dummett 1973, p229)
What this account rules out is bare knowledge of a term's reference,
where this would be a way of knowing the reference where there was
nothing more that could be said about a speaker's ways of knowing it.
Finally, Frege used the notion of sentence sense to play the role of
object for beliefs and other propositional attitudes. To characterise the
content of a thinker's belief we need a notion of content more
discriminating than just whether the belief is true or false, or just which
things the belief concerns. The notion of reference will not provide the
objects of belief. Thinkers do not just believe that a proposition is true or
false, they believe what the proposition propounds. When we choose a
sentence to report someone's belief we want to say that he believes what is
said by that sentence, and sense is the notion we need to provide an
account of what is said . This relation to belief enables us to provide a
criterion for the senses of sentences based on the sameness or difference in
cognitive value of two sentences. Two sentences will differ in cognitive
value just in case it is possible for a speaker who understands both of
them to take different attitudes towards them at the same time; believing
one but not the other, say. This is possible even when the two sentences
share exactly the same referents and structures.
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It is a moot point whether or not Davidson's theory of meaning is
truly Fregean. This turns, finally, on whether he has any use for the
notion of sense. Commentators like McDowell think he has, but as we
shall see there are many reasons to doubt this.
4.2) Truth and Interpretation
Davidson opts for a truth theory as his theory of meaning. But since on
the face of it this is a semantic theory that would correspond to a theory of
reference in the Fregean framework, we might wonder how it can be
capable of fully specifying the meaning, or sense, of expressions and
sentences in the language. Clearly, we need come assurance that a theory
of truth can serve as a theory of meaning.
The claim is made in some circles that carefully selected theories of
reference can serve as theories of sense. The idea is that in stating a theory
of reference we have to choose some means of specifying the reference of
any given expression, and that the linguistic means used to state the
reference will show the sense of that term. This idea is fine as far as it
goes, but the interesting work resides in saying what it is for a chosen
means of reference-specification for a language to express the senses
expressed by speakers of that language. For this we need to know the
factors that constrain the correct choice of sense-displaying reference
clauses. Presumably, these will be cognitive constraints on a theory of
reference that ensure that it is adequate to the task of capturing the
meanings of words and sentences. It is a large project to say what these
constraints are and how they are motivated. I want now to look at this
question in the context of a Davidsonian theory of meaning which takes
the form of a Tarski style recursive characterisation of truth for a
language.
Let us begin by asking what is it for a theory of truth to serve as a
theory of meaning for a natural language? Perhaps one could find some
suitable adequacy constraints that a truth theory for a language must meet
if its theorems are to present the meanings of declarative sentences in that
language. What we need to know first is how a Davidsonian decides that a
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(Tarski-style) truth theory is a plausible form for a meaning-specifying
theory to take.
We can start with the intuitive thought that the truth of a declarative
sentence is determined by its meaning and the relevant worldly facts, we
can treat this as a function called Evaluation:
Efmeaning, facts) -> truth.
Now for any two-place function there are exactly two inverse
functions, which we can call here, Knowledge, Kfmeaning, truth) -> facts,
and Interpretation, Iffacts, truth) -> meaning. The first of these concerns
the transmission of knowledge by communication, but it is the second
that concerns us most. For if we can provide a theory that supplies
patterns of assignments as arguments for the I-function it will also yield
specifications of sentence-meanings. This must be a theory that
coordinates assignments of truth with the facts that make those sentences
true - or, if the theory is to be sufficiently sensitive to the speakers'
perspective - coordinates assignments of truth with (an interpretation of)
speakers' beliefs about the states of affairs in which those sentences are
true. An overall interpretation theory that yields pairings for the I-
function will include a recursive means of attaching the truth-predicate to
sentences of the speakers' language, together with a theory of their beliefs
about what is the case when those sentences are true. The argument
pairings served up by combining a theory for applying the truth predicate
with a theory of belief can then be tested against the evidence of the
sentences that speakers' holds true; and the best combinations will be
those which make them hold true more sentences that are true (by the
interpreter's standards), thus maximising the number of true beliefs. In
these cases, the interpreter's route to linguistic interpretation is
straightforward. If, when the speaker holds a sentence true his beliefs are
veridical, and so concern what is the case (according to the interpreter),
then the interpreter can know what is the case when one of the speaker's
sentences is true. By taking the sentence to be true when those facts obtain,
he will take that sentence to be about the obtaining of those facts. These
cases give the interpreter local instances of interpretation. But to construct
a reliable theory of linguistic interpretation, one needs to find a principled
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way to coordinate the assignments of truth to sentences and beliefs to
speakers, in the straightforward cases, to ensure correct pairings of
arguments to the I-function for all other cases. That is to say, it is essential
to find the right way to project beyond the evidential base to pairings of
truth and truth maker that specify the truth conditions that native
speakers would themselves attach to these sentences. Only then can one
claim to have discovered the actual I-function for their language.
Extensive application of that function to sentences previously
unencountered or unconsidered will be given in the form of pairings that
say for each sentence S: S is true when and only when p.
As we shall see, the principled means of achieving this is going to
consist in providing a truth theory that meets certain formal and
empirical constraints; the formal constraints will concern the mechanics
of how the truth predicate gets assigned to sentences and the empirical
constraints will have to do with when it can be correctly assigned to them.
The claim is that philosophical illumination of the notion of meaning is
to be had by examining the nature of these constraints and their
interaction. For these are the constraints that together turn a formal
theory of truth into an empirically adequate theory of linguistic
interpretation capable of producing interpretive assignments of the
conditions for truth to every declarative sentence of the language. Let us
now look at these constraints.
The empirical constraint will be the serviceability of a truth theory's
pronouncements in the overall project of rational interpretation of the
agent. The formal constraints will have to do with whether the truth
theory has the means to provide a recursive characterisation in the style
of Tarski of the truth predicate for the speaker's language, specifying the
conditions under the truth predicate applies to any given sentence. (Non-
indicatives will have to be related to their corresponding indicatives by
transformations supplied in a theory of force.) John McDowell has
subsumed these two types of condition under the title of the Propositional
Attitude Constraint and the Constraint of Systematicity, respectively. I
shall state them both and go on to examine whether the empirical and the
formal constraints coincide, and if not how we can motivate the latter. I
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start now with the first requirement: that a theory of truth should
subserve a theory of intentional interpretation.
4.3) Empirical Constraints on Truth Theory
What empirical facts ensure that a truth theory can interpret a
speaker's utterances? Davidson's answer seems to point to everything
relevant to the project of the radical interpreter. But not everything
available to the radical interpreter is about meaning, so we need to know
how meaning is determined in the face of the available evidence. Now a
central aspect of radical interpretation is the interdependence of belief and
meaning, and ultimately, their inextricability. The inextricability thesis is
extremely important when defining the empirical constraints on
linguistic interpretations, and much of what follows is an attempt to
provide further clarification of it. But it is also an extremely subtle and
elusive thesis, with many possible interpretations, so before I begin,
perhaps it would be useful to list some of the claims I take it to
encompass: (i) the evidence for linguistic interpretation by itself offers us
no way of separating belief and meaning; (ii) we need a theory to identify
the distinct contributions of each; (iii) belief and meaning are interlocking,
complementary notions related at the theoretical level; and (iv) prior to
bringing a theory to bear on the evidence these notions have no
application to it. It follows that the only evidence for linguistic meaning is
intentional evidence, and the only access to it is via a theory of
interpretation. This is an extremely important claim to make, so we must
give some consideration to how it emerges.
Davidson tells us that the subject matter of radical interpretation is the
behaviour of a speaker, or speakers, and its task is to tell us what their
utterances mean. Now on this project there are no detectable facts which
concern linguistic meaning alone: evidence of language use is also
evidence of the beliefs, desires and intentions of the language user.
However, prior to interpretation there is no way of separating out, one by
one, the distinct contributions of belief, desire and meaning. It is by
application of theory that we recognise events in linguistic behaviour as
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the upshot of the meaning the speaker attaches to a sentence and his
beliefs and intentions in uttering it. Now an account that provides us
with these sorts of descriptions will involve both a theory of meaning and
a theory of mind. But now the question must be why do we need anything
more than a theory of meaning to extract the linguistic significance of
someone's utterance?
Well, the first thing to say is that the bits of behaviour that we are
interested in are the deliberate linguistic emissions of a speaker: we are
not interested in trying to make sense of those cases where a speaker is
merely making noises. Speech is a highly intentional activity: the speaker
puts his mind behind what he says. So we need to be able to identify those
intentional uses of language if we are to embark on a proper course of
linguistic interpretation. This suggests at least a minimal sense in which a
theory of psychological interpretation must accompany a theory of
meaning; but as yet there is no suggestion of a closer connection.
However, this will not do for Davidson who conceives a much stronger
link between the two theories. It is a link that arises from the exigencies of
radical interpretation.
To interpret someone's linguistic behaviour is to say what his words
mean on an occasion of use. The radical interpreter proposes to
accomplish this by stating a theory that enables us to derive particular
interpretations of each of a speaker's utterances. What we need to know is
how to tell whether the interpretations it provides are correct. Merely to
come up with an interpretation is no guarantee of correctness. There must
be some standards for when an interpretation is right.
Perhaps this could be achieved in the following way. Our grounds for
assigning meaning to people's utterances are also grounds for attributing
beliefs: if someone assents to a sentence and we interpret it, we thereby
attribute to him a belief. So perhaps the linguistic interpretations yielded
by the meaning theory can be checked against our assessment of the
speaker's beliefs and intentions. To interpret him as saying that p when
we can attribute to him the belief that p is to have some reason for
supposing that the sentence he utters expresses that belief for him. This
conjecture could be checked if we found evidence that he had other
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related beliefs, and suitable desires which gave him reason to express that
belief at the time of utterance.
There is something right about this but we must not make the mistake
of supposing that we can fix the meanings of his sentences by a prior
identification of his beliefs and intentions. The only adequate
interpretation of an agent's mind includes an interpretation of his speech.
This is not just because an interpretation of a person's language is a
characterisation of his mind, although it is always that; it is the stronger
claim that we could have no detailed knowledge of people's beliefs and
intentions without having interpreted a large part of their language. This
is because language use is a rich source of evidence about the fine
structure and discrimination amongst an agent's attitudes. Furthermore,
there is no way to complete a psychological interpretation without
interpreting the person's speech. Speech is a form of intentional
behaviour and so interpretations of speech are interpretations of action:
speech acts. As such they have to conform to holistic schemes in which
we provide rational explanations of the agent's behaviour in terms of the
beliefs and desires that give him reason to act. So, given Davidson's view
about the holistic character and scope of the mental, speech interpretation
will be integral to the whole system of beliefs, desires and reasons with
which we explain someone's behaviour; these interpretational schemes
must include a way of specifying what people say, along with attributions
of beliefs and desires that relate them to sentences and utterances
respectively. So to make sense of someone's mental life demands
nothing short of constructing a total theory for interpreting that person's
speech, attitudes and actions on the basis of his behaviour: the mental
scheme that emerges already includes the meanings of a speaker's words.
Thus far we have failed to find a way in which the radical interpreter
can enter the circle of linguistic and intentional notions. There is no way
to get at a person's beliefs and intentions without interpreting his
language, and there is no way of arriving at a correct account of his
linguistic behaviour without having both the linguistic and the




Since we cannot hope to interpret linguistic activity without
knowing what a speaker believes, and cannot found a theory of
what he means on a prior discovery of his beliefs and
intentions, I conclude that in interpreting utterances from
scratch - in radical interpretation - we must somehow deliver
simultaneously a theory of belief and a theory of meaning.
(Davidson 1984, pl44)
The two theories are needed to pick out the two separate strands of
interpretation in the partially interpreted intentional attitude of holding a
sentence true. On any occasion in which the speaker takes up this complex
attitude toward a sentence, the interpreter can treat it as having two
interlocking components neither of which he knows in advance: what the
speaker means by the sentence and what he believes about the conditions
for holding it true. Strictly speaking, Davidson talks about the meaning
the sentence has, and not the what the speaker means by it: for the
Davidsonian interpreter is not in the business of defining the speaker-
meaning of a sentence S in terms of a complex of psychological intentions,
nor is he trying to identify a psychological state that amounts of a
speaker's knowledge of the meaning of S; he is simply providing an
account of the grounds for attributing beliefs to speakers and meanings to
their utterances. It is a theory of the interpreter's competence, not the
speaker's: it describes what every interpreter knows when he knows what
is said; it does not describe how the speaker understands what he has said.
Although, to succeed in capturing what can be said by any sentences of a
speaker's language is ipso facto to provide an account of what the speaker
knows in virtue of being able to speak the language. The point is that for
the attributionist there can be no gap here. To interpret someone's
language correctly is also to portray his psychological attitudes. There can
be no further question of whether he really knows that this is what his
sentences mean.
From the perspective of the radical interpreter, who can identify the
sentences a speaker holds true before interpreting them, belief and
meaning are just like the dependent variables of a theoretical structure: he
must call upon some combination of theories of meaning and belief to
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provide plausible pairings of assignments so that he can try them out in
interpretations of his subject's speech. The crucial aspect of this approach
is that there is no way to fix one independently of the other. Davidson
even goes so far as to recommend that "we should think of meanings and
beliefs as interrelated constructs of a single theory" (Ibid., pl46); a single
theory which the interpreter has to bring to bear in interpreting his
subject's behaviour, verbal and otherwise.
Intuitively, then, good total theories will interpret the sentences a
speaker holds true as saying that p when they ascribe him the belief that p.
And since not just any attribution of belief will satisfy the wider
conditions on attitude ascription, the possibilities of belief-ascription will
serve as a constraint on ascriptions of content to a speaker's words. But
how can this constraint help us with our original inquiry, if it does not
tell us how we are to arrive at good theories? It merely recommends that
an interpretation should make someone say what we think he believes.
But we started off with the question of how to tell whether a theory's
interpretations of someone's linguistic behaviour are correct. All we have
discovered is that the linguistic and the psychological details are
complementary; that neither can be tested for independently of the other,
and that a correct account must get both sets of details right.
Without committing ourselves to the claim that we can determine a
unique set of pairings, we must still be able to judge whether any given set
of belief and meaning assignments correctly interprets a speaker's
sentences. Indeterminacy raises the further question of whether there
really is a unique way to resolve these complex sentential attitudes into
their two component factors. Davidson thinks there isn't: we could always
change meaning assignments by altering someone's beliefs, and make
adjustments to his beliefs by changing the meanings assigned to his words
consistently with the overall constraints of rationality and holistic fit with
the evidence. But these revisions can only be made within interpretation
theory itself once we have a number of correct interpretations to consider.
This is the force of the point that attributions of belief and meaning
belong to a theoretical structure and are not independently established in
the evidence; given the holistic nature of fit, there may be more than one
94
Chapter Four
way to give these two concepts their joint applications to the behavioural
evidence.
All of this means that the empirical conditions on a correct meaning
theory for a language are no more or less discriminating than the
constraints on the overall project for interpreting its speakers as rational
agents. A truth theory will serve as a theory of meaning when and only
when its pronouncements meet this global test of interpretation. And the
evidence for attributing a particular language to a speaker - as
characterised by the truth theory - will be the very same as the evidence
for attributing to him an overall pattern of beliefs, desires, intentions,
actions and meanings. Since there is no merely empirical way of
determining the character of that evidence, there can be no direct
empirical route to determining what language a person speaks, or what he
means on a given occasion, short of constructing an interpretation of his
mental life:
For the evidence on which all these matters depends gives us no
way of separating out the contributions of thought, action, desire
and meaning one by one. Total theories are what we must
construct and many theories will do equally well. (Davidson
1984, p241)
This means that finding a correct truth theory for the language of a
group of speakers demands nothing less than finding an overall
interpretive scheme for rationalising their behaviour; the evidence for an
interpretational theory of truth - a theory which serves as a theory of
meaning - will be nothing less than the evidence for a total scheme of
interpretation that includes it. So how can Davidson claim that
construction of such a theory will help the radical interpreter to arrive at a
satisfactory total scheme for interpreting a person, if what determines the
correct way of choosing a truth theory depends on success in interpreting
all of a person's linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour? The answer he
will give is that a theory of truth and a theory of the attitudes mutually
constrain the means for achieving the overall task of interpreting
someone. The radical interpreter must try out combinations of truth
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conditions and attitude ascriptions to determine which combinations
work best to interpret the total speech and conduct of the agent. A theory
of truth from which one can derive truth conditions which pull their
weight in this larger project will be a truth theory capable of specifying
sentence meanings: that is, it will serve as a theory of meaning for that
person's language. And now we have our standard of correctness for
linguistic interpretation in the form of an empirical constraint on truth
theories.
There are several points to nobce about this empirical constraint.
Firstly, it arises from theoretical decisions which can only be taken once
we have entered the intentional realm. And secondly, it rules out any way
of identifying a sentence's truth conditions at anything other than the
intentional level. The theoretical framework relates meaning to the
whole panoply of intentional attitudes and actions. Evidence for these
cannot be reduced to evidence of a wholly non-intentional kind. And if
meaning cannot be specified non-intentionally, then it cannot be located
at the lower level. Therefore, meaning, like mind, is an irreducibly
intentional notion, but one that cannot be reduced to the other irreducible
mental notions. Admittedly, it follows from inextricability and the
holistic nature of the interpreted mind that the most direct evidence for
linguistic meaning the radical interpreter can hope for is the theory-
dependent evidence of meaning and belief. But once he has entered the
circle of linguistic and psychological notions, he can turn the
inextricability thesis to his advantage to come up with a psychological
constraint on any putative assignment of meaning. And so long as there
are formal and empirical constraints of adequacy on the correctness of a
theory for linguistic interpretation, there will be room to carve out a space
within the interpreter's scheme for the notion of linguistic meaning. The
empirical constraint on meaning assignments will be a theoretically
motivated condition on the joint empirical application of the notions of
belief and meaning. This is the condition John McDowell calls the
Propositional Attitude Constraint (PAC):
[A physically described piece of linguistic behaviour can be re-
described by a theory of meaning as a saying with a specific
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content iff the re-descriptions are intelligible] against a
background of propositional attitudes - centrally beliefs and
desires - in terms of which the behaviour seems to make sense.
Ascription of propositional attitudes, in turn, is constrained in
complex ways by the physical facts about behaviour, the
environment, and their interconnections; also (circling back) by
the possibilities of interpreting linguistic behaviour in
conformity with [certain formal requirements on the theory].
(McDowell, 1978, pl22)
This indirect evidence gives us our condition on what it is for a
formally adequate truth theory (I turn to the formal requirements
shortly.) to be adequate for interpretation. Once the interpreter has opened
up a space to begin interpretation, it tells us what success would amount
to. An interpreter mindful of the empirical constraints must try to
provide a a truth theory whose content-specifications meet the PAC.
These will be assignments of truth conditions that "pull their weight in
making sense of speakers of the language we are concerned with"
(McDowell 1977, pi 61)
Of course, by itself, this constraint does not tell us how a truth theory
can meet such a requirement (given that we know something by now
about how the constraints on propositional attitude ascription are to be
met). It does not even tell us what it is for an act of utterance to be the
expression of one of the speaker's attitudes: it merely insists that in
specifying the meaning of someone's utterances we must come up with
reasons for him saying these things. This may be part of the deliberate
suggestion that although there is a close link between linguistics and
psychology, there is no chance of a reduction of the former to the latter.
However Davidson does have a strategy for using the Propositional
Attitude Constraint. His starting place is the sentences held true, and the
starting assumption from the general theory of interpretation is that most
of a speaker's beliefs are, by the interpreter's lights, true. This is the
Principle of Charity. Now on that basis, Davidson hopes to hold belief
constant and solve for meaning. By assuming the speaker's beliefs are
veridical and are caused by the objects which prompt him to assent to a
sentence he holds true, the interpreter can use his own beliefs about the
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current situation to ascribe a belief to the speaker, and on that basis, a
content to the sentence he holds true: it will be the content of the belief
ascribable to both subject and interpreter that allows for the fixing of
meaning. Notice how this view is reminiscent of Frege's identification of
the sense of a sentence with a content of a belief. But the view is
somewhat different. Frege arrives at this assumption from general
reflections on content and the semantic evaluations of belief-sentences.
Davidson arrives at his identification as a consequence of his
methodology. For Davidson, the content of a belief coincides with the
content of an utterance only when the objects that cause a particular belief
also prompt a particular utterance. This is very different from Frege's idea
of a shared cognitive content.
I said above that the principle of charity that maximises the number of
beliefs which are true would most likely have to be replaced by a principle
of humanity that tries to make the agent largely intelligible as opposed to
just largely right. But if we take this step (and it seems the Davidsonian
should), the strategy of holding belief constant and solving for meaning
becomes that much less central. In fact, the grounds for a speaker's
holding a sentence true would have to be fixed in the light of all the other
attributions and so they themselves might be open to revision in the
course of an interpretation. These would become less central also. But
notice that these reflections do nothing to disrupt the force of the PAC.
Combined with a principle of humanity, the empirical constraints on
truth theory would come to this. A theory of truth adequate for
interpretation will be one whose ascriptions of truth conditions together
with a plausible theory of the attitudes makes best overall sense of a
person's linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour.
4.4) Psychological Constraints on Truth Theory
We have seen how the a priori principles of interpretation can give
rise to a psychological constraint on meaning, but it is a constraint
governing the solution to a simultaneous equation involving the two
unknowns. There is no way to use our prior knowledge of psychological
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facts to direct us to the meaning of someone's words. The PAC simply
repudiates any such epistemological asymmetry between psychology and
semantics. We try out total patterns of belief and meaning assignment
which we check against a speaker's behavioural evidence and the pattern
of truth-values distributed over his sentences. This is a constraint on the
successful completion of a total theory.
For there to be an asymmetry between semantics and psychology there
would have to be psychological facts which the radical interpreter could
appeal to in determining the meaning of hitherto uninterpreted linguistic
behaviour; psychological details, that is, which were more empirically
accessible than the the deliverances of the theories of meaning they were
supposed to constrain, (see Evans & McDowell 1976, pxv.) But of course
that is just what is being denied. Empirically there is no way of getting at
one before the other; the interpreter constructs his theory of meaning and
theory of beliefs simultaneously, and tailors the output of one account to
the other.
Certainly, this seems the right thing to say if one is considering
propositional attitude psychology only, and if one is concerned with the
evidence available to the radical interpreter. But one wants to ask whether
there could be other ways of construing the psychological constraints on
meaning. As I said at the beginning of this thesis, all parties to the dispute
would accept the connection between mind and meaning and so would
accept the existence of some psychological constraints on semantics, but
the heart of the dispute lies with the precise nature of those constraints.
To invoke a different type of psychological constraint than that favoured
by the radical interpreter, we have to invoke a different conception of
psychology. So, for instance, if we were concerned with cognitive
psychology, there would be no need to think of the relevant psychological
details of language users as being available to the radical interpreter - at
least not consciously available to him as a subject of experience. The
empirical facts of the sort documented in psychology of this sort may
require elaborate investigation and detection, fitting as they do into a
project of scientific explanation. Now some of these facts about speakers
may be determined independently of the construction of theories of
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meaning for their language, and to that extent they may well be more
empirically accessible than the semantical facts. However, it is just because
those findings are not available on the basis of ordinary common sense
reasoning that they are not considered by the Davidsonian to be either
relevant or genuinely psychological: the right to deny an asymmetry
between the linguistic and the psychological depends on a preference for
rational a priori psychology and the linguistic predicament of the radical
interpreter. But the rapid developments in the linguistic and cognitive
sciences have given us reason to think that not all of the relevant
psychological material is to be had at that level by ordinary reflections on
observable behaviour. Facts about speaker's sensitivity to the constituent
structure of their sentences may be unreportable by the speakers'
themselves and yet these facts can be empirically confirmed and accessed
independently of radical interpretation. Doubtless, the attributionist will
deny the relevance of such so-called psychological facts to accounts of
meaning. Indeed, he will take the findings of empirical cognitive science
to have little to with the mental at all. This is due to his conception of
intentional psychology and its claim for exclusivity: the only genuine
psychological facts are the facts of rational psychology. So now we come up
against two questions to ask of interpretation theory : (i) Is this the right
description of our psychology? ; (ii) Do we need to consider facts about a
speaker's language other than those available to the radical interpreter on
the basis of ordinary reflection?
An answer to the first question depends both on comparisons with
alternative conceptions of the mental, and on an answer to the second
question. For if there are alternatives in the running, we need to know
why we should choose one over another, and the answer to (ii) will
provide the motivation. This will unfold slowly, so let me make a few
points now in advance.
Where there are alternatives to his picture (though the attributionist
will deny this), it will be no good asking him to consider which
conception of the mind gets the facts about meaning and mind right, since
he believes that the facts are determined by the theory, and the standards
of correctness in describing those facts are internal to the theory. One
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wants to know how many of the ordinary intuitive facts about a language
the radical interpreter can save in his account of linguistic meaning, but
the interpreter qua attributionist works to slacken our grip on that way of
looking at things, because he will insist that we have to collapse the
distinction between evidential and constitutive claims. Our scheme gives
our only grip on content, and the notion of pre-theoretic facts is put in
doubt. It is interpretation theory which organises the welter of hitherto
undifferentiated behaviour into descriptions of the mental and the
meaningful. There are no prior linguistic or psychological facts for the
interpreter to conform too because success in interpretation constitutes
such facts. So the attributions of belief and meaning to an agent are seen
through an interpreter's eyes; and what an interpreter singles out is
something that owes its identity to its place in a surrounding theory. Each
intentional description that can be given of a person's beliefs, or words, or
actions supports many other attributions that stand or fall together. And
now the gap between theory and evidence begins to close because we have
to describe bits of behavioural evidence in terms that are themselves bits
of the intentional theory. It seems that there is no getting at the pieces of
relevant behaviour independently of the high level descriptions which
organise and partition it. Of course, no single piece of behaviour is
guaranteed its particular intentional description - these might be revised
in the course of interpretation - but we always have to use the intentional
vocabulary of the attitudes to describe behaviour in the first place, or we
could not begin to filter out the sorts of linguistic activity the radical
interpreter is interested in: the cases of speakers' holding sentences true.
Now the vocabulary of intentional mental life demands a holistic fit with
its behavioural base, and it is just this holistic fit which obscures the link
between the theory of linguistic interpretation and its empirical evidence:
it is the holistic nature of the fit that confounds the attempt to essay more
local links between theoretical pronouncements and uninterpreted bits of
behaviour. We do not seek out evidence for an interpretation theory: we
try out theoretical descriptions as interpretations of the evidence in total.
Now there is only one way I can see to challenge this position directly -
indirect challenges would come from eliminativists or others who seek to
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replace interpretation theory and its constructs wholesale - and that is to
find instances of claims the interpreter is willing to make where he lacks
the materials to make them. This would show that there was something
seriously deficient with his picture. I intend to show that this is the case
with the claims he wants to make about language. This will involve
showing that there are certain claims about linguistic structure that are
simply not available when we restrict ourselves to the predicament of the
radical interpreter but which are assumed to be unproblematic. We might
be tempted to think that the predicament of the radical interpreter is an
epistemologically impoverished one and that it is only to be adopted
when we are dealing with a wholly foreign tongue. Surely, we should not
draw conclusions about all the facts there are about a language from the
results of radical interpretation. For surely the radical interpreter's project
is really unnecessary for discovering the empirical conditions on meaning
assignment when we attempt to provide a theory of meaning for the
language of speakers with whom we are able to converse. Here it seems
the evidence is more local and the scrupulous methods of the radical
interpreter are otiose. But this is not how Davidson sees it:
The problem of interpretation is domestic as well as foreign: it
surfaces for speakers of the same language in the form of the
question, how can it be determined that the language is the
same? Speakers of the same language can go on the assumption
that for them the same expressions are to be interpreted in the
same way, but this does not indicate what justifies the
assumption. All understanding of the speech of another
involves radical interpretation. (Davidson 1984, pi 25)
Given the extensive application of this method to questions of
linguistic interpretation we shall need to ask a supplementary question. Is
radical interpretation sufficiently discriminating to bring the facts of
linguistic meaning to light? In particular, is the methodology able to
substantiate the claim that the radical interpreter can describe all of the
linguistically meaningful sentences of a natural language. I shall suggest
that some aspects of this claim are simply not available on the
interpretive strategy. An argument of this form requires one to show that
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the radical interpreter lacks the materials to describe what he claims he
can describe quite explicitly. This is not an easy conclusion to prove since
it requires a fairly exhaustive investigation of the resources available to
the radical interpreter to make sure that he has no comeback to the
challenge levelled at him. Hence my fastidious discussion of the
Davidson programme. There is still a good deal further to go in
examining the materials and the justification for the interpreter's claims
to knowledge, for since the Davidsonian interpreter is concerned to
answer a Kantian question of how knowledge of others' language and
mind is possible we must not overlook any of the details that go into the
answer nor include anything which is not detailed in the account.
Davidson is offering not just a sufficient condition for such claims to
knowledge, but also a claim that this is the only sufficient condition. In
effect, what he is offering us is a transcendental argument telling us how
meaning and mind (or our knowledge of them) is possible.
Now I want to claim that in giving an account of linguistic
comprehension we do need to call on facts about language users which are
not available on the basis of a priori theorising; not least because the
concept of a language is not exhausted by a priori considerations. The
detailed discussion of this issue will begin with the case of syntax., which I
consider in the second half of this thesis. But for the moment I just want
to prime the reader to this issue by drawing attention to the following
point about the Davidson program. The cases of the sentential attitudes of
holding true are pivotal in the project of radical interpretation: they can be
identified without knowing either the meaning of the sentence or what
the speaker believes about the world. They provide the point of entry into
the speaker's intentional life, but at first these attitudes are identified by
their external characteristics alone (cf. knowing that a sentence is true
without knowing what proposition it expresses.) Initial descriptions of
holdings true open up a space in the mind of the speaker to be further
resolved into configurations of belief and meaning. This means that
holdings true must be recognised as genuinely mental attitudes -
attributions which carry commitments for the description of the rest of a
subject's mental life. But they are also psychological attitudes that reveal
103
Chapter Four
intentional relations between speakers and bits of their language. And
while the interpreter can know that a speaker holds a sentence true
without knowing its meaning or the belief an utterance of it expresses, it
is certainly not an attitude detectable without knowing which sentence
the speaker is holding true. Now the term 'sentence' has both an everyday
use and a more technical sense. It is the same notion that can be
recognised by individuals in an ordinary way, and described by linguists in
more technical terms. Ordinary speakers know which word strings are
sentences of their language, but they do not know how they know this.
Nor do they necessarily know what a sentence is. It is only when we turn
to linguistic theory that we get an adequate conception of this notion. As
linguists know, a sentence is not just an ordered string of words (as
ambiguity shows); it is a hierarchically structured grouping of constituents
which include both phrasal and lexical categories, and may include null
elements which have no phonetic realisation, (eg. Verb-Phrase ellipsis in
"Martin loves his cat and so does David ." ) These are intrinsic
features that are not exhibited in anything like the surface structure of a
sentence. They are described in syntactic theory and motivated by the gap
between what the word string makes available and what is needed to
determine the unique properties of a sentence with grammatical and
semantical relations to other sentences of that language. Now since
neither the a priori reflections of the interpreter, nor the facts about the
physically realised utterance bring these details to light, we should
conclude that our ordinary identification of sentences is neither a matter
of reasons nor causes alone; the identity conditions of sentences are
neither given by physics nor the folk, but by workers in empirical
linguistics, mindful of the fact that ordinary people do not identify
sentences in the terms linguists use to describe them. This makes it a very
good question how the radical interpreter knows which sentences the
speaker holds true. When the interpreter tries to work out the sentences
of a foreign language he needs nothing short of a detailed theory of syntax
which must be tested empirically and depends on facts about the speaker's
linguistic cognition. In a language that the interpreter knows, where he is
trying to determine whether he and the speaker mean the same by those
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sentences, he can already recognise the sentences involved but not as a
result of giving theoretical descriptions. There is a problem here which
has been too quickly glossed over.
Detailed arguments for the existence of such syntactic features and
their grasp by ordinary speakers must await my discussion of the work of
Noam Chomsky, but let me suggest a controversial conclusion that will be
made out in full in what follows. It is that when the radical interpreter
postulates intentional relations between speakers and their sentences he is
not simply alluding to facts about the existence of mental attitudes to be
resolved by interpretation: he has already entered the mind of the speaker
via the identity of the sentence recognised, for syntactic knowledge
depends on certain internal configurations in the speaker. Identifications
of the sentences a speaker holds true carry implications for the cognitive
structuring and processes of his mind. And so far as he can identify them,
they carry similar implications for the cognitive organisation of the
interpreter. The full range of relevant syntactic details are neither
conceptualised by the speaker nor the interpreter, they are neither physical
processes nor propositional attitudes, but they are encoded in the
cognitive states of a language user and put to use in processes that
facilitate the necessary transitions from sound to meaning.
Now for Davidson it was the a priori theory which was supposed to
help us to make these transitions from sound to meanings; and while I do
not doubt that these transitions are made possible on the basis of
everything available to the interpreter, they are not available to him as
Davidson conceives it. It is not the radical interpreter, as a priori theorist,
who brings all the linguistic facts to light, it is the radical interpreter as
language user, apprised of various syntactic details, who can recognise the
linguistic character of another person's behaviour and attitudes. These
syntactic aspects of a language are not imposed on the surface of a
speaker's practice by intentional re-description, rather they depend on
cognitive structures that are causally implicated in acts of speech
recognition and other linguistic capacities of speakers and interpreters.
They are aspects of cognition that give form and character to a speaker's
linguistic behaviour and knowledge.
105
Chapter Four
Now if the Davidsonian interpreter is supposed to recognise
something as elaborate as the sentence structure of English, he must show
how this can be manufactured on the basis of knowledge of certain a
priori principles and observations of a speaker's behaviour. The empirical
alternative is to base one's theory on linguistic data concerning speaker's
intuitions, their language acquisition and development; as well as on
constraints of psychological simplicity, psychological processing and on
the data from language deficits. This suggests a rather different relation
between linguistics and psychology; and it will be wholly illegitimate for
the Davidsonian to claim knowledge of what is linguistically described
and explained while repudiating this form of psychology. He must offer
us his own route to a recognition of the grammatically well-formed
sentences of a language, using no more than the ordinary intentional
idiom. No-one doubts that we know how to pick out sentences in a
language we have come across before, but interpretation theory is meant
to give us an explicit account of how we do this. Once again it is obvious
that one can know how to do this without knowing how one does it.
What is rather less obvious is why the the account of how we do it
belongs with the rational a priori theorising of the radical interpreter.
What we need from Davidson is more of the details of how linguistic
interpretation is carried out, and I shall turn to this in a moment. But
notice that Davidson does admit that it is an aspect of interpreting a
speaker that:
in passing from a description that does not interpret [his
uttering of certain words] to interpreting description [his saying
something by means of them], we must introduce a machinery
of words and expressions (which may or may not be exemplified
in actual utterances). (Davidson 1984, p!26)
However, we need to know what that machinery is and what if
anything it is working. Linguistic structures will have to be postulated in
the course of introducing sub-sentential items, but it is the whole thrust of
the interpreter's stance that if illumination is to be had we must not
presuppose notions more mysterious than the explanandum. This is one
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of the attractions of radical interpretation: it promises elucidation of the
notion of meaning without merely presupposing it. The same should
hold for linguistic structures and the invocation of "machinery". Now
when we try to elucidate the notion of linguistic structure and logical
form we are offered very little. Either the radical interpreter presupposes
structure (as in the syntactical case) or he refers us to the idea that it is the
deductive structure of the theory that articulates the semantic structure of
a language. But on the latter view we need to know whether the semantic
machinery of the theory follows the psychological contours of the
speaker's competence (or prescribes them); or whether it is purely an
artefact of theory. As Martin Davies neatly points out, the idea of
deductively revealed semantic structure:
...can be given a more a prioristic or a more empirical slant. For
the structure to be articulated may be considered as an abstract
(or mathematical) structure or as a psychological structure.
(Davies 1986, pl31)
If it is treated in the former way I will still want to know how the
interpreter has access to it. This is crucial since Davidson ends up by
assuming that there is no asymmetry between speaker and interpreter.
Whatever he says about semantic structure, I submit that he will be
unable to account for syntactic structure, and that furthermore, his
interpreter will have implicitly acknowledged empirically confirmable
details about psychological structure when he identifies the sentences a
speaker holds true; that these empirical details, concerning a speaker's
cognitive equipment, are part the speaker's mind challenges Davidson's a
priori conceptions of the mental. These conclusions have yet to be made
out in detail but it is as well to have them in front of us as we examine
further the workings of Davidson's semantic programme.
4.5) Putting the Empirical Constraint to Work
Now that we know what the interpretative requirement on linguistic
theory must look like, we must see how it can be met. The claim is that it
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is only by applying a theory to the undifferentiated evidence that the
interpreter can extract an account of linguistic meaning from a speaker's
linguistic behaviour. And now via the theory and the empirical adequacy
condition we get an account of what it is for a sentence to take the
meaning it does: for a sentence the speaker utters to have the meaning
assigned to it by semantic theory the content-specification must pull its
weight in the best interpretation we can give of that speaker. But now a
potential problem looms for the notion of individual sentence meaning. If
what it is for the sentence "Socrates flies" to mean, on the lips of the
speaker, that Socrates flies, is for that assignment of meaning to pull its
weight in an overall account that gives the best interpretation of his
behaviour, then this formula will apply to every other sentence too. The
sentence "Katy lied" will mean what it does on the same speaker's lips if
its meaning assignment pulls its weight in the best interpretation of him.
We will be reduced to giving the conditions for each sentence's meaning
what it does in exactly the same way. There is no difference in the
empirical conditions that support the assignment of meaning to the
different sentences. The same condition makes those sentences mean
different things. How can this be? Davidson's answer, if he can sustain it,
will have to be that the theory of meaning, which as we know for him is a
Tarskian theory of truth, will have to give different specifications of the
meanings or interpretations of individual sentences. So let us now look at
how this is to done.
The total evidence for the theory of truth consists in those intentional
speech acts where the speaker reveals his behaviour with respect to whole
sentences. What a Tarskian theory of truth has to do is to provide a
recursive characterisation of truth for the speaker's language L which
would enable us to specify truth conditions for his sentences. The
condition of material adequacy Tarski placed on this project was
Convention T, the condition that the theory should entail for each
declarative sentence in the language a theorem of the form:
(T) S is true-in-L iff p
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where instances of this form (called T-sentences) could be obtained by
replacing "S" with a sentence in L, while replacing "p" with a sentence in
the language of the theory that translates "S". Obviously, Davidson cannot
rely on translation to get at truth for L, so he relies on an intuitive
(language-neutral) notion of truth to get at interpretation. What we might
call Davidson's Convention D, would be as before, except to say that
instances of (T) are obtained by replacing "S" with a canonical description
of a sentence of the speaker's language L, while replacing "p" with a
sentence of the interpreter's language with the same truth conditions as
"S". To be interpretative, the truth conditions a theory assigns must be
those which service the project of overall interpretation of the speaker.
What an interpretational theory of truth then has to show is how the
truth conditions of all and only the declarative sentences of L are
determined as theorems. (Non-declaratives are assumed to be explained by
some relation to declaratives described by a suitable theory of force.) The
attributionist thought, here, will be that how the truth theory determines
the truth conditional meanings of sentences in L provides a sufficient
account of how the meanings of those sentences are determined; and since
there is no other access to the facts described by a correct theory, the
theoretical derivations provide the only sufficient explanation of how
those meanings are determined. There can be no other account of how the
meanings of sentences of L are determined for its speakers: the truth-
theoretic explanation of how meanings are determined constitutes these
facts. This idea will provide many of the conclusions we can draw about
the Davidsonian programme, so let us suspend it temporarily and proceed
to discover how the account of linguistic interpretation unfolds.
Construction of the truth theory proceeds by finding a finite set of axioms
from which all and only the T-theorems can be
109
Chapter Four
derived. Such an axiomatised theory for a speaker would satisfy
Convention D and show how the truth conditions (meaning) of any
arbitrary sentence of his language were determined. A further claim will
be that this is a compositional account; that is, the theory will show the T-
theorem for any given sentence to be determined on the basis of a
semantic structure it describes for the sentence in question. Seeing a
sentence as having semantic structure is a matter of seeing its semantic
value, here, its truth or falsity, as depending on the semantic features of
its parts and the inner structure of that sentence. The truth theory will
display this by having the T-theorems for a sentence deducible from
axioms that assign semantic properties to simple expressions occurring in
that sentence together with clauses that deal with their modes of
combination. The semantic features assigned to simple expressions must
show their truth-affecting potential, and this is achieved when the axioms
that assign them can be used in proofs of theorems that specify the truth
conditions of whole sentences. But these aspects of sub-sentential
semantics are not discovered by examining the empirical evidence: the fit
between the theory and the physical facts it re-describes is at the level of
the theorems. The compositional aspects of this account of meaning are
theoretical assumptions that have to be justified somehow. As Davidson
puts it:
A workable theory must, of course, treat sentences as
concatenations of expressions of less than sentential length, it must
introduce semantical notions like satisfaction and reference, and it
must appeal to an ontology of sequences and the objects ordered by
sequences. All this apparatus is properly viewed as a theoretical
construction, beyond the reach of direct verification. It has done its
work provided only it entails testable results in the form of T-
sentences, and these make no mention of the machinery.
(Davidson 1984, pl33)
The question is do these theoretical notions have any 'indirect
verification' ? To assess this we must confront the whole issue of the
systematicity of semantic theory, and I turn now to this.
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4.6) Formal Constraints on Truth Theory
A truth theory which really does describe how the meanings of a
speaker's sentences are determined will get the facts about that language
right. But what are those facts? It has been acknowledged that the only
empirical facts to go on concern a speaker's use of whole sentences. And
yet the truth theory tries to determine the truth conditional meanings of
sentences on the basis of the semantic features of their parts. Why should
it look into the internal structure of sentences if all that is required is to
provide interpretations of sentences that will pull their weight in the
reason-giving explanations? This is to question the need in an
interpretational truth theory for a requirement of system.
First of all, what is this requirement of systematicity? It is a demand
that we should see the meanings we attribute to a speaker's sayings as
"determined by the contributions of distinguishable parts...of utterances,
each of which may occur, making the same contribution, in a multiplicity
of utterances." (McDowell 1978, pl21) But now why should a theory aim to
be systematic. Well, it might be argued, there are compositional facts about
natural languages, and a systematic theory will reflect them. But this line
of response is not open to an attributionist who sees linguistic facts about
meaning as constituted by theoretically well-motivated descriptions of
linguistic behaviour. At this stage all we can say is that the project of
radical interpretation is systematic, not that the language is; and if
anything, for the attributionist, the language will be systematic because
radical interpretation is. But what we want to know is why radical
interpretation assumes systematicity.
Is there is any less loaded way of expressing the need for system in
interpretation? I think there might be, and that this may well be what
Davidson is aiming at. The intuitive idea was that the interpretations we
can give of someone's language seem to have some authority when they
bring out the system in someone's language. This thought was then larded
with the further claim that there was some system in the speaker's
language which a correct truth theory would be capable of tracking.
However, there is a different way to read the intuitive idea that suggests
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that it is because interpreters are systematic in interpretation - seeking out
many different points from which to fix on the meaning of some predicate
expression - that the behaviour we are interpreting is given its distinctive
linguisticality. The claim will be that the linguisticality of a subject's
behaviour will consist in the interpreter's being able to deploy
compositional resources to give a systematic interpretation of those
mouthings.
This reply would, I think, serve the Davidsonian attributionist much
better than the claim that the need for finite axiomatisation, or the need to
explain speakers' capacities to understand any of potential infinity of
sentences on a finite basis, requires systematicity. The first is redundant
when we are dealing with a large but finite language, and the second
should be no part of the attributionist's task given that he denies that
there are any theory-independent psychological facts underlying linguistic
behaviour. Instead, the systematicity constraint would be justified by the
need to treat some parts of a speaker's total behavioural output as in
essence linguistic. In this vein, recall Davidson's remarks about 'inducing
semantic structure' on sentences on the basis of speaker's actions and
dispositions to act. He can tell us in theoretical terms how we can do this:
...the kind of structure required seems either identical with or
closely related to the kind given by a definition of truth along the
lines first expounded by Tarski, for such a definition provides an
effective method for determining what every sentence means (ie.
gives the conditions under which it is true). (Davidson 1984, p8)
What Davidson cannot tell us is why such a theory is successful when
it is at treating people's behaviour in such a systematic way. Why do we
get away with it? The question will seem misconceived to the
attributionist, but I think it is hard to resist the idea that there is
something in virtue of which the theory is true when successful, and
whose absence would explain why, in some cases, the theory would not
work. The explanation would have to be given in terms of facts about the
underlying psychological structure of language users. Of course such an
answer is not open to Davidson, because his claim to exclusivity on the
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mental, leads him to say that there could be no such psychological facts for
successful theories to be about. We shall see.
Returning to the need for systematicity to support a claim that one is
giving linguistic interpretations of behaviour, we can see that this feature
of interpretations will provide a gloss on Davidson's reasons for thinking
that the two component view of why a speaker holds a sentence true
cannot be reduced to the single component of belief. No such Gricean
reduction is on the cards so long as we must interpret so as to describe a
linguistic system. The Gricean strategy would give us no insight into the
character of a speaker's language. Furthermore, this claim for system in
language may help with our earlier problem of how to separate out
accounts of individual sentence meaning from the point of view of the
interpreter, where we found that under the requirement of serviceability
in the project of interpretation, they were all given exactly the same
account in terms of their pulling their weight in making best sense
possible of the speaker. Now we might be able to give systematic
descriptions of their structure and their parts and, in terms of these, the
relations they bear to one another. If these notions can be substantiated
them so can the notion of sentence meaning.
Attributionists are also inclined to suppose that these facts about
linguistic systematicity are what underpins our right to think of beliefs
and other attitudes as having structured contents with conceptual
constituents. The linguistic means of expressing and interpreting
ourselves and others carves the contents of thoughts into concepts. This is
the largely Fregean idea that the composition of a sentence serves to
determine what thought it expresses and thus displays the conceptual
elements involved in grasping that thought. For example, the order of
composition matters when determining which of two thoughts is
expressed by the ambiguous sentence, "Everybody loves someone". The
different orders of composition reveal that on one reading the sentence
contains the monadic predicate, " loves someone" and on the other,
the different monadic predicate, "everybody loves Neither
semantically interpreted sentence contains the other. Thus in the first case,
the predicate expresses the concept of loving someone which has the
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property that everyone has it. In the second case, we have a predicate that
expresses the concept of everyone's having love for something which has
the property of being instantiated by at least one individual. Thus the two
different thoughts expressed by each reading are explained by the different
concepts exercised in each, and this is explained by our understanding of
two different expressions wrought by different orders of composition of
the same string of words.
However, this view may seem to raise a new threat. The systematic
properties that radical interpretation ascribes to natural language
prevented the reduction of linguistic meaning to speakers' beliefs and
intentions. But in the light of the above view of the linguistic
identification of concepts they might seem to threaten the other
component of the two factor story; viz. the notion of belief. For the
suggestion seems be that the only understanding we can have of belief is
that given in terms of the thinker's or the ascriber's potential for
expressing a belief by a sentence in a public language. However, this view
would not dispense with the belief-factor in the reasons for holding
sentences, true, it would simply give a certain explanatory prominence to
the linguistic side of interpreting a person's thought and action.
Davidson, McDowell, and Dummett all subscribe to this thesis. Dummett
has called the language-first doctrine the Fundamental Thesis of Analytic
Philosophy (and more recently, the Fundamental Thesis of Linguistic
Philosophy); it states that any account of thought should go via an account
of the language in which that thought is expressed.
This thesis is quite compatible with the conviction that an account of
language belongs to a larger account of making sense which presents a
plausible description of the speaker's psychology. But if that is the case
what would a denial of the Fundamental Thesis amount to? A recent
example of its denial would be the thought-theoretic account of content
given by Gareth Evans in The Varieties of Reference. In that work, Evans
supposes that a proper treatment of the devices of linguistic reference rests
upon a prior account of a speaker's capacity to entertain certain kinds of
singular thoughts. The theory of thought will describe how particular
kinds of singular thoughts relate the thinker to objective particulars. But
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notice that although Evans may be reversing Dummett's explanatory
priorities of thought and language, he still has need of both semantical
and psychological theories. He will explain the sameness or difference in
the senses of linguistic expressions in terms of the speaker's ways of
thinking of the referents of those expressions. So he is not trying to
replace the theory of truth that serves as a theory of linguistic senses by
the theory of thought that informs it. The upshot is that on both of these
non-reductive accounts of thought and language there is room for the two
factor account of holding a sentence true. Moreover, the issue of whether
we adopt thought-first or language-first theories is orthogonal to the issue
of whether there is any significant semantic structure in natural language.
On my reading of him, Davidson wants to see system as an essential
characteristic of language. The question will be whether he is entitled to do
so. To assess this we must look at how the empirical requirement of
interpretability and the formal requirement of system interact.
4.7) Truth Theory and the Physical Facts
When the interpreter begins to construct a recursive characterisation
of truth for the language of a subject all he has to go on are the
uninterpreted physical facts about that subject's behaviour. Prior to
interpretation these facts cannot be described in content-specifying terms,
and yet, even at this stage these facts must constrain the construction of
truth theory. For if they failed to do so, it would be hard to see how a
speaker's physical circumstances placed any constraints on how we could
interpret him. We could simply dream up an analytic definition of his
language and mind without reference to the particularities of his case.
Clearly, then, there have to be some points of contact between truth
theories and the kind of evidential facts which can support them. Let us
now look at these.
To begin with there is the level McDowell calls "the hard physical
facts" (McDowell 1978, pl22). Facts at this level comprise "the structural
properties of physical utterance-events" (Ibid) which enable us to
construct a syntactic description of the language together with the complex
1 1 5
Chapter Four
relations between a speaker's behaviour and his environment which will
permit the initial and tentative identification of some of his behaviour as
intentional action. Identifications of the latter sort will depend partly on
making imaginative leaps to interpretations within the content-specifying
mode of discourse; these intentional descriptions must be sustained in the
developing interpretation, or eventually overturned. But identifications
of the former kind are less easily revised: they are based on an assumed
relation of match between the structural descriptions in the theory of
syntax and "configurations observable in physical utterance-events" (Ibid.)
It is not at all obvious what is supposed to be 'observable' in the physical
events of utterance, but the tenor of McDowell's remarks suggest that
syntactic properties of a language are just physical properties of sounds.
Sounds, moreover, which are initially not even described as speech
sounds. As McDowell puts it, we should think of a theory of language:
...as warranting systematic imposition of interpreting descriptions
on a range of potential behaviour which would constitute speech in
the language, thought of as describable, in advance of receiving the
interpreting descriptions, only as emission of noise. (1977, pl47)
What we need now is to know more about the interpreting
descriptions supplied in the theory, along with some account of how they
make contact with the hard physical facts. Earlier we noted that the only
linguistic evidence we have is at the level of speaker's use of whole
sentences, presumably because the hard facts about the noise emissions
are only registered as linguistic behaviour once the interpreter has made a
tentative identification of the partially interpreted attitude of a speaker's
holding a sentence true. These facts about the use of whole sentences will
also be facts about the constituent syntactic structure of the sentence, since
this is also made available by the "hard physical facts". All we need to note
now is that on the side of the theory, it is the theorems that record
interpretations of linguistic behaviour, since it is at this level of Tarski-
style truth theory that interpretation-serving assignments of meanings
(truth conditions) are given to whole sentences. So it is at the level of its
theorems that an interpretational truth theory makes contact with the
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hard physical facts. Though it does this through the tentative
identifications of a speaker's intentional relation to a sentence. This is a
two stage process. Interpretation must effect a transition from the raw
behavioural evidence to descriptions like:
(H): X holds "S" true when and only when p
and from there to: "S" is true-in-L iff p
which as we know is the target schema all of whose instances must be
proved for the truth theory to satisfy Convention (D). But satisfaction of
this condition will not yet amount to interpretation for we could have
many truth theories for a language like English which allowed us to
prove theorems of the form:
(T!) "Coal is a fossilised carbon" is true-in-E iff grass is green
Here Convention (D) is met just because we have a sentence on the
right-hand side that is true under the same conditions as the sentence
mentioned on the left, and so long as we are dealing with the material
biconditional this will be a true consequence of candidate truth theories in
which it can be proved. But it is obvious what we should say here. The
evidence for an interpretational truth theory does not concern any one T-
sentence considered in isolation. We have to look at the whole range of T-
sentences provable from a theory with the resources to prove this one. So
long as any such theory is systematic, it will pair the expressions it
describes in the left-hand sentence with the same expression each time on
the right-hand side. Indeed this correlation will be recorded explicitly in
the axioms which serve as premisses for derivations of T-theorems for
sentences containing those expressions. Now in such a case it is unlikely
that all of the T-sentence pairings involving the expressions and
assignments used in (T!) will be true. To try to bring the theory back to
conformity with the evidence we would have to violate the requirement
of systematicity by allowing the very same expression to be given different
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interpretations on different occasions of use. Not only would this spoil
our chances of interpretation, by ruling out the possibilities of our finding
multiple points from which to get a fix on any particular expression; it
would also violate the holistic interdependencies whereby the correct
interpretation of each speech act is given in the light of all others. It is the
totality of T-sentences derivable within any T-theory that we must use to
test the interpretation a theorem gives of any particular sentence. The
legitimacy of a given truth theory cannot be tested by one or another T-
sentence: we must test the whole theory and all its logical consequences.
Holism and systematicity are mutually reinforcing in conspiring to
constrain the choice of genuinely interpretative theories of truth.
4.8) Systematicity and Epistemological Holism
Interpretation provides our only understanding of the mind: minds
and their contents are what we attribute to people in the course of
interpreting them as agents. So the formal and empirical constraints on
interpretation provide the contents of the mind with whatever
significance they have. The crucial importance of these constraints
consists in the sorts of intentional notions they make possible. Linguistic
interpretation plays a central role in the strategy of the interpreter so we
need to know exactly what is made available by linguistic interpretation of
someone's language. I have suggested that on Davidson's account the
factors which make it possible are systematicity and the holism of attitude
ascription. We need now to see just how they do this and precisely what
range of linguistic meanings they prescribe.
Systematicity requires us to discern a common feature in the
interpretation of sentences which contain the same linguistic expression.
Holism requires us to adjust the interpretation of each sentence uttered to
the interpretation of all others. The holistic constraint is entailed by the
fact that the evidence for sentence interpretation will be the speaker's
attitudes and actions directed towards sentences and utterances; in this
way sentence interpretation must be sensitive to the possibilities of belief
ascription. Systematicity is needed so that our attempts to interpret, in
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taking in all other aspects of a speaker's mental life, should be more than
just a case of propositional attitude ascription; they must be
interpretations of a linguistic system.
It is important to notice, here, that postulation of system does not
entail holism: the holism Davidson finds in the facts about meaning are
imbibed through the evidential-cum-constitutive conditions for fixing
meanings and beliefs. What system does provide us with is a means of
projecting meanings from the evidence of sentences actually used by the
speaker to those in the range he could potentially utter. However, holism
disrupts the stability of this picture. Any projected interpretation of new
cases that are tested against speakers' responses may well be discontinued
if they do not sit well with the best interpretation of the speaker's total
behaviour when we incorporate these additions to his repertoire. These
cases can lead to revisions in the systematic patterns already offered. Thus
projection is a risky business - there may be many ways to project all
equally compatible with the total evidence available at a given time. But
not all of them will stand up in the light of further behavioural evidence
(the hard physical facts and the initially conjectured attitude ascriptions).
Here we see why it is holism that breathes life into the system. Systematic
descriptions must be at the same time rational explanations.
But of course the holistic possibilities must be developed in league
with some type of system, so where there are choices available to the
interpreter we want to know both what range of systematic descriptions
he can work with, and on what basis he chooses between candidates
within that range.
Supposing for a moment that there are a number of possibilities, we
can see how more and more confirmations of projected interpretation
will deepen his confidence that he has the right view of the actual
fragment of the language he has interpreted. And it is this increased
confidence in giving interpretationally sound linguistic descriptions of a
speaker's utterance that will lead the interpreter to attribute a language to
a speaker characterised by the semantic features and structures of the
system he is using. But of course he can only begin to project to new cases
by reading structure into the sentences he encounters in speaker's practice.
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What he has to search for is a system of semantic features and internal
structuring on which to base an inference from old cases to new: from the
facts about combination as he sees them to the possibilities of re¬
combination permitted by the speaker. Increasing one's confidence that
one had latched on to, what we might call, a good system for interpreting
someone's language will enable one to individuate that person's beliefs
more precisely; in particular it will enable one to detect false beliefs of the
speaker.
So how does the interpreter construct a truth theory for someone else's
language? It works like this. The common features discerned in
interpretations of sentences sharing an expression will be semantic
features from which we can assemble truth conditions for whole
sentences. These semantic features will be assigned to expressions by the
axioms of the theory, and they will serve, in concert with similar axioms,
as premisses in the deduction of theorems that specify the truth
conditions of sentences containing those expressions. So a systematic
truth theory must be structurally insightful in the sense that it must
assign to sentences truth conditions on the basis of their semantic parts
and their internal structures. However, different axiomatisations will lead
to different structural insights and so what we need to know are the
parameters within which we can give axiomatisations of a truth theory
for a speaker's language. The remarks so far have given only the briefest
indication of what these semantic features and structures should be like.
But when it comes to the question of what Davidson thinks of as fixing
semantic structure, we find that he has very fixed ideas. Davidson believes
that whatever the choices of axiomatisation are, they must all take the
form of a Tarskian semantics. Let us quickly sketch out this assumption.
The sentences held true by a speaker provide crucial evidence of
theorems which belong to the set of all theorems we want to prove. The
theorist's job is to select the smallest set of axioms from which to derive
those T-sentences. To do this the theory must be structure-discerning. For
it is only by thinking of sentences in terms of parts and wholes that one
can see the projected truth conditions of new sentences as being based on
the truth conditions of the old ones. With the right formal conditions the
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truth conditions for new sentences can be computed as functions of the
permissible permutations of the semantic parts of the old ones.
This was the justification of compositional structure given by Tarski in
the original semantic definition of truth. Tarski wanted to give a uniform
semantical account of the logical operators, but the semantic treatment of
them as truth functions from the set of truth values onto itself broke
down in the case of the quantifiers. The truth values of logically complex
sentences with a quantifier dominant could not be treated as a function of
the truth-values of their parts, for their parts were not sentences and thus
were not truth-evaluable. Tarski solved the problem of uniformity while
retaining the idea of the operators as functions by introducing the notion
of satisfaction conditions to give the semantic values of not just sentences
but also what he called open sentences: sentences with the quantifier
prefix removed. An open sentence was one which could be satisfied by an
infinite sequence of objects by treating the unbound variable in the
sentence as a temporary name for one of the objects in that sequence. A
closed sentence with all its variables bound is one that is satisfied by all
sequences or none at all. Tarski defines truth as the first of these
conditions. In this way he is able to treat the satisfaction of logically
complex sentences uniformly as a function of the satisfaction conditions
of their parts, while still being able to account for the truth of whole
sentences. The importance of this development for our purposes was that
it led Tarski to look for structure inside the atomic sentences, normally
treated as wholes on accounts of the propositional constants, and this
gave rise to the possibility of a structure-discerning theory of truth.
Turning to an axiomatic theory of truth, we have to import another
notion of subsentential semantics, namely the reference of singular terms.
Tarski neglected these since his concern was with the variable in
quantified sentences. But by adding this notion to those of truth,
satisfaction and combination we have the semantical materials to
construct a finitely axiomatised theory of truth. The axioms will look like
this:
(Rl) "Socrates" denotes Socrates
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(SI) An object satisfies "flies" iff it flies.
(CI) A sentence combining a name n with a predicate F
is true iff the name denoted by n satisfies F.
From axioms like these together with a canonical set of proof
procedures we can prove theorems like:
(Tl) "Socrates flies" is true-in-L iff Socrates flies.
All such T-sentences must be deductively derived from a finite set of
axioms that deal with expressions and constructions that occur in
sentences on their left-hand sides. The axioms selectively called upon to
prove any particular T-sentence for a given sentence of L will reveal the
semantically significant constituents and the logical form the theory
assigns to that sentence. In this way, the axiom structure of the theory
shows how the reference (interpretation) of an expression contributes to
the truth conditions (interpretation) of sentences in which it occurs, thus
conferring on it a significant semantic role. And it can do this because the
canonical proofs of T-sentences reveal the semantic structure the truth
theory assigns to object language sentences.
But do these semantic features and structures characterise properties of
a speaker's language? To answer this we must turn from the formal
constraints to the empirical ones again, and ask what makes such a truth
theory a theory of interpretation?
An acceptable truth theory will be one whose T-sentences are
confirmed by the interpreted evidence about the sentences a speaker holds
true (adjusted for false beliefs). The object of linguistic interpretation is to
provide the right assignment of truth conditions and these can be thought
of as the acceptable T-sentences at which a correct theory must aim. So the
important part of the semantic enterprise, so far as interpretation is
concerned, is the empirically testable output of truth theory. Indeed this is
the only level at which the truth theory makes contact with the evidence
since the only linguistic evidence there can be is evidence about the use of
whole sentences. However, that level of evidence is meant to be revealing
122
Chapter Four
about the syntactic structure of the sentence, at least if we can believe the
story that says syntactic structuring is just a property of the physical facts of
utterance. Now we must imagine the interpreter constructing a truth
theory that employs the notions of reference and satisfaction to derive all
and only the acceptable T-sentences for a given language. But what is it to
say that a given T-sentence has adequately characterised a speaker's
language? All empirical adequacy requires is that it should get the truth
conditions right: that the pronouncements of the theory should meet the
Propositional Attitude Constraint. But of course the formal constraints
put conditions on notions below the level of the sentence. The truth
theorist has to supply axioms that specify the references of simple
expressions in L, together with axioms or rules that specify the semantic
impact of combining them in particular constructions. Is there any
empirical evidence to support the axioms? Not directly, as we know, but
they might be said to be indirectly evidentially supported just in case they
enable us to derive the right set of T-sentences. The T-theory would be
anchored to the facts not at the level of axioms but at the level of
theorems. The deductive means for getting from axioms to theorems
would appear to be irrelevant so long as they permitted the derivation of
empirically adequate theorems. (In fact very little is needed here: minimal
logic would suffice.) But it is the internal workings of the truth theory that
allow us to read semantically significant structure into sentences: the
semantic structure of a sentence is not exhibited in its T-sentence but in
the structure of the proof by which it was derived. All the evidence the
radical interpreter has to go on is a pattern of truth-values assigned by
speakers to sentences of the language under specific conditions given by
the beliefs we can ascribe to them about what is the case when they assent
to those sentences. It looks as though the theoretical notions needed to
describe how those truth-values are determined can only be confirmed
from the theorems up. But now, if there is any other way of tracing back
up to a different set of axioms and proofs confirmed by the very same
theorems then we have a distinction without an empirical difference.
Does this last claim show that notions of structure and the references
of sub-sentential expressions have no empirical content? Well, we have
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to be careful here. What we know is that the empirical and formal
adequacy conditions do not coincide. The formal conditions govern the
deductive direction from theorems to axioms dealing with the inner
composition of sentences, whereas the empirical conditions relate to the
output of the theory at the level of theorems. But this is not to claim that
there is no connection between the two types of conditions. Perhaps, the
empirical content of an adequate truth theory flows back up through the
derivational structure of the theory, transmitting content to the axioms
indirectly through the multiplicity of connections they enjoy with the
testable T-sentences they give rise to. This would allow us to see each T-
sentence containing a given expression as providing a point from which
to fix the content of the axioms that deals with it. Just so long as we are
systematic there will be good evidence to think of a word as having the
semantic feature we use to arrive at more and more interpreting
descriptions of sentences containing it. It might be fair to say that the
semantic properties of words that the axioms record are abstracted from
the semantic properties (truth conditions) of sentences in which they
appear.
Now we can see a way of putting the constraints together: T-theories
should generate all and only the correct T-sentences for the language in
question; evidence at the level of these output theorems would confer
empirical adequacy on the formally correct theories that give rise to them.
However, a major difficulty arises at this point. What are we to say of
empirically adequate theories that implement the formal constraints in
different ways. Whenever there are different sets of axioms and proof-
theories that enable us to derive the same set of T-sentences as theorems
they will count as equally adequate but empirically equivalent truth
theories. Does this makes it a theoretical insight rather than an empirical
discovery that the truth values of a speaker's sentences are determined by
the semantic properties of their constituents under some arrangement?
Then the claim to be able find semantical features of subsentential
expressions depends less on the linguistic practice of the speaker and more
on the theoretical principles that impose structure on sentences as a
formal requirement of theory. Notice that this answer will give us no clue
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as to how the empirical consequences can put pressure on the form of the
theory by transmitting falsity from theorems to axioms in incorrect
theories. There is a world of difference between finding that there are
many axiom pools from which to prove the target biconditional, and
finding that a disconfirmed T-sentence must lead to a shift in the
resources from which it was derived. In this way, the upwards
transmission of falsity from theorems to axioms forces revisions in the
theory and thus gives rise to a shift in intra-sentential insights on the
language. But the trouble is that empirical pressure of this sort is merely
pressure to change, but it comes without instruction of what to change.
(Borrowing a phrase from work on the diagnoses of error in computer
programs this could be called "The assignment of blame problem".) We
could revise the proof theory for example, which could lead to a change in
the proof structure of theorems; or alternatively we could revise some of
the axioms. Davidson denies us the chance of changing the logic since he
says we must read into the language we interpret as much of our
quantificational structure as is necessary to carry out the interpreter's task.
Besides, the choice of logic is not important within the theory since even
minimal logic will enable us to derive the biconditionals. The revisions
must be made to the axioms. These include axioms dealing with specific
constructions so revisions to the structurally-insightful descriptions we
give to a language are still possible. Ideally, what we want to know is how
much choice there is here in how we make the revisions. Care must be
taken since we test T-sentences not singly but as a whole, so we must
adjust the axiomatic resources of the theory in such a way that the revised
theory is assured of empirical adequacy. But even still, choices may
remain, and the point is that there will be no empirical way to chose
between them.
Does this mean that there is no empirical content to the structure-
discerning aspects of truth theory? There is as much content as the
evidence for T-theorems confers upon them. I suppose the follow up to
that answer would be a question about the likelihood on this framework
of massive indeterminacy within the structure of individual sentences.
How likely is it, when empirical push comes to shove, that there will be a
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huge variety of axiomatisations that will all guarantee the right set of
theorems as output? Davidson thinks the fact that we have to take into
account the totality of T-sentences and that we have to bring to bear on
that totality a systematic truth theory in the Tarski-style, means that a
good deal of indeterminacy will be brought under control, (see Davidson
1984, p228) But this answer highlights the fact that it is the theorist's
assumption of system and not the empirical facts that give rise to the
logical form of a sentence. It is the deductive apparatus of truth theory
that induces structure on the sentences a speaker uses. Davidson speaks of
the deductive apparatus as theoretical machinery that makes no showing
in the verifiable parts of a theory. He says that a T-theory has done its
work provided that it entails testable results in the form of T-sentences. So
should we conclude that the intra-sentential insights are just empirically
irrelevant? Would any means of getting to the right theorems suffice? It
seems to me that Davidson should be in a quandry here. It is the
assumption of system that allows him to persevere with interpretation
when faced with such bare evidential materials, and the assumption
seems like a purely a priori speculative principle. But once again one
wants to ask why does the assumption work when it does? Why do the
revisions of T-theories in the light of disconfirmed projections sometimes
work out and sometimes not? Qua attributionist, Davidson has no
answers to these questions: we know a priori when the theory is
successful because we know a priori when the empirical conditions
support such theoretical descriptions.
The question was how much does the empirical evidence constrain
the choice of axiomatic truth theories, and why? On my reading of him,
Davidson, tells us that the only pressure exerted on the choice of
axiomatisation comes from the formal requirements of system and the
interpretative demands of the Propositional Attitude Constraint. He
proclaims:
A theory of truth thus reconciles the demand for a theory that
articulates grammatical structure with the demand for a theory that




But how much empirical life do these two requirements, acting in
concert, breath into the semantic structures of sentences and the axioms of
truth theory from which we derive truth conditions for those sentences?
The Propositional Attitude Constraint is itself a source of indeterminacy:
we know that the anomalous mental leaves room for more than one
configuration of internal states and intentional actions that enjoy a fit
with the patterns in a normal person's behaviour. So this will lead to
indeterminacy about choice of truth theory. Secondly, we know that the
references of expressions recorded in the axioms enjoy no direct fit with
the empirical evidence of linguistic practice, and so where different
reference assignments to words are compatible with the same systematic
assignments of truth-values to whole sentences, there will be
indeterminacy of reference. And lastly, we have Davidson's merest hint
that in choosing the Tarski-style format to realise his assumption of
systematicity in linguistic theory, he will have cut down on a great deal of
indeterminacy to do with logical form. Indeterminacy will arise whenever
there is a range of formal options within a theoretical setting that make
no empirical difference whatsoever. The crucial question is to determine
just what tolerances we have to work to when formulating the means to
implement an interpretive truth theory. The interpretive needs are met
by "showing how the theory can be supported by relating T-sentences, and
nothing else, to the evidence" (Davidson 1984, p223). Meanwhile, at some
places in his writing, Davidson seems to suggest that anything not
mentioned in the T-sentences themselves must be considered purely
theoretical and entirely lacking in empirical content. Speaking of
reference and satisfaction Davidson says:
these notions we must treat as theoretical constructs whose
function is exhausted in stating the truth conditions for sentences.
Similarly, for that matter, for the logical form attributed to
sentences, and the whole machinery of term, predicates,
connectives, quantifiers. None of this is open to direct
confrontation with the evidence. (Davidson 1984, p223)
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But in other places, Davidson expresses confidence that there is
something in common between empirically adequate truth theories that
purport to characterise a given language.:
reasonable empirical constraints on the interpretation of T-
sentences....plus the formal constraints will leave enough invariant
as between theories to allow us to say that a theory of truth captures
the essential role of each sentence. (p224)
and
what is invariant as between different acceptable theories of truth is
meaning. (p225)
So some aspect of the meaning or the role of any sentence is not itself
crudely empirical or behaviour at all, but a property of the theory. Now
given this conception of meaning it becomes of immense importance in
linguistic terms to know where the indeterminacies fall and where they
do not; and where they do not, why they do not. Answers to these
questions mark out the territory left to Davidson for the notion of
meaning or interpretation, and the importance of these issues cannot be
overstressed:
Indeterminacy of meaning or translation does not represent a
failure to capture significant distinctions; it marks the fact that
certain distinctions are not significant. (Davidson 1984, pi54)
This is an important admission on Davidson's part and it sets the stage
for his resulting position which I shall call Semantical Minimalism.
Minimalism is what Davidson's theory of linguistic meaning leaves
room for, and we can only appreciate the nature of this doctrine by seeing




5.1) Meaning and Logical Form
I want to start examining Davidson's minimalist conception of
meaning by considering the indeterminacy of form. This is a crucial issue
for Davidson given his use of the assumption of systematicity to identify
linguistically interpretable material. For this reason, I want to raise the
question of form in the light of a powerful challenge to structure-
discerning theories made recently by Crispin Wright (1981, 1983, p74,1986a
pp31-44, 1987 pp204-39). The question Wright raises is whether there is
any good reason for insisting that a Davidsonian truth theory should be
structure-discerning in the way described above. If Davidson's answer is
given in terms of the uses to which such theories can be put, Wright will
want to know more precisely what those uses are and whether they can be
met by non-structure discerning theories.
Davidson wants theories of truth to serve as theories of meaning by
providing correct interpretations for each of the infinitely many
declarative sentences of the language in question. They can do this by
providing the deductive means for generating infinitely many theorems
that make acceptable assignments of content to each of those declarative
sentences. The acceptable content-assignments will be those that pull their
weight in making best overall sense of the life and conduct of speakers of
that language. Now the question Wright asks is why such a theory should
postulate a semantically articulated structure for the language, given that
it fits the empirical evidence from the theorems upwards and is
empirically testable only at the sentential level. Why should a theory that
is only required to deliver the right T-sentences be thought to tell us
anything about the structure of the object language sentences themselves?
Davidson's reason for thinking that it must seems to rest on an
assumption that any theory capable of yielding a totality of T-sentences
fitting the evidence, and extendable to infinitely many other cases, must
invoke a semantic machinery for deriving those T-sentences from a finite
set of axioms. The axioms will deal with each of the finitely many
expressions and constructions in the language, and will entail for each of
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the infinitely many declarative sentences, a meaning-specifying theorem
whose proof structure shows how the meaning of that sentence depends
on its composition. In this way, the canonical derivation of each T-
sentence will record a structure assigned to the object language sentence it
contains, and hence, so long as a truth theory is finitely axiomatised it will
yield insights into the structure of the language to which it applies. But to
accept this claim is not to accept that it is necessary to construct a finitely
axiomatised truth theory. So why does Davidson think that it is
necessary? Perhaps, it is because he supposes that there is no other way to
state finitely a theory for an infinite language: only a finitely axiomatised
theory is capable of yielding all the right deductive consequences for an
infinity of cases; and any such theory will provide insight into the
structure of the language. It is this claim that Wright casts doubt upon in
the homophonic case - the case in which the language for stating the
theory is an extension of the object language, minimally enriched by the
addition of certain key semantical terms. Here, the T-theorems are merely
disquotational, and Wright suggests that "provided we have have a
recursive specification of the syntax of the (declarative part of the)
language", we can arrive at the meaning-specifying theorems for every
declarative sentence of the object language by means of a theory which:
merely stipulates as an axiom every instance of the schema:
A is T if and only if P,
where 'P' may be replaced by any declarative sentence of the
object language and 'A' by the quotational name of that
sentence. (Wright 1987, p221)
This theory is not finitely axiomatised, but it is finitely stated. It
accomplishes the same task as the finitely axiomatised theory, since in
conjuction with the recursive syntax, it provides an effective means for
arriving at the empirically adequate, and hence meaning-specifying, T-
theorems for every declarative sentence in the language. But it does this
without revealing structure in the sentences on the left-hand sides of the
biconditionals; and if we persist in thinking that the canonical proof of a
T-sentence reflects the logical form the theory assigns to the sentence,
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then these sentences are assigned no semantic structure at all. (It will
however have to find a syntactic articulation for these sentences which as
I suggested above will require detailed empirical inquiry of something
other than just speakers' linguistic behaviour.) The theory would still
present an interpreter with the deductive means to arrive at information
sufficient for understanding every (declarative) sentence of that language.
So it would seem that Wright has offered Davidson a theory which meets
the needs of interpretation theory without appealing to "the machinery"
that articulates semantic structure. The moral according to Wright is clear:
the ambition to describe information which would suffice for
mastery of a particular language may impose certain constraints
on the form taken by the theorems of a theory of meaning, but it
imposes no interesting constraints on the mechanics of the
theory. (Ibid. p212)
This is a powerful point when combined with Davidson's thought that
language is by and large a theoretical construct attributed to speakers by
interpreting their behaviour. For if language reflects the properties the
theory assigns to it, and it is not a necessary condition of an empirically
correct truth theory that it should attribute logical form to speakers'
sentences, then a natural language is subject to the most extensive
indeterminacy of logical form. Of course, Wright is not proposing any
such indeterminacy, he is merely pointing to a deficiency in Davidson's
programme which leaves it unclear why one should seek to give a
structure-discerning theory of meaning in the first place.
Should the Davidsonian accept the moral Wright draws from this
example? The conclusion seems rather overstated, for it concerns the
homophonic case alone, and if we are to take Davidson seriously when he
insists on the global nature of radical interpretation, then he can never
afford the unthinking complacency of a homophonic translator. It is only
a modest theorist, like McDowell, who assumes that the concepts and
contents used on the right-hand sides of T-sentences are exemplified in
the sentences mentioned on the left. Here we can always use the sentence
itself to state its own truth conditions, and against this modest proposal
131
Chapter Five
Wright's point is quite telling. But why should it apply to the project of
the radical interpreter too? Surely Davidson will insist that we have to
earn the right to assume that what someone's sentences mean on his lips
are what they mean on ours. All that the homophonic case comes to, for
Davidson, is just a familiarity with the sentences the speaker uses, but not
with the beliefs speakers have or the meanings they attach to those
sentences. Constructing a homophonic truth theory for a speaker of my
linguistic community is the first move in constructing a theory of his
beliefs; but the initial choice of theory is a conjecture that may have to be
revised in the light of an evolving interpretation of that person's
behaviour. The use of a homophonic truth theory, then, is never a
guaranteed prior assumption of interpretation: it is a hypothesis that may
be vindicated by a successful interpretation. So perhaps it is the process of
radical interpretation that calls for a compositional theory of meaning. I
will examine this claim in a moment. But leaving the radical interpreter
aside, it is worth noting briefly the wider implications of Wright's
worries.
The real concern is with the underlying motives and ambitions of
those who insist that a Davidsonian theory of meaning should describe
semantic structure within sentences. The homophonic case serves to
remind us that the demand that semantic theory should assign structure
is additional to the demand that the theory should be finitely statable
while being able to account for the meaning of the infinitely many
sentences belonging to a given language. So what extra requirement is a
structure-discerning theory being asked to meet in the homophonic case?
Or as Wright puts it, what project would call for the provision of a
compositional theory of meaning (by which he means a finitely
axiomatised theory in which the meanings assigned by theorems to
sentences are shown, in the derivations of these theorems, to depend
structurally on the meanings assigned by the axioms to their parts)? If the
ambition is merely to provide a complete description of the meanings a
speaker could attach to any of the potential infinity of sentences he could
use and understand, there will be no need to come up with a
compositional theory. So what additional requirement is it that calls for
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the postulation of semantic structure and the provision of a
compositional account of language? Wright's Challenge, as I shall call it,
is to come up with a project whose successful completion calls for a
compositional theory of meaning. The homophonic case shows quite
clearly that we are looking for a theory of meaning to do something more
than just describe the meanings of a speakers' sentences. Wright is
interested in whatever else it is that proponents of Davidsonian theories
of meaning see these accounts as providing. For whatever it is, it must be
the underlying reason for thinking, and so the basis for defending the
idea, that a Davidsonian truth theory provides the right form for a theory
of natural language meaning.
Two conceptions suggest themselves, both of which Wright regards as
highly suspect. One involves seeing the theory of meaning as an attempt
to describe the inner workings of the language, quite independently of its
speakers' knowledge of it. The other sees an important role for the theory
of meaning in explaining the linguistic capacities of actual language users.
The former view treats compositional structure as a mathematical
property of the way the autonomous language works. The latter view
treats compositionality as reflecting the psychological form of speakers'
competence. Despite their differences Wright is opposed to both views,
for the Wittgensteinian reason that they each in their different ways try to
import what Wittgenstein would regard as a spurious objectivity into the
notion of a language. Both types of theorist believe that the correct
axiomatisation of a theory of meaning for a particular language reveals
something of the essential character of the language in question, and that
the axioms codify "information which systematically settles the content of
so far unconstructed and unconsidered sentences". (Wright 1981, p!12) So
both types of theorist would, in their different respects, consider the
project of constructing systematic theories of meaning for given natural
languages to be the right way to capture certain crucial facts about them;
the determinate character of a language is what one aims to describe in the
semantic theory. In one case, those facts would be autonomous; being both
speaker-independent and beyond the epistemic reach of the non-specialist.
In the other case, the relevant linguistic facts would be determined by
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(though they would not be identical with) certain psychological facts about
language users, facts which although quite firmly dependent on the
speakers' epistemic reach, would not be explicitly known to ordinary
speakers but only to the specialist.
While I share Wright's reservations that any Platonistic conception of
the former sort will create an epistemologically intolerable divide between
meaning and understanding, because it treats the 'facts' about the
language independently of what speakers of that language know, I see less
reason to doubt the intelligibility of the second position. What this
position calls for is a notion of a speaker's implicit or tacit knowledge of
the details of the formalised theory of meaning. Without this there is no
way of saying how it is that a structure-reflecting theory of meaning, most
of whose details are not explicitly known to the ordinary language user,
can nevertheless play a central role in explaining his linguistic capacities
and what he ordinarily knows about his language. On this conception,
the theory of meaning will play a part in the psychological explanation of
a speaker's cognitive capacities, and not just the rational explanation of a
speaker's linguistic behaviour. For this reason it departs from the true
Davidsonian picture.
There are many things to be said about the psychological explanation
of linguistic competence, and many objections to it that Wright raises, but
these are topics for the second half of the thesis. So what I want to
consider now is whether Davidson's radical interpreter has to call upon a
structured semantic theory to pass from descriptions of a speaker's
behaviour that do not interpret to descriptions that do?
5.2) Why Should Davidson's Semantic Theory be Structure-
Discerning?
Davidson's postulation of structure in language must be reconciled
with his acceptance of the following two claims. When we begin to
interpret speakers of L we bring to the task a theory of linguistic
interpretation that provides insights into the structure, words, word-
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meanings and references of items of L; these are what make for the
distinctively linguistic materials of the interpreter. However, these
theoretical insights into the internal workings of a language are merely
brought to bear on the evidence by the interpreter but can be given "no
independent confirmation or empirical basis" in the data for linguistic
interpretation. How can we hold on to the claim that semantic theory
must be structure discerning, as opposed to the merely de facto claim that
we tend to carry out interpretation in a systematic way. If systematicity is a
requirement of an adequate truth theory, it needs to be justified.
Structure is a delivery of the theoretical description of a language, but
why should this be a desideratum? One answer that suggests itself has to
do with the project of rational reconstruction, or what is really for the
attributionist, rational postulation. Only the theory of interpretation, and
in particular that part of it which deals with linguistic interpretation,
brings to light the facts about meaning. A physical sound or mark, like a
mental state, is meaningful only as described; so the theoretical
description we give it is very important. The principles of the theory that
does the describing will constitute all the linguistic facts. But why should
such a project of rational reconstruction invoke principles of semantic
structuring and not just the infinitary axiom schema? I shall now try to
say why.
Well, what would it be for our semantic theory to be systematic? How
should it work? First, we would presume that there could be
configurations in the language L of sentences, SI, Sn, and S for which
someone could come to have knowledge of the meaning of S as a result of
knowing the meaning of each of SI, ,Sn. Then we could, by
constructing a finitely axiomatised truth-theory, show that the only
theoretical resources needed to derive the T-sentences for each of
SI, ,Sn would suffice for the deductive derivation of the T-sentence for
S. Apart from the standard logical resources of a truth-theory, the
derivations would depend, in particular, on the axioms dealing with the
semantic structure and the semantic properties of parts of SI, Sn. The
assumption would have to be that these derivations included the axioms
called upon in the derivation for S, and so S had parts in common with
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all of SI, Sn and shared a common structure with at least one (or one
sub-part of one) of them. But these configurations of SI, ,Sn, S give rise
to two very different versions of this structure and parts account. And
depending on the nature of the cases, the part-whole structures could be
implemented by theories which reveal different degrees of structuring.
Here are the two cases.
For any of these configurations, it will be possible to suggest that parts
of S are contained somewhere in the set SI, ,Sn. For some
configurations of this sort, this could be true in virtue of S's being merely
a logical compound of all of SI, Sn, giving recursive application to a
logical operator already in use in at least one member of the set; eg. S
could be 'A&(B&C)' and SI, ,Sn, could be {A&B, C}. This would not yet
oblige us to discern, or describe, sub-sentential structure, though it would
require the logical structuring of sentences into molecular and atomic
statements. But for at least some configurations of SI, ,Sn, S, it is
plausible to suppose that S is an atomic statement, composed, in the main,
of semantically primitive expressions. An expression is a semantic
primitive "provided the rules which give the meaning for sentences in
which it does not occur do not suffice to determine the meaning of the
sentences in which it does occur" (Davidson,1984, p9). So if, for the case of
atomic S, we can understand it in virtue of understanding each of
SI, ,Sn, then the truth-theoretical description entails that S and the
members of SI, ,Sn have semantic primitives in common. These will
be expressions each of which is given a meaning, or semantic role, by an
axiom in the set from which we can derive all the T-sentences for Sl,....,Sn
and S. Once the theorist finds a set of axioms which meet these
requirements, the T-theory to which they belong will have established a
stock of semantically relevant sentence-constituents whose structured
permutations in accordance with the principles of construction will take
us beyond the original set of meaningful sentences to a host of new ones.
In this way the detection of sub-structure in the original sentences treated
permit us to extend this evidential base. The thought here being that,
when seen through the eyes of the theory, the constituents and structures
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of novel sentences are already present in the sentences of the evidential
base just sampled.
Now, if we take our opening presumption that there are such
configurations to mean that: "it would be possible for someone to proceed
by rational inductive means from knowing what SI, ,Sn mean to
knowing what S means" (Davies 1981, p56), then our finitely axiomatised
theory would provide a rational explanation of the means of achieving
this. (However, this would not be the means used by any ordinary
speaker.)
Notice that such a theory would also explain why, when we revise the
belief we attribute to a speaker, and hence the truth-condition we assign to
the relevant sentence S, when the speaker holds that sentence true, we
have to make corresponding adjustments in a number of beliefs and truth
conditions ascribed to the speaker with respect to other sentences he holds
true, to secure conformity with the behavioural evidence, on the one
hand, and the rationality, coherence and consistency of his beliefs, on the
other. In the sort of configurations just mentioned, revision to the truth-
conditions of S would require a change in the T-sentence, and hence a
change in its canonical proof. If this means changing the axioms then this
will force alterations in the axiom pool for SI, ,Sn and hence revised
derivations for some, if not all of them, thus changing their meanings.
There may be some evidence for such revisions amongst the corpus of
sentences held true. And the finitely axiomatised truth-theory would
provide the best interpretation of any such data; ie. the best rational
reconstruction of what is going on here.
Now we can answer the original question: why should we assume, as
we did to begin with, that the semantic theory should be systematic? The
answer is: because it provides a rational reconstruction of an ideal
speaker's knowledge of meaning; the means by which he could arrive at
the meaning of any of the indicative sentences of his language.
Davies explains the reconstruction as follows. The semantic theorist
may judge there to be sufficient systematic similarity of meaning




....enable a rational agent (relevantly like himself) to reason
inductively from knowing what certain sentences mean to
knowing what other syntactically similar sentences mean. It is
this judgement about the possibility of self-conscious, reflective
projection of meanings which encourages the attempt to
provide a theory of meaning which not only delivers the correct
meaning specifications but also reveals how the meanings of
sentences depend on upon the occurrence of particular syntactic
constituents (roughly: words and ways of putting expressions
together). (Davies 1981, p56)
Davies takes his Structural Constraint as a constraint on theories of
meaning, whose descriptive job it is to reveal the structure of the
language in a Platonistic sense of this. A finitely axiomatised semantic
theory will implement this task, but it leaves it as a further question how
the understander actually tackles the task.
I shall depart from Davies's description here by suggesting that the
full-blown attributionist is making a decision, and not a judgement, about
structure being, not revealed, but imposed on the language; and I shall
equate the rational agent with the interpretation theorist himself. Of
course the decision to impute semantically relevant structure to the data
may not work out if the choice of structures on which the projections are
based is not borne out by further evidence from the speaker's corpus. But
if the imposition of structure can be sustained, the account will constitute
a rational explanation of the speaker's practices in terms of rationally
derived knowledge of the truth conditions of all the indicative sentences
of his language. This is what an explicit theory of what the interpreter
achieves is supposed to provide. Furthermore, such a theorist can proceed
by rational means to an understanding of novel sentences without any
further empirical investigations: this is a purely philosophical project.
Complete knowledge of the natural language a speaker uses (or as
complete a knowledge of it as the vocabulary and syntactic competence of
our informant allows for) can be arrived at by a priori inquiry.
This suggestion corresponds closely to the strong interpretation of
Davies' Structural Constraint on theories proposed by Wright in his 1987,
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p215, but with stronger attributionist emphasis here on the imposition,
instead of the revelation, of linguistic structure.
We have now arrived at what I believe to be the correct resting place
on this matter for the attributionist. He must settle for a theory-internal
justification of structure. But since the facts about the theory constitute the
facts of the matter about meanings and minds - linguistic like mental
events are only what they are as described - it is legitimate for the
attributionist to transfer these properties to the concept of language itself.
But this motivation for structure disconnects it from any explanatory role
in describing or explaining the understanding of actual speakers. Perhaps
some would see this as something of a pyrrhic victory, although others
will be heartened by this disavowal of explanatory pretensions.
Still the niggling question persists: why should this strategy be
successful? What is it about the speakers' use of L that sustains this
decision? Why are the data gathered from speakers' usage of L more or
less amenable to certain postulations of structure? Surely, anyone who
claims that the decision to construct a structure-discerning semantic
theory is correct only if that decision is borne out by the evidence owes us
some explanation of why it is or isn't borne out in particular cases. Some
account is due of what it is in virtue of which the theorist either does, or
does not, get away with his theoretical descriptions. The thought that
there might be facts about semantic structure already there in the
language to be described by the theory runs counter to the attributionist's
position.
One promising line suggests itself immediately. Perhaps we can claim
that the re-combinable, recurrent and projectible parts and structures of
sentences of L are not only described by means of the articulated semantic
theory, but are also perceived by the speakers of L themselves? It is hard to
see how this response will serve. The attributionist believes that the facts
of linguistic meaning, including facts about linguistic structure, are
constituted by description , and thus they are constituted by the articulated
structure of the theory that brings them into sight. Facts about a natural
language are answerable to facts about its theoretical description in a
theory that meets the normative a priori constraints. The language will be
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systematic only in so far as the theory is systematic. So where are we to
look for evidence that speakers of L perceive, or grasp, the 'facts' that the
sentences they hold true are made up out of semantically relevant
expressions under some particular mode of combination? These facts are
already a matter of theoretical description, so the they cannot be used to
bolster our confidence in the theoretical descriptions. Is the correct
conclusion that unless speakers are radical interpreters, in the strong
sense of being theorists of interpretation, they could not know such facts
at all? Or could speakers simply be said to know the semantical structures
of their sentences in the reconstructed sense that knowledge of truth
conditions can be attributed to them as a consequence of the theory which
adequately interprets their behaviour? The trouble with the latter
suggestion is that the only behavioural data for interpretation must be
describable without appeal to the concepts of theory. So what makes it
plausible for the theorist's handling of L to import those particular
structural discriminations into it?
It is hard to imagine anything more the attributionist could offer to try
to ground his theoretical appeal to structure in the practices of speakers
given that he is not describing some antecedently available set of facts
about actual speakers' linguistic capacities.
The last resort is to appeal to a prior assumption that speakers learn
the meanings of some sentences on the basis of others; in fact, that they
have to, if their finite resources confer upon them a potentially infinite
capacity for understanding sentences. On this assumption, it is as well to
construct a theory that shows how it is possible. But appealing to the
course of learning to support a theoretical account of a learnable language
is out of bounds to the attributionist. For the attributionist believes that
facts about mind and language are delivered by a theoretically adequate re-
description of a subject's actual and potential behaviour. So if an appeal
can be legitimately made to patterns of learning (described in intentional
terms), then the details of this process must be included already in the
theoretical description; or if such an appeal runs counter to the
attributionist stance they are rightfully ignored. But Davidsonians of this
persuasion either eschew what they regard as the non-philosophically
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illuminating details of language acquisition ("we are entitled to consider
in advance of empirical study what we shall count as knowing a
language" Davidson 1984, p7); or are balefully silent on accounts of
learning ("Light dawns gradually over the whole" Wittgenstein, On
Certainty Sect. 141, oft-quoted by McDowell) But even so, there can be no
appeal to learning because there is no available set of facts, antecedent to
the theory, to do with the stages of meaning-conferring linguistic
cognition in speakers. The attributionist cannot take these to be
psychological facts about speakers which the theory aims to describe. So
this plausible avenue of checking on the actual linguistic capacities of
speakers cannot feature on this approach. The attributionist has cut off
any retreat to facts at another level of inquiry that might have supported
his descriptions and to which they could be seen as answerable.
But the attributionist still decides to assume systematic dependence of
meaning on form in giving his theoretical descriptions of natural
language. Whether this systematicity can be borne out or not, (and if so,
how?) is left unexplained by the attributionist. Is there no more to be
said?
Grant for the moment the unilluminating nature of such a proposal, I
think it is still possible to see why the theorist would want to assume
systematicity in the first place. As a project, it is a legitimate a priori
undertaking. When the question is: "Given that speakers could learn by
rational means the meanings of up to an infinite number of sentences on
the basis of exposure to a finite number of sentences, how is it possible?"
the finitely axiomatised truth-theory supplies an answer. The theory does
not aim to describe the existing contours of actual speaker's knowledge,
rather, it must construct plausible contours for it. The plausibility, or
otherwise, however, must remain unexplained. Worse still, I suggest that
it remains incomplete since the method of rational reconstruction is not
very plausible for syntax, and presumably this is part of a speaker's
knowledge of language.
Nevertheless, the interpreter's grip on semantic structure and his
knowledge of semantic dependency is ensured by this approach. They
must be antecedently familiar to anyone who can deploy such a theory to
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interpret others. But who interprets the interpreters? As I shall argue
later, the omission of any convincing answer, when there are places to
look for answers, is a glaring omission in this account.
Before going on let me revert to the question of indeterminacy and ask
how much indeterminacy has been removed by the rationally
reconstructing theorist's way of motivating semantic structure? The
answer is: very little. There are a number of ways one can import
semantic structure into a systematic truth-theory. For example one could
diverge from Tarksi and use the Fregean hierarchy of semantic types
when treating noun-phrases and treat singular terms as basic terms, and
quantifier phrases as second-order predicates of first-order predicates of
terms; or one could treat singular terms as second-order predicates of the
predicates they can be combined with to express true or false sentences.
This would have the knock-on effect of forcing the quantifier variable to
be third-order. Such a formalisation is not inconceivable. (See Wright
1983, p33)
Davidson himself has his own preferences, believing that we must
read first-order quantificational logic into interpretable language, and
hence into the thoughts of a speaker. This leads to a decision about which
logical forms can be assigned the sentences of the language: but by itself it
cannot lead to conclusions about which assignments of those logical
forms to make to particular sentences.
Nor do these theoretical decisions always enable one to identify which
sentence is which in any pattern of dependencies. For example, there
could be cases amongst the configurations of the above sort, SI, ,Sn and
S, where we could swap the meaning of S with the meaning of one of
SI, ,Sn without changing the membership of the smallest set of axioms
that will enable us to derive all the corresponding T-sentences, and while
still preserving the patterns of dependence and revision throughout. Take
as a simplified example a language which consists of just the following
three sentences: AvB, AvC, BvC. Any two of these could stand in the
pattern of dependencies to the other one. With the same axiom set and
the same assigned structures there would still be indeterminacy of
meaning within the semantic theory for this language. These cases may be
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unlikely once more and more sentences have to be treated by the T-
theory. The holistic interdependencies of sentence meanings across the
language may make these substitutions unworkable in an adequate theory
for the whole language. But it remains to be shown that such cases are
impossible to conceive within holistically construed theories.
However, another and more damaging source of indeterminacy looms
large. I mean, of course, the indeterminacy of reference.
5.3) The Inscrutability of Reference
Suppose that the semantic values assigned by the axioms to each of the
semantic primitives common to S and SI, ,Sn could be systematically
changed while preserving the semantic roles of the expressions within
whole sentences, so that there could be a different smallest set of axioms
from which to derive the T-sentences of SI, ,Sn and S while preserving
patterns of dependence and revision amongst them. If this can be done in
a number of different ways, then a number of different, arbitrary,
competing T-theories can be constructed, compatibly with all available
evidence, for the language in question.
How can it be done? The example is by now familiar of a shift in the
references assigned to singular terms of the language. Briefly, the idea is
that each axiom that assigns an object as reference to a singular term is
replaced by one that assigns to that term a displaced object, related to the
original by a permutation function 0 that maps each object in the universe
on to another that is R-related to it, for some R. R could be as arbitrary as
"the place-or-object-occupying-the-place-two-inches-to-the-left-of", it does
not matter. The point is quite general,
...even if logical form and truth are fixed, acceptable theories
may differ with respect to the references they assign to the same
words and phrases. (Davidson 1984, p228)
This works in the following way for any permutation 0:
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If we have a satisfactory scheme of reference for a language
that speaks of this universe, we can produce another scheme of
reference by using the permutation: whenever, on the first
scheme, a name refers to an object x, on the second scheme it
refers to 0(x); whenever, on the first scheme, a predicate refers to
(is true of) each thing x such that Fx, on the second scheme it
refers to each thing x such that F0(x). Assuming that reference is
geared to an appropriate characterisation of a relation like
satisfaction in each case, it is easy to see that the truth conditions
the second scheme assigns to a sentence will in every case be
equivalent to the truth conditions assigned to that sentence by
the first scheme. (Ibid., p229)
It is easy to see that the structural properties and logical dependencies
amongst sentences would not change, but Davidson shows himself to be
departing from Frege here in what he means by a sentence's truth
condition. For Frege, if the referents, which are the leading protagonists in
a truth-condition, change, then so do the senses of the expressions, just so
long as sense determines reference. And if the sense constituents of a
sentence change then so does the sense of the whole sentence to which
the expressions with those senses belong. But since the sense of a sentence
is its truth condition, the truth condition will have changed as well.
Davidson clearly departs from Frege here, and perhaps this is where we
can point out that he has no use for the notion of sense. Truth conditions
for Davidson are at the level of reference, or better, ontology, and not at
the level of sense (reference-determination). The radical interpreter tries
to fix the truth conditions for a subject's sentences, at first, by pairing them
with sentences of his own that share the same truth-values. In so far as he
can use his own language's logical relations and standards of truth to
constrain the assignments of truth-values to the subject's other sentences,
to ensure an overall fit with the subject's pattern of assents and dissents,
and to endorse the sentences the subject holds true, he has fixed their
truth conditions. The same events and conditions obtain in the world
under the permutations; the evidence of assent or dissent in speakers is
exactly the same on one scheme of reference or the other. So the




(This conclusion might seem to threaten the Fregean identification I
suggested between the truth condition of a sentence and the object of the
belief of a speaker who holds it true. But I think not. Davidson holds to
the identification, but in doing so, he reveals how indeterminate, down¬
graded and theory-dependent his notion of belief really is. More on this
later.)
These alternative schemes of reference give rise to alternative truth-
theories, but they do not by themselves lead to indeterminacy. There is
indeterminacy only if there is no way to choose between such theories, no
way of picking out the T-theory with the correct scheme of reference for
speakers of L. To be able to do this we must find some condition, or set of
conditions, that underpins the relation of reference. With such an account
one could provide a strong adequacy condition on interpretative theories
of truth for L. Reference could serve as a constraint on interpretation.
Alas, the attributionist has denied himself all the materials with which
to choose between the different theories that anchor language to the
world. The natural place to look is in the mind of the speaker. Intuitively,
one wants to ask, which object is he thinking of, x or 0(x) ? But remember
that the only materials at our disposal here are the propositional attitudes
ascribed to a speaker in the course of interpreting his behaviour. And it
has already been claimed that belief and meaning are inextricable and the
best grounds for attributing belief to a person rest upon an interpretation
of his speech. So any resolving of the indeterminacy must proceed on
both fronts at once. An account of reference must solve for belief and
meaning simultaneously.
With this in mind we can turn to another intuitive proposal, offered
here by Colin McGinn, and this is the idea that causal links between the
speaker/thinker and his environment underpin his ability to refer to, or
think about, one object as distinct from many others. After all, these are
relations the interpreter can take into account from his third-person
perspective.
McGinn states Davidson's necessary conditions for something's being
the referent of a speaker's singular term, or the object of his thought.
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Heeding the inextricability point, McGinn gives the conditions for both
thought and language:
an object x can be the referent of a term t in a sentence SO
uttered by a speaker U only if there is some set T = {SI, ,Sn} of
sentences containing t such that U is disposed to affirm T and x
satisfies the "predicative component" of the majority of
{SI, ,Sn}, for some fairly large ("endless") n. (McGinn, 1977,
p524)
The reason why U might be disposed to affirm T is that he has many
true beliefs about x, expressed by the sentences in T. But when we look to
see which object his beliefs concern, the best we can do is this:
....an object can be the subject of a belief BO only if there is
some set of beliefs S = {Bl, ,Bn} such that x satisfies the
"predicative components" of the majority of {Bl, ,Bn], for
some fairly large ("endless") n. (loc. cit.)
McGinn calls this position the satisfactional theory of intentionality.
The object the speaker is thinking, or talking about is determined by the
speakers beliefs, and assertions, about the properties the object has. The
beliefs about its properties pick it out. Of course, there may be false beliefs
the speaker holds about that object, but even for that to be the case he
must already hold many true beliefs about it (or many beliefs that concur
with the interpreter's conception of it) for there to be an object of
reference. But since an object is determined by the speaker's beliefs about
its properties, if more than one object can satisfy them, then it is
indeterminate which object his thought and talk concerns.
McGinn's response to this exploits the relational character of the
content of perceptual states, namely, that which perceptual states we are in
depends on just which object is involved (in the right way) in the causal
process that gives rise to that perceptual state. If one is having a perceptual
experience as of seeing an F, and the content of that experience is correctly
stated by mentioning an object a which happens to be uniquely F, then
one is not having the same perceptual experience in another world where
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one is having a perceptual experience as of seeing an F, correctly stated by
mentioning b, an object uniquely F in that world, if a is not identical with
b. In each case, the perceptual state necessarily involves its object. So if
belief can inherit these characteristics of perception, to have a belief B
about an object a, it is necessary that a be involved in some appropriate
causal chain that resulted in B. As McGinn wants to say, "the fact that B is
necessarily about a is explained by the fact that B is necessarily caused by a
"(Ibid., p529)
Now our question is whether the attributionist can take advantage of
this response. Certainly, the radical interpreter can take into consideration
a subject's relation to his perceptual environment. So an interpreter
should be able to include causal relations in the grounds for his
attribution of attitudes to the subject. But remember, the only evidence
the interpreter has to go on, as far as linguistic reference is concerned, is
the linguistic behaviour of subjects with respect to whole utterances. How
can one determine from patterns of assent and dissent in the speaker that
he does not mean the object or place two inches to the left of the one that
he is perceptually in contact with? Sufficient adjustment to the meanings
of terms and predicates would secure this as his reference. Secondly, when
the interpreter is attributing beliefs to the subject on the basis of their
mutual surroundings, the interpreter can only be as determinate as his
own beliefs, categories and distinctions admit of. But how discriminating
are these? If we are told, they are as discriminating as the causal facts
underlying perception allow for, then we have the basis for a more
substantial account of mental content, but we give up the attributionist's
cherished view that all intentional phenomena have the form and
character they do as a matter of interpretation. Causal factors that, in part,
explain the interpreter's states of mind and linguistic competence may
have to be part of a correct theory of mind and language, but as far as the
attributionist is concerned, these factors can only enter the account once
they are parts of the interpreter's conceptualised experience. The appeal to
causal factors, and the roles they can be given in determining the objects




What a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a
speaker means is all there is to learn; the same goes for what the
speaker believes. (Davidson 1986, p315)
In the light of this, I disagree with McGinn that interpretation theory:
....is not equipped to explain why it is that the identity and
existence conditions of the contents of mental states and of the
senses of names are determined by the particular objects whose
mention serves to specify those contents or senses.(Op cit., p528)
It is equipped to explain this, but only in its own terms, and not by
going beyond the sphere of human experience to point towards causal
determinants of the character and content of that experience.
Interpretation theory will explain the role of objects in determining the
content of someone's attitudes and utterances but only through the
interpreter's eyes. Appeal to the external objects is mediated by the
interpreter's beliefs about those objects.
One way of trying to get outside the sphere of human experience is to
take the barest evidential base and try to reduce the higher level notions
to that. This was Quine's way in Word and Object. We now know
Davidson's reasons for thinking that that cannot be done. Nevertheless,
he does want his theory of interpretation to illuminate the conditions for
believing or meaning something, and, in general, making sense:
If we want to illuminate the nature of meaning and belief,
therefore, we need to start with something that assumes neither.
(Davidson 1986, p315)
Only thus can he show how these notions can be accommodated in the
material world. Like Quine he chooses hitherto uninterpreted evidence of
a speaker giving his prompted assent to a sentence. The informative part
of interpretation theory lies in finding the cause of that assent. Both
Quine and Davidson start from the same evidential base. Both are
inquiring after the cause of assent, by attempting a backwards inference
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from effect to cause. But for Quine, the cause, and hence the interpretation
of the sentence, depends on stimulation of the sensory surfaces of
speakers. From these meagre materials Quine sticks scrupulously to the
impoverished interpretation (or translation) known as the "stimulus
meaning" of the sentence.
This lowly view of the cause for speaker's assent is explicitly rejected by
Davidson. As I have said, for him, the cause of assent depends on two
interlocking factors: what a speaker means by a sentence and what he
believes about the world. The radical interpreter must reconstruct these
notions giving them application to the uninterpreted speaker's
behaviour. Quine's sensory stimulations are no help with this.
....sensory stimulations are indeed part of the causal chain that
leads to belief, but cannot, without confusion, be considered to
be evidence, or a source of justification, for the stimulated
beliefs. (Davidson 1986(b), p317)
Instead, Davidson makes interpretation (the identification of these two
factors), "depend on the external events and objects the sentence is
interpreted as being about" (loc.cit.) These external events and objects are
interpretations going beyond Quine's sensory information and out into
the world. But Davidson can only appeal to these because they are
interpreted already, they belong to the beliefs of the interpreter and
speaker. So Davidson's "causes" are not independent of the interpreted
subject's beliefs or meanings:
....we can't in general first identify beliefs and meanings and
then ask what caused them. The causality plays an indispensable
role in determining the content of what we say and believe. This
is a fact we can be led to recognise by taking up, as we have, the
interpreter's point of view, (loc.cit)
The causes of the brute behaviour are given through the interpretative
sights of the theorist. Davidson can engender a richer result than Quine in
interpreting the effect of assent behaviour, because he is not sticking to a
brute description of the cause: for this too is interpreted. The causally
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relevant events and objects are not independent of the speaker's belief;
like the belief itself, they are individuated by the interpreter, who regards
them as what causes the subject's belief. The interpreter then charitably
ascribes to the speaker the belief about the circumstances those causes
engender in him (or, more accurately, 'the belief that includes those
events and objects'). The interpreter can only think of them at all in
virtue of his beliefs about the circumstances. Thus the events and objects
that cause a speaker's belief are presented from the point of view of the
interpreter: they are the objects of his beliefs.
Given the interpreter's largely charitable assumptions, he will attribute
his own belief to the subject. This happens as follows. The object of the
interpreter's belief will be taken to be the cause of the subject's belief, and
under the methodology of interpretation the object of the speaker's belief
will be the causes of that belief. And most of the time, because of the
Principle of Charity, the assumption will be that in the same perceptual
circumstances, the same belief will be engendered in the speaker and the
interpreter. So as interpreters of what others believe, we infer the content
of their beliefs from what causes them. This is how, interpretatively
speaking, the possibility of shared belief and communication opens up on
the Davidsonian picture. But all of this is secured from within the
seemless realm of human experience for Davidson permits no scheme-
content distinction. There is no more direct way the mindless world can
figure in interpretation. Communication rests on this convergence of
causes, but causes which are already objects of belief.
Beliefs, thinks Davidson, can only be identified and supported by their
relations to other beliefs. An interpretation which finds a subject right on
many matters of fact, identifies the causes of his beliefs with the objects of
those beliefs. The interpretation "works" if we can make the identification
compatible with the evidence of the subject's behaviour and our
expectations for his future action. But the interpretation strictly proceeds
from within what the interpreter believes to be the case, and unless there
is massive agreement between interpreter and interpreted subject, there
will be no sense to be made of the latter.
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Because we are self-interpreting animals, and so subject ourselves to
the above points, limits must be placed on the amount of intelligible
error we can be subjected to. But limits are placed also on where we may
look for more finely individuating conditions of reference for (parts of)
our beliefs and sentences. Thus Davidson closes the hermeneutical circle.
Verstehen does not submit to scientific investigation. Matters of mind
and meaning are captured in the normative notions of a higher-level
intentional vocabulary that cannot be incorporated into, but must be
imposed upon the world of facts as described by the natural sciences.
Which, of course, is of no help with the original indeterminacy at all.
To sum up. Indeterminacy prevails where we limit the evidential base
as Davidson does to the overt behavioural evidence of speakers in
relation to whole utterances; their assent, dissent and utterances. Of
course, unlike Quine, Davidson has the further evidence of the attitudes
to go on, but these too are inferred (though not uniquely) from observable
behaviour. The contents of intentional mental states cannot enjoy tighter
connections with the physical conditions they are about, for their
significance partly resides in the systematic relations they bear to one
another, and only in the light of these relations do they collectively enjoy
application to the lower levels of description and explanation at all.
Davidson is a coherence theorist of truth, arguing that to be intelligible (ie.
interpretable) the majority of our beliefs must be true and therefore
correspond to reality. Thus he thinks coherence yields correspondence,
but correspondence without confrontation. In this vein, he asserts that
there can be no empirical foundation for belief or meaning.
It is this last point, together with the prevailing a priori orthodoxy of
Davidson's philosophical psychology, that leaves him with no room to
look for a cognitive relation between a thinker and an object of thought or
reference. In looking for this cognitive relation, the rational psychologist
can only consult the beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes he
has grounds for attributing to the speaker. But the grounds for their
attribution include the interpreted utterances made by the thinker, and it
is these interpretations of the thinker's words that we sought to render
more precise in the first place by looking for a cognitive or causal relation
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between the thinker and an object of his thought or reference. An appeal
to rational psychology offers the interpreter no way out of this circle.
Yet why should everything in the mental realm be treated as a
cognitive state whose content is conceptualised by the subject of
experience? Why shouldn't we examine other types of intentional state,
such as those involved in the early stages of visual processing, or auditory
or tactile sensations, to see if we could find more discriminating object-
dependent cognitive relations to identify the objects of our perceptually
based thoughts? Perhaps non-conceptual informational states play a
crucial part in certain cases in providing the conditions underpinning
certain modes of identification of the thought about objects by providing
us with information-links to the objects. But postulations of such states,
and empirical examination of the relevant perceptual links cannot
proceed without paying due attention to the subject's conceptualising
equipment for receiving and shaping such informational input at the
level of thought. So an empirical investigation of the passage of
information through all these levels would depend upon a sophisticated
and multi-layered theory of cognition that reached right up to the domain
of conceptual thinking.
It is just such a (partly) empirical theory of cognition that Davidson
rejects as having nothing to do with the mental. He has argued that the
application of propositional attitudes to agents is the criterion of mental
life, and that any investigation of phenomena outside this realm, where
normative notions no longer have application, would amount to
"changing the subject". These empirical proposals would no longer have a
bearing on the mental directly.
I think this is wholly wrong and shall argue against it in what follows.
But here I have simply been canvassing the range of materials the
attributionist has at his disposal to cut down on the indeterminacy of
thought and language. And in turning to the the rational grounds for
belief and desire attribution that characterise a speaker's psychology, the
interpreter finds nothing independent to say about the speaker's way of
thinking of objects which might substantiate the linguistic interpreter's
appeal to the relation of reference. Rather, a person's ability to think about
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a particular object is only as secure as the claim that he can talk
determinately about that object to the exclusion of all others. This, in its
turn, depends on how he may be linguistically interpreted, and this rests
with the interpreter's way of construing the speaker's referential talk. But
being in the same position as the speaker, linguistically speaking, the
interpreter cannot put any more determinacy into his rendering of others
than is available in his own linguistic resources.
There is no way to escape the conceptual scheme of the interpreter and
look for unmediated causal relations to connect his language or thought
to the world more directly. The collapse of the scheme-content distinction
forbids this: "it is absurd to look for a justifying ground for the totality of
beliefs, something outside this totality which we can use to test or
compare our beliefs." (Davidson, 1986, p314)
For this reason too there can be no suggestion that the speaker's words
secure objective reference to non-linguistic particulars in a way that is in
principle beyond the ken of the interpreter. Of course, there will be
occasions when speaker and interpreter diverge in thought and meaning,
holding different beliefs about what is true in their shared present
circumstances. But it does not follow that we can thereby impute to the
sentence uttered by the speaker more determinacy of meaning or
reference than a well placed interpreter could attach to it. Divergence is
catered for within interpretation theory, that is why we need to attribute
beliefs as well as meaningful utterances to a speaker: belief takes up the
slack between what the speaker holds true and what is objectively the case.
But divergence does not entail that the speaker's belief or meaning on
such occasions falls outside the interpreter's compass. In those
circumstances, the objects and events give rise to (cause) different beliefs
in the speaker and the interpreter. This shows up when the speaker
judges the sentence assented to to be true (false) whereas the interpreter
takes it to be false (true). If the interpreter makes a theoretical conjecture
that he and the speaker mean the same thing by the sentence, then he has
to conclude they have different beliefs. But does this mean that the
character of the speaker's belief is determined by some objective features
of the events that caused it, quite beyond the interpreter's epistemic
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reach? Beliefs do not have their contents fixed one by one in this isolated
way. The correct divergent belief to ascribe to someone here is one that
does service in explaining the speaker's reason for asserting (denying) the
sentence, from the interpreter's point of view. The interpreter cannot just
defer to the causal conditions in giving the content of a speaker's beliefs.
Instead he must cast around to find a belief, belonging to a set of beliefs
which forms part of an interpretation that make the speaker's decisions,
and thoughts and utterances intelligible to the interpreter. So even in the
case of a single belief, sponsored by the ambient conditions, that belief
must be individuated and tested holistically: "all that counts as evidence
or justification for a belief must come from the totality of belief to which it
belongs" (Ibid., p319) - a totality that makes best sense of the speaker's
speech and conduct.
So after all these points have been heeded, what does the notion of
reference amount to for the Davidsonian? Whatever role it has, it is
far from substantive since:
It plays no essential role in explaining the relation between
language and reality. (Davidson 1984, p225)
Once we have gone this far, what useful function can reference serve?
Why don't we just discard it altogether? Some of Davidson's headier
claims seems to suggest that we can:
We don't need the concept of reference, neither do we need
reference itself, whatever that may be. (ibid., p224)
But this is too strong, and all Davidson means by it is that:
..if there is one way of assigning entities to expressions....that
yields acceptable results with respect to the truth conditions of
sentences, there will be endless ways that do as well. There is no
reason, then, to call any of these semantical relations 'reference'
or 'satisfaction'. (Davidson 1984, p224)
It is too strong to say that we don't need reference at all because even
when stripped of its usual extra-linguistic function, it must be retained to
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preserve the compositional insight that enables the interpreter to assign
truth conditions to every indicative sentence of a speaker's language. The
thought here is that to assign a given sentence a particular truth condition,
and to have it depend holistically on the assignments of truth conditions
to all the others, one must give the sentences an articulation which
exhibits the expressions that recur in other sentences, and assign the same
semantic roles to these expressions in other sentences. That is to say, to
interpret a piece of linguistic behaviour as showing that a speaker assigns a
truth condition p to a given sentence S, one must interpret his linguistic
behaviour with respect to other sentences structurally related to S: this can
only be done by providing systematic descriptions of the inner structures
of his sentences in terms of names, predicates, quantifiers, connectives and
functors, and giving each of these a semantic role that contributes to
(partly determines) the truth-values of sentences containing it. This is
where reference enters the picture, for the compositional insight is cashed
out for the interpreter by a truth theory that shows how a sentence's truth-
value is determined by its structure and the reference of its constituents.
Truth theory shows what it is to treat a sentence as having a certain truth
condition by showing how the referential aspects of that sentence have the
semantic function of determining the truth-value of this and other
sentences in which they occur. Moreover, it is by fixing reference for a
finite number of basic vocabulary items and fixing the truth-affecting
properties for finitely many constructions that the theory recursively
explains the truth conditions for infinitely many sentences. So how could
such a theory serve to interpret a language if we denied it the truth-
affecting nature of the subsentential expressions?
Davidson's solution is to preserve the theory-internal function for
reference assignments while denying that they have any empirical import.
This squares well with the idea that we certify a truth theory empirically by
testing (some of) its consequences. But it also means that we cannot test
the truth conditions a T-sentence assigns to a sentence by assessing
whether the right referents are given the leading roles in determining its
truth-value. This would be to suppose that we have some non-truth-
theoretical way of determining the references of singular terms and
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predicates: but this is just what Davidson denies us. According to him,
there is no empirical check on reference, only on truth; so reference
assignment is not an empirical constraint on the correct ascription of truth
conditions, it is merely a theoretical means of achieving this.
This strategy calls for a distinction between explanation within a theory
and explanation of a theory. Explanations within a theory invoke the
machinery of reference and satisfaction in the axioms of the theory,
assigning these properties to the structurally revealed parts of sentences.
From the axioms, together with simple inference rules, we can derive T-
sentences of the form: "S" is true-in-L iff p for all indicative sentences of
the language L. The derivational structures of the T-theorems reveal the
logical forms assigned to the object language sentences; and this is how the
compositional insight is promoted.
On the other hand, explanations of the theory have to relate theoretical
concepts to the uninterpreted facts at the lower, physical level of
description, and the suggestion here is that these points of contact can be
described without mention of sub-sentential semantic structures or the
sub-sentential reference assignments. The theory makes contact with its
empirical base at the level of its output theorems, and not at the level of
its axioms. It is always related to that evidence in the context of a rational
explanation of a speaker's linguistic behaviour (overall theory of
interpretation), and the confirming fit with the T-sentences is always
holistic.
The distinction between explanations of a theory and explanations in
a theory enable Davidson to propose a molecular truth theory as part of a
holistic theory of meaning. It is only when the molecular truth theory is
construed in terms of the empirical evidence and its role in interpretation
that it functions as a holistic theory of meaning. This point also shows that
it is not in every case necessary to relate the theoretical concepts used by
the interpreter to the empirical base for interpretation. Some merely serve
to oil the internal wheels of the theory. Let us call these the purely
theoretical concepts . So while the concepts of truth, reference and
satisfaction are all theoretical concepts, in the sense of belonging to the
mechanics of truth theory, truth alone corresponds for Davidson to a pre-
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theoretic notion; reference and satisfaction are purely theoretical concepts.
This much is unequivocal in Davidson:
I suggest that words, word meanings, reference and satisfaction
are posits we need to implement a theory of truth (Davidson
1984, p 222)
What we need to know is how extensively Davidson applies this pure
theoretical status to other semantical notions at, or below, the level of the
sentence. For instance, is the logical form of a sentence a purely theoretical
notion? Is it similarly empirically indeterminate, and only necessary for
specifying the truth conditions of all sentences? Davidson's answer is far
from clear. I suggest that it depends on what he means by saying that the
form of the theory can be reconciled with the nature of its evidence. On
the one hand we have it that:
The articulation of sentences into singular terms, quantifiers,
predicates, connectives must be treated as so much theoretical
construction, to be tested only by its success in predicting the truth
conditions of sentences. (Davidson 1984, p74)
which leads Davidson to declare that it is one of the chief merits of this
approach that:
it touches the observable only when it comes to sentences, [and]
seems to leave the analysis of internal structure simply up for grabs
(Ibid, emphasis mine)
On the other hand, Davidson declares that:
A satisfactory theory for interpreting the utterances of a language,
our own included, will reveal significant semantic structure
(Davidson 1984, pi30 emphasis mine)
He also tells us that these 'structurally-revealing' theories have done
their job once they have delivered interpretively adequate T-sentences,
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and that these make "no mention" of the internal apparatus of the truth
theory. This will take a little effort to unravel.
In what follows I will bring out two objections to the Davidsonian
programme. Both of them address the fact that for Davidson the notion of
meaning is an artefact of truth theory, and as such has a theoretical status
which demands a certain theoretical character in someone's knowledge of
meaning. The objections are (1) that his theory of language does not
describe as much as speakers ordinarily know, and (2) that it credits them
with more than they ordinarily know. Now both of these objections
depend on the assumptions that a theory of meaning should be a theory of
understanding, and that there are facts about a speaker's knowledge of
meaning against which to test our accounts of meaning. These are highly
controversial assumptions and may mean something quite different in
the Davidsonian setting. So we should do well to proceed carefully. But
just to signal the strategy of the argument in advance, should it prove
philosophically cogent to substantiate the claims about a speaker's
linguistic understanding the claim against the Davidsonian programme
will be that it cannot serve as a theory of meaning because it fails to
recover what speakers know of the meanings in their language, and it fails
as a theory of understanding because it credits them with knowledge they
do not have. So the first step in this line of reasoning is to establish what
the Davidsonian can recover of meaning for any given language, while at
the same time trying to ascertain what kind of understanding he credits to
speakers of the language in question. In particular we should ask does
meaning reside within the theory or in the linguistic evidence, and do
speakers of the language have access to the theory or just the linguistic
evidence?
5.4) Logical Form as Significant Semantic Structure?




sententially-structured/ sententially tested) is premissed on the idea that
the formal theory of truth "imposes a complex structure on sentences" as
revealed in the proofs of the corresponding T-sentences, while the
evidence for the T-sentences, and hence for the theory as a whole, consists
"entirely of facts about the behaviour and the attitudes of speakers in
relations to sentences". So how do these facts confirm the significance of
the structure shown in the proofs? Is there some way, perhaps obliquely,
in which evidence of this sort harbours structure revealed by the correct
theory? Not as far as I can see. Though, in his early papers, Davidson was
given to saying that:
Empirical power in such a theory depends on success in recovering
the structure of a very complicated ability - the ability to speak and
understand a language (Davidson 1984, p25)
Nowadays, it is much less clear that he would have any truck with
common structure in the abilities of all English speakers, or in the ability
of a single speaker across time. Instead, a speaker's linguistic ability is seen
as a method for converging on interpretations of his own and others
words from time to time. But:
There is no more chance of regularizing or teaching this process,
than regularising or teaching the process of correcting new theories
to cope with new data in any field - for that is what this process
involves. (Davidson 1986, p446)
On this latest view there is no common method of interpretation
across speakers, or single method in a speaker across time; and since
languages are identified via theories of interpretation, this means that is
no such thing as a common language, or even the language of a single
speaker. But what of the case of syntax, given that syntactic criteria
partially identify languages? Are these facts similarly a matter of varied,
idiosyncratic conjecture? No, Chomsky would argue; but he trades on
something like Davidson's despairing conclusion to argue that in large
part syntactic knowledge must be innately specified. Davidson is simply
looking in the wrong place for an account of the underlying regularities of
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our language. Chomsky would agree that syntax cannot be taught - but he
has shown that it can be regularised. I shall come back to this too. Thus,
while having reservations himself about the idea of an external, and only
extensionally characterised public language, Chomsky would resist
Davidson's latest eliminativist conclusion that:
....there is no such things as a language, not if language is anything
like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is
therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with. (Ibid,
p446)
This eliminativism about language is not easy to reconcile with many
of Davidson's past remarks, but perhaps it is the inevitable outcome of
what I have been calling his Semantical Minimalism about meaning. I
shall restrict myself to an inquiry into this minimalist view of meaning,
rather than look at the newly arrived at eliminativism. But this is still
apposite since meanings, or rather interpretations, do survive in the new
and somewhat dispiriting picture.
Certainly, Davidson's earlier remarks are more encouraging; but the
evidence of the linguistic ability he mentions has to come from evidence
of behaviour and/or evidence for psychological ascription, and neither of
these seem to serve his purpose. To begin with, there are only two ways of
construing talk of behaviour: it is either a matter of the hard physical facts,
or it is a matter of the intentional behaviour of the agent. Construed in the
first way, it is hard to see how the physical properties of speech events
could display the semantic structures of sentences since, as Davidson
himself admits:
The relations between these semantically tractable patterns and the
surface grammar of sentences may be very complicated. (Ibid.,
p!51)
One need only recall Davidson's handling of adverbs in action
sentences, where he treats sentences as involving implicit quantification
over events, to recognise how revisionary of the surface structure (word
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strings?) these logical forms are. Obviously, the extra argument place
cannot show up in the physical properties of the utterance-event.
Should we look for the 'recoverable structure' of a speaker's linguistic
abilities in his intentional behaviour then; that is, in his linguistic
actions? Well, since we are not looking for signs of logical form in the
external behavioural surfaces of an action, perhaps we should look for a
deeper source of evidence at the linguistic attitudes in the mind 'behind'
(embodied in) these utterances. However, the way things have been set up
in interpretation theory there is no hope of examining the mind with a
view to confirming particular sentence structures since they themselves
are used to give a more precise form to mental descriptions:
...attributions of attitudes, at least where subtlety is required,
demand a theory that must rest on much the same evidence as
interpretation [of linguistic behaviour]. (Ibid., pi34 bracketing mine)
So in neither the hard physical facts of behaviour, nor the intentional
character of the mind do we find a recess in which to locate the semantic
structures brought to light by the theory. So what are we to make of
Davidson's talk of "significant semantic structure" ? He explicitly denies
that semantic structure can be regarded, as Chomsky regards syntactic
structure, as reflecting "the internalized grammars" of speakers of the
language. He even goes so far as to deny that we need postulate the
differences in syntactic deep structure Chomsky points to in pairs of
superficially similar sentences like:
(1) I persuaded John to leave
(2) I expected John to leave
which show meaning differences in the active and passive
complements of "persuade" but not in the active and passive
complements of "expect". (Eg: "I persuaded John to be examined by a
specialist"/ "I persuaded a specialist to examine John"; cf. "I expected John
to be examined by a specialist"/ "I expected a specialist to examine John")
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Instead of showing their differences as Chomsky does (1981, plOO) in terms
of what he regards as the different syntactic descriptions a speaker's
internalised grammar assigns to these sentences:
(1') I persuaded John [ PRO to leave]
(2') I expected [John to leave]
where "PRO" is the empty Pronoun Subject and "John" in (1') is the
main clause object and not the subordinate clause subject, thus showing a
grammatical similarity between (1) and sentences like:
(3) I decided [ PRO to leave]
(4) The president isn't sure [ whether PRO to vote for himself]
Davidson supposes that the difference between (1) and (2) is one of
semantic structure shown by noting that "John" can be replaced by any co-
referring expression in (1), salva veritate, but not in (2). This would make
the semantic role of "John" different in (1) and (2) and this would have to
be recorded in truth theory. I doubt whether these intuitions are very
reliable, but notice anyway that in Davidson's attempt to motivate an
alternative to deep structure in terms of the semantic structure of truth
theory, he does not explain the difference in semantic structure in terms of
a speaker's tacit knowledge, or the "intrinsic competence of an idealised
speaker". Instead, he explains it by claiming that "the evidence suggests
that a theory that assigns different structures to (1) and (2) may be simpler
than one that does not" (Davidson 1984, p64). But unfortunately,
Davidson's suggestion and his simplicity assumption for this case will not
provide the extensive generalisations about structure provided by the
postulation of PRO and the consequent structural arrangements offered by
Chomsky. It turns out that the simplest theory that deals with all the data
needs far more than the categories of semantic structure, and that it is far
from simple (or rationally inductive) at all. (I shall elaborate on this when
we come to discuss syntax below.)
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This claim of Davidson's that truth theory can deliver propositional
forms from word strings is wholly untried; but equally, from the empirical
evidence, it is wholly unlikely. So he could only ever be claiming to be
describing some part of the structure of a speaker's linguistic ability, for the
devices of the truth-theoretic interpretation could be applied to a language
only after it had been regimented by something like a generative
grammar; and it would be the empirical claim of syntactic theory that it
describes aspects of the cognitive psychological structure of a speaker's
linguistic ability. But since this is not what Davidson has in mind for
semantic theory, there would have to be both an a priori, attributed
structure and an underlying cognitive psychological structure to
someone's linguistic ability. But if there are any significant relations
between syntax and semantics we shall soon confront the thorny problem
of how this interface is to be described.
That said, what is the justification for saying that the structure of
semantic theory reveals the significant structure of the language? So far,
then, all we can find reason to say is that semantic structures reside
entirely on the side of the theory, and that the theory is imposed on the
evidence. But we have still to say what it means "to reconcile the need for
a semantically articulated structure with a theory testable only at the
sentential level" (Davidson 1984, pl37) - where, presumably, at this level,
the sentences do not display the complex logical forms they are given in
the theory. Perhaps this can be done by a theoretical argument that claims
that it is only by bringing the theory to bear on the evidence that one can
say that someone's sentences have a meaning (interpretation) at all. The
justification would be that meaning is a matter of a sentence's having
truth conditions, and imposing a truth theory brings meaning to light
because it is only in this way that one can justify talk of sentences
possessing truth conditions.
Now we seem to be getting somewhere; but the appropriate cost will be
that a speaker's language and the meaning of his sentences will be a
matter of theoretical construction; notions externally attributed to him on
the basis of his behaviour. Semantic structure is in the eye of the theorist,
who must impose it on linguistic behaviour in order to produce
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interpretations. So it is a theoretical presupposition of the interpreter that
he will find semantic structure in his subject's sentences: it is this
imposition of form on the evidence that makes it possible to treat a
subject's sentences as having truth conditions. This looks like the right
thing for the attributionist to say. And as we know Davidson even tells us
what the presupposed forms are:
A satisfactory theory cannot depart much, it seems, from standard
quantificational structures or their usual semantics. (Ibid., pl51)
This is a theoretical decision to read into the object language the
structures of quantificational theory employed in the metalanguage:
The result of applying the formal constraints is, then, to fit the
object language as a whole to the procrustean bed of quantification
theory, (loc. cit.)
Note, however, that it is not obvious here whether this itself is the
process of regimenting the language for interpretation, or whether that
can only be done once the theory of syntax has extracted linguistic forms
from the primitive data. Either way, it is little wonder that the interpreter
'finds' certain significant logical forms in the linguistic material he
interprets: he simply reads them into the object language; and little
wonder too that the differences in the structure of truth theories for given
languages will be minimal, with the major differences consisting in the
content of their axioms. However, this imposition of structure does not by
itself entail, as Davidson seems to imagine, the stronger conclusion that:
The identification of the semantic features of a sentence will then
be essentially invariant: correct theories will agree on the whole
about the quantificational structure to be assigned to a given
sentence, (loc.cit. Italics mine.)
While I accept that, on this picture, there is no difference between
theories in the forms that they can impose on the data, there can still be
differences in their actual impositions of those forms. For Davidson, all
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equally acceptable theories for a given language share the same set of
forms to impose, but different theories could assign semantic structures
differently to the individual sentences of the object language. And in that
event, if there was no empirical basis on which to choose between the
different acceptable theories, there would still be an indeterminacy of
semantic structure within the object language sentences themselves.
Admittedly, this would be indeterminacy within principled limits:
namely, those set by the format of a Tarski-type truth theory. But it would
be an indeterminacy of logical form nevertheless. Davidson's unargued
for claim that different empirically equivalent truth theories are in
agreement (nearly enough) about the roles they assign to sentences in the
language - roles based on the structural relations they are deemed to enter
into - (see Davidson 1984, p225) is not established by the more restrained
claim that:
...indeterminacy is automatically put under greater control if one
insists, as I do, on a Tarski-style theory of truth as the basis for an
acceptable [interpretation theory]. (Davidson 1984, p228)
Davidson has not banished, but merely cut down the options for
widespread indeterminacy of structure. Although it still remains a distinct
possibility that:
...logical form may be indeterminate: two satisfactory theories may
differ in what they count as singular terms or quantifiers or
predicates, or even with respect to the underlying logic, (loc.cit.)
Let us look at the strategy of containment. It depends on what
Davidson calls:
...a principle of reverse charity that judges a theory better the more
of its own resources it reads into the language for which it is a
theory. (Ibid., p228-9)
But Davidson acknowledges the lack of complete freedom here. Not
just anything "can be read into the object language simply by assuming it
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to be in the metalanguage". For instance, Davidson would resist
assumptions that we are dealing with a modal language just because we
can make appeal to metalinguistic modal operators. But what substance
can he give to a principled distinction? There are two questions here. One
has to do with what semantical resources there should be in the theory;
and the other has to do with how the theoretical devices apply to actual
linguistic practice. On the view I favour, attempts to answer the latter
question provide a means of answering the former. But as we shall see, for
Davidson the priority is reversed.
Whether Davidson's application of the reverse charity principle is
correct in the case of particular languages would require detailed
considerations of how successful he is in using the structures of first-order
extensional logic to deal with the semantic phenomena that seem to call
for alternative logical forms. These will include phenomena that call
upon intensional or modal logics, such as generics, conditionals and
modal terms, and intentional verbs. Such a study would also examine the
proposed refinements to the Davidson framework to deal with cases of
vagueness, tense, discourse reference, demonstratives and indexicals. Full
discussion of these issues is obviously beyond the scope of this work, but
we can still raise the important question of why Davidson assumes that
some and not other theoretical characterisations of a language are
appropriate ways to characterise language. Davidson reads this as the first
of our two questions - what theoretical devices should the theory make
use of - and he hopes to subordinate the second - how do these notions
relate to linguistic practice - to it. The reasons for this will emerge, but let
me stress once more that without an answer to the second question we
shall have no idea why the strategy of attributing quantificational
structures to object language sentences is successful in capturing
regularities in language use, patterns of speaker's inference, and projection
to new cases.
Surely it is quite natural to think that when a truth theory provides a
successful interpretation of a given language there must be some
evidential feature of a speaker's linguistic practice, or some pattern or
structure in his ability to use the language for the logical forms supplied by
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the theory to pick out? But it is just this thought that an attributionist like
Davidson denies to us. Is it then correct, in the absence of any significant
structure in the evidence, to resort to the idea of a forced fit with the forms
of the truth theory? That move would seem to be hopeless because it
threatens to allow back into the picture the postulation of alternative
logical forms, with the resultant indeterminacy. But what other move can
the Davidsonian make? The pattern discerned in a sentence is given by
the theory and is not there in the evidence independently; but at the same
time, Davidson believes that the evidence of that sentence's use does not
permit the imposition of the several different patterns which different
kinds of semantic theory would each see it as exemplifying. Clearly,
Davidson urgently needs some way to motivate the idea of an appropriate
fit if he is going to argue not just for finite axiomatisation and structure-
revealing theories, but for a certain form of axiomatisation and a certain
range of logical forms. However, what he resorts to, and what blocks the
threatened return of alternatives which the idea of a forced fit seemed to
enjoin, is the provision, on a case by case basis, of auxiliary arguments at
the meta-level for why we should not make use of alternative forms of
semantic theory. In the modal case, he offers several arguments that we
should not employ an object language and metalanguage that differ in
expressive power (I shall not discuss these arguments here since I am
concerned in the main with Davidson's strategy of argument). In the case
of adding more structure to sentences on the right-hand sides of T-
sentences than we commonly assume for the sentence mentioned on the
left, Davidson must distinguish between trivial cases where we just
append a tautology to the right-hand side of each T-sentence - such as: (T)
"Snow is white" is true-in-L iff snow is white and 2+2 =4. - and cases
where the extra structure uncovers a genuine logical form, as in the case of
action sentences. Perhaps methodological arguments from simplicity will
help to rule out the trivial cases, but it will not help with cases where
different, equally simple theories provide alternative, empirically
adequate, analyses of the structures of sentences. Davidson's position
seems ill-equipped to cope with such cases, for he has no uninterpreted
source of evidence against which to measure the two theories. He would
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have to resort to a priori grounds to decide the matter, or to rule out the
possibility of any such case. But as Dummett says:
...the idea that something may be complex and yet be exhibited as
complex in different, equally good, ways is not in itself absurd
(Dummett 1981, p279)
We may harbour the intuition that the sentence has one complex
structure and not another. Permutations of structure-assignments to the
same set of sentences, if compatible with the overall evidence (and we
have yet to be shown why they are not) may provide cases where two
theories assign different complex structures to the same sentence.
Arguably, there would be nothing to choose between such theories: but
this would be to concede a point about indeterminacy and forfeit an
invariance in the precise roles given to individual sentences by any
adequate theory. Perhaps this much Davidson cannot "put under greater
control".
The point of all this is to establish is that theoretical possibilities of
rival accounts of the semantic character of a language are not closed-off in
advance by Davidson's heterogeneous arguments against alternative
approaches. Unlike those who think there are facts of the matter about
speaker's knowledge or a linguistic practice that explain the linguistic
evidence we are trying to describe, Davidson cannot appeal to the
linguistic character of the language to support the type of theory he
favours, and thus he cannot ignore the recherche alternatives that can be
put up as alternative ways of fitting the evidence. He offers a theoretical
view in contrast to other theoretical views: so he must pit his theory
against alternative views rather than seek direct confirmation that he is
capturing the linguistic facts about the language. For theory constitutes
these facts according to the attributionist.
Perhaps it will be objected that this is going too far. After all, the
empirical evidence does not permit the theorist of meaning complete
freedom either. Surely, he is constrained by the patterns in a speaker's
linguistic behaviour to fix the meaning of an expression the same way
each time it is used. Well strictly speaking, this depends on how much
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regimentation of the language takes place prior to interpretation. For
instance, can we assume that word -strings are available in uninterpreted
linguistic behaviour rather than mere emissions of noise? Perhaps the
thought is that the interpreter will be empirically bound to assume
(subject to special considerations) that an item of the same phonetic type
must be interpreted everywhere in the same way. Were he not to do so, he
could not assume that expressions made a uniform and stable
contribution to the meaning (truth conditions) of sentences in which they
occurred. And yet this is vital since it is only by guaranteeing this for each
significant non-indexical expression of the language (the indexicals having
been cordoned-off somehow) that the interpreter is able to work out the
meaning (truth conditions) of every (non-indexical) sentence in the
language as a function of the meaning of its parts. However, this
supposedly empirically well-attested assumption is really a matter of
theoretical decision too. For the decision to identify a part of two or more
sentences as the recurrence of the same word is a decision to recognise a
common semantic feature of those sentences; and this in turn depends on
a semantic theory which articulates the inner structure of those sentences
and isolates a part within each of them that has that unique semantic role.
Furthermore, Davidson believes that this theoretical insight into parts and
wholes must come from a holistic theory of meaning. The key thought
here is that because we cannot fix the truth conditions of a sentence in
isolation, we can only fix it in the context of a theory that fixes the truth
conditions for every sentence. This is a highly contentious claim and
Davidson does little to substantiate it but we can sketch, however
unsatisfactorily, how it is supposed to emerge for him.
The truth conditions the interpreter assigns to a single sentences must
depend on the semantically significant parts it has; but as we now know
this is the result of a theoretical decision. From the theorist's point of view
it is by imposing an internal structure on a sentence that it is revealed as
having sub-sentential parts whose semantic roles determine its truth
conditions. But now this assumption will be confirmed or revised in the
light of similar theoretical decisions made about the inner structures
assigned to other sentences, and the truth-determining roles of their parts.
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The thought here is that fixing the semantic role for any one expression
will depend on how one decides to fix the semantic roles of each of the
other expressions that accompany it in the different sentences in which it
occurs; for it must combine with the semantic roles of different
combinations of these expressions to determine the truth-values of
sentences in which it occurs; just as the semantic roles of each of these
expressions must likewise conspire with the roles assigned to their
accompanying expressions to determine the truth values for all sentences
in which they occur. It is only when we have a satisfactory theory that
determines the correct truth-values of every sentence on the basis of its
theoretical imposed structure and theoretically described parts, that we can
certify the identification of the common semantic features of sentences
that share the same term or predicate. The semantic role of any
subsentential expression will be displayed in truth theory by how the
axiom for it functions in the derivations of T-theorems for sentences
containing it; and of course this will depend on the supporting role of the
other axioms. The correct assignment of truth conditions to any
individual sentence will be one that fits into an empirically confirmable
and systematic account of how the truth conditions of the sentences of that
language are determined; and the correct assignments of semantic features
to words will be those assignments that serve to deliver the correct
assignments of truth conditions. So to extract the semantic properties of a
word from linguistic usage demands nothing short of a theory that has
application to the language as a whole. Davidson's takes it that his holistic
conception of meaning is a straightforward consequence of this theoretical
route to meaning:
Words have no function save as they play a role in sentences: their
semantic features are abstracted from the semantic features of
sentences, just as the semantic features of sentences are abstracted
from their part in helping people achieve goals or realize
intentions. (Davidson 1984, p220)
Now while most theorists of meaning would assume with Davidson that,
since a language consists of an infinity of actual or potentially utterable
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sentences built up from a finite stock of vocabulary items and
constructions, we must see "the semantic features of this potential infinity
of sentences as owed to the semantic features of the items of the finite
vocabulary" they would not necessarily concur in thinking that the fixing
of the semantic features of the basic vocabulary items depends on the
language as a whole. That is, they would not share Davidson's view that
because the meanings of words depend on the meanings of sentences in
which they occur, and how they are composed of words whose meanings
are given in terms of stable contributions to yet other sentences, that to
give the meaning of any word or sentence we should have to account for
the meaning of every sentence; ie. that there is no partial ordering of
sentences in the language in respect of their dependencies of meaning.
Opponents would argue that we have yet to be shown a formally satisfying
argument that adoption of the context principle entails a semantic holism
where the meaning of a sentence is a function of the total assignment of
meaning to every sentence. Michael Dummett (1978), Neil Tennant (1987),
Christopher Peacocke (1986a), and Alan Weir (1985) have all offered
arguments that it does not. The alternative is semantic molecularism.
Molecularism is the thesis that the meaning of a sentence is compounded
out of its own constituents and can be given independently of (some)
sentences in the language not involving those constituents (although the
molecularist must, it seems, permit 'local holisms' in the account of
linguistic meaning, thus frustrating any general thesis that sentence
meaning is always basic in a theory of language). All the molecularist need
acknowledge by way of semantic dependencies is that a grasp of the
meaning of any sentence will "depend upon a mastery of some fragment
of the language, a fragment which may, in some cases, be quite extensive."
(Dummett 1978, p304). I cannot enter into these arguments here (though I
will come back to the issue of holism versus molecularity below), but it is
worth pointing out that Davidson's view that the semantic features of
words are abstracted from the semantic features of sentences does not
automatically guarantee semantic holism.
A more promising motivation for Davidson's holistic conclusions
about meaning comes from his evidential holism where we have to work
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back to theoretical posits of words and sentences from the gradual
application of a formal theory to more and more evidence of the use of the
language as a whole. The point is neatly expressed by Gareth Evans.
Suppose that a theory treats some expression e as W, where "W" is some
property of taking a particular semantic value or being structured, then:
In so far as empirical considerations bear upon the correctness of
the claim that an expression is W, they bear globally upon the the
theory according to which it is W, and cannot be brought into any
more direct relation with that feature of the internal constitution of
the theory in virtue of which it may be said to be treating e as W.
(Evans 1976, p200-l)
And even then empirical support for a truth theory will be a matter of
how well its linguistic interpretations service the project of interpreting
the behaviour of the agent as a whole. The upshot is that the evidence
from a speaker's linguistic behaviour cannot support particular meaning-
assignments or specifications of structure unless it supports them all.
Meaning-specifications for any word or sentence are dependent on all
other assignments of meaning made by the theory.
But now we could raise a second objection. Why should we suppose
that the only evidence for linguistic meaning concerns the potential
infinity of points of contact between theorems of the theory and actual or
potential uses of sentences, where this is conceived, at first, in purely
behavioural terms? Could we not seek evidence of speaker's knowledge
of word-meaning or sentence-meaning, as manifested in their linguistic
practice as it relates to that word or that sentence? It is just this
discriminatory evidence from linguistic practice which Davidson denies
us. But the denial rests upon his attributionist picture of the mind of the
speaker according to which linguistic and psychological facts depend upon
the resources of the interpreter and what theoretical constructions he can
put upon someone's behaviour. The constructions imposed on the basis
of behaviour are an interlocking set of beliefs, desires and meanings, but
we can, with some justification accuse Davidson of neglecting the mental
state of a speaker's knowledge of meaning , and the neglecting the
evidence of patterns of linguistic use in which that knowledge is typically
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behaviourally manifested. Both of these may be more robust that
Davidson imagines. The trouble is that, for Davidson, these patterns of use
- let us think of them as behavioural dispositions - are picked out in terms
of the flimsy web of intentional notions that overlays behaviour.
Conceiving of a pattern of language use in this way, as constituted by an
act of interpretation, there is no reason to pay special heed to them: they
will be constantly open to revision in the shifting sands of interpretation
theory. But if we think of linguistic dispositions of speakers as underpined
by certain cognitive psychological states, which partly identify those
dispositions, then it is possible to conceive of speakers as possessing stable
mental structures which function as available place-holders for encoding
recurrent features of linguistic experience. Of course the character of a
disposition can change but there is some reason to expect a more stable set
up, and to find more continuities in language use, than the interpreter is
used to. This makes the regularities in linguistic behaviour less
remarkable or mysterious. However, these remarks are highly
programmatic, and the alternative conception to which they allude has to
be developed before this objection can stick. It will gradually unfold
towards the end of this chapter and in the next chapter. But the main
point to grasp at this stage is simply that it is a methodological
consequence - and hence for Davidson constitutive - of the interpreter's
stance that there is no reason to suppose that there are stable states of
knowledge less given to revision in the light of non-massive changes in a
speaker's belief system; there is just no reason to expect any part of that
intentional framework to be more stable than any other. So if there are
evidentially well-supported generalisations to be had about these
knowledge-involving patterns of language use, the Davidsonian with the
resources of the radical interpreter will simply miss them.
Instead of speaker's knowledge of meaning, Davidson talks about
understanding a language, and a body of knowledge that would suffice for
this. But here he is speaking about the interpreter and providing a
theoretical account of the knowledge one could attribute to him. Davidson
is not accounting for the knowledge a speaker possesses, nor is he really
accounting for the knowledge an interpreter possesses, save in that he is
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talking about the knowledge attributed to the interpreter by the theorist.
This view of linguistic understanding will concern us much in what
follows. But first we need to know more about his conception of
individual meanings; for a proper understanding of this will help us to
see why he resists the thoughts about speaker's knowledge of meaning
just expressed. Extremely roughly, then, the underlying conception will
contain the following strands. Meaning in a language isn't rule-governed
in that meaning does not determine use; meaning is abstracted from use
in that it is plotted by a theory that interprets a vast range of linguistic and
non-linguistic evidence. Just as in the attributionist conception of the
mental, there is a certain Wittgensteinian flavour to these ideas. But
where Wittgenstein and Davidson part company is in Wittgenstein's very
important insight that there is a notion of meaning (grasping a rule)
which is not a matter of interpretation (Philosophical Investigations,
$201): "Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning mustn't be
capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation." (Blue Book. p34).
What Wittgenstein's thinking reinforces so powerfully is the idea that so
far as the speaker is concerned an interpretation will not help him to
determine how he should go on extending a pattern in future cases of
language use.
Leaving that thought aside for the moment, the next thing to do is to
get a clearer idea of Davidson's conception of individual sentence
meaning and from here try to find a home for significant semantic
structure. In the end these two tasks will be one.
None of the foregoing remarks are meant to suggest that an
interpretation theory is entirely unanchored to the empirical facts. It
simply means that the empirical facts that anchor the theory at the level of
its theorems are very sparse indeed. So is what we find there enough to
constitute meaning? If we do not acknowledge the presence of meanings
at this level we will rob the concept of meaning of all empirical import,
treating it like reference, as a notion purely internal to the theory of truth.
This would be disastrous since without empirical conditions of application
any theoretically sound assignment of linguistic meaning could be made
to accord with the evidence, which simply means that we could not speak
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of a correct assignment of meaning at all. Meaning would be rendered
wholly indeterminate and the attributionist's motivation to accommodate
facts about minds and meanings in the material world would have been
undercut. This is not an option for Davidson.
Now any empirical content the concept of meaning has must go via
the T-sentences, since it is T-sentences that relate to the evidence and
nothing else. But do they contain enough information to amount to
specifications of meanings? At first it seems not; for remember that these
testable T-sentences "make no mention of the machinery" of quantifiers,
terms, predicates, connectives, used in the attributed logical forms that
take us from descriptions that do not interpret utterances to those that do.
On the other hand, Davidson says that "a T-sentence gives truth
conditions" (Davidson 1984, pl38). But now what sort of conception of
truth conditions is this? They make no use of the concept of reference, and
make no mention of the constituents of sentences on their left-hand sides.
So there is no reason to ascribe a logical form to the sentences they
contain: they merely present pairs of sentences of the object language and
metalanguage that agree in truth-value. That is why we can test the output
of a truth theory without knowing the meanings of the sentences already.
But now it will be easy to agree with Davidson that "a T-sentence does not
give the meaning of the sentence it concerns" (loc.cit..) However, in the
light of this and the previously quoted remark, Davidson's claim to
uphold a truth conditional conception of meaning now appears highly
problematical. For how can these referentially-insensitive truth conditions
which make no mention of a sentence's constituents possibly constitute a
sentence's meaning? Obviously they cannot; but since they are without
logical form they cannot really constitute a sentence's truth conditions
either. So what Davidson needs to do, if he is to retain the thought that T-
sentences specify the truth conditions (meanings) of object language
sentences is to give the notion of logical form application to their left-
hand sides. But logical form is a notion derived from the internal working
of the theory, it has no empirical basis in the evidence so why should it be
included in meaning? The puzzle is why meaning should be aligned with
the theory on matters of structure, but aligned with the evidence on
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matters of reference. Neither reference nor semantic structure have a basis
in the empirical evidence, and since reference is not an ingredient of
meaning, or even a constraint upon it, why should should we suppose
structure is either? Like reference it is just a posit needed to implement
the truth theory. One bad answer here would be that Davidson believes,
somewhat dubiously, that the semantic structure of sentences and the
non-referential semantic roles of their expressions are invariant across all
empirically equivalent truth theories. That is, that all theories of truth for
a language will take the same finitely axiomatised form, although the
actual reference-specifying axioms they dedicate to each semantic
primitive will depend on different though equally systematic ways of
matching object language names and predicates to metalinguistic names
and predicates. These variations leave the empirical content of the
theories unchanged, and so this time meaning follows the evidence and
we say that the meaning is unchanged. However to have meaning depend
on structure for the same sort of reason would require the assumption
that the same structured meanings are involved in each of the empirically
equivalent theories. And this depends on the unargued for claim that
there is just one structurally sound way to resolve the language into its
semantic primitives. If this is an empirical claim it would have to be
substantiated. If it is an a priori claim we need an argument. At this point
Davidson resorts to a claim that questions of logical form will have been
settled just in case we have assured ourselves that the T-theory delivers all
the right T-sentences and thus enjoys an overall fit with its evidence.
Certainly, it will have been settled to some extent if it is a theoretical
decision taken in advance that those forms will be imposed on the
evidence but this won't help us if we are trying to find out why we should
see this theoretical notion as an ingredient of empirical meaning. What
Davidson actually claims is somewhat stronger:
It makes no sense, on this approach to complain that a theory
comes up with the right truth conditions time after time, but has
the logical form (or deep structure) wrong. (Davidson 1984, p223)
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But the very acceptability of this thought depends on just how one is to
characterise the notion of a sentence's truth conditions. If in order to see
T-sentences as giving the truth conditions of object language sentences we
must suppose that their canonical proofs show how the truth value of an
object language sentence depends (recursively) on its structure, then it will
be no surprise that the logical forms are correct if the truth conditions are.
But we are trying to motivate the notion of a semantically structured truth
condition, and this just seems to presuppose it. The trouble is that truth
conditions settle logical form, for Davidson, only because he uses logical
form (partly) to settle truth conditions; but this is a theoretical decision
and not a guarantee of theoretical correctness. We need to know why are
we justified in reading structure into the evidence for meaning but not all
the rest of the theoretical apparatus?
I think we are now in a position to answer this for Davidson; and the
answer will rest upon a transcendental argument. Here is how it would
go. The best suggestion for why it is crucial to include structure in the
account of meaning is because there is just too little in the evidential
points of contact with the theory to qualify as a notion of meaning. This is
why meaning must be in part a theoretical notion: a matter of the
imposition of semantic structure on the available evidence. It is by
imposing the form of the theory on the evidence that we achieve
interpretations of sentences from the very thin evidence available. It is the
nature of this fit between theory and evidence that constitutes the facts of
interpretation. Without the notion of semantic structure there would be
no subject matter for a theory of meaning at all. So although logical form
is a notion that belongs higher up in the theory, and is strictly speaking
part of the machinery which helps the interpreter to make transitions
between the uninterpreted and the interpreted evidence, it is to be given
application to the evidence as a condition for making linguistic
interpretation possible. Thus although it has no empirical support,
structure must be imposed on the evidence; and it can be imposed when
we go holistic and induce it over the patterns of evidence for the T-
sentences by constructing a finitely axiomatised theory that enables us to
derive all these T-sentences as consequences. We must do this to provide
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any sort of analysis of meaning at all. It is for this reason that the
derivations of the biconditionals have to be taken as revealing (imposing)
the form in (on) the sentences they contain. The transcendental argument,
as I have called it, is an argument for semantic structure in a language, in
particular, for structured meanings, and it is premissed on the possibility
of linguistic meaning (interpretation). Only by imposing form on the
evidence which is brought to bear on the theory, can it yield rich, though
empirically supportable, results of a non-arbitrary kind about the
theoretical meanings assigned to sentences. And only thus can there be a
subject matter for a theory of meaning.
This strategy provides us with the reconciliation we sought earlier.
Only by application of an interpretation theory to a person can we find
linguistic meaning in his hitherto uninterpreted behaviour; and since the
evidence for meaning bears on the theory as a whole, the theoretical
notion of meaning must be holistic. And by this sleight of hand, the
earlier air of paradox for the truth conditional conception of meaning is
dispelled. Considered one at a time, the T-sentences do not present the
meanings of the object language sentences; they are entirely trivial. But
when we view them as the consequences of a theory meeting the formal
and empirical constraints, we come to see the T-sentences as providing
correct interpretations of a speaker's language. From this theoretical
perspective on T-sentences one can restore something more workable in a
theory of meaning, something much less trivial than the form a T-
sentence itself suggests. They do specify meanings but only in the context
of a theory; and they only specify meanings correctly in the context of a
satisfying interpretation of all the evidence concerning an agent's
behaviour and conduct. But the cost of going theoretical is to make
individual meanings theoretical constructs that depend on the whole of
the theory in which they reside, and its evidential setting. Knowledge of
these meanings requires grasp of the deductive apparatus whereby truth is
determined by reference; but it also requires meta-theoretical knowledge
about the goodness of fit between any such theory and the evidence for it.




a semantic location within the patterns of sentences that comprise
the language. (Davidson 1984, p225)
Since we cannot survey the whole of our language, we can only do this by
locating the position of its T-sentences within a theory that systematises
the language for us. When we know this, we know, in particular, how the
truth conditions of the sentences on the left-hand sides are assembled
from the semantic roles of their parts. This is just one theoretical
component within a much larger complex structure. And so it is a
consequence of this way of thinking, and the essential theoricity of
semantical facts that meaning can only be given application only by
semantic ascent. The theory plots the relations between object language
sentences by tracing the truth-theoretic connections between their T-
sentences; meanwhile, the criterion of interpretational adequacy for the
whole enterprise "is that the T-sentences should....optimally fit evidence
about sentences held true by native speakers" (Davidson 1984, pi39). The
advertised advantage being "that very thin evidence in support of each of
a potential infinity of points can yield rich results, even with respect to the
points." (Ibid., pl37); and these "rich results" are available only to
interpreters. We need to know a theory to be able to construct meanings;
but we need to know much more about a theory to be able to construct
interpretations. It is only by knowing a formally satisfactory theory that we
can move from the primitive data to interpretations of sentences; but it is
only by knowing enough about that theory and its relation to the evidence
that we can know that any particular sentence's truth condition is an
interpretation.
5.5) T-theories, Sentence Meanings, and Individual Beliefs
We can now review Davidson's Semantical Minimalism. It arises from
the need to find an empirically constrained notion of meaning available to
anyone with the resources of the radical interpreter. The concept of
meaning cannot be purely theoretical and empirically unconstrained, or
else we could make anyone's words mean anything we liked. At the same
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time there is no hope of constraining our ascriptions of meaning so as to
keep faith with the speaker's intentions in utterring. For although a
speaker's meaning must conform to his intentions, from the interpreter's
point of view it conforms to the intention the interpreter attributes to
him; and in attributing an intention, the interpreter is largely guided by an
understanding of his subject's speech. The evidence for meaning and
intentions comes from evidence that mentions neither. Faced with
evidence that cannot by itself support the notion of meaning, the
interpreter needs to manufacture meanings and beliefs by an
interpretation theory that gives them joint application in the re-described
evidence of an agent's behaviour. The theory of linguistic interpretation is
a sub-part of this overall theory. Now to find an empirically respectable
notion of meaning which respects the fact that meaning is theoretical and
that evidence for meaning bears on interpretation as a whole, one must
see meaning (interpretation) as the result of bringing the empirical
evidence under the control of a formal truth theory. And although not
every aspect of the theory is an aspect of meaning, there is just too little at
the different points of contact between the theory and its evidence to
constitute meanings, so the possibility of meaning requires that what we
find at those points are sentences with a semantic structure induced by
theory over a pattern of truth values evinced from a speaker's attitudes
and actions towards sentences and utterances. Since the parts revealed by
those structures cannot play any substantial part in interpretation, it is
only the structures of these truth-evaluable sentences that constitute their
meanings. These meaning-structures give us what Davidson calls a
sentence's role in the language. This has to be more than its truth-value,
since that alone does not tell us why it depends on the patterns of truth-
values other sentences can take; but it is much less than a means of
referring to the places, people, and things in the event, or state of affairs
that the sentence is about:
The question what objects a particular sentence is about, like the
questions what object a term refers to, or what objects a predicate is
true of, has no answer. (Davidson 1984, pxix)
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To account for the individual meanings of sentences is to account for
the role each sentence plays in the language, which means considering the
semantic dependencies in the context of all other truth-evaluable
sentences of the language. Since, for Davidson, it is the structure of a
sentence that determines its relations to others; it is these structural
relationships which give it "a semantic location in a pattern of sentences
that comprise the language". This, then, is what Davidson understands
sentence meaning to consist in. The analysis of meaning is the analysis of
semantic structure; a structure best accounted for by a theory of truth:
To see the structure of a sentence through the eyes of theory of
truth is to see it as built up by devices a finite number of which
suffice for every sentence. (Davidson 1984, p55)
And so it will be a theory of truth which supplies the correct theory of
meaning:
I suggest that a theory of truth for a language does, in a minimal but
important respect, do what we want, that is, gives the meanings of
all independently meaningful expressions on the basis of an
analysis of their structure, (loc. cit.)
Since the meanings of sentences are given in terms of their structural
relationships to all other sentence, the structures, and hence the
meanings, we can assign to them are constrained holistically by the
evidence that fixes their T-sentences. Evidence about these should reveal a
pattern of truth values amongst the object language sentences. Therefore,
the identifications of sentences and the truth-values speakers attach to
them is vitally important to this whole approach since it is on these that
semantic structure is induced by appeal to the apparatus of a truth theory
that entails all those T-sentences. The structures induced and therefore the
meanings of every sentence depend on the totality of evidence. To mis-
attribute sentential attitudes to a speaker, by mis-identifying his sentences,
or his assent or dissent to them, can lead one to make false assignments of
meanings and therefore to mis-identify a speaker's language. Davidson
has given us no cause to think that sentential attitudes are any more
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reliably attributed or immune to revision that any others, and yet it is on
these that the possibility of a more precise specification of an agent's
mental life depends. What would help to stabilize this part of
interpretation theory is a clear identification of the individual sentences
involved. But it is difficult to see what the syntactic identification of one
among many meaningful sentences consists in for the interpreter since
these identifications are brought to light by the re-descriptions of the
"mere emissions of noise", and their identifications depend on the
cogency of the overall pattern revealed by interpretation in which they are
located. More precise syntactic criteria of identification are nowhere
available in the interpreter's picture. If it is assumed that we need a
recursively specified syntax for the declarative part of a language just to
identify the interpretable and truth-evaluable sentences (whether or not
we recognise semantic structure in them in the purely homophonic case),
then it is going to be hard to motivate a speaker's, or interpreter's,
knowledge of this, even by rational re-construction. For while there is a
perfectly coherent method for extracting the semantic features of words
from sentences by rational inductive means, this depends on a suitable
presentation of the linguistic data of sentences and dependencies, which in
turn rests upon certain syntactic information, and here it is just not
obvious what the rational inductive means of describing syntax could
produce. What are the premisses; what inductive inferences we should
draw? Grammarians have long argued that the evidence available to the
ordinary language learner is just too impoverished to support the
generalisations necessary for the notion of syntactic well-formedness, and
yet all speakers have it. Famously, Chomsky draws the conclusion from
the "poverty of stimulus" arguments, that high-level grammatical
generalisations must be innate. Without this move there is a vast gap to
be plugged in the account that tells us how we get from sounds to
meanings; a gap that must be filled by an account of how we construct a
descriptively adequate grammar for our language that meets all available
empirical criteria. Candidates for this role are noticeably absent. The
proper conclusion of all this should be that whatever little there is to the
notion of meaning on the Semantic Minimalist's picture, his claim to
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recover it from the primitive behavioural data by means of an
interpretation theory alone looks highly implausible.
Returning to the minimalist's conception, it is also worth noting how
the holism it enshrines guarantees a highly theoretical status to the notion
of individual sentence meanings, which in turn makes knowledge of
meaning too theoretical to capture the facts about ordinary speaker's
linguistic understanding. It seems as if this vital part of any person's
mental life is either unjustifiably ignored or misrepresented. The point
emerges as follow. It is the totality of T-sentences derivable within the
theory that fixes the interpretation of any particular sentence dealt with by
one of them. So it is not just the T-sentences and their canonical proofs
that give a meaning (interpretation) for a sentence. It is the whole theory
with all its logical consequences. The fundamental conception of meaning
is one of a theoretically suspended item tied to the evidence via the rest of
a theory. If the meanings of individual sentences are specified by reference
to the whole of the theory, we shall need the whole of the theory to specify
their meanings each time. This is just what Davidson expects:
we can give the meaning of any sentence (or word) only by giving
the meaning of every sentence (and word) in the language.
(Davidson 1984, p22)
There are an infinite number of sentences to take into consideration,
and finite creatures like us can encompass them all only by means of our
knowing a theory that recursively characterises each of them. In this way,
the distinctive role in the language of any particular sentence will be
acknowledged when specifying its meaning if this is done by means of a
theory that already anticipates, though its deductive apparatus, the
relation of that sentence to all others with which it deals.
There may be a number of different theories one could construct
compatibly with the evidence. Building the theory, in a piecemeal fashion
means that "a pattern must be built up that preserves the formal
constraints while suiting the evidence as well as may be" (Davidson 1984,
pl52). Interpreters may satisfy this requirement while while arriving at
different interpretational schemes; but their use of different theories need
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not threaten the idea that they can know the meanings in a particular
public language. This idea can be preserved by the semantical minimalist:
I suggest that what is invariant as between different acceptable
theories of truth is meaning. (Davidson 1984, p225)
This will be a field of semantical structures, each one of which is a
theoretical component knowable only on the basis of knowing a theory to
which it belongs. It is by reference to this notion that Davidson fixes the
identity of languages, and not by the schemes of reference embodied in
particular theories of interpretation. So as far as the character of the
language goes this is indeed significant semantic structure (subject to the
misgivings if we are not guaranteed a unique assignment function pairing
these structures with individual sentences.)
Davidson is now entitled to say that meaning reflects the structure of
the language, and to that extend, the structure of language use. But
remember that the structure reflected in meaning is the structure of the
theory, and there is a lingering temptation which, Davidson would have
us resist, to ask whether the theory is correct. As we know Davidson
would simply deny that there is anywhere else to look for an answer save
in the formal and the empirical constraints on truth theory. The formal
constraints are justified by the requirements of interpretation, and the
empirical constraints just provide us with too little to say without appeal
to the theory.
Now of course the confirmation of T-sentences does depend on belief-
ascriptions, as the other contributory factor to the evidence of speakers
holding sentences true, and so this means that truth conditional
assignments are not so hopelessly unconstrained as just to arrive at the
correct overall pattern of sentences' truth-values. But remember these
belief-ascriptions are made from within interpretation theory and such
ascriptions themselves depends for their precise rendering on the way we
can interpret the believer's language; so as far as matters of semantic
refinement go they may not constrain logical form and semantic content
that much. Certainly, we have to interpret people so as to make the
sentences they use relate to one another in much the same way that their
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thoughts relate to one another, and all this in a way that conforms to - ie.
depends on and constrains - the speaker's behaviour and attitudes in these
and other linguistic situations; but this tells us little about how fine¬
grained or course cut the contents of someone's utterances and beliefs
should be, or how much indeterminacy is tolerated in a correct
interpretation of him. All we have from Davidson is a policy decision to
adopt a Tarski-style theory of truth for interpreting a language, which
enjoins a finite axiomatisation and a wide range of logical forms but does
not guarantee unique assignments of forms to individual sentences of the
language. And if matters of logical form have not been settled just by
taking that decision alone, then there is room to cast doubt on Davidson's
assumption that logical form is (nearly enough) invariant across different
acceptable T-sentences. But the indeterminacy point aside, Davidson's
attributionist picture simply produces a point at which justification gives
out and where we are dissuaded from asking any more. At that point the
best Davidson can do is try to persuade the recalcitrant that:
if we were to ask for evidence that the explanation is correct, this
evidence would in the end consist of more data concerning the sort
of event being explained, namely further behaviour which is
explained by the postulated beliefs and desires. Adverting to beliefs
and desires to explain action is therefore a way of fitting an action
into a pattern of behaviour made coherent by the theory. (Davidson
1984, pi59)
The appeal to 'coherency' like the appeal to rationality represents an
ultimate stopping place for inquiry. The only further thing to be be said in
favour of the theory is to speak of what Frege would have called its
'fruitfulness':
if we ask how a method of interpretation is tested. In the end, the
answer must be that it helps bring order into our understanding of
behaviour. (Davidson 1984, pi61)
But it is at just this point that one can wonder whether it does. Do we
ordinarily use such a theory to make sense of others? Further, we can
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wonder whether it can tell us enough about what we need to understand
when conversing with others: in particular, what they are talking about.
These are both objections to Davidson's picture based on an appeal to the
notion of speaker's knowledge of language. If this notion can be
substantiated it will in no small respect threaten the whole foundation of
Davidson's attributionism. For what seems so unsatisfying about that
picture is that it leaves meaning not so much in the mind of the speaker,
but that it leaves both in the eye of the interpreter who interprets what is
said. Meaning is the product of applying a formally adequate truth theory
to the behavioural evidence of what a speaker says and does:
Such a theory may be taken as giving an interpretation of each
sentence a speaker might utter. To belong to a speech community -
to be an interpreter of the speech of others - one needs, in effect, to
know such a theory, and to know that it is a theory of the right
kind. (Davidson 1984, pl61)
In the terms used above, this might seem an unnecessary conflation
between the interpreter and the theory of what the interpreter knows. I
shall turn to this next. But note that on Davidson's conception of
interpreted meanings it is quite unclear how the speaker is to produce his
linguistic responses. Perhaps the proper conclusion here should be that
there is no guarantee that the ordinary speaker has an understanding of
the structure of his own language. Being a speaker would not
automatically give one insight into the character of one's own language
since this would include structure constituted by a theoretical
characterisation of the language. However, taken to extremes this would
mean that the speaker does not have an understanding of his own
language: which is absurd. To avoid this, Davidson has recently written:
an interpreter uses his theory to understand the speaker; the
speaker uses the same (or an equivalent) theory to guide his speech.
For the speaker, it is a theory about how the interpreter will
interpret him. (Davidson 1986, p438)
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This is an extraordinary claim. We may well have a theoretically
developed view about how we will be understood, but it is a huge jump
from there to the claim that this theory guides us in saying what we do.
The psycholinguist has an extremely complex view about the structure of
the sentences he utters and the reception properties of his hearers, but he
could not claim in any uncontroversial sense that he was using that
theory to guide him in producing speech. The controversial sense would
talk about the psychological reality of the theory and suggest that rather
than the speaker using the theory, the theory is true of those unconscious
processes in the speaker causally responsible for his speech. The
corresponding claim for the psychological reality of truth theory would
argue that the rules and representations that make up the deductive
apparatus of a correct truth-theory should describe ( at least some part of)
the actual psychological mechanisms which are causally responsible for
the linguistic behaviour of competent speakers. But as we saw above
Davidson eschews the explanatory pretensions of cognitive psychology. So
we are still owed some account of what it is to be guided by such a theory.
It is here that Davidson needs to recognise Wittgenstein's Auffassung: "a
way of grasping a rule that is not a matter of interpretation".
The trouble with the attributionist picture is not that it has nothing to
say about the psychological reality of the interpreter's semantical
pronouncements for the speaker: in its re-working of that notion, the
psychological characteristics of the mind do confirm the ascription of
meaning and structure, but it is just that they too are externally attributed
from the third-person standpoint of the interpreter, which means our
subject's psychological reality is partitioned and exhausted by the
conditions on attitude-ascription, conditions which include
interpretations of his speech. The trouble is that there is no independent
check on the psychological reality of an externally attributed semantic
theory. But then, there is no such thing for the theory to conform to, as far
as the attributionist is concerned. Neither has he any other independent
means of confirming his theory: there are no "physical underpinnings for
the deductive apparatus of truth-theories, over and above their output"
(McDowell 1978 p!26), and for the attributionist this exhausts the places to
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look: there is only the explanatory space of physical theory that provides
causes of the way the world works, and the explanatory space of
intentional theory that explains behaviour, understood in terms of the
sort of thing an agent could see reasons for going in for. (See, McDowell,
pl26). Now since interpretation theory does fit into the patterns of causal
explanation in physical theory, Davidson's talk of a speaker being guided
by such a theory must belong to the latter type of explanations. But this is
wildly disruptive of the normal picture of unreflective language use
which McDowell advocates so strongly. I shall return to this in the next
section.
It has been a constant criticism of this approach, by antirealists like
Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright, that it gives us no account of what
a speaker's knowledge of truth conditions consists in. But now we are
better placed to see why Davidson omits to give this. From the
attributionist standpoint there is nothing further to say over and above
providing an account of what it is for the sentences in the speaker's
language to have particular truth conditions assigned to them.
Confirmation that the theory gives the meaning of the sentences in
question, and that they are publically knowable, is offered in terms of the
theory's success: that knowledge of the theory would suffice for
understanding the sentences of that speaker's language. Any further
confirmation is either impossible or resides not in the nature of speaker's
knowledge itself, but in the theory which entitles us to so describe him in
terms of his beliefs, desires and reasons for action. The structure and
content of the rational mind, like the structure and content of the
language it so crucially depends on, are externally attributed by the theory
of interpretation. What then becomes so crucial in evaluating these
theories is their precise nature of fit with the behavioural and physical
evidence. But as we now know, it is only via the a priori constraints that
the physical conditions become an important part of the grounds for the
attributions made to a subject in interpretation theory. Unharnessed
ascriptions of truth conditions to a speaker's sentences that make him
speak about remote parts of the world, or in principle unknowable
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conditions, are meant to be reined in here. But this all depends, once
more, on the resources of the interpreter.
But still one wants to protest that not every external attributed theory
correctly captures the psychological and semantical facts about an
individual mind and an individual's grasp of his language. Saying more
precisely which ones do is vital whenever we are faced with philosophical
controversy or scepticism about the nature of the attributions as in the
realist-antirealist debate. Davidson's stopping place just won't do. Even
the transcendental argument I ascribe to him will not settle the more
controversial issues. What we would need to know is whether the
conclusion of the transcendental argument tells us something about the
features of reality, in this case, the reality of linguistic structure, or merely
tells us what someone with that conceptual framework must think.
Conceived in the latter way, it is not surprising that it must make the
structure-positing move to retain any credible notion of meaning. But to
the non-attributionist, this will look like a desperate attempt to come to
grips with explicable facts about actual languages and actual language
users. We only need look in the right place.
The problem that faces is us is to motivate an account of semantic
structure and the semantic properties of sentence-constituents which is
less blankly external to the minds and linguistic practices of the ordinary
speaker. On the attributionist's picture these properties of individual
sentences have no psychological reality or empirical significance over and
above that which attaches to the theory as a whole. The holism of
interpretation theory denies these key notions any status beyond that of
abstractions from the overall intentional organisation of a speaker's
behavioural history. What a non-attributionist psychology must make
room for is some more local correlation of these semantic features of
sentences with properties of speakers' knowledge or mental states. This
will require an adequate conception of both the object of knowledge and
the conditions for possessing it. Clearly, Davidson's notion of a sentence's
meaning or truth conditions won't serve as objects of knowledge of this
kind since they are theoretical components belonging to a complex
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structure. We need an alternative conception of sentence meaning, and
the best place to start is with a Fregean conception of truth conditions.
For Frege, the truth-values of sentences were determined by the
references of their parts. But speakers working out the truth-value of a
sentence from the references of its parts would have to go via the senses of
those parts, for speakers never grasp just the reference of an expression
(and in the case of intelligible but undecided identity statements they do
not grasp as much as the reference of an expression) except by way of the
sense of the expression of which that thing is the reference. Also for Frege,
sense is a cognitive notion, a notion we use to explain what it is a speaker
understands by an expression, or the meanings he attaches to it. So the
determination of a sentence's truth-value on the basis of its parts is a
possible object of speaker's knowledge - to know that sentence's meaning
is to grasp its truth conditions. Thus truth conditions belong at the level of
sense and can be regarded as parts of a speaker's linguistic knowledge.
Since the sense of the sentence, that is, its truth conditions, involve a
number of subsentential senses the sense of the sentence must be
structured, having those senses that determine the relevant truth-affecting
references of words as its constituents. Thus semantic structure is also part
of speaker's knowledge. Thus Frege's conception of truth conditions gives
rise to a very rich conception of speaker's knowledge. As Dummett
describes it, Frege's requirement on understanding builds into it the
notions which Davidson locates higher up in the structure of the truth
theory:
For Frege, a speaker grasps the sense of a sentence only by
apprehending its truth-value as being determined in a certain way
corresponding to its structure, the senses of the constituents
determining their referents and hence the truth-value of the
whole. The conception of the references of the parts of the sentence
therefore enters into the speaker's grasp of the thought it expresses:
without this conception, we cannot explain what it is for him to




This strong requirement would have it that to understand an
indicative sentence, one must have a conception of the conditions for the
sentence's truth that essentially involves grasp of its structure and
knowledge of what it is for certain things to be the referents of its terms.
This means that one is constrained to find a theory which accurately
portrays the referential content and structure of a speaker's knowledge. To
come up with the correct Fregean truth conditions of a sentence is most
certainly to fix the correct logical form. But to do this one must find the
right semantic structure for a speaker's sentences and the right reference
for their structurally revealed parts; and these constraints of reference and
structure on the correct theory of meaning for a speaker's language are
constraints on correctly describing what that speaker understands by the
sentences of his language. His understanding of his own sentences is a
matter of what he knows, for the meanings of his sentences are genuine
objects of knowledge. In this sense an adequate theory of meaning must be
a theory of understanding; a theory of sense must a be a theory of a
thinker's grasp of sense.
This Fregean conception of truth conditions is not applicable on
Davidson's picture, and this is where McDowell's defense of Davidson
looks strained. The notions that Frege sees as integral to a sentence's truth
conditions as genuine objects of speaker's knowledge, Davidson sees as
merely posited to implement the theory. Even in attribution there is no
suggestion that these notions of the semantic machinery must enter the
mind of the speaker. Unable to make use of these constraints on an
adequate account of meaning for a language, Davidson has no way to cut
down on the threatened indeterminacies. But he shows his semantic
minimalism in full by embracing the limitations of his linguistic theory:
This doctrine of indeterminacy of translation, as Quine called
it, should be viewed as neither mysterious nor threatening. It is
no more mysterious than the facts that temperature can be
measured in Centigrade or Farenheit (or any linear
transformation of these numbers). And it is not threatening
because the very procedure that demonstrates the degree of
indeterminacy at the same time demonstrates that what is
determinate is all we need. In my view, erasing the line between
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analytic and synthetic saved philosophy of language as a serious
subject by showing that it could be pursued without what there
cannot be: determinate meanings. (Davidson 1986, p313
emphasis mine)
Now combine this view with the thesis of the inextricability of belief
and meaning: "the only access to the fine structure and individuation of
belief is through the sentences speakers and interpreters of speakers use to
express and describe beliefs." (Ibid., p315) and we have a position that we
could now think of Davidson's position as a combined Semantical and
Psychological Minimalism:
What a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker
means is all there is to learn; the same goes for what a speaker
believes. (Davidson 1986, p315)
Total theories are what we must construct, and many theories will
do equally well. (Davidson 1984, p241)
Indeterminacy of meaning or translation does not represent a
failure to capture significant distinctions; it marks the fact that
certain distinctions are not significant. (Davidson 1984, pi 54)
This is a high price to pay if it means that the distinction between
thinking about this person rather than that one is not significant, or
cannot be made for the subject at all. But this is just what the
interdependence of language and the propositional attitudes leads to when
combined with the inscrutability of reference. The traditional notion of
the intentionality of a mental state, the notion that there is something a
particular thought is about is dispensed with. A further consequence is
that if the structure and content of language provides the only guide to the
structure and content of thought, then Davidson will have to say that the
linguistic articulation provides some guidance to the conceptual structure
of thought, but that the interpretation of language undermines the idea
that the distinct conceptual constituents contribute to determining the
contents of the thoughts in which they partake. The conceptual structure
of a thought - subject to whatever structural indeterminacies there are in
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language - offers no guide to parts which determine the referential
features of a thought, for there is really no such thing. What else, then,
could the conceptual constituents of thoughts be about ? For Davidson
there is little else we can say about them. So the concepts we might
reasonably suppose make for the precise contents of our thoughts will
have a purely instrumental status in the context of belief attribution.
There is just no fact of the matter concerning questions about whether or
not someone possesses this or that particular concept, save whether he is
apt to be ascribed it in an overall interpretation that makes best sense of
his behaviour. Davidson says that the "question of concept possession is
inseparable from that of attitude ascription" (A&E, p221), and in a perfectly
respectable sense this is true. But this picture encourages us to go further
in thinking that there is no empirical significance to concept-ascription.
This should be denied.
To sum up, the principles of rational psychology and semantic theory
are constitutive of the practice of interpreting others' behaviour, and since
there is no gap between the best interpretation we can produce and the
mental life of the interpreted subject, these principles are constitutive of
the concepts of mind and meaning. The mental and the meaningful are
introduced into the world by way of these concepts because they are the
notions we use to give an intentional organisation to things that are really
physical. Minds and meanings are manufactured from the available
evidence brought under the control of the principles of interpretation, and
permit the degree of discrimination or indeterminacy that attaches to the
language we use to report another's speech or thought. Save for the
principles of interpretation, there is no other way to cut down on the
indeterminacy of language or thought. The beliefs an interpreter can
ascribe to someone will be identified by their contents, and the contents of
beliefs will be inseparable from the constructions placed upon sentences
held true because of them in theories of linguistic interpretation.
However, the assignments of meaning made here cannot be separated
from attributions of belief; beliefs and meanings form an interconnected
system, much like the theory that ascribed them, which confronts the
evidence as a whole. Every attribution of an attitude, or interpretation of a
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sentence, is a move within a holistic theory for interpreting a subject's
behavioural output. This means that language, like the sentence
meanings it contains, and the individual beliefs identified by them, is a
largely theoretical construct imposed on the available evidence: the
characteristic properties of a language are identified by the interpreter and
attributed to the words of a speaker. This is achieved by the theory of truth.
Given an antecedently understood notion of truth, and a theory's
fulfilment of Convention T, the constraints which do most of the work in
ensuring that we have an interpretative truth theory are the Propositional
Attitude Constraint and Systematicity Constraint. The first brings with it a
holistic constraint on theories of interpretation, and the second makes
sure the embedded theory of linguistic interpretation can take advantage
of a compositional molecular semantics; at least in a theory-internal way.
If theories of meaning meeting both of these requirements leave room for
a great deal of indeterminacy, then we must either look for further
adequacy conditions, or embrace Semantic Minimalism. The
indeterminacies we discovered are that equally adequate truth theories
may assign different truth conditions to the same sentences if they make
compensatory adjustments in the speaker's beliefs. This is possible because
beliefs and meanings are dependent variables in a theory of behaviour
built on irreducible, intentional notions that enjoy a holistic fit with the
physical evidence, and it is a feature of this total fit that various
instantiations of the dependent variables can be realised by the same
physical base. So theories making different attributions can be applied to
the same individual. Secondly, the contents of his utterances and beliefs
are referentially inscrutable. And thirdly, different truth theories may
assign their semantic structures differently to the same set of sentences.
Alternatives to this attributionist conception of mind and language
may be motivated by the thought that one must cut down on this degree
of indeterminacy and restore facts of the matter about what people think
and say, including facts about whom and what they are speaking and
thinking of. This sort of opposition to attributionism would be motivated
by a methodological maxim to the effect that if there is a way to reduce the
indeterminacy in our best account of meaning and mind without lapsing
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into philosophical error we should take it. This would be motivation
enough, but I think we can make a stronger claim about the inadequacy of
the attributionist's picture. For even if the meanings attached to
individual sentences cannot be constrained by referential properties of
their parts, they should be constrained by the demand that a theory of
meaning should provide an account of speaker's knowledge of meaning.
And in this respect, Davidson's account is deeply flawed; for he can be
seen to be ascribing to speakers/ interpreters less than they know, while on
the other hand crediting them with knowledge they do not have. This
suggests that he is failing to recognise important facts about speakers'
knowledge which a non-attributionist account of these matters would
have to make out. Moreover, even in the case where we accept the
minimalist conclusions about meaning and accredit the interpreter with
reflective knowledge of the theory, it is doubtful whether he can recover
the propositional forms used in truth theory from "mere emissions of
noise" without resort to a descriptively adequate syntax. The attributionist
position on knowledge of syntax will look much less plausible once we see
what sort of theory is required.
I now want to motivate a more explanatory approach to matters of
mind and meaning, based on a different conception of psychology which
will lead to the construction of more substantial psychological constraints
on theories of meaning. I shall suggest that in the end the correct way to
substantiate the psychological reality of individual sentence meanings is
by reference to cognitive psychological facts about language users.
However, to be a non-attributionist all one is required to believe is that
there are facts of the matter about the psychological lives of speakers and
the linguistic properties of their languages which are there to be described ,
rather than constituted, by correct theories of them. Those who believe
this while eschewing all empirical psychological investigation, will have
to establish the existence of a domain of facts about a speaker's knowledge
of language which are not just a matter of attribution and which, being
confirmed independently of their ascription to a speaker, provide some
constraints on what that the theory can legitimately describe a speaker as
knowing. The less cognitive psychologically committed picture of
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speaker's knowledge will still have to face up to the challenge of
describing a speaker's knowledge of syntax and say what it is for him to
possess that knowledge. I shall claim that the most plausible approach to
matters of syntax is to be given by an explanatory theory that describes facts
about a speaker's psychological organisation that explain aspects of his
linguistic competence.
Both of these approaches to a speaker's knowledge of language will try
to provide substantial constraints on the theoretical assignments of
semantic structures and semantic properties to sentences. And whether
the desire is to describe aspects of the psychology of the language user, or
simply to provide further constraints on a semantic theory adequate for
describing the determinable properties of an actual language, the basis for
claims about properties of structure and reference in a language must go
via speakers' knowledge of those properties if we are to reject the model-
theoretic approach to semantics I rejected at the outset. The flaw in the
Davidson programme is that it lacks the resources to capture these
essential linguistic facts and misdescribes the character of linguistic
understanding.
I shall now turn to these alternative conceptions, and I begin by
contrasting the resources of the explanatory, the descriptive and the
interpretive theories of meaning.
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Philosophy, Mind and Language
6.1) Theories of Meaning, and Theories of Understanding
In a number of papers, Michael Dummett has insisted that questions
about meaning are best interpreted as questions about understanding; and
since he also believes that questions about meaning should be tackled by
attempting to construct a theory of meaning for a language, he has
advocated that we should think of a theory of meaning as a theory of
understanding. Let us call this Dummett's equivalence claim. It says that a
theory of meaning should be an account of what a speaker knows when he
knows how to speak a language. Dummett tends to stress that the account
of linguistic knowledge should be 'speaker-centered':
What we are after is an account of the sort of understanding a
speaker has. (Dummett 1976, p69)
This account of what it is to know a language will be a detailed account
of what it is to have the knowledge a speaker has about his own language;
in particular, it must state what he knows about any given sentence.
Now we must take care when interpreting Dummett's dictum for it
can be read in different ways. At its most bland, it seems a truism that the
meaning of a sentence is what someone who understands that sentence
knows, and unless one is prepared to say more, it seems to add little to
describe a theory of meaning as equivalent to a theory of understanding.
But Dummett does add more, not just by stressing that the theory of
meaning should account for the nature of speakers' knowledge, but also by
insisting that it should also tell us what a speaker's having this knowledge
consists in. That is, it should be possible to say what someone who
possesses that knowledge has that distinguishes him from someone who
lacks it. This extra requirement turns the equivalence into a knowledge
constraint on theories of meaning. The force of this constraint will depend
on what one is prepared to take as establishing that a person possesses any
given piece of linguistic knowledge. As is familiar, Dummett is prepared
to ascribe someone a knowledge of the meaning of a particular sentence (a
grasp of its truth conditions) only if that person can distinctively manifest
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this in behaviour describable in terms other than his saying that such and
such is the case. Indeed the behaviour in which someone manifests his
understanding of a sentence should be recognisable by another without
command of the language in question; for only then could another learn
what the sentence means (on that speaker's lips) without merely guessing
this, or knowing it already. The sort of thing envisaged as manifesting this
knowledge is a complex discriminatory skill exercised in response to
publically accessible circumstances, (see Wright's "Strawson on Anti-
realism" in Wright 1987) This version of the further requirement on
knowledge - that speakers be able to show what they know - is the
manifestation requirement, and it is this which turns Dummett's
knowledge constraint on theories of meaning into an antirealist
requirement. For there is nothing in a speaker's ability to use a sentence
with purportedly verification-transcendent truth conditions that shows
his sensitivity to the obtaining or not of those conditions; so there is
nothing to show that he has that knowledge. Indeed someone's grasp of
the difference between the obtaining or not of those truth conditions could
not be shown to an audience with a merely human range of cognitive
capacities, for it would transcend their checking powers too, ex hypothesi.
So instead of treating the competent speaker as manifesting knowledge of
this sort, Dummett regards what he is capable of manifesting as being his
sensitivity to a whole range of evidential conditions which bear upon the
warrant for the assertion or denial of that sentence. This would amount to
displaying knowledge of the sentence's assertion conditions.
I have said that the equivalence Dummett sees between a theory of
meaning and a theory of understanding is just the claim that a theory of
meaning must be a theory of speakers' knowledge of meaning, and that it
is a further demand that the theorist should be able to say what it is to
possess the items of knowledge the theory describes. But now I want to
look at different ways of reading Dummett's equivalence claim. In fact,
there are at least three ways to read the claim that a theory of meaning is a
theory of understanding. We can read it from left to right, from right to
left, or without giving any explanatory priority to either side.
The attributionist about linguistic knowledge, like the Platonist about
meanings or senses, will read it from left to right. That is, he will consider
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it enough to give an adequate account of what the sentences in some
speaker's language mean, without looking for further evidence that these
are the meanings the speaker of the language actually grasps. This theorist
will not equate a specification of what a speaker knows with an attempt to
account for a speaker's mastery of his language. If the theory of meaning
adequately characterises the language in question then these will be the
meanings speakers of that language grasp: ie. the claim for correct
linguistic specifications, here, will licence the ascription to speakers of the
corresponding linguistic knowledge. This sort of theorist feels under no
obligation to say more about a speaker's having that knowledge than he
says by describing the objects of that knowledge. In particular, he will not
feel the need to say what it is for the speaker to acquire or exhibit an
understanding of his language. But the equivalence is maintained since
the theoretical description of what sentences in a speaker's language mean
will suffice to give a partial characterisation of his mind. Here, as in all
cases of attributionism, we are invited to think that there is no further fact
for a speaker's possession of that knowledge to consist in.
Another way to read the requirement is to see no priority between the
right and the left hand side. To describe one side is to describe the other. If
we say what someone knows when he understands an expression or
sentence, then we will be saying what that expression or sentence means,
and vice versa. But for this theorist, unlike the first, there will be no way
to arrive at an adequate theory of meaning without including satisfactory
conditions on what it is to know the objects described. Meaning is an
object of knowledge, so a theory of meaning must be an account of items
of knowledge. This makes epistemological matters crucial to semantic
theory. At the end of the day, someone of this persuasion will think that
the two sorts of theory are really just one: a theory of meaning just is a
theory of the knowledge a speaker has.
Although this theorist sees meaning as an epistemologically
constrained notion, he will not see an account of meaning as answering to
psychological constraints. This is what distinguishes him from the third
of our protagonists. The no-priority theorist (like the first protagonist) can
see no epistemological asymmetry between the task performed by a theory
of understanding and that performed by a theory of meaning. There is no
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extra role for a theory of understanding to play in constraining choice of
an adequate theory of meaning, and so no extra purchase it affords us. The
only candidates for being theories of meaning for a language must already
be theories of understanding, and the only form a theory of understanding
can take is the form given to it by providing a theory of meaning that
delivers meaning-specifying theorems of the familiar kind.
The right to left reading of the equivalence would give explanatory
priority to the right hand side giving the theory of understanding a more
substantial role to play than either of the above two positions. This would
not entail a reduction of meaning to an account of a speaker's non-
linguistic intentions but it would stress the relevance of certain
psychological considerations to any account of linguistic meaning. For on
this position, the theory of understanding would be embedded within a
wider context of the psychological states and processes, and overall
cognitive organisation of the language user. So for example, a theory of
meaning might be required to contribute to the psychological explanation
of a speaker's linguistic behaviour. Our best model of psychological
explanation would then impose strong constraints on the left-hand side of
the equivalence claim. For instance, where psychological explanation is a
form of causal explanation, and where the causal processes are
computations, the axiomatic structure of a theory of meaning might be
required to reflect those states of a speaker that are implicated in
computations that result in the various observable linguistic outputs. On
this approach, the form of a theory of meaning would be a matter of
empirical hypothesis. The information states of a speaker, his
information-processing and perceptual capacities, his relations with the
environment and with others could all contribute to determining the
meanings he could grasp. This would amount to giving a substantive
account of understanding; one which says not only what a speaker knows
but also how he acquired that knowledge, how it is encoded, and how it is
deployed. The epistemological asymmetry would be due to the fact that
empirical theories would aim to reveal antecedent conditions on learning
and using a language which could then shape the notion of meaning the




As well as drawing upon the psychological conditions for
understanding, such an account could also draw upon (without reducing
meaning to) the notions of content in the theory of thought. But
Dummett's equivalence operates at the level of thought too: a theory of
thought must be a theory of our grasp of thought. This too is open to
various interpretations. Someone could suppose that a logical account of
thoughts and the relations between them would be an account of what
thinkers could grasp. Others would insist that we need to give some
substance to the epistemological claims being made about just what
speakers grasp. But someone who thinks there is a point in looking for
some non-attributionist theory of grasp need not conceive this as a
psychological theory. The advocate of this middle position would try to
distinguish between giving a theory of our grasp of thoughts and giving a
theory of thinking. He would see the former as the proper task of the
philosopher and the latter as the proper task for the psychologist. Like the
Platonist, someone holding this position will want to distinguish his
logical inquiries from a psychological inquiry; but unlike the Platonist, he
will believe that logical claims involve epistemological matters about the
precise nature of the thoughts speakers actually grasp. The epistemological
constraints on the logical account of thoughts will not, he thinks, involve
any psychological constraints. Distancing the theory of grasp from
psychological theorising depends on making use of some such distinction
as that "between the process by which we come to acquire a grasp of sense
and what constitutes such a grasp" (Dummett 1973, p240), where only the
latter is of interest to the philosopher of language. But this depends on
coming up with an account of what constitutes grasping certain thoughts;
an account which does not just read-off facts about grasp from a plausible
and coherent theory of thought, but which is also an account that eschews
all psychological facts about a speaker detectable by empirical research.
However, our third protagonist will regard success in the theory of
thought as very much dependent upon psychological facts about our
thought-processes, such as whether of not they involve the processing of
structured states. To this theorist, any facts of the matter as to whether or
not we grasp something structured will be referred to independently
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investigable features of our psychological processes, such as whether their
inputs, outputs and intermediate working structures have a syntax.
The notion of grasping a thought is Frege's, as is the analytical
conception of a study of meaning or thought. Although Frege never fully
dealt with the notion of grasp in a satisfactory way, his remarks in the
following passage are illuminating. Speaking of our ability to grasp a
thought about a law of gravitation he wrote:
... it is a process which takes place on the very confines of the
mental and which for that reason cannot be completely understood
from a purely psychological standpoint. For in grasping the law
something comes into view whose nature is no longer mental in
the proper sense, namely, the thought; and this process is perhaps
the most mysterious of all. But just because it is mental in character
we do not need to concern ourselves with it in logic. (Frege 1979,
pi45)
The Platonist sentiments expressed in the final sentence risk denying
Dummett's equivalence between thought and our grasp of thought. But it
is interesting to note that attempts to re-introduce it in the context of
Frege's view would involve us in an inquiry on the borders of philosophy
and psychology. This is just what the explanatory theorist believes.
Notice that a Fregean Platonism which attempted to eschew all
epistemological matters about speakers' grasp would be quite unworkable
as a theory of sense (thought), since the individuation of the senses of
words or sentences, and the concepts exercised in judgements depends in
part upon their cognitive significance for creatures like us. A purely logical
theory of sense that prescinds from all facts about the psychological states
of thinkers still has to recognise a notion of cognitive value that connects
the finely individuated senses of thought and language with facts about
people's ordinary propositional attitudes. Judgements of identity or
distinctness among the conceptual contents of thoughts or sentences are
sensitive to facts about whether a thinker can take different attitudes
towards those contents of sentences. No acknowledgement is made by the
Platonist of why the precise degree of difference between the logical
possibilities of mind-independent senses should coincide with the degree
of discrimination in psychological attitudes reflected by human thinkers
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in reports of their own or others' mental lives. The third kind of theorist
would simply insist that the only thoughts there could be would be those
which fell within the human range of cognitively discriminable
judgements. He would insist that thoughts simply are what a theory of
our grasp is a theory of.
Let us now review these three positions. We can think of someone
who occupies the third position as a cognitivist, committed to giving an
explanatory account of our intellectual achievements, such as our capacity
for inference, perception, language use and understanding. The cognitivist
need not believe that all the facts about the contents of mind or language
should be given in terms of the psychological apparatus of the language
user (thinker); nor need he believe that a theory of meaning (content) is
no more than a sub-branch of a scientific individual psychology. He can
claim that while we need to know something of the internal cognitive
organisation of language users, any adequate account of intentional
contents would have to mention relations between states of a thinker's
cognitive system and objects in his environment, or draw upon the social
aspects of communal language use. None of this is ruled out by adversion
to the psychological underpinnings. But what a cognitive theorist of
language does insist upon is that the intentional level account should
incorporate the structural details of the cognitive system that makes
possible someone's grasp of the relevant contents. The citing of certain
crucial features of a thinker or speaker's cognitive psychological
organisation is a necessary condition on a satisfactory account of what it is
for him to grasp the thoughts or meanings we ordinarily ascribe to him.
To read Dummett's equivalence thus, from right to left, in the case of
either theories of language or theories of thought, is to be committed to
providing a genuinely explanatory account of what it is to know certain
meanings and to think certain thoughts. So we shall call someone who
adopts this position an Explanatory Theorist
The less ambitious project for someone occupying the middle position
is to describe what speakers know and what their having that knowledge
consists in; where the latter part of this task is undertaken within a theory
of knowledge for these speakers. Such an account must describe what it is
for someone to have the knowledge the theory ascribes to him, given in
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terms of a non-psychologistic, non-naturalised epistemology. We could
call such a theorist a Descriptivist since he takes himself to be describing
facts about speaker's knowledge of meaning. He may choose to give these
descriptions in a full-blooded way, where he would be obliged to tell us
what facts about a speaker he is describing, and why such facts about a
speaker amounts to that person's having knowledge of a language of the
sort characterised in the theory of meaning.
The least epistemologically constrained position is the avowedly
modest proposal of the first theorist. He merely describes the meanings of
someone's words and to that extent takes himself to be describing what is
known or knowable by someone who can understand that language. It is
natural enough to see any explanatory pretensions this theorist might
have as being merely those of intending to interpret the speaker's
language; so we could call him an Interpretation Theorist in Davidson's
sense. This theorist would be an attributionist about speakers' knowledge
of meaning. Any articulation of a speaker's knowledge would be a
reflection of the structures exhibited in the theory of his language.
So we can think of these three readings of the equivalence thesis as
providing three construals of the theory of meaning. We can think of
them as three stances we can take towards such a theory: the Interpreter's
Stance, the Descriptivist's Stance or the Explanatory Stance.
6.2) How Should We Construe the Theory of Meaning?
I take the question of how we should construe the theory of meaning
as the question of which of the three stances on the above classification we
should adopt towards the theory of meaning. Let us examine this now.
If we return to Dummett's own view and ask where he belongs on this
classification, it seems natural to place him in the middle. He wants to
give an account of linguistic meaning that describes genuine knowledge of
the speaker; but his stress on the epistemological constraints on a notion
of meaning do not extend to cognitive psychological constraints on it. Yet
on the other hand Dummett does want to say what it is for a speaker to
have the knowledge which a theory of meaning would ascribe to him; and
he does want to propose some substantive conditions on what it is to
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possess that knowledge. Dummett sees such knowledge as consisting in
the speaker's possession of a complex capacity to use the language, and he
regards the theoretical account of meaning as a representation of this
capacity. One important question for this position is whether it can
account for the structure of our linguistic abilities. We must do more than
just ascribe to speakers a complex ability to use the language that somehow
issues in the various aspects of our linguistic practices. It seems that we
want an articulation of this complex ability into smaller sub-abilities
relating particular abilities to particular aspects of the language. But the
question is whether the segregation of these individual linguistic abilities
should reflect the structure the theory discerns in the language, or should
more directly reflect facts about the structure of speakers' competence. And
if the structure of particular linguistic abilities is owed not just to the
theory that describes them, but to properties of speakers, then Dummett is
obliged to say more about just which properties of a speaker they are.
At times Dummett seems to view axiomatisation as not just an
articulation of the theory's structure but also as a reflection of the
speaker's conceptual resources. He offers this picture as a contrast with
Davidson's holism where the deductive organisation of the molecular
truth theory can play "no genuine role in the account of what constitutes a
speaker's mastery of his language" (Dummett 1975a, pi 16). This suggests
that, in contrast with Davidson, Dummett is keen to ensure that the
theory's carvings of sentences into parts and wholes should be aligned to
the conceptual structure of a speaker's linguistic understanding. But on
the other hand he believes that the way to find out what that conceptual
structure is like is not to investigate the cognitive structuring of an
individual language user but to provide a theory of meaning that describes
linguistic use correctly. But now we need to know exactly how we are to
describe the behaviour that constitutes language use. And it is here that
we find in Dummett an ambivalence about being drawn into empirical
theorising which leaves him oscillating between the second and the third
positions. He believes there are empirical facts to be captured about the
character of a speaker's knowledge while at the same time believing that
this is not a matter for empirical investigation. The theorist of meaning
can proceed without detailed empirical inquiries to propose conditions on
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language mastery which can then be checked empirically. These include
ascribing to speakers' certain cognitive capacities such as those which
enable them to observe the conditions for a statement's truth, or to detect
the evidence that bears upon a statement's truth. These are genuine
epistemological claims about what an incipient language user must know
if he is said to understand what the competent speaker understands by
these sentences; and since meanings cannot be divorced from
understanding, these are genuine epistemological conditions on the
meaning ascriptions we should go in for in an adequate theory of
meaning. Thus for Dummett, we want a theory of meaning that says what
speakers' actually know, but which does not require any empirical
investigation of the actual cognitive capacities involved. He also seems to
think that we can undertake this project "without first having undertaken
any epistemological inquiry at all" (Dummett 1978, p89) But this is odd for
one who believes that the epistemology of understanding is based on the
human cognitive capacities that constrain what we can think, see and
mean. Dummett's concern that we should respect these epistemological
limits when constructing a theory of meaning seems to be motivated by
his antirealism - seen here as the thesis that truth is epistemologically
constrained. But at the same time, executing the task of constructing a
theory of meaning is meant to serve as a ground for his antirealist
conclusions. This is an unhappy state of affairs since it leaves Dummett's
claims that a truth conditional theory of meaning should "explain
meaning in terms of actual human capacities for the recognition of truth"
(Dummett 1976, pl36) as resting upon uncashed assumptions about our
epistemological limits, and hence open to the criticism that McGinn levels
at him that he is simply pre-supposing "a prior inventory of recognitional
capacities" (McGinn 1981). The reply might be that the onus is on the
realist to come up with some account of how a speaker could have
acquired knowledge of the verification-transcending truth conditions of a
statement, or succeed in manifesting his grasp of them to others. But all
such challenges depend on background assumptions that there will always
be a flaw in the realist's attempt to do this, which presupposes some
uncontroversial view about just what can be acquired or manifested in the
normal course of things. So just as any attempt to describe a pathology
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assumes some model of normal functioning, what the antirealist needs to
offer is some account of the types of content exercises of our recognitional
capacities ordinarily deliver. For without further investigations what can
Dummett offer in the face of an attributionist challenges to his account of
what someone with these and other linguistic abilities knows?
The attributionist who is also a semantic realist may say that even in
the basic cases of language use what the speaker is required to apprehend
when observing a state of affairs necessary and sufficient for the objective
truth of some observation statement is what it is for that state of affairs to
obtain undetectably, or at other times. So even at this most basic level of
language use a disagreement could arise between realist and antirealist as
to how we should conceive a speaker's knowledge of such a statement's
truth conditions and hence about what we should assume he can display
to others of his knowledge. The upshot is that if there is a genuine dispute
between realist and antirealist as to what contents we actually succeed in
grasping and expressing, and, if Dummett believes there is a fact of the
matter here, it won't do to settle the dispute by resort to the the linguistic
abilities as they are represented in one's preferred theory of meaning, or to
one's epistemologically preferred way of describing the behaviour
manifesting our possession of those abilities. The crucial question is
whether one theory or another accurately represents the contents of the
understanding acquired, deployed and displayed by native speakers of that
language. The search for epistemological conditions on meaning
assignments, as Dummett sees them, may well have to be grounded in
something else, and I submit that an important way to get at some of the
essential features of the semantical saliences picked out by our network of
recognitional capacities is to turn to the cognitive psychological
underpinnings of these capacities as described by empirical theories of
cognition. The success of this project will depend on how satisfactorily the
empirical psychology provides a detailed treatment of many aspects of
intelligent human behaviour originally identified in our ordinary, non-
scientific way. Within the framework of such an account the realist would
be obliged to explain how we arrive at a conception of certain states of
affairs with which we are wholly unconnected by our cognitive powers. It
is hard to see how such a naturalistic account of our knowledge could
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make room for our representation of verification-transcendent states of
affairs, whereas the antirealist position might put no strain on an account
of our cognitive capacities grounded in our informational commerce and
causal contact with the environment.
Meanwhile, the position Dummett is trying to occupy is that of a priori
theorist who preserves the theory of meaning as a purely philosophical
project while trying to insist, in opposition to the attributionist, that there
are linguistic facts, and facts about speaker's knowledge, which are not
merely artefacts of the truth-theory, or matters of external attribution.
Pressed to say what these facts are, Dummett will say they are our abilities
to use words as we do; but asked to say more about how we are able to use
them he will claim that he is not describing the interior psychological
states of the language user or attempting to "explain how we are able to
use [a] word as we do", but that he is simply providing "part of an
extended description of what that use consists in" (Dummett 1973, p681)
But what does this use consist in exactly? All the observation of a
speaker's use licences us to ascribe is a behavioural disposition of the
speaker to continue using the word in the same way. But we have still to
be given a full characterisation of what that 'same' way is and what
content the expression so used is thereby revealed to have. Without this
how can we know which specific ability a speaker is exercising and what
knowledge this involves. All we observe of the facts of meaning in use is a
wide range of behavioural practices, but how should we describe these?
The attributionist will have one view of this, but what is the alternative of
the descriptivist who claims to be faithful to the epistemology of speakers'
understanding?
The only distance Dummett can gain from the bare facts of linguistic
behaviour- themselves insufficient to support an account of linguistic
meaning - depends on his claim to descry evidence in those behavioural
events of a speaker's exercise of different abilities. But what is Dummett to
say about those abilities? He must either treat them behaviouristically or
mentalistically; either as merely externally displayed discriminatory skills,
or as capacities that depend on the internal organisation and functioning
of the speaker's cognitive apparatus. Of course neither of these options
will supply every part of our account of the contents of a speaker's
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utterances, but the question is where we are to locate the facts about
linguistic meaning and understanding. Whatever the full story about the
contents of speech in a language might look like, can the theory's
description of them be supported by the pieces of speaker's behaviour
characterised without recourse to the language in question, or must they
be taken to reside in those psychological states of the language user
involved in the causal aetiology of his behaviour? Dummett wants to
resist behaviourism, wants to maintain a full-bloodedness requirement,
but does not want to go all the way towards the explanatory stance. But in
doing so what we see is a hopeless oscillation between attributionism and
some more committed explanatory position.
When resisting the attributionist, Dummett makes remarks about
what it is to possess the theoretically described knowledge which tend in
the direction of an explanatory account of speakers' linguistic capacities.
He criticizes Davidson's account of knowledge that suffices to understand
a language as being:
... somewhat roundabout unless [the] ability to speak a language
actually does involve having such knowledge (Dummett,1981(b),
p5)
The trouble as Dummett sees it with Davidson's handling of the theory
of meaning is that it does not:
... explain how the speaker is able to understand the language, ie.
what renders him capable of doing so: it at most provides a
somewhat oblique characterisation of his linguistic ability, (loc. cit)
This suggests that we need a more psychologically realistic, non-oblique
characterisation. However, at other times, in his efforts to resist what he
sees as psychologism in the theory of meaning, Dummett seems to revert
to the position of the interpretation theorist who talks about giving an
account of what a speaker knows, and not how he is able to know it:
A theory of meaning is not a rendering of what a speaker knows in




A successful theory of meaning explains how the sentences of the
language express thoughts by displaying what it is for them to have
the meanings that they do. What does this is not just that part of
the theory which specifies their meaning according to its own
technical characterisation of meaning, but the theory as a whole,
including the principles for deriving other features of sentences
from their meaning as so characterised; for it thus exhibits the
entire functioning of the language, (loc. cit)
In no case is a theory of meaning intended to give a representation
of what in fact a speaker knows, any more than an axiomatisation
of a mathematical theory hitherto unaxiomatised is meant to
represent the previous state of that theory, (loc. cit)
Even though Dummett stresses that:
Only a theory of meaning that employs notions directly based,
unlike those of truth and falsity, on features of linguistic practice
can be reconciled to the character of our knowledge of our mother-
tongue. (ibid., pl65)
There are plenty of remarks by Dummett that give credence to one side
or the other. I see Dummett's difficulties here as due to the inherent
instability of the Descriptivist position he wants to occupy. There is no
middle way between a priori attributionism and a commitment to describe
genuinely explanatory facts.
This tension in Dummett's position surfaces mainly in his discussions
of the structure of linguistic abilities, where he describes something like a
psychological structure for them, only to dismiss the idea that our actual
knowledge could really be psychologically structured in this way. For
example, Dummett is prepared to say that:
... a knowledge of a language involves a knowledge of its syntax,
and this requires a classification of words and phrases into syntactic
categories, so that we may attribute to one who has the capacity to
speak grammatically a tacit knowledge that a given word is, eg., a
noun. (Dummett 1976, p71)
He goes on to suggest that:
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..the capacity to recognize certain sentences containing that word as
well-formed, and others as ill-formed, depends upon knowing the
syntactic categories of other words and the complex rules of
sentence-formation which may be expressed in terms of those
categories. Here, an implicit grasp of certain general principles,
naturally represented by axioms of the theory, has issued in a
capacity to recognise, for each sentence in a large, perhaps infinite
range, whether or not it is well-formed, a capacity naturally
represented as the tacit derivation of certain theorems of the theory,
(loc.cit.)
However, when it comes to talk about the actual knowledge a speaker
has, then Dummett's talk about knowledge of axioms is just a facon de
parler. The only knowledge Dummett can credit a speaker with is
knowledge of the theorems, and this is because it is only the theorems
which correspond to recognisable, specific linguistic abilities of the
speaker: in this case, abilities to recognise of any sentence whether or not it
is grammatical. Exercises of these abilities are said to manifest his implicit
knowledge of particular theorems. A speaker has implicit knowledge of a
theorem when it provides a theoretical representation of a specific ability
in which his knowledge is taken to consist. Dummett expresses his
reservations about this notion when he says of a speaker, "we are not
explaining, but merely characterising, his practical competence, his
possession of which simply constitutes his [implicit] knowledge of the
theory ". (Dummett 1983, pllO). It is because he sees himself as
'characterising' the practical abilities shown in behaviour that he is stuck
when it comes to implicit knowledge of the axioms. He feels the need to
make use of them, to describe the deductive shape of the theory and to
appeal unhesitatingly to the process of derivation, but because he can
isolate no single ability in behaviour to manifest knowledge of an axiom
he can characterise no separate ability as a component of the language
user's knowledge, and so is forced to deny any psychological reality to
separable abilities that constitute knowledge of words in the speaker's
mind. But we might question Dummett's argument here. It seems to be
that since possession of linguistic knowledge is constituted by possession
of specific linguistic abilities, and no specific abilities corresponding to the
axioms are identifiable in a speaker's behaviour, he cannot be accredited
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with separate knowledge of the axioms. But it is only because the abilities
are not behaviourally isolable that speakers are not accorded knowledge of
the axioms: but what is behaviourally inscrutable may be cognitively
discriminable. But for this we would need recourse to a theory of
cognition. Dummett resists this move but it is not obvious that Dummett
wants to rely on the behaviourist premise either. But the truth is he has
no other clear way to separate out particular abilities from mere
observation of a speaker's language use. The best he can do is this:
... the ascription to the speaker of an implicit knowledge of those
axioms is based on the confidence that he has a general capacity
which embraces all the specific abilities which correspond to
theorems derivable from that set of axioms, (loc. cit.)
But we get no further analysis of that general capacity except by the
deductive structure of the theory, so we can begin to wonder whether this
is a purely theoretical characterisation of structure like that offered by the
attributionist. Moreover, no account is forthcoming about what it is that
issues in these specific abilities. Were he not restricted to examinations of
behaviour, he might find articulations in the cognitive states of speakers
which mirrored the deductive structure of the theory, and could use these
to give some substance to an articulation of our linguistic abilities. These
could be dependent states, having no significance on their own, but which
together enter into one's structured understanding of a language.
Dummett simply refuses to look for such hidden details and rests content
with an external description of linguistic use. But it is doubtful whether
language use can also show us what gives rise to it, or what gives it the
form and character we recognise in it.
In holding to an account of meaning in terms of a description of
observable use, Dummett's makes the remark that the theory which
represents a speaker's abilities:
... is not open to assessment in the same way as an ordinary
empirical theory; it is not to be judged correct merely on the ground
that it tallies satisfactorily with observed linguistic behaviour.
(Dummett, 1975b, pi 5)
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Does this mean the only alternative to behaviourism is
attributionism? It would appear so, just as long as one sticks to Dummett's
misleading portrayal of how empirical linguistic theories can be tested. But
the other alternative is cognitivism which I shall motivate below.
Notice that what holds for the case of syntax holds at the semantic level
too. Dummett believes that the theory of meaning is finitely axiomatised
in the form of a truth theory, with the notion of truth understood in
terms of warranted assertibility. But he has no way of substantiating
knowledge of the axioms here either, and so for Dummett, everything
below the level of the sentence should be treated instrumentalistically. But
this position sits ill with many other things he says, and in particular with
his semantic molecularism where " a speaker of a language derives his
understanding of any sentence of that language from his knowledge of the
meanings of words" (loc cit.) If the meanings of words are just abstractions
over the meanings of whole sentences, then we seem forced to treat this
account of understanding instrumentalistically too. But now this
undermines any attempt to justify the psychological reality of semantic
structure and reference-determining word senses. And yet Dummett
seems to follow Frege in thinking that :
... the understanding of the sentence, which is something cognitive,
an act of mind, mediates between the semantic features of the
sentence, in the strict sense, that is, its structure and the references
of its constituents, and the actual employment of the sentence.
(Dummett 1981a, p461)
In particular, a speaker's grasp of the truth conditions of sentences in
which a proper name recurs is in each case a grasp of something which
involves "knowledge of what has to be true of any given object for it to be
the bearer of the name" (Dummett 1976, pi36) If this is a particular piece of
knowledge the speaker has and exercises on a number of occasions then
his grasp of the meanings of individual sentences must be structured. And
indeed Dummett says in "What is a Theory of Meaning" that the
deductive shape of a theory of meaning: "makes dues acknowledgement
of the undoubted fact that a process of derivation of some kind is involved
in the understanding of a sentence." (1975b, p!12). Again and again
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Dummett seems torn between being merely descriptive and saying
something more explanatory. What is he to do? Were he to stick with his
non-psychological treatment of implicit knowledge where one is said to
implicitly know the theoretical description that represents some practical
ability just in case one has that ability, he will suffer all the problems of the
attributionist. In particular, how is he to reply to the charge that not every
way of representing what a person does correctly captures that person's
knowledge. To be sure of describing how things are with the agent we
must find a guarantee that he is acting intentionally under the description
we give of him. In the case of linguistic action this amounts to finding a
description of the speech act and content a speaker expresses by his
utterance. But if this is just a matter of finding some rule-governed
description of his behaviour, there will be many ways to do this. And to
say that a person implicitly knows a rule just in case it represents the
pattern of his unfolding ability to use some sentence or expression will
mean that he implicitly knows any of a multitude of possible rules that
could represent his patterns of activity. How are we to impose further
conditions on when a theoretical representation correctly describes how
things are with our subject? If we can find no such conditions but we
persist with Dummett in thinking there is something in virtue of which a
speaker is expressing one sense rather than another, then we are faced
with the uncomfortable conclusion that not all of these ways represent
some actual feature of the knowledge a speaker can be said to be displaying
but that we cannot tell which one does. This is entirely unacceptable to
Dummett since it would leave some aspect of meaning and speaker's
knowledge hidden and incommunicable. And yet Dummett tells us that a
speaker knowledge of meaning must be fully manifest in his linguistic
behaviour. But given that a theory of meaning's fit with linguistic
behaviour does not enable us to judge of its correctness, how are we to
judge a theoretical representation of what a speaker knows? If a
judgement here just consists in some theoretical decision this would tend
to undermine Dummett's descriptivism and full-bloodedness about what
it is to possess the concepts a speaker is said to be exercising in his
competent use of the language. What is Dummett's alternative? Consider
for instance Dummett's sketch of what it is to grasp the concept "square":
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At the very least, it is to be able to discriminate between things that
are square and those that are not. Such an ability can be ascribed
only to one who will, on occasion, treat square things differently
from things that are not square; one way among many other
possible ways, of doing this is to apply the word "square" to square
things and not to others. (Dummett 1975b, p7)
There is nothing trivial or question-begging in such an account since
although it makes use of the concept square it only uses it in first
intention and not in the context of a that-clause describing the knowledge
or thoughts of the subject. The troubling question is whether the account
will do. Any number of finite manifestations of this discriminatory skill
will not distinguish it as an exercise of the concept 'square' from the
exercise of many disjunctive concepts of the form "square or....". This
criticism of Dummett's account by John McDowell in "In Defense of
Modesty" (McDowell 1987) is not relieved by turning to the subject's use of
the word 'square' for we need know what concept it expresses for him. We
seem bound to say that there are many different rules which could
represent his ability to use the word: one for each of the disjunctive
concepts whose conditions of application provide alternative rules for his
use of the word. Must a subject be said to have implicit knowledge of all of
these? Surely this would devalue the notion of a speaker's implicit
knowledge of the meaning of his words. Perhaps the way ahead is to point
out that while a speaker may fit many rule-governed descriptions it would
be hopeless to say that he is guided by all of them. But which one of them
does guide him? Of the rules someone could be said to be following
Dummett says:
What these rules are is not open to immediate inspection: they do
not for instance exhaust the observable regularities in play. (Ibid.,
pl3-14)
No amount of inspection will rule out the alternatives. So Dummett
seems forced either to say that we cannot know what a speaker implicitly
knows about his language since he cannot manifest that knowledge in his
behaviour, or to give up the idea that a speaker is actually following one
21 6
Chapter Six
particular rule rather than another. The latter option might be open to
Dummett for the following reason. A speaker manifests his knowledge in
behaviour but his possession of that knowledge consists in possession of
an ability which is only exercised but never fully revealed in that
behaviour. This need not mean that there was some hidden component
to a speaker's knowledge of meaning since the inference from
observations of someone F-ing to his having the ability to F is not an
inference from effect to cause. So we need not think of the knowledge-
constituting ability in terms of some hidden component of a speaker's
knowledge that guides his linguistic behaviour in a causally relevant
psychological sense. But now by the same token it becomes utterly
mysterious how we are to characterise the speaker's ability to use words in
a non-question-begging way; and difficult too, to see how we are to account
for the speaker using those words in the same way over time. At this point
the Descriptivist faces the option of moving wholeheartedly towards
attributionism. But of course this offers no non-question begging way of
saying what a subject knows, and in some cases, no way of saying what he
knows at all. Furthermore, if a subject's behaviour is susceptible to
descriptions in terms of particular semantical regularities then we will
want some account of what renders it thus amenable to these descriptions;
ie. we shall want some account of what its exhibiting those very semantic
patterns consists in.
I suggest the answer to McDowell's underdetermination objection
might lie in adopting a more naturalistic and less a prioristic account of
concept-mastery which would suggest that the acquisitions of the more
outre disjunctive concepts is less evolutionary likely for creatures like us,
functioning well in our environment, than is our acquisition and stable
possession of the simpler concepts we could make use of. It is simply more
likely that creatures with our cognitive functions, when acquiring a
concept by repeated exposure to square things, will acquire the concept
square, since it is more likely to be the normal function of the state which
produces an output for a perceptual input of something square, or the
ability that is exercised in response to square things, to indicate the
presence of something square. This appeal to simplicity does not involve
speakers in inductive hypothesising about the meanings of others words,
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or in comparing the idiolectic character of their own understanding with
that of others. So it does not risk the pernicious psychologism McDowell
envisages, which would make another's meaning a matter of guesswork
as to how things stood in some concealed, private sphere. The concepts
acquired by, and recognised in, the behavioural manifestations of others
would be those which it was most natural for cognitive systems with our
information-gathering facilities to acquire and recognise.
On a related issue, Dummett's inability to offer anything for the
theorist of meaning to be describing accurately does nothing to allay the
fears that the Descriptivist has nothing non-attributive to say about why
theorist's describe the contents of speaker's sentences as structured.
Dummett is in a worse position than the attributionist, so far as his claim
to be describing speaker's implicit knowledge of semantically structured
truth conditions goes, since he cannot just claim this structure is an
artefact of theory as the attributionist can. And finally, attributionism
should be resisted if one wants to retain, as Dummett does, the idea that a
speaker's use of his language is guided by a his knowledge of language. But
how can Dummett sustain this? The only satisfactory option I can dimly
discern here would have to involve the thought that the guiding
mechanism of linguistic use was not itself a mental notion (or indeed
content-involving) but that it was a causal mechanism responsible for a
behavioural disposition which got subsequently re-described as a genuine
linguistic ability when the unfolding pattern of word use created by
exercises of that disposition inherited its identify in the setting of a
communal language practice. This might require the following set up:
The verbal output provides the "pattern" for assigning semantic
properties (meaning or content) to those internal,
neurophysiological states that produced it. The internal structure of
our cognitive states is merely a reflection of the semantic properties
of the output they produce. (Dretske 1984, p283)
But what is also required is some cogent account of how the communal
practice of public language use succeeds in conferring semantic properties
on the patterns there displayed. I confess I find it utterly mysterious how
this is supposed to happen, unless by reference to some social psychology,
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but then such a molar psychology would have to resist attempts to ask
what enables individuals to participate in the practices thereby established;
and it would have to do this by answering those questions itself. But
nothing is forthcoming about what such an account might look like and
how it might work. Talk of "forms of life" is the best we can do here. But
since not every creature can participate in those practices, surely we want
to know what properties of those who are able to do so equips them for
this. And surely at that point we are going to have to appeal to facts about
individual participants? Language use may depend on a society but it is a
society of minds.
I suggest the only satisfactory remedy is for Dummett is to become
more full-blooded and explanatory and be prepared to look for genuinely
substantive conditions on what it is to possess concepts and to have a
structured understanding of one's language. It has yet to be said how this
can be done. However, it should be becoming clear that the real dispute
between attributionist and non-attributionist conceptions of mind and
language is whether we should adopt an Interpretive or an Explanatory
Stance towards the theory of meaning; so far the middle position seems
untenable. I shall now show why Dummett cannot adopt the former.
6.3) Not a Theory of Meaning, not a Theory of Understanding
In the light of the foregoing discussion we can focus on two earlier
objections I made to Davidson's semantic programme. He offers an
account of thought in terms of language and his theory of language leaves
the content, if not the structure, of thought and language massively
indeterminate. From the Explanatory Stance it is not hard to see why,
since he cannot allude to the facts of the matter which determine how
things are with the speaker. The main objections, as mentioned above, are
that he cannot account for what speakers actually know, and that he
credits them with more than they know. So he fails to satisfy both sides of
Dummett's equivalence thesis. Let us look at these in order.
Since Davidson thinks that language is our only route to the character
and content of someone's thinking, and since the question of which
objects a speaker is referring to has no answer, then the question of which
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object he is thinking about has no answer either. The notion of individual
belief as identified linguistically will be referentially inscrutable and
plotted by theory.
It is at this point that Fregeans and Russellians on this side of the
Atlantic begin to protest (although John McDowell wants to owe
allegiance to Frege, Russell and Davidson). Many British philosophers
have wanted to say that we cannot know what a speaker means unless we
know which things the singular terms in his sentences are about. Some
have even said that we cannot ourselves entertain singular thoughts
unless there is an object for those thoughts to be about. The knowledge of
reference is either explained in a reference-determining way (by Fregeans)
or a reference-dependent way (by Russellians). Note that neo-Fregeans
combine these accounts and end up with object-dependent senses.
Further elaboration of these views is needed, but it is useful to point
out straight away that these requirements are taken to be conditions on
linguistic understanding, where the account of understanding is an
account of the meanings known to the speakers of the relevant language.
So what we have here is a strong repudiation of Davidson's conception of
an interpretation as an account of linguistic meaning or understanding on
the grounds that there is more to be described than this.
For Dummett, understanding a sentence containing a singular term
involves knowing what it is for something to be the referent of that term.
For concrete terms this might, in some cases, amount to the subject's
possession of an ability to recognise an object as the bearer of that name
when appropriately presented with it. However, there may be a variety of
ways to explain our knowledge of the identity of a term's reference.
Whatever mode of identification is given it is provided in support of a
general principle that to understand a sentence containing a singular term
one must know which objects and properties the terms and predicates of
that sentence concern. Only thus can one know what another person
asserts or denies, for only then can one know what it is for what is said to
be the case.
Gareth Evans would go so far as to contend that one does not
understand what is said by an utterance of a sentence containing indexical
or demonstrative expressions unless one knows enough to identify the
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references of those expressions. This is clearly to ask for more from the
notion of meaning than Davidson thinks is possible. While to understand
only what Davidson suggests an interpreter can recover of meaning on
occasions is not enough to be able to understand the sentence used,
according to Evans. So if Evans can substantiate his account of speaker's
knowledge of meaning, he will have shown that Davidson cannot
provide an account of what a speaker knows.
Davidson is not, of course, oblivious to the importance of indexicals
and demonstratives in the everyday use of a language, and he even
suggests that the application of a truth predicate should be relativised to
speakers and times of utterance. Davidsonians then talk of harmlessly
abstracting from these details when discussing theories of truth and
interpretation more generally. But a moment's thought should tell us
how odd Davidson's concession really is. Firstly, the relativisings will still
not guarantee to the object language terms a local reference to salient
objects and events; and secondly, how do these words in the language of
the theory manage to refer when Davidson has argued quite generally that
nothing about a language can show how its singular terms and predicates
map onto objects. He even says, "I find it impossible to formulate the
relativised concept of reference in an acceptable way" (Davidson 1984,
p227). There is no mystery about how an interpreter can set up arbitrary
alternative reference schemes , which match different object language
terms and predicates with terms and predicates in his own language. But
that is not to the point here. The relativisations to speaker and time are
meant to do real semantical work. Relative to a language they can specify
a reference, but these specifications have no empirical import, the terms
make no genuine reference.
For Evans, this position would leave us hopelessly unconnected to the
world and unable to think the thoughts required to understand certain
basic types of speech. According to Evans, one part of what we need for a
satisfactory account of demonstratives is to see the understander as
enjoying the right informational connections with his environment;
where this does not mean his merely thinking the thought, "I am
connected to the object from which I am currently receiving this
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information", which could not bridge the gap. It requires him to be in
those informational relationships with things.
More generally, Evans supposes that "a subject cannot make a
judgement about something unless he knows which object his judgement
is about" (Evans 1982, p89). The subject must be able to distinguish the
something he is thinking of from all other things. Evans calls this
Russell's Principle (a liberated descendant of Russell's Principle of
Acquaintance). What is needed is an account of what it is for the subject to
know which object he is thinking or speaking about, where "knowing
which" provides discriminating knowledge of that object. To do this,
Evans is required to do two things: (i) to give an account of the thinker's
capacity to distinguish that object from all other things, which amounts to
his having identifying knowledge of it, and (ii) to say why thoughts about
individual particulars requires the subject to be able to do this. The former
is given in terms of different modes of identification that enter into our
thinking about particulars. These are: the descriptive, the demonstrative
and the recognition-based identifications of individual particulars. For the
second part of the requirement Evans offers a theoretical defence of
Russell's principle that unifies these different relations in which thinking
subjects stand to objects. The account Evans then gives is nothing short of
what he takes to be the correct conception of singular reference and its role
in conceptual thinking and the ascription of thoughts. The defence is tied
to an account of how perception delivers thoughts about particular objects
and how concept-exercising and reasoning is only possible atop "an
informational system - which constitutes the substratum of our cognitive
lives". The explanatory work for a theory of thinking, that explains our
ability to think about material objects (non-descriptively), is to postulate
connections between the two cognitive levels: the primitive and the more
sophisticated level. For this we need some theory of the levels of cognition
that would identify the primitive and the sophisticated layers of our
cognitive lives. This is the background to the theoretical defence of
Russell's Principle. The defence itself amounts to a lengthy discussion of
the inadequacy of alternative accounts of reference that deny the Principle.
But to someone like Davidson who denies any substance to the relation of
reference in the first place, this is a non-issue. The importance of all this
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for our consideration of Davidson is that Evans' picture requires different
levels of cognition and a theory of these, as well as introducing "the
notion of being in an informational state with such-and -such a content as
a primitive for philosophy"(ibid. ,pl23). This is a belief-independent state
which can embody non-conceptual content - such as proprioceptive
information about one's orientation in behavioural space, as sitting up,
falling over backwards, in front, behind, etc.. This is a kind of information
Davidson either ignores or re-presents in conceptual terms by way of
subject's beliefs. Either way, Davidson would see it as having no role in
our theorising about the mental. Theorising of the sort Evans goes in for is
merely "changing the subject" so far as Davidson is concerned. Given how
little Davidson's attributed notion of mind recovers of the properties of
mind and language, perhaps it is time we changed the subject. However,
the serious objection would be that the attributionist has just appropriated
the concept of mind. Evans' rebuke to Davidson consists in showing that
nothing less than the postulation of a layered theory of cognition is
needed to give an adequate account of our cognitive lives, which for
Evans includes perception, memory, communication, and knowledge. He
claims that it is in these underlying levels of cognition that certain
essential features of our cognitive and linguistic abilities inhere. This is a
large project, of which I hope to tackle just one small corner: the need for
cognitive underpinnings in an account of our knowledge of language.
Without rehearsing the battery of arguments for the existence of a
genuine notion of reference, including the argument that there could be
no notion of sense without it, let me just record my agreement with Frege,
Dummett, Evans, and Wright (1983, p78ff), that an account of meaning
sufficient to capture the facts about a speaker's linguistic understanding of
a sentences containing singular terms needs to include an account of what
it is for individual particulars to be knowably the references of those
terms. My strategy will be to accept that the sense of a linguistic expression
is always given in terms of our way of thinking of, or being presented
with, the reference of the expression; and that if the notion of sense can be
made good by giving it some psychological reality, then there will be some
substance to the notion of reference, pace Davidson. Although I accept the
idea that linguistic sense involves the notion of linguistic reference, I do
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not accept Dummett's claim that sense as a constituent of thought always
has to be the sense of some linguistic expression or other. A variety of
recognitional abilities can offer examples of reference-dependent, or
reference-determining, senses which preserve the intentionality of
thought in a non-linguistic medium. However, I also believe that the
kinds of recognitional abilities we acquire, and the set we develop as
permanent features of our cognitive make-up depend to a large extent on
the language we speak and the linguistic community in which we learn
our mother-tongue. Now if the senses speakers attach to their words and
sentences are part of what they have to know to grasp the meanings of
those sentences, then a theory of meaning will have to treat knowledge of
what it is for objects to be the references of certain words to be a necessary
part of speakers' understanding and ability to use their language. Without
it, neither the speakers themselves, nor the meaning-theorist, would
know what is was for what is said by their sentences to be true. The
knowledge of what it is for something to be the reference of a singular
term occurring in a sentence must be part of the linguistic knowledge
recorded in any theory of meaning which says what the speaker
understands by that sentence. So it is an adequacy constraint on a theory of
meaning that it should assign references to a speaker's terms compatibly
with a model of this knowledge. Now if knowledge about the references of
constituents enters a speaker's conception of a sentence's truth conditions
so will its semantic structure. So we could require of any theory of
meaning for a speaker's language which provided a correct description of
his understanding that it should assign the correct structures and
references to his sentences and their parts. Structure and reference
constraints on theories of meaning would cut down vastly on
indeterminacy. But they can only serve as genuine constraints if they can
be related to aspects of speaker's knowledge. If this proves possible then
the basis for a correct identification of someone's language will be what
Davidson's theoretical descriptions deny us: what speakers know of their
own language. The challenge is to substantiate this objection in the face of




It is time to turn to the second objection to Davidson's approach: that
he credits speakers with more than they know. From the interpreter's
stance, meaning is a matter of the construction an interpreter can put on
someone's words. For this he needs a theory that extracts the meaning in
the context of neighbouring meanings for sentences and supporting
propositional attitudes of the speaker. The theory has to isolate those parts
of a speaker's behaviour which count as the bearers of particular semantic
roles within sentences, and semantic roles of sentences within the
language. No speaker or interpreter commands a clear sight of the whole
of a language, but he is supposed, instead, to have command of an
evolving theory which he adjusts to the demands of interpreting anyone
he encounters:
In practice an interpreter keeps the conversation going by adjusting
his theory on the spot. The principles of such inventive
accommodation are not themselves reducible to theory, involving
as they do nothing less than our skills at theory construction.
(Davidson 1984, pxix-xx)
But why should the principles of conversation be required to account
for linguistic understanding? I submit there is a perfectly intelligible sense
in which you can read and understand the words on this page and you do
so without need of an overall theory of me. You may wonder why I have
said what I said, but you are in no doubt about what I said. A theory of
meaning has every right to set out to be a systematic theory of that notion
of linguistic understanding. The philosophically challenging task will be
to say what facts about a speaker such a theory is describing.
But for Davidson, since meaning is plotted by a theory that interprets a
vast range of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, its theoretical status
leads to the implausible suggestion that the only way a language user can
know the meaning of someone's words is to be in possession of a theory of
the language to which they belong. This is implausible for three reasons.
Firstly, there is precious little evidence that speakers know any such things
as a truth theory. Secondly, if they did, there is a problem about what their
knowledge of the language in which the theory is couched consists in.
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Thirdly, as Dummett points out, there must be a way of understanding a
sentence which is not a matter of putting an interpretation on it.
How would Davidson reply? His only route as far as I can see is to take
the line taken in the case of psychological interpretation, where one could
distinguish between the subject, the interpreter and the theory of what the
interpreter knows. Can one be an interpreter of language without being a
theorist of linguistic interpretation? Davidson talks of regarding the
interpreter "as if he were using the theory we use to describe his
competence" , but how plausible is it to treat communication as if it were
interpretive theorising? Well, Davidson could say that when we
communicate we do not share a common thought, or obey common
conventions or rules: we simply appropriate people's words and put the
best interpretation on them we can. We must always understand others in
our own terms, and so how reflective or theoretical the process of
interpretation is will depend on the degree of difficulty involved and the
closeness of someone else's language to our own. But the attributionist is
supposed to think that all that is available to an interpreter is all there is to
meaning. So, talk of closeness of meaning or structure would be strictly
misleading here.
Davidson's need to turn speakers into interpreters is partly due to the
lack of intersubjective synonymy between speakers: we cannot presume
any two speakers share the same holistic understanding of the language
they both speak. But to say that speakers re-interpret others in terms of the
meanings they use does not explain a speaker/interpreter's knowledge of
his own language. If we try to side-step this problem by simply providing a
theory of meaning (interpretation) for the interpreter's language, this
would not show that it was a theory of what that interpreter himself
understood. Does this not put a strain on the relations between meaning
and mind? This depends on one's view of things. Davidson could insist
that the meanings assigned to a speaker's words must always comport
with the beliefs we can ascribe to him. Furthermore, the account of the
meanings of someone else's language has to be an account of the
meanings that any well-informed interpreter could know. So a connection
between meanings and minds is preserved. But to some this connection
will seem highly problematical, for the theory of meaning is now to be
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regarded as a theory of what the interpreter understands: meanings are
objects of the interpreter's knowledge. So the theory of meaning for a
language is a theoretical account of what every interpreter knows, not
what every speaker knows. The ground-floor level of linguistic
comprehension is what is missing on this account, but this is a
straightforward consequence of Davidson's third-personal perspective on
the linguistically revealed mind. From the interpreter's perspective one is
always making sense of the speech of others by ascribing beliefs, desires
and meanings which portray their psychological life. But now we want an
account of the interpreter's understanding of the materials he uses to give
these interpretations. How does he understand the language in which the
interpretation is expressed? To answer this, we are required to ascend to
the next level and provide a theory of meaning for the interpreter's
language. But this will not give us the interpreter's own understanding of
this language. We are faced with a dilemma: if the interpreter's knowledge
of his own words depended on his grasping of the theory we would be
faced with a regress, and if we do not expect the interpreter to know such a
theory, then knowledge of the meanings of his own words seems to be
beyond the interpreter's reach. The second horn may seem unsatisfactory
but it is this move which successfully avoids the threatened regress.
Instead of having more and more interpretations, each one standing
behind the other, and each one having to be a genuine item of knowledge,
the chain is broken by making the theory for interpreting a
speaker/interpreter's language a possible object of human judgement as
opposed to an actual item of knowledge. A speaker is not required to know
a theory for his language but he has to satisfy one. There must be a theory
which could, in principle, be provided for him. This theory must be
potentially knowable by other human subjects to be a theory of
understanding. But since no-one need fill this role there is no risk of the
regress. The fact that two speakers in a conversation are making sense is to
be explained by the possibility of a third-person making sense of what they
say by means of the theory. They make sense only because of the possibility
of interpreting them, and because of the possibility of their being able to
master the theory of their conversation.
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There are a number of difficulties with this position. For a start, it can
provide no satisfactory account of a speaker's understanding. Davidson's
suggestion would be that a speaker could not be said to understand his
own language unless he was capable of grasping a theory for it. This idea
involves no contentious claims about a speaker's actually having
theoretical knowledge but it does not adequately characterise the speaker's
knowledge, for I agree with Strawson that a speaker's potential for
grasping a theory cannot explain his actual mastery of his language and his
capacity to engage in meaningful speech. (Strawson, 1966, pl93). So we are
still none the wiser about the interpreter's grasp of his materials for giving
interpretations. And without this, there is an epistemological risk that all
we are giving is aw account of the meanings of speakers' words without
providing the right account. There is just no notion of what a speaker's
knowledge consists in over and above an interpreter's account of what a
speaker's words mean and what beliefs can be ascribed to him. But if there
is something knowable to recover about a speaker's state of understanding
then Davidson's claims for the exhaustive potential of the methods of
interpretation are false, and moreover, if that knowledge contains
information that helps us to determine more of the properties of the
speaker's language, Davidson risks misrepresenting the character of the
language.
Worst of all, the theory of interpretation which a speaker satisfies, and
in virtue of which he is a meaningful speaker, is a theory of his linguistic
behaviour. This is the wrong level of description on which to append
some of the important aspects of structure in a language. Syntactically, this
picture is hopeless, for a theory of syntax, whatever it is, certainly isn't a
theory of behaviour. Furthermore, an account which re-describes
behaviour in intentional terms cannot provide any account of our capacity
for linguistic production. The contrast would have to be with a notion of
speaker's knowledge which stated information used in both
comprehension and production, and neutral with respect to both. Talk of
regarding the interpreter "as if he were using the theory we use to describe
his competence" will not help with any of these objections.
Is there an alternative? One alternative would be to work out a closer
link between semantic theory and a theory of cognition for speakers.
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Cognitive theory characterises the internal psychological organisation of
speakers; whereas semantic theory characterises the structures and
semantic rules for sentences and expressions in a language. Prima facie,
the two projects might be linked if the structured linguistic abilities of a
speaker - those that determine the semantic properties of his language -
turn out to be psychologically structured abilities. The notion that shows
how a theory of meaning contributes to psychological explanation is
notion of tacit knowledge, for the facts about cognition on which
semantical facts could be said to depend would be facts about a speaker's
tacit knowledge of semantic theory. This is not an account of the conscious
propositional knowledge the ordinary speaker has, for he need not know
any of the details of the theory in this way; instead it is a matter of certain
properties which are true of him, such as his being in certain cognitive
states whose contents are correctly described by the clauses of the theory. I
shall discuss this notion more fully in the next two chapters. But before
going on, let me end by suggesting why both Dummett and Wright,
despite their resistance to such a notion (Dummett 1983, ppllO-2, 1986b
ppl47-8; Wright 1981, 1987, pp204-238), need to embrace something of this
sort to provide an alternative to Davidsonian attributionism. I believe that
both of them feel the need to provide a more substantive notion of
speakers linguistic understanding, but without fully diagnosing the need
for a cognitivist theory of understanding which this entails.
6.4) Linguistic Abilities as Cognitive Psychological Abilities
Antirealists like Dummett and Wright are often accused of
behaviourism because of "the fundamental anti-realist thesis that we have
understanding only of concepts of which we can distinctively manifest our
understanding" (Wright 1980, p221). But the charge of behaviourism
confuses what it is to possess an understanding with what it is to manifest
it. To possess linguistic understanding is to possess an ability of some sort;
to manifest it is to exercise that ability. Thus the behaviour which counts
as an exercise of an ability to use a particular word correctly can count as a
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way of manifesting one's possession of the concept it expresses. The
behaviourist's mistake is quite general: it is to confuse the evidence for a
mental state with the state itself. To avoid this, the antirealist must find a
way to separate the ability to use a given word or sentence from the
behavioural evidence for that ability. But how is he to do this? After all,
Dummett talks of an ability being exhaustively manifest in use. So if a
linguistic ability is something over and above a speaker's behavioural use,
we need to know how we are to characterise a person's linguistic abilities.
This is just the difficulty we ran into above. For instance, are these
cognitive or behavioural aspects of speakers? It would be hopeless to
characterise them in purely behavioural terms since that would threaten
behaviourism once more, and worse still, it would leave us with nothing
informative to say about just which bits of linguistic knowledge speakers
had succeeded in manifesting (cf. the banality of saying that a speaker
succeeded in manifesting his own behaviour). It seems clear that if we are
going to consider behavioural manifestations as evidence of the
knowledge-involving abilities a speaker is exercising, we cannot
characterise those abilities in behavioural terms alone. What we should
say then is that a speaker's understanding consists is his possession of
certain cognitive abilities which can be behaviourally manifested.
However, it is all very well to say that our linguistic abilities have both a
mentalistic and a behavioural side, but we need some way of
substantiating the claim for a cognitive component in these practical
abilities. Both Dummett and Wright appreciate the need for such a
component but neither of them offers any substantial account of what it
could consist in, nor sufficient evidence for postulating it. They could
resort to seeing it as a purely theoretical posit, but to do so is to lose the
advantage over the attributionist of being able to substantiate the notion of
a speaker's structured understanding of his language. This is a lacuna
which I claim can only be filled by a substantive and cognitivist account of
our linguistic abilities. Let us look at the cases.
We saw above how McDowell criticized the manifestation requirement
that someone's understanding should be fully manifest in behaviour
characterised without appeal to the concepts of the language in question.
His objection is framed in the form of a dilemma. Either the
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understanding could not be fully manifested in behaviour, since the
theorist's choice of which concept to describe the speaker as exercising
would always be underdetermined by the available evidence; or it could
be fully manifest, but only in behaviour characterised by prior appeal to
the contents and concepts we suppose him to be expressing. McDowell's
defence of modesty rests upon the claim that without presupposing a prior
understanding of a subject's language we could not see his behaviour as
the joint exercise of a number of specific linguistic abilities in which his
knowledge of language consists. There is just too little in the behavioural
evidence of linguistic use, as the antirealist conceives it, to justify the
ascription of specific linguistic abilities and hence particular pieces of
knowledge. With that said, McDowell now sees himself to be free to
describe a speaker's linguistic competence as he chooses, and in particular,
to be free to ascribe to him knowledge of realist truth conditions.
Wright's response to this begins by admitting that a speaker's linguistic
abilities are only partially separable in their behavioural manifestations.
Just as a belief is at the service of many different projects and can be
manifested by many different behaviours depending on the background
beliefs and desires, so a particular linguistic ability admits of numerous
behavioural manifestations, and cannot be correlated with a any
determinate range of behaviours. Wright suggests that this does not blunt
the manifestation challenge, for the antirealist's point concerns the
connection between understanding and ability. If a speaker displays his
understanding in exercises of recognitional and inferential abilities then
attributions of realist understanding of a sentence must be accompanied by
an indication of the abilities which would manifest that knowledge. It
matters not that that this ability can be behaviourally displayed in
multiple ways; the realist/ antirealist dispute takes place at one remove
from behaviour. Wright suggests that the realist can come up with no
ability whose mutifarious exercises could manifest grasp of evidence-
transcendent truth conditions. But this strategy of inserting a wedge
between the complex set of practical abilities that make up understanding
and the holism of behavioural manifestation depends on finding some
way to substantiate the postulation of stable aspects of a speaker's mind
that are more than just the sum of their exercises in behaviour. They
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cannot be identified with behavioural dispositions or else we face
McDowell's dilemma once more. If they are just theoretical posits we fare
no better than the modest attributionist. McDowell requires Wright to
justify his identifications of these stable and projectible cognitive abilities
without merely presupposing the contents and concepts they are supposed
to confer on a speaker. It is not obvious how Wright is to do this. The
abilities themselves seem more like the beliefs which admit of such varied
manifestations, and indeed Wright suggests that a speaker's exercise of
recognitional abilities are accompanied by the formation of beliefs that
things are as they are recognised to be. So, for example, an exercise of our
ability to use the word "red", which depends on our capacity to recognise
red things, will always give rise to a belief in the speaker that the object he
is attending to is red. But in what does the presence of this belief consist? It
cannot be manifested in behaviour in any non-question-begging way
because of the evidential holism Wright describes; nor can it just be a
matter of attribution if there is a fact of the matter about exactly which
concept a speaker is exercising. If Wright needs to appeal to beliefs to
ensure the intentional significance of a speakers' linguistic abilities and
identify the abilities actually manifested, then we need to know on what
basis subjects are credited with those beliefs. The identificatory role Wright
conceives for belief-attributions shows the need for some further
condition on behaviour to warrant the claim that a speaker is exercising a
genuinely mental ability. But since the precise contents of our beliefs are
identified linguistically, we can hardly appeal to these beliefs to identify
the specific abilities which help us to identify the content of people's
speech. So as far as finding identity conditions for our linguistic abilities is
concerned, the unexplained appeal to belief does not really help. Once
again we face a dilemma. Either some non-linguistic theory of concept
mastery has to be provided, or the auxiliary beliefs will have to be
identified by taking an interpreter's stance to the speaker's behaviour like
that taken by the attributionist. The latter could not satisfy the antirealist's
concern to describe what speakers actually understand and the abilities
they exercise and manifest in their linguistic behaviour. The former
option already embroils the theorist is giving a substantive account of the
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cognitive structuring of a person's mind, as we shall see in the next
chapter.
Turning to Dummett, it is interesting to note that his ambivalence as
between descriptive and explanatory theories shows up in his discussion
of the nature of the practical capacities we manifest in behaviour, and by
whose exercise we manifest our linguistic knowledge. He tells us that any
practical ability will have a theoretical as well as a practical component:
The skill of a ballet dancer, for example, involves not only the
ability to perform certain movements of which those not so trained
are incapable - the practical component - but also a knowledge of
which movements to perform, which is the theoretical component;
someone who was a natural ballet dancer in the sense that he
could, without any training, execute fouettes and the like as soon as
he was shown them would, until he was shown the steps, possess
only the practical component of the ability and not the ability itself.
(Dummett 1983, pill italics mine)
But how are we to characterise the theoretical component in the
complex ability to speak a language? If not by appeal to behaviour or
conscious knowledge of the reflective language user, then by what? It is at
this point that we would surely hope to appeal to the underlying cognitive
states and processes that give rise to speakers' conscious judgements about
their language. Our conscious knowledge of language may not be
inferential but if there were underlying psychological states, which were
not beliefs, but which were "part of the process leading to belief
formation" (Stich 1978 p501), and some complex mechanism mediating
between acoustic inputs and outputs in conscious linguistic judgements
about the properties of a sentence, then we could describe the process of
comprehension in terms of inference-like computations involving
subdoxastic states that made no showing in consciousness. These low-
level information states, the mediating computations, and our conscious
awareness of language, would all be involved in the provision of an
overall account of the theoretical component of our linguistic abilities.
This would be an account drawing on conceptual and non-conceptual
states, and it would commit us to seeing the notions of a speaker's
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knowledge of language as a complex property spanning more than one
level of cognition. And this is precisely what we need.
Furthermore if we take care to distinguish this form of cognitivism
from certain pernicious theses of psychologism then we will avoid much
bad argument. Among other things, psychologism meant: that the objects
of enquiry were mental images or subjective ideas; that the methodology
committed one to introspectionist psychology; that the contents of mind
conceived in this way were private and incommunicable; and that
processes of thinking affects the products of thought. Cognitivism, on the
other hand is the meta-theory of scientific cognitive psychology: its results
and methods are open to public examination; it aims to provide testable
theories of the individual that generalise across all individuals; it posits
fields of representational structures in computational systems whose
contents may depend on relations to the environment, as in theories of
visual processing. What it shares with the doctrine of psychologism and
what leaves it open to attack from anti-psychologists is that it conforms to
the thesis that the theory of processing is relevant to the account of
products. In that sense it challenges the sovereignty of a priori theorising
in analytical philosophy, mixing empirical and conceptual issues. It may
be for this reason that descriptivists like Dummett and Wright resist it,
although they both feel the need to provide a more substantive account of
our cognitive and linguistic abilities. The temptations of the interpreter's
stance and the a priori isolationism still beckon. I shall now show why
that resting place is unsatisfactory.
The problem for the descriptivist begins when we ask what do we grasp
when we grasp a sentence's truth conditions. And as far as the explanatory
theorist is concerned the most acute difficulties arise for Dummett when
he tries to explain a speaker's knowledge of the truth conditions of basic
statements. A non-basic statement is one for which it is possible to give a
non-trivial answer to the question of what renders that sentence true. In
these cases we already have an explanation of what a speaker must know
if he is said to know such a statement's truth conditions. A basic statement
- prototypically an observation statement - is one whose truth is neither a
matter of inference from the truths of other statements, nor a matter of
reductive analysis on the basis of truths of some other kind. The
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important thing about these cases, as Dummett stresses, is that although
the meaning theory can give no non-trivial account of that which renders
those sentences true, it must give a non-trivial account of speakers'
knowledge of what renders them true. It does this by ascribing to speakers
a capacity to recognise, in favourable circumstances, the condition for a
sentence of this kind to be true. Since these recognitional capacities
embody knowledge of truth conditions which is neither inferential or
reductive, the meaning theory must attribute to speakers "a faculty of
unmediated recognition". This confers on those who are favourably
placed a direct access to those truth conditions. Dummett goes on to say of
these direct recognitional capacities that:
..neither the speaker nor the meaning-theorist can say whereby he
recognises the condition as obtaining" (Dummett 1982, pi 06)
But surely something more must be said if we are to know anything of
the character of a speaker's understanding. Dummett's denial of this
seems to rest on the thought that further investigation of the faculty of
recognition is a task for the theorist of cognition, and thus not strictly
relevant to the project of the meaning theorist. But I shall now argue that
this is false. Unless we say more about such capacities to recognise truth
there will be no knowing for sure what someone grasps as the meaning of
those sentences, and in particular, there will be no way of knowing
whether he grasps the structure the theory of meaning ascribes to such
sentences. Thus there will be no way to connect the detailed articulations
in the theory of meaning to the facts about actual speakers' understanding.
Furthermore, an investigation of this faculty of recognition will give us
the clearest idea of the semantic content at the base of our language. For
the epistemological function of this cognitive component of a speaker's
mind is to track the semantically salient features of the environment, the
evidential circumstances which warrant us in asserting the basic sentences
of the language; so it only by understanding what is involved in the
exercise of these cognitive capacities, that we can know what sorts of
things are being indicated, and thus what the semantically salient features
of the environment are. I shall have less to say about this last point for I
want to concentrate on the argument that language mastery requires
235
Chapter Six
structure in our recognitional capacities, to be explained by treating them
as psychologically structured abilities.
Despite having nothing informative to say about what make a basic
sentence true, the meaning theory will still provide articulations of the
semantic structures of these sentences. Now if these semantic structures
characterise part of a speaker's understanding of each individual sentence,
then there must be a structure to his recognitional abilities. The question
is how are we to account for the structure of a recognitional ability? This is
important, for if speakers really do grasp the structure of their sentences,
and it is only via the structure of their recognitional capacities that we can
tell which structures they grasp, then it is only by investigating those
recognitional abilities that we can discover whether a theory of meaning
that assigns a particular set of semantic structures can serve as a theory of
understanding for their language. The claim that it is only via the
structure of their recognitional capacities that we can discern the structures
speakers grasp for their sentences is a simple consequence of the fact that
for these basic sentences a speaker's understanding simply consists in the
possession of a recognitional capacity. So that much is clear. But as yet we
have no reason to assume that speakers actually grasp the details of the
theoretical articulations the meaning theory provides for their sentences.
So at this stage we have a conditional claim: if grasp of the meaning of a
basic statement involves grasp of its structure, then that structure must be
part of the structure of a recognitional capacity. Arguing by detachment I
will then try to show that the relevant notion of structure in a
recognitional ability is that of its cognitive psychological structure. This
will provide an argument for the relevance of the theory of cognition to
the semantical project of constructing a theory of meaning for a speaker's
language. It will show that the meaning theorist must advert to a theory of
cognition to get at the actual semantical details of a speaker's language.
Let us begin with the conditional claim. Does Dummett endorse the
antecedent: that grasp of meaning involves grasp of structure? It might
seem that in the case of basic sentences, and atomic sentences more
generally, Dummett does not want to attach any weight to claims for the
speakers' knowledge of their sub-sentential structure or the words they
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contain. So, for example, he describes our understanding of words in
terms our understanding of sentences:
..what constitutes the speaker's attaching a particular sense to the
word is his using the word - more exactly, using sentences
containing that word - in a particular way. (Dummett 1981a, p52)
These ways of using words must be described without taking advantage
of the prior grasp of their senses by a speaker; for we are trying to say why
his using a word in this way constitutes his attaching a particular sense to
it. So it seems that we must describe his use of whole sentences without
'taking advantage of his prior grasp' of the senses of the words they
contain. But now it will be hard to see how that use can show his grasp of
particular senses for each of the words involved. Perhaps this means that
all a speaker can show is a knowledge of the meaning of whole sentences
and that it is the task of the theorist of meaning to articulate a structure for
that knowledge and to abstract stable meanings for the words that recur in
a number of sentences. Speaker's knowledge of the meaning of words
would be a theoretical abstraction from his knowledge of the meaning of
whole sentences. These would be represented in the meaning theory by
particular axioms.
This reading of Dummett concurs with what he says about an axiom
earning it place in a theory only to the extent that it can be used for the
derivation of theorems for whole sentences. It is the theorems which
correspond to specific linguistic abilities by which speakers manifest their
knowledge, but "there need not be any direct correlation of that knowledge
which is taken as constituting understanding of any one word with any
specific linguistic ability"; and so:
The ascription of a grasp of the axioms governing words is a means
of representing his derivation of component words, but his
knowledge of the axioms need not be manifested in anything but
the employment of the sentences. (Dummett 1976, p71)
Does this mean that our understanding of each basic sentence in the
language is initially unstructured, and that their inclusion of component
word senses can only be appreciated once we make reflective judgements
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about how their component words are exercised in other, perhaps more
complex, sentences? This seems unsatisfactory for several reasons. Firstly,
because it turns the account of meaning understood on the basis of
unmediated recognitional capacities into a kind of sentential atomism.
But this conception of what is understood is in tension with the theorist's
account of meaning; for while speakers grasp these meanings as a whole,
the theory describes them as having parts. Secondly, there is simply not
enough structure in those meanings to show how the speaker could be
expressing a conceptual judgement about what he recognises. For without
the thought that he could make similar judgements on other occasions,
re-identify individual particulars in other scenes, and recognise other
objects as possessing the properties ascribed to the objects recognised on
one occasion, we should have reason to doubt that an exercise of a
recognitional capacity involves conceptual thought at all. What would be
the difference between a speaker of a feature-placing language recognising
similar situations and speakers recognising the recurrence of an
individual particular unless that recognitional capacity embodied a
criterion of identification for that object? The point is that to have
conceptual content, a recognition-based judgement has to be seen as the
exercise of distinct and re-usable concepts; and to know which content a
judgement involves we need to be told more precisely which concepts are
involved. For this we need some account of the re-combinable parts of
these recognitional judgements. Thirdly, not only should the details of
our grasp of the meanings of basic sentences tell us something about the
content and the structure of our ways of conceptually dividing reality into
individual objects and properties, they also tell us something about the
semantical organisation of a sentence. This is vital if Dummett's appeal to
the faculty of unmediated recognition is to avoid the crudity of the
positivist picture which simply associates each sentence with some set of
verifying experiences.
All of these points suggest that to give an account of what is grasped
Dummett needs to give an account of the structure of what is grasped; and
for this his instrumentalist account of our knowledge of the meanings of
words is hopeless. However, there is a second reading of Dummett where
he seems to endorse the requirement of the antecedent, and where he does
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want to see the notion of a sentence's internal structure as entering into a
speaker's conception of what is said by the sentence. This reading is
established in countless places in his writings, (see Dummett 1975a, pi 11-2,
Dummett 1976, p69, Dummett 1973, p229, Dummett 1981a, pp276-281, 310-
2, 460-1, 1982, pi05). Consider the following statement on the need for
structured understanding:
...there is no such thing as understanding a sentence as a whole,
without reference to its structure, since understanding a sentence
requires an understanding of at least part of the language to which
it belongs, and the understanding of language cannot be described
without reference to structure. (Dummett 1981a, p310)
Even on the output side there is a need to recognise distinct
components in understanding:
When...understanding is held to reside in a grasp of the truth
condition of a sentence, this will be manifested by the ability to
identify ....the bearer of the name and to judge, at least of such
objects, whether they [ fall under a given concept] and the
preparedness to accept that object's falling under that concept as
determining the sentence as true. (Ibid., p311)
This places a heavy burden on what can be manifest in the exercise of
an unmediated recognitional capacity. However, perhaps nothing like this
is involved for the basic sentences Dummett has in mind. But even in the
simplest cases of understanding he seems prepared to admit that
something like this is required:
...recognition of the truth-condition for "Watling Street is straight"
as being fulfilled should involve two elements, the identification of
the object and the recognition that it satisfies the predicate.
(Dummett 1981a, p312)
The two elements would seem to be the conceptual constituents of the
recognition, and so to appreciate the conceptual content of the recognition
in full we need some account of the structure and components of a
recognitional ability. But as we saw above Dummett thinks that the
meaning theorist can say nothing further about those recognitional
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capacities beyond attributing them to the speaker. Of course the meaning
theory can also describe the structure of a sentence whose meaning is
grasped by means of a recognitional capacity, but to assert that the theory
provides the structure of a speaker's understanding is to give up the
pretense of describing the actual facts of a speaker's understanding and be
merely attributionist about the structure of competence. To explain what a
speaker's grasp of the meaning and structure of those sentences consists in
will take us beyond the theory of meaning, for it must provide a non-
truth-theoretic account of the structure of our recognitional abilities. Only
then can the facts of understanding confirm the form of the theory of
meaning. The account I recommend would see our recognitional
capacities as psychologically structured abilities and we would then need to
call upon the cognitive psychological notion of a causally explanatory
structure in the speaker. But just note that in a last ditch effort to avoid
any such non-linguistic explanation of structure, and despite his
disclaimer that neither the meaning theorist nor the speaker can say any
more about the recognitional capacities for basic statements, Dummett is
prepared to say:
....knowledge of language is normally accompanied by explicit,
though partial, knowledge of the articulation of the complex
capacity corresponding to the articulation of sentences. (Dummett
1981a, p310)
Even though this may be correct, we are entitled to some account of the
speaker's possession of that knowledge; and this must be a non-verbal
account on pain of regress.
Dummett's difficulties arise, I suggest, from an attempt to avoid
empirical psychological matters in the theory of meaning, and to give a
language-first account of our grasp of concepts. Dummett is not unaware
of the need to give accounts of our grasp of particular concepts like red, or
square, and of our knowledge of particular things; and he is surely right to
tie these accounts to our possession of certain recognitional abilities. But
he is unwilling to give a non-linguistic account of these concepts and our
grasp of them, and it is this which leads him into regress. For the only
account that Dummett can give of a speaker's ability to recognise red
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things, or his recognitional ability for a particular person X, consists in the
speaker's being able to judge, when in a deciding position, the truth of
recognition statements like 'This is red" and "This is X". But once again,
the question arises about the nature of our grasp of the meanings those
statements. Is it structured? Do we have to grasp the meanings of the
constituent expressions? In particular, what is Dummett's model of a
speaker's grasp of the demonstrative expression in the subject position of
these statements? As Evans points out, it had better not take the same
linguistic form as before, on pain of vicious regress (Evans 1982, p95). It is
because Dummett wishes to account for our grasp of the the meanings of
words, and the concepts they express, in the linguistic context of our use of
whole sentences including them, that he is reluctant to say anything more
about the meanings of those sentences or the component conceptual
abilities exercised in our understanding. In trying to explain the meanings
of words via the meanings of sentences, without begging the question as to
what constitutes speakers attaching the meanings they do to their
sentences, Dummett has to explain what it is for speakers to grasp the
meaning of whole statements without drawing on the details of their
parts. Like Frege's contextual definitions his problem is to explain what it
is to attach a particular sense to a whole proposition. But as Dummett
presents it, the account is either incomplete, or inconsistent with much
else that he says about sentence understanding.
How is he to characterise sentence understanding at first without
reference to sentence parts? One way forward here is behaviourism. We
could take a speaker's understanding of a sentence S to consist simply in
his dispositions to suit his use of it to the patterns of assent and dissent
shown in the responses of others. Thus 'X understands S' is true provided
that X would act in accordance with S's meaning. When we combine this
with a theory of truth which serves as a theory of meaning, we get 'X
understands S as true when and only when p' is true provided that X
would act in accordance with the conditions for S's truth; ie. would assent
to S when and only when p. But this is hardly Dummettian antirealism
which demands that a speaker's understanding should consist in his
exercise of cognitive capacities. Thus Dummett would say for some basic
sentence S, that 'X understands S as true when and only when p' is true
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provided that X is able to recognise the conditions p for asserting S. But
now what account of that recognitional capacity can distinguish it from
behaviourism. Moreover, what account can show that it confers
understanding which can also be described as the grasp of something
structured, and, where relevant, as involving grasp of some expression in
S whose use is indexically tied to some particular part of the recognised
scene? Without prior appeal to the subject's grasp of the concepts and
structures involved, Dummett seems to lack the materials to offer any
satisfactory account here.
Certainly, at times Dummett points to the non-behaviourist elements
of his approach, when he acknowledges that at the primitive level of
language use (that which includes demonstratives and indexicals as the
principal devices for making reference) we are operating with perceptual
procedures which "involve an interplay of sensation and conceptual
thought" (Dummett 1981a, p!44) But he goes no further towards a non-
linguistic account of our handling of indexicals, and he offers no non-
linguistic account of the structure of conceptual thought. So we are given
nothing more to illuminate the character of linguistic grasp. Without such
materials he cannot give a convincing account of the distinction he needs
between what we might call weak knowledge and strong knowledge of
truth conditions. Weak knowledge of truth conditions is possessed by a
person or a device which can detect and register the obtaining of
conditions for a sentence's truth. This amounts to merely knowing when
a sentence is true. In contrast, someone has strong knowledge of a
sentence's truth conditions when he grasps the structure of the sentence
and its constituent senses. This knowledge requires a speaker to know
what the sentence is about, in the sense of knowing which objects and
properties its terms and predicates are about (Russell's Principle). Now
whereas weak knowledge of truth conditions requires only that the
speaker or device suits its dispositions or practice to the output theorems
of a T-theory, strong knowledge of truth conditions requires a speaker to
know what it is for the sentence to have that truth condition. For the
attributionist, this might be knowledge of the theory from which the
theorem is derived, but for Dummett it must be something closer to the
speaker's understanding of the sentence itself; that is, knowledge
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embodied in the specific linguistic ability correlated with the relevant
theorem. However we characterise that ability, to count as possession of
strong knowledge of truth conditions it must confer on its possessor an
understanding of the sentence that involves "grasp of how it is
determined as true, if true, in accordance with its meaning" (Dummett
1982, p61). It is in the attempt to account for these details of grasp that the
difference between Dummett and the interpreter shows. For unlike the
interpreter's externally attributed semantical descriptions, Dummett
thinks that:
a theory of meaning must ascribe to a speaker an implicit
knowledge of the underlying semantic theory (Ibid. p62)
But since that knowledge can only be meaningfully ascribed when it is
manifested in exercise of specific linguistic abilities - abilities correlated
with output theorems of the semantic theory - we cannot simply use the
theory's description of those abilities to confirm that the speaker has
strong knowledge of (structured) truth conditions. Dummett needs some
non-attributionist way of meeting Wright's Challenge. An account of the
psychological facts about grasp and the conceptual abilities exercised in
knowledge of any particular object or property is what is needed here.
Without these it is hard to see how we can do better than account for
speaker's weak knowledge of truth conditions. To settle for an account in
terms of weak knowledge does not really tell us what speakers grasp since
we have to rely on the interior of the theory to put any gloss on the
sentence on the theorem's right-hand side. To serve as a theory of
understanding we need more substantive conditions on what it is for the
speaker to grasp the truth conditions the meaning theorist assigns to his
sentences. The trouble is that by resisting the theory of thought and
without an account of cognition Dummett lacks the materials necessary to
complete an account of our understanding of a structured language and
our possession of concepts.
Ironically, the only other alternative to the Davidsonian picture of
attributed understanding comes from John McDowell's view of speakers'
understanding as a perceptual capacity. Although McDowell modestly
presupposes the contents of the language he describes, by adverting to this
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perceptual capacity he is attempting to offer us a thesis about the character
of a speaker's own knowledge of meaning. For McDowell:
Understanding a language consists in the ability to know, when
speakers produce utterances in it, what propositional acts with what
contents they are performing. (McDowell 1976, p45)
This ability is quite simply an ability to hear utterances as speech acts of
a certain kind with specific contents. This is non-inferential knowledge
with the distinctive phenomenology of the unreflective language user.
But why then should McDowell also be interested in giving a formal
theory of truth to describe speaker's competence? It would seem rather
roundabout as a description of their knowledge if they do not actually
make use of it. McDowell's reply would be that we need to characterise the
perceptual capacity to know precisely what it is a capacity to do, or rather
which capacity it is; and for an interpretation theorist like McDowell, the
truth theory characterises the relation that defines the capacity. But where
in all this do we earn the right to describe speaker's sentences as
semantically structured in the way the T-theory describes; and how does
McDowell guarantee reference to sun-sentential expressions? The answer
is that McDowell is also an attributionist about speaker's knowledge. The
content and character of the theory of meaning give the content and
character of a speaker's knowledge of his language. It is the theory which
gives a conceptual character and structure to the speaker's perceptual
capacity. While it is just plausible to be an attributionist about the
articulation of a speaker's abilities and hence his knowledge of language,
reading-off the the separate pieces of a speaker's knowledge from the
clauses and theorems of the meaning-theory, it is less clear how McDowell
can substantiate his claims for the reference of words and their individual
senses. If truth-theories are anchored to the evidence at the level of their
theorems not their axioms, then being an attributionist about the structure
of a speaker's understanding of sentences will guarantee separable
components within that knowledge, but this move alone cannot
substantiate claims for reference. But no further account is offered to
guarantee genuine empirical import to the relation of reference. For a
guarantee of properties of reference for a speaker's words we must rely on
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the modesty of McDowell's theory of meaning. But this means no account
is offered at all, just an unsubstantiated presupposition that the words do
make reference to extra-linguistic items. What is so unsatisfactory about
this position is that it smuggles in an intended interpretation (in terms of
realist truth conditions) for the words and sentences that appear with what
is supposedly their normal uses on the right-hand sides of the axioms and
T-sentences. But this is merely question-begging, in that the antirealist
could in similar vein simply assert his preferred reading for the right-
hand sides, in terms of the notion of assertibility. Neither realist nor
antirealist would have given a non-question begging argument for his
conclusion. The realist/antirealist debate should not be begged in this way,
and certainly not by appeal to one's favourite theory of meaning, given
that the whole question of realism and antirealism is an issue of debate in
the theory of meaning.
It is now time to motivate an explanatory approach to these matters
which will substantiate claims for knowledge of meaning and structure
without begging questions of content and form. This would alleviate the
needs of the Descriptivist in the unstable middle position who is trying to
resist attributionism by looking for for facts about speakers' knowledge for
the theory of meaning to describe. For this we need an explanatory theory
of those mental states of a speaker - his knowledge of language - that enter
into a causal explanation of his language-mastery.
245
Chapter Seven
The Indispensability of Concepts
7.1) The System of Concepts
We saw above how the interpretation theory leads us to the surprising
conclusion that talk about concepts is purely instrumental. Davidson is a
realist about attitudes - there are facts of the matter available to
interpreters (up to indeterminacy of schemes) about when it is correct to
ascribe a set of attitudes to a subject - but he is an instrumentalist about
concepts as constituents of their contents.
But is this even coherent? Some think not. Gareth Evans, for one,
thinks that belief involves the possession of concepts:
Behind the idea of a system of beliefs lies that of a system of
concepts, the structure in which determines the inferential
properties which thoughts [possess]. (Evans 1981, pl32)
But is the inference from a holistic web of inferentially connected
thoughts to conceptual structuring in those thoughts too swift? Let us start
with the premiss. The ascription of even a single attitude imposes a
number of requirements on a thinker. For Davidson, one belief makes
sense only in the presence of many others to which it is naturally tied, and
to whose presence it owes its own particular content. The requirement
that other attitudes be actually present in a thinker may be too strong, but
Evans, who does not think of concepts as elements of thoughts, but rather
as conceptual capacities or abilities we exercise in thought and action, sees
the ability to think certain thoughts as requiring that the thinker be
capable of thinking certain others. And he explains this requirement by
means of the underlying system of concepts because he believes that
thinking thoughts amounts to the joint exercise of a complex of
interacting abilities. Arguing in this way he thinks can discern a general
constraint upon what it is to be capable of thinking a thought with a
propositional content (or being ascribed a propositional attitude, or
understanding and assenting to a proposition that expresses that thought.)
He calls this condition the Generality Constraint:
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If a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then
he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the
thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which he
has a conception We thus see the thought that a is F as lying
at the intersection of two series of thoughts: on the one hand,
the series of thoughts that a is F, that b is F, that c is F,...,and on
the other hand, the series of thoughts that a is F, that a is G, that
a is H, (Evans 1982, pl04 & fn.21)
From this Evans draws the conclusion that being able to grasp the
thought that a is F involves the exercise of two distinct abilities; for
example, it involves "knowledge of what it is for something to be F -
which can be exercised in indefinitely many distinct thoughts, and would
be exercised in, for instance, the thought that b is F." (Ibid., 103) There
must also be an ability to think of a particular object, for this is "a capacity
which, when combined with a knowledge of what it is in general for an
object to be F, yields the ability to entertain the thought that a is F, or at
least a knowledge of what it...would be for a to be F" (Loc. cit.) These
knowledge-involving abilities are exercised jointly and only in the context
of thinking whole thoughts, but each one is exercised in a number of
different thoughts in tandem with yet other (though categorially
appropriate) abilities, and it plays a common role in the explanations of
our grasp of these different thoughts. Thus thoughts are structured, and by
this, Evans means, conceptually structured, and not merely supported by
cognitive mechanisms that are causally structured - although this could be
true too - for the component abilities that enter the explanations are
knowledge-involving.
If it is sound, this is a powerful argument for the conceptual structure
of thought, sadly lacking in the Davidsonian story. The best Davidson can
do is try to interpret people's speech as expressing their beliefs, and other
thoughts, and then try to induce semantic structure on their sentences
through the use of an interpretive truth theory for their language. The
structure of language could then be treated as the best guide to the
structure of thought. But we have seen how insubstantial Davidson's
claims are for linguistic structure. The strategy of interpretation is simply
not committed to thought being essentially structured. But Evans is.
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As we saw above Dummett is a language first theorist and appeals to
the Fregean assumption to substantiate and explain the structure of
thought. This commits Dummett to having to substantiate linguistic
structure (but unlike Frege in a non-platonistic way). Evans cannot follow
this strategy because he is a thought-first theorist and as a theorist of
thoughts he separates the structure of thought from the structure of
language. He thinks that "while sentences need not be structured,
thoughts are essentially structured" (Ibid, pl02). He is thinking of elliptical
sentences, eg. "Fire", where a complex meaning is expressed quite simply.
But the strong conclusion he wants is unmistakable:
it is simply not a possibility for for the thought that a is F to
be unstructured - that is, not to be the exercise of two distinct
abilities, (loc.cit.)
If he is right about this then Davidson's interpretation theory falls
down:
We should surely be reluctant to assign the content 'I am in
pain' to any internal state of a subject unless we were persuaded
that the subject possessed an idea of what it is for someone - not
necessarily himself - to be in pain, and unless we were
persuaded that the internal state in question involved the
exercise of this idea. (Ibid, pi 03, underlining mine)
But is Evans entitled to these conclusions from the Generality
Constraint? Can we argue from this to the structure of thought? Martin
Davies's careful work has shown us that we can't. As Davies points out,
the Generality Constraint only commits us to a certain closure condition
on the contents of thoughts, which he illustrates as follows:
if a thinker can think that a is F and that b is G, then the
thinker is able to frame the thought that a is G and that b is F;
and if a thinker is able to think the thought that a is R to b, then




This thought allows us to see how the conclusion of a transitive
inference R (a c), from R (a b) and R (a c) is made conceptually available to
a thinker in virtue of his grasping the premisses. (Why he chooses that
conclusion requires a separate explanation.)
It seems to me that Davidson could accept this closure condition, and
that interpretation theory could satisfy it without yet committing
Davidson to the essential structure of thoughts. The important question
to ask at this stage is why Evans thinks we should be committed to it. It
has been accepted that the Generality Constraint is a necessary condition
on thought, and it might even be accepted that Evans is offering an
explanatorily insightful way of satisfying it in terms of these complexes of
component abilities. But the Davidsonian will want to know why this is
obligatory. Davidsonians would also point out that the explanatory story is
irrelevant to the conceptual issue of whether or not we have concepts. (No
pun intended). They will say that this is an implementational matter.
How we satisfy the Generality Constraint may be explained
computationally but that we satisfy it is all that matters.
It is important to tread carefully here because Evans is not saying that
the structure involved here is just a computational matter, even if it can
be illuminatingly explained by a computational story.
Once again, Evans, like McDowell, could warn of a kind of 'naturalistic
fallacy' in the offing, here, if anyone thought the structure of a
computational processor that conformed to the Generality Constraint was
what it was to satisfy that constraint. Plenty of computational devices
could exhibit the sort of closure property such Generality involves, all that
is needed is a device that can point to, or move through, any of the
interstices of a Cartesian coordinate framework. This is not difficult to
explain. What it is conceptually difficult to explain, without a reduction, is
why a certain structured process amounts to the exercise of knowledge-
involving abilities. Evans is not attempting a reduction and he is still
working at the level of knowledge. So what is behind Evans' insistence on
the essential structure of thought? It might be that Evans treats conceptual
structure as a necessary condition of thinking:
It is a feature of the thought-content that John is Happy that
to grasp it requires distinguishable skills. In particular, it
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requires possession of the concept of happiness - knowledge of
what it is for a person to be happy; and that is not something
tied to this or that particular question. (Ibid., pi03)
If Evans just means to make this a constitutive claim on what it is to
possess certain thoughts, and the Davidsonian refuses it as such, we seem
to reach an impasse where they simply trade rival constitutive claims.
This makes for very unproductive and sterile Oxford Philosophy. To
avoid this I shall suggest a controversial way out.
What is not controversial is that Evans embraces what I shall call the
Cognitivist Assumption, believing that the theory of our cognitive
underpinnings enters into the top-level theory of our knowledge or grasp.
This is because the notions the highest level deals with are to be located at
the level of our cognitive mechanisms and because the cognitive theory
shows us how the requirements on these notions are met. (This is not to
say that the cognitive theory of our internal mechanisms can stand alone:
it can't. In fact, adoption of the Cognitivist Assumption means that one
thinks that the explanatory space occupied by such a meagre theory should
be occupied by a conceptually richer explanatory theory of content that
draws upon a good deal of the details of a theory of mechanism. A slightly
different way of making the same point is to say that a meld of the
conceptual content theory and the cognitive processing theory, originally
conceived as theories at Marr levels 1 and 2 , respectively, is to be
achieved by moving to level 1.5 . This is the tack taken by Peacocke in
adopting the cognitivist position. (Peacocke 1986b).
7.2 Causal Systematicity
I think that it is in this cognitivist spirit that Davies provides Evans
with an argument to the structure of thought from what he calls 'the
causal systematicity of inference". This may go beyond anything Evans
explicitly claims but there are hints of such a leaning in the Varieties of
Reference and "Semantics Theory and Tacit Knowledge" (Evans 1981).
Davies' idea goes like this. Being a believer involves the capacity to
make systematic inferential transitions between thoughts. This is just the
closure condition and even Davidson would agree with this. But are the
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processes that realise these transitions causally systematic in a way that
corresponds to the systematicity of our inferential capacities? Davies
thinks that if they are then the structure of processing offers us good
reason to think that there is structure in the inputs and outputs of that
process. So making inferences would require the thinker to have
structured thoughts.
The reasoning is concerned with the conditional claim that if a
cognitive process is systematic them the inputs and outputs to that process
are syntactically structured; ie. there is an inference from the system to its
syntax. Although it is a conditional claim, to show this is to establish an
important result because it argues for a conclusion about our cognition
from an empirical claim about our cognitive architecture. Here is Davies'
argument. He starts with the antecedent.
Processes mediate between inputs and outputs. Processes are systematic
relative to patterns in their input-output relations. In a
cognitivist/computational setting, this pattern is revealed under a
semantic description of the inputs and outputs to the process. Now
suppose that we are dealing with aspects of human inference making and
suppose we notice that there is a common pattern in the inferences people
make from the thoughts 'Margaret Thatcher alienated her European
partners', and 'Margaret Thatcher lost support at home', to 'Margaret
Thatcher has both alienated her European partners and lost support at
home', and from 'Tessa Blackstone is the Baroness of Stoke Newington'
and 'Tessa Blackstone is the Master of Birkbeck College' to 'Tessa
Blackstone is both Baroness of Stoke Newington and Master of Birkbeck
College'. Several input-output pairs may exhibit this common pattern; so
we can frame a semantic generalisation which we can state as "Whenever
there are thoughts of the form a is F and a is G one can infer a thought of
the form "a is G and F." The semantic generalisation goes beyond mere
conjunction reduction because some transitions are illicit; eg. those from
"Someone is in love with him" and "Someone has his welfare in mind"
to "Someone is both in love with him and has his welfare in mind". The
semantic generalisations will identify a pattern of conjunction reduction




The cognitivist/computationalist will ask the question, do these
various input-output transitions have a common causal explanation
corresponding to the pattern they instantiate? To deny a common causal
explanation is to think of each of these transitions from pairs of thought-
conjuncts to the conjunctively reduced thoughts as being separate
dedicated processes; hard wired, if you like.
Whereas if there is a common causal explanation in all cases of
inferences from thoughts described as having the semantic form: a is F, a
is G; to thoughts described as having the semantic form: a is F and G, then
we may say that the process of inference is causally systematic relative to
that pattern , ie the pattern captured by our generalisation. Just
conforming to that pattern in inputs and outputs is not sufficient for
causal systematicity: two machines could exhibit the same input output
patterns but still be causally systematic with respect to different patterns;
calculators are the obvious examples. So we cannot conclude that
systematic processors with a certain input-output patterns are causally
systematic with respect to that pattern.
As Davies puts it:
A systematic process is not merely a process whose input-
output relation conforms to such patterns as these. Systematicity
relative to these patterns requires that, corresponding to each
pattern (in extension) there should be a real commonality of
process: a causal common factor in the form of a component
mechanism implicated in the various transitions that conform
to the pattern. (Davies forthcoming, p7)
That a device can be given a systematic semantical description does not
entail the systematicity of its internal processes. So in our case, there is no
direct argument from systematic descriptions of the semantic contents of
our mental states - our having thoughts which meet the Generality
Constraint - to our having structured processes that mediate the
transitions between them.
In accordance with the Davidsonian story, inferences can be made from
propositional attitudes to actions. Consider an example of this where there
is a choice of outputs. Suppose that Sheila has the enduring desire to
avoid seeing her husband Bill. Unfortunately they work together in the
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same office. Now suppose that she is sitting in a restaurant at lunchtime
deciding what to do. It makes sense to suppose that in concert with her
deeply held desire to avoid Bill she can have various beliefs, each of which
give her a different reason to act. Imagine the following four cases. (1)
Sheila believes that Bill will take a bottle of brandy back to the office, so
she orders another coffee and a taxi to take her home. (2) Sheila believes
that Bill will take a bottle of brandy home, so she orders another coffee and
a taxi to take her to the office. (3) Sheila believes that Bill will want
several more brandies before turning up at the office plastered, so she
refuses another coffee and orders a taxi to take her home. (4) Sheila
believes that Bill will want several more brandies before turning up at
home plastered, so she refuses another coffee and orders a taxi to take her
to the office.
Davidson could rationalise this behaviour in intentional terms: these
are the patterns of a disasterous relationship. But as far as the processing
story goes, there are (at least) two very different ways to describe the
intentional causes of her action. Let us also suppose that her desire for a
second cup of coffee is constant too, but her desire to be rid of Bill is even
greater. The two possible descriptions are as follows: either each complex
of belief and desire just leads to its unique outcome in independence of
the others (she has a set of dedicated intentions); or there is a causally
efficacious common factor in the explanations of her refusing a second cup
of coffee, and a different causal efficacious common factor in explanations
of her having a second cup. (We can also add to the latter sorts of
explanation, the cross-cutting causal common factor in the explanations of
cases where she goes to the office, or the causal common factor in
explanations where she goes home.) The cognitive psychologist would
want to ask whether the causally efficacious reasons for Sheila's acting as
she does are causally systematic or not? Is there something in common to
the explanations where she has to refuse a second cup of coffee? Certainly
in the intentional descriptions of the inputs they are both cases where part
of her belief has to do with the likelihood of Bill's having a brandy. And
in the cases where she goes to the office, what she does has to do with a
part of her belief concerning the likelihood of Bill' not going there. But
these patterns are due to semantical descriptions of the input-output pairs.
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What about the states of belief themselves. We need to know whether
there is a common explanation for her actions when her beliefs concern
Bill's having several more brandies, or a common explanation when her
beliefs concern his destination after leaving the restaurant. And, in cases
such as these Davies says: "The answers to these questions are not
determined by the facts about the input-output relation, but by facts about
the internal [cognitive] architecture of the [agent]" (Ibid, p6 brackets mine.)
Although we now know what is is for a cognitive process to be
causally systematic, why does causal systematicity entail syntactic
structuring in the inputs? First we need to know what syntactic
structuring at this level amounts to.
In a computational setting syntax is Janus-faced. Looking outwards,
what counts as a syntactic property of the input depends on what semantic
properties we can discern; syntactic properties are systematically related to
semantics. Looking inwards, the syntactic properties of an input state
depend on the internal constitution of the machine; the causal role of a
symbol string in one machine may be quite different when it is input to
another. For example, what counts as an assertion in one programming
environment, may count as a procedure call in another. (Students
learning to formalise English sentences in propositional calculus pay scant
attention to their internal structures; later when they have to formalise in
predicate calculus they are forced to change. Once again a syntactic property
is relative to a programming environment. Syntactic properties are doubly
relative.
If we suppose there is causal systematicity in our example we can see
that causal systematicity imposes requirements on causal properties of the
input states. Each time Sheila orders a taxi for home, there must be some
causal component that makes her act in that way. And each time she has a
second cup of coffee there must be something that makes her do that too.
In the cases where she orders a taxi to take her to the office we can suppose
that it is the causal property common to the belief state with the content
that Bill will take a bottle of brandy home, and the belief state with the
content that Bill will have several more brandies before going home. But
whatever this is, the two belief states do not have all their causal powers
in common: there is a causally relevant difference between them because
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in one case she orders another coffee and in the other, she refuses a
second cup. So there is one commonality and one relevant difference in
the causally explanatory powers of the two belief states.
As Davies points out, it is an empirical question what these causally
salient properties are, but if we suppose that this happens to Sheila quite
often, it is hard to believe that the commonality is just a physical
similarity each time. What we should say is that on every occasion of a
certain intentionally described type, where there is a constant complex of
beliefs, desires and actions, there is a physical property that causes her to
behave in these intentionally similar ways, but not the same physical
property each time. So what are the constraints on the physical properties
that can achieve the right result? Well, they have physically to realise the
causal role of a state whose operative properties produces certain input-
output patterns in the agent as described in intentional terms. We can
now describe the following set-up. Causal systematicity in a decision¬
making agent requires the belief states that are input to a process of
reasoning (the same argument could run for her desires) to have causally
operative properties which correlate with semantical descriptions of those
inputs. So the belief with the content that Bill will have several more
brandies (before going home or to the office) should have something in
common with other input belief states that engage whatever mechanism
makes her say no to the offer of coffee and leave the restaurant in a taxi.
Over all the inputs and permutations of cases, these correlations between
semantical properties and causal properties guarantees that causal
systematicity keeps in step with causal systematicity. But what property
corresponds to an aspect of the semantic contents of beliefs that is constant
across all input states that cause her to leave so quickly? Whatever
property it is it must also affect her internal operations if it causes her to
act like that. The property we want is the doubly relative notion of a
syntactic property. This establishes the conditional claim. Davies point out,
that it requires neither that every aspect of semantic content have a
corresponding syntactic property, nor that the inferential transitions
should be explicitly represented.
This is just a conditional claim so now we want to know if we can
detach. Is there any reason to suppose that some of our cognitive
255
Chapter Seven
processes are so causally systematic? Let us return to Evans and his claim
that underlying our system of beliefs there is a system of concepts. If this
were true we could put more of a gloss on the Generality Constraint and
the closure condition it entails. We could say that the domain of
conceptual thinking had to be closed under recombination of syntactically
appropriate conceptual constituents. To be capable of thinking the thought
that a is F, one must have the resources for thinking the thought that b is
F, that c is F, and so on, for all particular objects of which we have a
conception. Having mastery of the concept F, in general, is knowing what
it is for an arbitrary individual to be F, in this way we do not need to
account for a subject's capacity to know what it is for his thoughts about F
to be true one by one. As Evans says, knowledge of what it is for
something to be an F "can be exercised in indefinitely many distinct
thoughts, and would be exercised in, for instance the thought that b if F"
(1982, pl03). He also says (Evans 1981) that to have a belief requires one to
understand its location in a network of other beliefs, and this depends on
the thinker grasping certain inferential links:
the subject's appreciation of the inferential potential of one
belief (eg. the belief that a is F) at least partly depending upon the
same general capacity as his appreciation of the inferential
potential of others (eg. the belief that b is F) (1981, pl32.)
If the very same capacity was exercised in making transitions from say a
is F to a is H and in transitions from b is F to b is G, Evans would say that
possession of that capacity would amount to mastery of a concept. We can
put this by saying there is a causal systematicity:
the two inferences are manifestations of a common
underlying capacity: namely mastery of the concept of being F.
(Davies 1989, pi 5)
Another way to describe this systematicity is to point out that to think
the thought that something is F one must grasp the concept of F, ie. know
what it is for something to be an F. In particular this may involve
knowing that all Fs are Hs, and therefore there is an inferential transition
we are prepared to make on thinking or discovering that something is an
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F, namely that it is an H. The causal systematicity explains this common
inferential capacity of F-involving thoughts, because it provides a
mechanism for the transitions, and so it can play the major part in
explaining what it is for us to embody grasp of the concept F. The
mechanism can be a crude causal mechanism, so the device that effects the
transitions need not be content-involving but they have to operate in
virtue of properties of the input that triggers them, and this now argues
for a syntax systematically related to the conceptual structure of thought.
This is Christopher Peacocke's position (Peacocke 1989u) where he says
that if we reflect on these inferential transitions we will admit to finding
them primitively compelling; and what is more they will be primitively
compelling in virtue of their form. Inferential transitions would be part
of what Peacocke calls the possession conditions of a concepts. Possession
conditions offer us a way to give a more direct and less holistic
characterisation of what it is to have mastery of a given concept. Together
with the arguments in Evans and Davies, this is a way of responding to
the attributionist's claim that there is no other way to ground the
ascription to an individual of a particular concept than to say that it pulls
its theoretical weight in making attributions of beliefs and desires that can
be confirmed by holistic interpretation.
These can all be regarded as explanatory approaches to concept mastery
in that they seek to give a direct account of what it is to possess a concept,
or to put constraints on the form any such account must take. These are
adequacy conditions of theories of thought. In offering positive proposals
on the nature of concept possession they certainly offer an alternative to
the the attributionist's picture of things. But do they go beyond the claim
to offer a competing rival account? Yes they do. I think this is clearest in
the case of Davies who is arguing for an internal architectural constraint
on the contents ascribable to a system. These amount to internal
architectural constraints on what it is to be a believer: to lack this inner
cognitive organisation is to fail to satisfy the requirements on what it is to
be capable of conceptual thinking and reasoning.
This provides us with the desired contrast with Davidson's
attributionist minimalism. Davidson says that:
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the question how to tell when a creature has propositional
attitudes is not empirical; the question is what sort of
empirical evidence is relevant to deciding when a creature has
propositional attitudes. (Davidson 1982, p317)
As we have seen, he concludes that it must be behavioural evidence,
including evidence of linguistic behaviour. Davies, Evans and Peacocke
are all arguing for cognitive conditions of internal structuring on what it
is to be a thinker, and not merely behavioural constraints.
The difference can be brought out like this: whereas Davidson would
say that if two creatures shared all the same behavioural dispositions and
physical histories, they would have exactly the same mental lives, Davies
is committed to the idea that they could share all the same input-output
patterns in their environments and behaviour, and yet be causally
systematic with respect to different semantical or intentional patterns in
their input-output pairs. In such a case Davies would say that they had
different mental lives. For Davidson, the mental supervenes on the
behavioural, physically conceived. For Davies et al, the mental life of
human beings supervenes on their behaviour and their internal cognitive
structuring.
I find Davies' argument convincing, with the caveat that the syntax in
conceptual structure is rather more complex than these examples suggest.
Davies is aware of this but I suspect he would draw different lessons from
this than I would. For in contradistinction to Evans, Peacocke, and perhaps
Davies, I do not think that it is correct to attempt to base a theory of
meaning for a natural language on a prior theory of thought. This is Evans
strategy. He hopes to explain our ability to understand various linguistic
constructions by reference to the kinds of thoughts we have to think to
understand them; and for this he needs a prior account of thoughts and
what our grasp of those thoughts consists in that does not refer him
straight back to our ability to use various natural language sentences. To
assert that we do not need and possibly cannot have a theory of thought
prior to a theory of the language in which that thought is expressed, is not
to argue for an explanatory priority that forbids all access to the level of
thought in our theorising about language. It is just to assert that we could
not have a prior and finished theory of thought in whose terms we could
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give an account of public language meaning. Thought cannot be
exhaustively explained without reference to explanations of linguistic
significance. This is not primarily for reasons of the publicity of thought
and meaning, although some ranges of thought cannot be expressed or are
simply unavailable without prior mastery of the use of linguistic
expressions. Rather, they have to do with the fact that the syntactic
structure of conceptual thought must be at least as intricate as the syntactic
structure in language, which requires symbol strings to have not just
constituent structure but also hierarchical structure-dependencies. Those
constituents that serve as basic categories must also be understood in
terms of their syntactic roles in larger structures; all of which suggests a
theory of grammar at least as complex as that of natural language syntax.
My argument would be that syntactic structure of this complexity exists
because of the systematic role it plays in relation to the semantics of
languages.
Chomsky has argued that the primary role of language is not
communication but expression, and syntactic structuring is certainly an
important ingredient in facilitating the huge range of expressions
available in natural language. Chomsky has also argued that the basic
principles of this syntactic structure as innately possessed, encoded in
certain cognitive mechanisms dedicated to the production and
comprehension of language. Those thought theorists who thought the
language-like propositions that inhabit the domain of conceptual thinking
were available before our capacity to speak a language would be involved
in a merely terminological dispute with me. The very capacity for thought
they described would need to make an essential appeal to part of our
innate equipment for mastering a public language. It would be truely a
language of thought!
Evans acknowledges the point about the categorial constraints on the
recombinations of conceptual constituents, but does not pay sufficient
heed to the point when dismissing an account of thought-constituents in
terms of elements in a structure, in favour of structured capacities.
I think one of Evans' great achievements was to point the range of
non-conceptual contents in our thinking and to trace out the connections
between these and certain informational underpinnings and the contents
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of conceptual thought. Importantly, he draws attention to how certain
thought-contents are partly determined by their connections with these
others notions, and just how big a part certain informational connections
with the world play in the possibilities of reference and singular thought.
Unlike those who suppose a strict explanatory priority of language over
thought, I would suggest an ecumenical stance here. There may be many
places where we have recourse to notions that find their home in the
theory of thought and theories of the cognitive psychological
underpinnings to language-mastery, and I suggest that no adequate theory
of linguistic understanding can be given without drawing upon them. But
this is not to recommend a thought-first approach to the problem of
meaning.
There may be many kinds of psychological contents and levels of
structure which support and sustain our ability to use and understand a
natural language, but the meanings of items in public language cannot be
reduced to any one of these; however, the possibility of meaning may
require certain relations between them. One of the biggest tasks in the
philosophy of language will be to construct a stratified account of linguistic
content and to decide which psychological facts determine which aspects of
meaning and which are due to facts of some other sort. I see no reason to
think we can have a simplified unified account. The important point for
the Davidsonian to grasp is that any such account will have need of a
theory of concept mastery.
A good question is whether Evans can use his cognitivist credentials to
undermine the Davidsonian position? Could he, for example, point out
that a structured processing story is the only way to explain our satisfaction
of the Generality Constraint and claim that a theory of thought
(interpretative theory of the propositional attitudes) that could not meet
the constraints of a theory of our grasp of thoughts could not be a plausible
contender? Davidson should accept this challenge, for even if he did not
share the cognitivist assumption that the theory of grasp had anything to
do with the mental, he must concede that there is some non-mentalistic
story to be told about implementation. So, can there be brute processors




It is here that connectionism, or parallel distributed processing, in
particular and Davidson's interpretations theory find themselves as
strange bed-fellows. For the claim is that using non-symbolic
representations, and hence non-symbolic processes, a connectionist
network could be built to behave, in many respects as we do, while at the
same time satisfying the closure condition. Different stable patterns of
activation across the units in the system would serve as distributed
representations of whole thoughts, and the systems could make
transitions between these without there being any part of one of those
patterns which corresponded on each occasion to a conceptual constituent
that recurred as a common component, according to the structured
account, in a each of set of other thoughts reached by this process. The
process could be the superimposition of one pattern on another, where
one patterns of activation can prompt another; an easy thing to achieve in
connectionist computation. However, the key point would be that neither
the structure of the representations or the processing need correspond to
the Evansian structure of thought. There is no articulation of the states of
the system into syntactically structured vehicles of representational
content. This may provide us with the implementation of a believer who
lacks concepts.
This is the claim anyway. But what still has to be established is whether
connectionist networks are capable of satisfying the closure property, or
producing the right outputs for the right linguistic inputs. Not just the
input-output patterns of systematic inference matter here, but also
patterns of breakdown and certain systematic failures. All this is part of
satisfying the patterns in the right way, which is distinct from merely
coinciding de facto on a number of occasions. Whether or not the
connectionist networks are so systematic may turn out to be an empirical
question. If the answer is no, Evans wins the day.
(Note also that this merely implementational role for combined
connectionism and interpretation theory would not satisfy connectionists
with genuinely cognitive psychological explanatory ambitions. An
ambitious connectionism would want to explain the intentionality of
mental life or the nature and content of our cognitive states. And in this
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respect they would be rivals to Davidson because the two approaches
would jostle for the same explanatory space.)
The hard task for the cognitivist's construal of linguistic structure is to
say why the internal facts about a language that give structure to our
capacity to understand our native language are genuinely psychological
facts. For if the structure of language depends upon the structure of our
knowledge of language, it must be shown that the structurally salient facts
about linguistic processes are part of a speaker's knowledge of language.




8.1) Knowledge of Language and Theories of Language
This thesis began by locating its concerns within a certain family of
philosophical issues. These have to do with the relationship between
language and mind. I said at the outset that all parties to the dispute that
concerns me accept that there is an intimate connection between mind
and meaning because of the mind's involvement in meaningful speech.
Where they disagree is in their conceptions of the mental states involved
in language mastery. I looked at one fully worked out view of the
philosophy of mind and language called attributionism, and then went on
to sketch the foundations for an alternative form of mentalism. And in
turning now to theories of language, it is time for me to be more precise
about the nature of this relationship between language and mind.
I suggest that we should locate theories of meaning of the sort we have
already looked at within the larger project of constructing theories of
language. Let me say something quite neutral to begin with about the
point of a theory of language. Language, like meaning, is an elusive
notion and is best approached via theory. But what does a theory of
language look like? What are its data? What is such a theory for? Let me
take these in order.
By the term 'theory of language' I shall mean a collection of
complementary sub-theories, each of which addresses its own proprietary
level of description of the linguistic data, together with a theory of the
relation between the levels. So, for example, a theory of language will
include theories of phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics
and possibly pragmatics. What are the linguistic data for such a theory?
The primary data for linguistic theories are examples of spontaneous
speech. Speech is prior to writing in the order of development and more
widespread than literacy so it constitutes our starting place. Pre-
theoretically, we are not entitled to claim that a language exists




A secondary source of evidence for linguistic theories is equally
available in behaviour but less commonly available than the first. This is
a native speaker's intuitions about his or her own language. Described
without mentalist overtones, linguistic intuitions amount to behavioural
responses to specific linguistic promptings. Even Quine's behaviouristic
field linguists rely on this. A whole range of data across subjects can be
gleaned by posing questions that require speakers to produce
"acceptability' judgements on a range of specially contrived examples. It is
of course a theoretical issue what this secondary source of native speakers'
judgements of 'acceptability' are judgements of.
Thirdly, we can usually produce comparisons across populations of
language users of the relative frequency of occurrence in their language of
certain constructions, lexical items, phonemes, etc. These frequency and
distribution data can also be achieved for single speakers if we consult a
sufficiently large documented corpus of their speech.
Fourthly, we can look at cross-language comparisons, comparing the
phonological or sound systems of those languages, the sizes of their
vocabularies, the distributions of their terms within sentences; and then
once we have constructed theories, of say, syntax, we can compare the
syntactic constructions different languages permit by inventing examples
of sentences which we test against the primary and secondary sources of
evidence.
Fifthly, we have information about patterns of development from
child language acquisition research.
And finally, we have information about certain types of language
pathologies which give rise to different patterns of breakdown of our
language skills. Data about the impact on speech of various cognitive
disorders can show how a speaker's complex of linguistic abilities are
organised and how they individually participate in the functioning of the
whole system.
All the above material is classifiable as data only relative to a theory.
So let us return to the nature of theories of language and ask what we
need a theory of language for. The best way to answer this is to isolate the
specific question a theory of language is supposed to provide an answer to.
We need to distinguish the linguist's task from the theoretical tasks of
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those working in related disciplines; even if, at the end of the day we want
to relate the project of linguistics to those other disciplines. Consider the
following example and a number of different questions we could ask
about it. Let us suppose that Gill is having a conversation with Stephanie
in English one afternoon at a quarter to two. The different interests we
could take in this incident reflect the different disciplinary questions and
methodologies of the philosopher, the psychologist and the linguist.
Philosophers like to distinguish how questions from why questions,
seeing the latter as marking the domain of their inquiries. But this
contrast is too simple. I take it that the question of why Gill and Stephanie
were having a conversation is a question for the depth psychologist: a
question which might take on a special interest if we knew that Gill was
getting married that day and was due at the Church at two o'clock. But
this is not the philosopher's question. We need to probe a little further.
The psycholinguist might ask what enabled Gill and Stephanie to produce
and comprehend those speech sounds; where this would involve
questions about the proper functioning of their short term memories,
their encoding of the phonological structure of English, whether they
stored their knowledge of words phonologically or orthographically, and
so on. But arguably there is a question which is logically prior to this one,
a question that has to be answered before the psycholinguist can answer
her questions. This is: what are Gill and Stephanie actually doing? Or,
rather, what is it to be speaking and understanding a language like
English? This is the question that concerns the linguist and philosopher.
And the priority claim is that we must characterise this activity before we
can explain how it was brought about. Let us follow up the question of
what speakers are able to do.
What both speakers are doing is engaging in linguistic activity in a
language they have both mastered. Possession and exercise of this skill
essentially involves knowledge. To suppose that it does not would be to
find nothing odd about the remark by a character in a P.G.Wodehouse
novel, who when asked at a party if she speaks Spanish, replies, "I don't
know. I've never tried". This example cited by Dummett (1975b pi), can be
contrasted with the same reply to the question "Can you run a mile in
under five minutes?". The absurdity in the first case, but not the second, is
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due to the fact that speaking and understanding a language like Spanish
requires conscious knowledge, and in particular knowledge that one is
speaking that language. In the other case, one could imagine someone
chased by a tiger running a mile in under five minutes, without knowing
he was doing this. But one could not find oneself speaking Spanish and
not know that the words coming out of one's mouth were Spanish; not,
that is, if one was able not only to speak but to understand those words.
The fact that we describe both complex cognitive skills like language-
mastery and complex physical skills like being able to swim as cases of
knowing how to do something may simply reflect the fact that we were
taught to do both. But the cases are very different. Even though
unconscious cognitive processes play a large part in sustaining our
linguistic abilities, knowledge of a language requires a good deal of
conscious knowledge too, and any theory that left conscious knowledge of
the language we speak out of account would be an inadequate theory of
language. But for particular languages, like English, we need to account
for speakers' knowledge of language in detail since possession of this
knowledge distinguishes someone who is able to speak English from
those who can't. It is this knowledge which determines which language a
speaker speaks. So a theory of language must be a theory of speakers'
knowledge of language. Let us call this the knowledge of language claim.
This is the requirement that a theory of language should describe the
actual knowledge speakers possess. But to assess the claim that the theory
is a model of a speaker's actual knowledge we need to ask two questions:
(1) Which aspects of speakers does the theory describe?
(2) Which features of the theory do the describing?
Before we can start on these questions we shall need more details of
the theory. A speaker's exercise of her ability to speak a language gives
rise to a number of complex phenomena that can be described by highly
complex principles of linguistic theory. The sounds she makes can be
partitioned according to the phoneme boundaries of English dictated by
phonology. Morphology describes the clustering of phonemes and the
syllabic structure of words; it includes syntactic information about the
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derivational history of a word from its lexical stem, such as the relations
between derived nominals and their corresponding verbs (eg.
criticism/criticize, destruction/destroy). Slightly larger chunks can be
described as strings of words, some of which make up sentences. Different
forms of structure can be described here, including different units of
language larger than the word and smaller than the sentence. This is
called constituent structure and without principles to describe it our
theory would be unable to heed the fact that sentences composed of
different word strings can exhibit common structures. At the semantic
level too we must discern the recurrent items in sentence structures For
this we need semantic rules that give the meaning of lexical items and
semantic principles that describe the semantic upshot of their legitimate
syntactic compounding. Beyond this point, may lie the larger structures
such as those described in the pragmatic theory of discourse
representation theory. The possibilities of meaningful expression in a
human language are traced out by the complement of sub-theories that
state the principles of correct applications of these linguistic concepts
together with some overarching account of their interaction.
I am assuming that the principles that describe (most of) these concepts
of structure are necessary to describe the linguistic structure and content of
anything as complex as a natural language like English. But it is
immediately recognisable that ordinary speakers need know none of these
principles (in any ordinary sense of 'know') to be able to function
competently in their use of the language they describe. Ordinary speakers
may consciously know that they are speaking English, or Russian, or
whatever, but they do not need to know the principles by which,
according to theory, they are performing such a feat. I take it that a more
controversial claim would be that they do not need to know any of the
concepts governed by these principles. Issues become tricky at this stage.
Philosophers who accept the knowledge claim above are wont to say that
speakers know the meaning of an indicative sentence because they know
its truth conditions. Speakers may not have the concept of a truth
condition but they have the concept of a type of situation in which the
sentence concerned is true, and we represent this concept theoretically as a
truth condition. But do we want to say that in all cases of linguistic
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concepts belonging to the sub-theories the speakers have knowledge
theoretically representable by those concepts? We can consider everything
from truth conditions down to allophones. The question is how many of
these notions are involved in a speaker's knowledge of language.
Because I advocate the cognitivist approach to language - one which
sees the structural properties of human language as reflecting facts about
the cognitive structures and operations of the human language user - I
am inclined to see each of these sub-theories as addressing a different
level of processing in the speech chain that takes us from physical sound
to meaning. To understand the speech chain we must understand every
stage of this transition in the computation of meaning from sound. This
is an enormously complex task involving the imposition of many
constraints on the inputs to each level: the information must be chunked
and ordered under pre-specified categories, filtering out the rest as mere
noise in the system. At the lowest level of input we are dealing with
purely physical sounds and at the highest level we have abstract mental
representations of structure. To understand the computation we must
understand how sensory input of continuous acoustic signals can be
analysed so as to make initial contact with our linguistic knowledge. The
interface between the input and the application of phonological
information is itself extremely complex. No two utterances of the sound
/p/ will be the same physically. This is true even for the same individual
speaker as a sound spectograph can show. What this shows is that there is
an important distinction between objective physical sound and perceived
sound. Across sounds there will be perceptible physical differences: but
these are not necessarily accessible to the conscious language user. The
perceived difference between articulations of the bi-labial plosives, /b/
and /p/ depends on the delayed start of voicing for phonemes following
/p/, absent in the case of the voiced plosive /b/. This short delay is known
as the voice onset time, and it is our sensitivity to this which accounts for
the difference in our perception of the two sounds. Vietnamese speakers,
by contrast, have six sounds between /b/ and /p/ which English speakers
cannot discriminate. This suggests different sensitivities to variation in
voice onset times. Our recognition of which sound is physically realised
by a speaker depends on how much tolerance we permit in what we count
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as physical realisations of the same sound. This is important since the
difference between phonemes can mean the difference between words and
this can mean a difference in the perceived meaning of a speaker's
utterance. And so sameness or difference between individual speech
sounds depends facts about speakers' similarity judgements based on their
stored information about the permitted tolerance for a sound's variable
realisation. An account of what speakers know when they know the
difference between speech sounds will call for a cognitive phonetics,
where this will be an account of that knowledge which invokes both low-
level information-processing states and high level conscious judgements.
Such a theory would describe the initial stages of the speech chain from
sound to meaning, and would be an indispensable part of an account of
what speakers know.
This first stage of the speech chain would involve segmentation of the
continuous sound signal into stable units which could be matched against
our stored knowledge of phonemes and words. In fact, the whole process
must relate the various minimal units of analysis at each stage: sounds,
phones, phonemes, syllables, morphemes, words, phrases, constituents,
sentences and possibly discourse structures to one another. I suggest that
the whole task of describing this process should be tackled by constructing
a computational theory analogous to Marr's computational theory of
vision. We need a hierarchical model of how the human language
processor makes these computations from sounds to meanings. A theory
of the computation would also have to explain the relation between the
levels and the constraints on the transitions between levels. Each distinct
sub-theory of linguistics would provide a proper part of the explanation of
the computations taking place at each levels of processing. The overall
processing story would have to tell us how in comprehending a speaker's
utterance, the hearer moves from a continuous sound signal, as input, to
knowledge of the structured meaning of what was said, as output.
Reflections on the nature of linguistic knowledge in the light of some of
empirical evidence can already provide important conclusions about
these connections, as I will show in a moment.
The whole computational theory of language will provide an
articulated description of a part of the cognitive system at various
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linguistic levels of description and explanation. Claims about the nature
of information handled at those levels will depend on claims about our
cognitive architecture. The cognitive architecture will engineer various
solutions to information processing tasks that will constrain the
information available to the system. Setting the perceptible phoneme
boundaries of one's native language in the early stages of language
acquisition determines what one will count as speech sounds of one's
mother tongue; and this tuning-up of one's speech perceptions takes place
as a result of information transfer between the level of phenomenological
experience and the sub-personal processes. When the categories are stable
we can say that these sub-personal settings explain our distinctive
phenomenological response to a certain range of humanly produced
sounds. These developments take place with respect to the early stages of
speech processing but there are analogous cases we can look for in the
levels above. Of course, I do not intend to give a fully articulated
description of the computational theory of language processing: this is a
collaborative task for linguists, psycholinguistics, computational
psychologists, computer scientists, logicians, as so forth; a task for
cognitive science. My aim is simply to point out the philosophical
relevance of such a project and the relevance of philosophy to it; and to
ask is there something radically distinct about the task of the philosopher
here? Are his theories explanatorily prior to those working in
neighbouring disciplines? Indeed, need he call on these empirical theories
at all to complete what he has traditionally seen as a purely conceptual
inquiry? This depends on what his aims are of course. But if the
philosopher of language is attempting to cast light on the questions of
how finite creatures can understand a potential infinity of sentences in a
natural language, how they can learn such a language in a finite time, and
how they can understand sentences they have never before encountered,
is he not asking for an empirical theory that will explain the actual
linguistic abilities of speakers? If the claim is that this not the case, and the
aim is to provide a purely philosophical theory of meaning then I want to
ask whether philosophers of language can afford to rest content with what
Crispin Wright (1986a, p32) has called the "cosily collaborative" picture,
according to which it is the philosopher's a priori task to devise theories
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in line with certain key assumptions and adequacy conditions, and it is
the task of the empirical researcher to determine whether or not the a
priori theory reflects the actual states of speakers? (I suspect this
collaboration is less cosy for the empirical researchers; for it looks as
though the philosopher has nothing to learn from them except after the
event.) This depends, as Wright says, on what properties of speakers the
theorist of meaning takes himself to be describing. Wright thinks this is a
philosophical matter: the philosopher's task being to state the conditions
on a speaker's having knowledge of meaning, and the empirical
psychologist's task being to tell us whether the conditions are met by
anyone. I disagree. My burden will be to show that it is not always up to
the philosopher alone to decide which aspects of a speaker the theorist of
meaning is trying to describe. Philosophers can be and have been
mistaken about what they themselves are trying to describe in their
theories of language. Proper attention to the provenance of the concepts
we use in constructing our 'philosophical' theories will show that they
have an everyday usage and a more technical usage. Often the everyday
usage simply presupposes that they can be given a more technical sense,
without offering any indication of what such an account might be like. So
concepts of this sort exhibit the phenomenon Putnam calls the division of
linguistic labour. In these cases our ordinary use of the concepts of gold or
air, and claims we might make about such things, would be given a more
precise sense by the relevant range of experts. The linguistic concepts of
word, sentence, grammar and language have an everyday sense and a
more technical usage, and it would be wrong to assume that just because
we ordinarily know which things are meaningful sentences that we know
what a meaningful sentence is, or what property of a speaker amounts to
his possessing knowledge of a particular sentence. The question is
whether the philosopher of language can really rest content with the
everyday usage of these notions, or whether he is presupposing some
further account of them. The trouble with the former option is just that
we are trying to give a theory of these things, and ordinary knowledge is
not theoretical knowledge; it is just this admission which requires us to
say what the relation is between theories of meaning and individual
language users. But if we take the latter option, then I claim that prior
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knowledge of empirical findings is required to determine the subject
matter of the theory and to determine which states of a speaker are being
described. Nobody would deny the philosopher or the AI programmer the
right to invent formal systems and then to ask the psychologist whether
there any creatures whose (behavioural? neural? conscious?) states can be
described by the patterns in these systems (eg. rational decision theory).
But when philosophers take themselves to be proposing theories of
meaning for natural languages actually spoken by some community,
albeit under certain idealised regimentations of the data, they cannot
merely help themselves to a rich theoretical vocabulary for specifying the
a priori theory and then go on to stipulate that the particular descriptions
contained in these theories correspond to, say, the patterns of behaviour
in linguistic use. Heed must be paid to where we get the materials for
constructing such theories: the provenance of those concepts. A proper
understanding of what the significance of certain concepts is owed to may
show us that by its use we are already committed to describing certain
aspects of a speaker, as we saw in the case of the concept of a phoneme.
The epistemology of language dictates the objects in the ontology of
language, so we need to know what goes into an account of the ordinary
speaker's epistemology of language. I shall now show that we need a
mixture of philosophical reflection and empirical theory to say what a
knowledge of the identify of individual sentences consists in. Detailed
treatment of this issue will unfold throughout this chapter, but at this
stage, I am merely seeking to open up a space for a computational account
of a speaker's capacity to speak his native language. It would provide an
articulated description of that part of the cognitive system that performs
the task of linguistic comprehension (and production). This type of
computational theory of language provides a partial model of the mind.
8.2) Knowledge of Syntax
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I propose to begin this large scale task with an argument from syntax
since this is a relatively high-level property of the sentences we utter and
intimately related to the meanings that our sentences can express. The
task syntax performs in a language like ours is easy to state: it puts the
words in the right order. What is not so easy to state are the rules that
describe what it is for words to be in the right order. But I suspect most
philosophers of language simply assume that there is a story to be told of
how it is done and that we can simply take this account for granted to get
onto the interesting philosophical issues about meaning. This is a
mistake. Only by getting the words in one of the right orders do we mean
anything sensible at all, and the question of how this is done by speakers is
of great philosophical importance. Philosophical interest should be
aroused too by the fact that the word "grammar" is used ambiguously to
mean both a speaker's knowledge or 'cognisance' of the syntactic structure
of sentences and the linguistics theory of this. It is obviously a large
philosophical issue what a speaker's knowledge of grammar is and what
his having it consists in. We cannot simply equate knowledge of grammar
with theory of grammar without saying something more. After all,
unreflective language users do not know a theory of syntax for their
language; or at least they do not know one in any ordinary sense of
'know'. Chomsky tells us that 'grammar' means both a cognitive
structure and a linguist's theory of it. So large claims are being made by
the linguist's use of theoretical terms and the philosopher reserves the
right to look at those claims very carefully.
Part of this project will be to discover where facts about the grammar of
a language are to be located. In saying which properties of speakers a
theory of meaning describes, Dummett talks of the need for certain
"linking principles" to connect theoretical notions to the linguistic
practices of speakers. (Dummett 1986a, p467) As he says, these linking
principles are usually implicit and unexplained by the theorist of
meaning, and yet until we have an account of them it does make sense to
ask whether the theory is correct or incorrect. I take myself to be giving a
part of the account of these linking principles for that part of a theory of
language concerned with syntax; and once again the question will be
which aspects of speakers does a theory of syntax describe and which
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features of theory do the describing. An account of these linking principles
is of fundamental importance to the philosopher of language for only a
finished theory which include these can tie together the three central
strands of language mastery: meaning, knowledge and use.
Should the linking principles connect the concepts of syntax with
properties of observable behaviour or should it connect them with a
speaker's cognitive psychological states? Philosophers usually ignore this
question by talking about the questions that arise after the provision of
some suitable syntax. But they are all agreed that it has a role to play in the
theory of meaning. Wright declares that theories of meaning of the kind
we have been considering will have a syntactic and a semantic part. "The
syntactic part", he tells us, "will divide the the atomic expressions of the
language into finitely many basic syntactic kinds, and determine on the
basis of that division which combinations of such expressions are
grammatically well-formed." This is no mean task; and whatever
properties of a speaker these theoretical descriptions relate to, it is these
items which are also supposed to have meaning. Later on in the
collaboration Wright imagines a two stage process of theory construction
and testing. At the first stage the armchair theorist would give an
axiomatic characterisation of the relevant properties of sentences; the
second stage would involve the empirical researcher trying to work out
how human beings could embody the information represented in the
theory. But attention to the actual practice of theory construction in
theoretical linguistics would show that it is in the course of constructing
such a theory that we come to decisions about the aspects of speakers we
are describing. The term "state" may be our term of art but it is not just up
to us to specify contents in our theory of a speaker's language
independently of undertaking commitments to the sort of things we are
describing. By the time we have a theory of syntax of the sort Wright
describes we shall have committed ourselves to describing a speaker's
mental representations of structure. It will then be a further question
what it is for a physical device to have mental representations, just as we
can ask what it is for a physical device to run a high-level programming




Not all philosophers take the ecumenical stance of Wright or show his
reticence to pronounce on the nature of linguistic facts. When asked
whether semantical facts are grounded in behavioural facts, psychological
facts, social facts, or facts about a platonic realm, they will feel themselves
able to rule out some of these options a priori and in advance of empirical
research. Such thinkers believe that we can establish the claim that
semantics cannot be grounded in psychology just by reflection on the
nature of semantics and reflection on the nature of psychology. But I
think we can afford to be rightly suspicious of these claims. Quite often,
we need to know more, empirically speaking, about data and the
experimental findings of a theory before we can pronounce with any
authority about the nature of its subject matter
McDowell speaks of the "the match between theoretical syntax and
actual utterance events" conceiving of syntax as "configurations
observable in physical utterance events". But his modesty allows him to
bring to bear concepts already available to us in the course of exercising
the understanding the theory is trying to explain, so perhaps he has
recourse to a rich notion of what we perceive when we hear physical
utterances. But it appears not because as we saw above he goes on to tell us
that syntactic properties are to be found among "the hard physical
facts..which constrain the construction of a truth characterisation for a
language actually spoken" and he conceives them as "structural properties
of physical utterance-events which permit the language to be given a
syntactic characterisation". (McDowell 1978, pl22). So we know he thinks
of syntax as describing physical facts; those facts on which we can put an
interpretation. Here is an a priori decision about the nature of syntactic
facts. It is also wrong. To see this we must struggle out of the armchairs
and look at some empirical evidence.
To begin with, even at the earliest stages of linguistic processing before
we get to syntax what we must recognise, or register, is information about
the structure of phonemes in a speaker's utterance. This is information
that is perceptible though not phenomenologically salient, such as
perception of a voice onset time. And as we saw earlier, phonemes are not
physical entities, they are variably realised as physical sound within
certain tolerances. We have to have some way of registering the degrees of
275
Chapter Eight
tolerance in the acoustic properties of what is to count as the articulation
of a /t/ or a /d/, say, especially since the phonetic realisation of each
phoneme depends on the context in which it occurs. Now if we want an
account of what we know when we hear that sound, can we do better
than to say modestly that we hear it as a /p/ ? Yes, for we can give a full-
blooded account of this information state by means of distinctive feature
phonology which refers to properties of the articulation of a word which
are below the level of consciousness for ordinary language users. Each
informational state is a cluster of features about the sound heard, either
(+/- voiced), (+/- rounding), (+/- continuent), (+/- vocalic), etc. The
principled description of these linguistic phenomena draws on notions of
information not conceptualised by ordinary speakers. Nevertheless, we
can show that speakers are sensitive to these features. On this basis, we
can argue for their psychological reality. This is not just a claim about
speech perception. In fact, it would be hard to claim that our sub-personal
'knowledge' of the distinctive features of phonemes is constituted by the
information state involved in speech perception since this information
affects perception, has an effect on articulation and is productive. For
example, take the phonemes that realise the -ed affix in regular past tense
endings of verb stems. Consider, the three past participles, "walked",
"jogged", "hated". Pronounce them aloud. You will notice that you
pronounce the -ed ending differently in each case. They are realised by the
phonemes, /t/, /d/, and /Id/ respectively. Consonant clusters at the end of
a word never show the sequence (unvoiced-voiced) or vice versa, "walk"
ends in an unvoiced consonant, and "jog" ends in a voiced consonant, so
they are followed, respectively, by unvoiced and voiced phonemes; both
of which realise the same morphological function. So when we perceive
the consonant at the end of a regular verb stem we have to follow an
instruction to produce the correct realisation. Devices which are not
sensitive to the internal structure of phonemes could not make these
adjustments. Also the subject has no difficulty in projecting this property
to the articulation of new words, or non-words. Subjects do not have a
degree of freedom to extend to new cases in any way they chose. This
productivity argues for a generalisation about a level of unconscious
information processing that requires analysis of input, classification, and
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rule-governed output. This can only be achieved if the processor has
access to structured representations of the distinctive features involved.
Now it would be hard to describe these data in terms of purely physical
processes since the structures we are describing are not physical structures.
What we are describing is part of a speaker's cognition, and not just
events that tend to happen in the normal physical course of things. These
properties affect perception, and speech production, and we can be made
aware of them phenomenologically once our attention has been drawn to
them. What we have is an information processing story about states "that
play a role in the proximate causal history of beliefs, though they are not
beliefs themselves", in Stich's words "subdoxastic" states. These are not
necessarily unconscious states since the state bearing information about
the distinctive features of these phonemes can surface in consciousness
with a little persuasion. They are however non-conceptual in the sense of
not being conceptualised by the subject (until he consciously attends to
them). There is still a distinction between what you now know as a
theorist of phonology and your hearing as different phonemes which are
voiced and unvoiced. However, this is a very low-level representation of
information and perhaps not worth calling mental representation, but we
can now move to analogous cases of conceptual structures higher up the
processing hierarchy.
Let us turn to syntax. Although linguists of Chomsky's persuasion use
the word 'grammar' with studied ambiguity to mean either an
internalised cognitive structure of the speaker or a theorist's description
of the properties of that structure, there is still a difference that Chomsky
points to between a speaker knowing rule R and a theorist knowing that
rule R is a rule of the speaker's internalised grammar (even if the theorist
and the subject are one and the same person). One difference is that we
cannot express the speaker's knowledge of R, we can only represent it by
a theory. To adopt Wittgenstein's terms and reverse them, we cannot
show this knowledge we can only say what it is, so we can give an
account of it. So Chomsky provides a theory of what speakers know of
syntax . A theory of what we know must be a theory of our grasp of that
knowledge; so a theory of what speakers know of syntactic structure must
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be a theory of their grasp of such structure. This is what Chomsky offers us
in giving a full-blooded, rather than a modest, theory of syntax.
Consider the following pair of sentences:
(1) Linguists are difficult to employ
(2) Linguists are keen to learn
Do they strike one as similar? The behaviourist might well admit
there was a similar pattern here. Do we perceive them as having the same
structure? By McDowell's criteria we probably do. But are they they
syntactically similar? Consider the following related pairs of sentences:
(3) It is difficult to employ linguists
*(4) It is keen to learn linguists
(5) Employing linguists is difficult
*(6) Learning linguists is keen
Clearly, (4) and (6) are aberrant in some way, and yet we have
performed the same re-arrangements in the case of (3) and (5) which seem
okay. We know this straightaway and never try to produce sentence like
(4) and (6) on the basis of our successes with (3) and (5). How is this to be
explained? The answer is, of course, that "Linguists" is the grammatical
object of "to employ" in (1) and the grammatical subject of "to learn" in
(2). Moral: surface syntax is misleading. Now we must have some way of
registering to ourselves the grammatical relations involved in these
sentences, even if we cannot say what a grammatical subject or object is.
The fanciful suggestion is that we have represented in some way the
structure of (1) and (2) as follows:
(1') Linguists are difficult [ e to employ e' ]
(2') Linguists are keen [ e to learn]
This is known as S-level in Chomsky's Government/Binding theory
(GB). This is a level prior to phonological realisation at which crucial
information is recorded which has a role to play in both phonological
realisation and semantical interpretation. Elements like 'e' are called
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empty categories. Although these empty categories are often
phonologically unrealised, some cases permit realisation. For example,
the first empty category e in (1') can be lexically filled by the formative
"one" when accompanied by the complementiser "for", giving us:
(1") Linguists are difficult [for one to employ e' ]
Some may find it egregious to admit to such extra levels of structure
and balk at the thought that we are claiming them to be somehow
psychologically represented by the speaker. The mention of empty
categories will seem unparsimonious, psychologically extravagant and
wholly dispensable. From these examples alone I would agree. However,
we can give stronger reasons than this for acknowledging empty
categories in our theoretical representations of speakers' knowledge. Here
are a few more.
From the postulations of two empty categories in (1') nothing so far
prevents us from linking "Linguists" with the first element e to give the
reading 'It is difficult to get linguists to employ people', and yet that is not
an option for (1). That is not a meaning we would consider. So how is it
ruled out? It is prevented by a structural condition of control that the
understood element for 'one' never occurs as an object, and so 'Linguists'
cannot be the subject of 'to employ'. Explaining why (1) is unambiguous
and why certain meanings are not available to us is just as important as
explaining what these sentences do mean. If not just any way of 'going on'
constitutes a correct use of our language then we need to know the
constraints under which we are operating. The structural conditions do
not provide descriptions of our intentions to use, but constraints on how
we can implement our linguistic intentions. And these constraints place
conditions on what speakers of a language can be said to know. The
notion of constraint has become of increasing importance in
contemporary grammar, gradually replacing the notion of generativity.
But before I say more about this we still need truly convincing reasons to
admit the existence of empty categories.
Consider the following four sentences:
(7) Who did Bill see?
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(8) Bill sees Mary
(9) Bill sees
(10) Who did Bill see Mary?
I think the intuition is that (7) and (8) are acceptable, but that (9) and
(10) are not. What is wrong with (9) is that "see* is a transitive verb and
requires a direct object. Sentence (9) has a subject but no object to follow
"see", therefore it is ill-formed. But what happens in (7) where there is no
direct object but the sentence is grammatical? Clearly, the requirement is
suspended. Perhaps it is optional? But then (10) shows us that there are
cases were the direct object must be suspended on pain of
ungrammaticality. We can see the reason for this straightaway: the
relative pronoun "who" is the direct object, so when it is present, as in
(10), the position following "see" must not be filled; and when it is absent
in (8) and (9) it must be. Hence, the irregularity of (9).
The importance of this example is that shows why we cannot explain
these data by features of simple linear order alone. It is not optional
whether we have a lexical item in the final position of the verb phrase so
we could not construct a context free grammar for these sentences with
the following re-write rules. (Bracketing indicating optionality.)
(i) VP => V (NP)
(11) S => (Who) NP VP
Neither of these rules is correct since they both permit ungrammatical
constructions. The problem that confronts us when trying to write a
context-free grammar is that there is a dependency between these two
rules: the NP must be suppressed in (i) when 'Who' is realised in
applications of (ii), and 'Who' must suppressed when the NP is realised
in applications of (i). The dependencies between these two rules must be
expressed by a higher-order rule that describes not just categories and
structures but relations and dependencies between them. For this we need
movement rules. The thought is that "who" is a displaced element which
would have started life in that post-verbal position, as we can see in the
case of so-called echo questions:
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(11) Bill saw who?
The usual story is that "who" has been moved by a transformation
(wh-movement) that takes it to the front of the sentence.
The example also gives rise to claims about psychological reality. If we
are sensitive to the conditions on structure described in a grammar
adequate to represent what we know, then our knowledge of syntax is
structure-dependent. The Structural Dependency Principle says that
speakers of natural languages require knowledge of the relationships
between words and not just knowledge of their linear ordering. Chomsky
glosses it, not in terms of knowledge, but as a principle at work in
computational cognition:
children unerringly use computationally complex structure-
dependent rules rather than computationally simple rules that
involve only the predicate "leftmost" in a linear sequence of
words" (Chomsky 1986, pp7-8)
Whether one wants to call the states involved here 'knowledge', they
are certainly implicated in the computational mechanisms that determine
the uses, misuses, and restrictions we observe in language use. And
although the computational operations themselves do not have to be
explicitly represented in the system, the structures over which the
computations are performed do. But Chomsky can claim more than this.
Structure-dependency is a universal property of all human languages; and
since a theory of language is a theory of speaker's knowledge of language,
speaker's must know the structure-dependencies the grammars of their
languages describe. This knowledge of structured objects does not yet
entail structured knowledge; but then, if there is a mechanism for
explaining our knowledge of these structured objects and if that
mechanism includes structured representations that causally affect the
sorts of things we do with our language, there is a strong inclination to say
that this does amount to our having structured knowledge. The argument
for this would be a 'How else do we come to have knowledge of
something structured?' challenge. If we have knowledge of structured
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objects and their structure is not a reflection of the structure of our
knowledge, nor of their overt linear form, then where else does this
structure reside? Platonism is one suggestion, but it is epistemologically
problematic and cannot explain the generalisations about speaker's use.
Why should our cognitive operations show such conformity to properties
of these abstract entities? Is it not more likely that these abstract properties
of structure are projections from our cognitive functionings? It is in this
spirit, I believe, that Chomsky says: 'language has no objective existence
apart from its mental representation" (Chomsky 1972, 169). This why
'knowledge of language' is a structured state of the language user and not
a speaker's epistemic relation to something independent of him. This is a
very special sense of knowledge and for the moment, without saying any
more, let us call it tacit knowledge.
Perhaps we are still not convinced that this provides a case for mental
representation. But there is more to be said. The theory of GB requires that
there should be an empty category in object position in (7), and that this
position should be assigned the same 'thematic' role (eg. agent, patient,
instrument, etc.) as the the moved element "who". This is a special kind
of empty category called a trace. We can think of it as the trace left by the
moved element. Its presence indicates a chain linking "who" and its trace,
which ensures the sharing of certain grammatical information (such as
that it is a direct object) The details are described in a part of the grammar
known as trace theory. The structure of (7) is as follows:
(12) Who did [Bill see t ]
Two questions arise straightaway: 'What is the motivation for trace
theory?', 'Are traces psychologically real?' Let me take these in order.
To understand trace theory one must understand something about the
'architecture' of Chomsky' Government/Binding framework. I cannot
hope to give an adequate exposition of this highly sophisticated theory
here, so I shall simply provide a short tour pointing out the sights that are
important for our purposes.
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8.3) Principles and Parameters
GB is a collection of interrelated sub-theories. These sub-theories deal
with the highly interactive principles of Universal Grammar (UG). UG is
"a system of principles, conditions, and rules that are elements or
properties of all human languages". A Universal Grammar gives the
essential properties of language, and it describes an innately given part of
a speaker's linguistic knowledge. The principles of UG allow for certain
parametric variations within fixed limits. These are the variations
between languages. Universal Grammar is not the grammar of any
particular language, it describes the initial state of the language faculty. For
us to acquire language we have to acquire a particular grammar
determined by features of the language used in the community in which
we first learn language. Acquiring language means coming to apply the
innately given principles of UG to the data of a particular language and
setting the values of the parameters locally according to that language.
An example of parameter setting is the Head-parameter which
specifies the order of elements in the syntactic structure of different
languages. In English, the lexical heads, or dominant lexical categories of
the major constituents of a sentence, Verb Phrase, Noun Phrase,
Prepositional Phrase, all occur on the left of their phrase structures:
(VP) carried his books to the station
(PP) to the station
(NP) man with the dark overcoat
In other language, like Japanese, the lexical heads appear to the right of
the other elements in their phrasal categories eg.:
(PP) Nihon ni. (Japan in)
(VP) E wa kabe ni kakatte imasu. (picture wall on is hanging)
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It turns out that languages are internally consistent and that the
position of heads in all the phrases of a language can be specified as either
head-initial or head-final. This illustrates one of the features of the
Principles and Parameters framework: there are no construction specific
rules. So instead of a long list of phrase structure rules from which we
could work out the positions of lexical heads in phrases, we get a single
generalisation. All the incipient language learner has to do is discover
whether her language is a head-initial or head-final language and set her
parameter accordingly. Children need evidence of this, but even simple
three word sentences like "John ran home" will provide it. This is the
head parameter.
Several other parameters exist involving the extent of the structural
dependencies of movement in various languages. Languages exhibit a
strict hierarchy of positions on which one can move a wh-word so as to
question or relativise, like the wh-movement of "Who" in the example
above. Moving from left to right, there is a strict ordering of the noun-
phrase positions in a sentence which are accessible for relativising: subject,
object, indirect object, prepositional object, and complement positions.
Different languages stop at different positions along this list, with
relativisations on positions beyond the stopping point considered as
ungrammatical. Each language stops somewhere along this left to right
list, but no language has gaps. This is known as the Keenan-Comrie
Relative Clause Accessibility Hierarchy Parameter.
Chomsky has said that:
Ideally, we hope to find that complexes of properties differentiating
otherwise similar languages are reducible to a single parameter, fixed
in one or another way (Chomsky 1981, p6)
The claim would then be that starting out with UG, if we set the
parameters one way we get one language, if we set them another we get a
different language. This would be a strong vindication of Chomsky's




Because of the extreme generality of the principles, more and more
information is carried in the lexical entries for each word rather than by
rules, as it was in transformational grammar. The lexical entries will be
categorised under lexical headings, like Verb, Noun, Determiner, etc. But
they will also be su fr-categorised. So for example, verbs that are transitive
will be subcategorised as having to have an NP after them. The
information is recorded in theory by subcategorisation frames. These will
include information about the number of argument places for a verb, and
the number and position of its complements. (Note that the arguments of
a two-place verb like "loves" will require it to have a subject and an object.
But the complement is the argument that actually occurs in the verb-
phrase itself, ie. its object)
Subcategorisation frames look like this:
v. gives [ _, NP1 to NP2]
The brace tells us what syntactic contexts "gives" can occur in. They
will also tells us when verbs like "give" can also occur in the syntactic
contexts:
v. [_, NP2 NP1]
Note that while "give" can occur in the second kind of context, a
similar verb like "donate" cannot. This subcategorisation information is
obviously interactive when several words are placed together. If they each
fit into one another's slots then we have the beginnings of a sentence
structure: a D-structure. There is only one transformation rule that takes
D-structures to S-structures; this is "Move -a", where " a " is a variable
ranging over any grammatical category. It says, in effect, move anything
anywhere. What stops this overgeneralising and permitting absolute
nonsense is the constraining effect of the principles. The principles
interact to rule out impermissible structures. So any word-string is
possible unless it violates one of the principles. In this way, GB is not a
generative theory: it is a constraints theory. It says that however we arrive
at word strings, if they violate the principles of structure then the result is
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ungrammatical. Gaps in the data are meant to reflect the operation of a
constraint. But of course, the constraints do not say we cannot construct
ungrammatical sentences, they merely account for our finding certain
(perhaps randomly produced) word strings unacceptable.
To give an example of the interaction of principles I need to mention
two more notions. First, the Projection Principle; this says that
information in the lexical entries should be projected to every level of
syntactic representation. A syntactic structure is a projection from lexical
properties, so subcategorisation information must be preserved. Next
there is a part of GB known as theta-theory. This is the part that specifies
the thematic roles of agent, or patient or theme for arguments of the verbs
and prepositions. Theta roles are assigned at D-structure in accordance
with the theta criterion:
0-Criterion: Each argument bears one and only one 0-role, and each 0-
role is assigned to one and only one argument.
Now, since syntax is a projection from lexical properties, there is a
requirement that every lexical head should get the correct number of
arguments specified for it in its subcategorisation frame; and every such
argument should be assigned one and only one O-role. These
requirements are related in GB by a principle known as 0-marking. This
principle makes the two systems interact as follows:
If X subcategories the position occupied by Y, then X 0-marks Y
This means that subcategorisation entails 0-marking. This in turn
entails a constraint on the mapping between D-structure and S-structure.
Elements cannot be moved from one subcategorised position to another
for then the moved element would have two 0-roles assigned to it in
violation of the 0-Criterion. It would have a 0-role in the position it had
before movement, and in the position it had after movement. All this
entails that an argument (or complement) in a phrase structure can only
move if it moves to a non theta-marked position. Only some positions are
open for movement: these are known as landing sites.
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Now because a verb phrase is only well formed if its head occurs in the
syntactic context specified in its lexical entry, any 'moved-from' position
in that context will have been subcategorised for and theta-marked. This
has the upshot that the well-formed configuration:
v. see [ _, NP]
must be preserved as it is projected to all levels of syntactic representation.
Once a syntactic position exists it must continue to exist at each stage of
the derivation from D-structure to S-structure and to the level Chomsky
calls Logical Form (LF) where information about the relative scopes of
expressions is made available. After movement, a syntactic position that
existed must still be available in the structure. Thus the Projection
Principle entails the existence of empty categories; in this case traces.
So if, as in our example of "Who did Bill see?", the element has been
moved out of the direct object position, there must be a trace left there to
conform to the Projection Principle. So the sentence takes the S-structure:
Who did [Bill see t ]
There are other excellent empirical motivations for traces. Lexical
material cannot be moved into the position occupied by a trace. The
relation between a moved item and its trace is that of bound anaphora -
like the relation between a reflexive pronoun (eg."themselves") and its
antecedent. This relation must satisfy certain structural conditions such as
c-command. This is a relation between nodes of a phrase structure tree: a
given category A c-commands another category B when every branching
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structure of a maximal projection (highest phrasal category of the head's
type) dominating A dominates B.
A moved item must properly bind its trace if the sentence is to be
grammatical, and it can only do so when it c-commands its trace. This
relation of c-command an essential condition on anaphoric binding in
general. (The Binding Principles in GB state constraints on co-reference.)
Given that traces play an integral role in the theory in concert with
many interacting principles that conspire to explain the data, we must ask
whether they have any psychological reality for speakers. This is part of
the question of whether a grammar describes a speaker's mental
representation of syntactic structure.
Traces do give rise to certain effects in speech so let us consider an
argument of their psychological reality. The evidence for the psychological
reality of traces concern the phenomena of wanna-contraction. We know
that people often make the following phonological contractions:
want to -> wanna
going to -> gonna
In some cases this sounds okay but in others it does not. So for
example, we say: "I'm gonna kiss you" , but not "I'm gonna London".
This should satisfy us that we have intuitions about such cases. Consider






(13) Who do you want to play?
This could be read in the sense of who do you want to play at squash,
or in the sense of who do you want to play scrum half on Saturday, or to
play the Kruetzer Sonata. It depends on whether you want someone else
to do the playing or you want to play someone at a game. Now take the
case of wanna-contraction:
(14) Who d'you wanna play?
Can it be read both ways? I think the intuition is that we can only
understand it in the sense of who do you want to play at squash. The
reading of who do you want to play the Kreutzer Sonata is ruled out. The
explanation for this is is shown by revealing the two S-structures for (13):
(15) Who do you want to play t
(16) Who do you want t to play
We cannot contract "want" and "to" in (16) because they are separated
by a trace "t". The explanation now given is that speakers are sensitive to
this empty category even though it is phonologically unrealised. This is
because it is mentally represented, although phenomenologically and
consciously inaccessible. This argues for a level of information processing
at which speakers draw on the information recorded in a theory of syntax
to guide their linguistic productions and judgements about
grammaticality and ambiguity.
This is just one case where we have to mentally represent structure
not disclosed in the surface of utterances; but there are many more. For
instance, the syntactic phenomena of 'gapping', or verb-phrase anaphora
in sentences such as:
(17) Martin had a glass of wine and so did Barry .
with the understood element being the constituent "have a glass of wine".
To understand the sentence one needs to 'know' how to interpret the
289
Chapter Eight
missing element. VP ellipsis can also give rise to ambiguities of the
'pronouns of laziness' variety, as in the following case:
(18) Keith loved his cat and so did Lee .
Here we can either construe (18) as meaning Lee loved Keith's cat or
Lee loved his own cat. But for both possibilities to be available we must
have a way of acknowledging the different completions of the sentence. A
plethora of cases for empty categories or 'understood' constituents emerge
when we look at any grammar with the expressive power to describe
structures as complex as those found in natural languages. The
importance of these phonologically unrealised constituents in
understanding sentences argues for the psychological reality of S-
structure. The psychological reality of D-structure resides in the complex
information we carry about the syntactic roles of individual words.
Furthermore, transformations need no longer be seen as psychologically
real operations. One can, if one wishes, merely think of them in terms of
constraints on the mapping from D-structure to S-structure. The problem
of linguistic knowledge is then a matter of how, given what we know or
cognise about words, we can find grammatically permissible strings for
which permissible mappings can be given. The principles of GB provide
strong constraints on the range of possibilities.
What conclusions can we draw? We can begin by answering the
opening question of this section: do the concepts of theoretical syntax
describe patterns of speakers' behaviour, or do they describe speakers'
psychological states? The answer must be the latter. Syntactic information
is not a property of behaviour; it is systematic, structure-dependent, multi-
levelled, and causally efficacious. In this way, the underlying
representational structures give form to the behaviour whereby we realise
the articulation of a sentence.
Of course it is open to the die-hard to claim that we can treat traces
instrumentalistically, but it is a good question what causal-physical story
of the observable facts will be. There would have to be a physical
mechanism that explained wanna contractions and non-contractions,
regardless of the presence or absence of empty categories or the purported
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movements in the syntax. These purely physical explanations of linguistic
production would presumably be separate from explanations of our
perceptual phenomenology and how we respond to supposedly
ambiguous structures. I fail to see what any such purely causal story
would look like since there is no generalisation to be had at that level.
The only answer an instrumentalist about the top-most level of
description could give of what make the data take the shape there
described for them will be in terms of 'whatever it takes' to get those data
to conform to the instrumental generalisations. This is at best a little thin,
but at worst it ignores an account already available to us at the irreducible
cognitive psychological level of description, intermediate between the
physical and the folk-psychological levels. At this level we can frame
testable predictions about many other items of data. The computationally
minded linguist is producing generalisations, the physical scientist is not.
The linguist can hold onto the attractive idea that this mentally
represented information about syntax is neutral as between
comprehension and production and is called upon in both. If he does not
fall into philosophical error in making such claims, then prima facie, he
has a testable, well-supported hypothesis about how we do what we do
with our language.
There is a possible confusion at this stage that must be avoided. These
psychological explanations are not purely syntactic. The content of the
relevant states of our linguistic processing system are about syntax, and
the representational structures represent the underlying grammatical
information with which we gloss behavioural acts of utterance. To
account for them we need a content-using theory of these cognitive states
and a psychological explanation of how they affect linguistic output. An
important part of these outputs is that derivations of syntactic structures,
however they are computed, emerge in fully conscious grammaticality
judgements, including judgements about shared constituents, and, I
would add, they give rise to such non-conceptual states as our hearing of
sentences as structured, which depend crucially on particular
phenomenological experiences. The content-using psychological
explanations of the causes of these experiences refer to internalised
structures of the cognitive system that do not require those structures to
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be phenomenologically or conceptually available to the person whose
states they are.
8.5) Syntax and the Three Stances
What do each of our protagonists make of this. Let me begin with
Dummett and his Descriptivist position. The descriptivist believes that
there are facts of the matter about our knowledge of language: something
that knowledge consists in that exists independently of its theoretical
characterisation. So what is Dummett to make of the claims for syntactic
knowledge?
He should approve of Chomsky's full-blooded account of that
knowledge; but he will frown upon the postulation of mental
representations and unconscious psychological states, fearing some threat
of psychologism. But the first thing to point out to him is that this is not
psychologism in the sense summed up by McDowell as:
...a conception according to which the significance of others'
utterances is a subject for guesswork or speculation as to how things
are in a private sphere concealed behind their behaviour
(McDowell 1981, p225)
The psychological states which constitute a speaker's grasp of syntax
are neither private nor accessible only by introspection. They are
empirically discovered and described facts which can tested for by
consulting all the types of evidence mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter. Nor are they private, since others can know more about a
speaker's internalised grammar than he does. Nor are they infallible;
speakers can be mistaken in speech or judgements about their own
language and brought to recognise this. Mistakes can be dues to the fact
that the language faculty is just one component of the mind that interacts
with many others that are involved in the production of behaviour.
Computational models provide a thoroughly perspicuous account of what
it is for a physical system to perform some of the operations described,
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they provide a respectable scientific theory of those aspects of cognition.
What these cognitive theories do share with psychologism is the claim
that products depend on processes, not just for their coming into being,
but for the characterisation of what they produce. The syntactic facts about
an utterance depend on how it was produced and arrived at. If an
utterance is produced by a speaker who lacks the psychological
organisation of a human language user, and cannot represent the
structure to himself in the correct way, then he will not have produced or
recognised a sentence of our language. On behavioural grounds alone we
can be mistaken about who is a language user and who isn't, as the Turing
Test for computer simulations show. To suppose that there could be a
device or a creature who had some other way of producing speech
behaviour which, for a sufficiently large range of cases, was not
differentiable from humans' use on behavioural grounds is not to say that
it is indistinguishable or identical to us in respect of knowledge of
language. We are simply wrong about what we read-into its behaviour,
imbuing it with a syntactic gloss it does not deserve. When two systems,
or speakers are behaviourally indiscriminable this does not entail that
they are cognitively indiscriminable. With a computational parser we can
strip it down and see whether it is actually drawing upon the structures of
our grammar. The same is not true in the case of a human being, or
human like creature, but we have the sources of evidence mentioned
above. If the claim is that there could be one of us that operates as we do
but doesn't conform to our internal structuring (the cognitive structure
described by the theory) then we are owed an account of how this remote
logical possibility could be properly imagined. How else could the speaker
do this? Could order really arise out of chaos? Surely there has to be some
order at the sub-bedrock level that explains the simulator's ability to go on
producing and responding to speech as we do; and we already have an
account of what this organisation looks like. To consider this possibility as
a serious challenge we are owed some detailed account of it. Inner
processes stand in need of outward criteria.
Objecting to Chomsky, Dummett says:
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The difficulty is that we have no idea what structure and character
knowledge, conceived as an an internal state, may have, apart from
the structure of what is known. (Dummett 1981b, p6)
But that is precisely what Chomsky is giving when he speaks of
providing a characterisation of the speaker's internalised grammar at
some level of abstraction from physical mechanism. This is what he calls
the speaker's I-language: "some element of the mind of the person who
knows the language, acquired by the learner and used by the speaker
hearer" (Chomsky 1986, p22) The term "knowledge of language" refers to
a speaker's state of having an I-language. According to Chomsky, there is
no good use for the notion of an E-language, in the sense of "external" or
"extensional" language. What we are interested in are speakers' I-
languages. Although this is an idiolectic notion, it does not involve
overtones of a private language. It is investigable by others and perhaps its
internal structures may be better known to the linguist than to the user.
Nor need there be any fear that the contents of our thoughts and meaning
will be seen to be constituted by materials internal to these cognitive
mechanisms. The issue of internalism and externalism is largely
orthogonal to the ones I am discussing here. We are simply giving an
account of part of what is involved in a speaker's giving some linguistic
significance to a heard expression in a particular situation; and for this we
need to look at "components of the mind/brain that carry out the process
of interpretation, abstracting from the complexities of the world of
experience" (Chomsky 1989, p9). This is not to suggest that other features
of his world, or his experience, do not enter into his understanding of an
expression. We are simply studying the grammatical part of this process. It
is also important to note here that these are accounts of facets of
individual idiolects that generalise across individuals and so in that sense
belong to the field of Individual Psychology (as explained above). These
common features of speakers belong to the theory of the genetically pre-
coded Universal Grammar:
Universal grammar specifies the class of systems that a person
would acquire in an ideal homogeneous speech community. We
may think of it as a function that maps experience in such a
community into a state of the language faculty. (Chomsky 1989, p9)
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The formal properties of a speaker's I-language, which include the
structural descriptions assigned to sentences and expressions are
characterised by a linguistic theory. Chomsky has shown (as we saw
above) how "general and invariant principles of the language faculty
interact, sometimes in intricate ways, to determine the form and meaning
of expressions." (Ibid., pl2) Chomsky's formal theory of grammar is an
elaborate account of the structure of what is known, postulating different
fundamental levels of representation at D-structure, S-structure and LF.
But he is also telling us what the knowledge formally described in terms
of these rich and elaborate arrays of structure must consist in:
Each of these levels stand at an interface of the computational
system and some other system of the mind/brain. (Ibid., pl3)
each structural description that a grammar (in either sense) assigns to an
sentence and its expressions
...consists of a representation at each of these three interface levels,
(loc. cit.)
and
Each element of these representations must be licensed by an
appropriate relation to the external system at the interface.(loc cit)
from which Chomsky concludes that:
...the formal and semantic properties of linguistic expressions and a
network of relations among them are substantially determined by
the human language faculty itself, (loc. cit.)
If we add "substantially but not entirely" this should assuage
Dummett's worries. Of course the will still be a need for further empirical
research to fill out the details of how the brain embodies a linguistic
processor with these properties. But that is the task for a computational
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psychologist and neurophysiologist to work out between Marr levels 2
and 3 on Marr's hierarchy of levels. Levels 2 and 3 are the level of the
algorithm and representations involved in the computation and the
hardware realisation of these, respectively. On the hierarchy, these details
are worked out once we have some level 1 theory of the logic of the
computation being performed. So a level 1 theory of language could be an
account of what the competent speaker can do, what judgements he can
make, and so forth.
So far I see no reason why Dummett should object to this account on
anti-psychologistic grounds. The position I want to make room for here
and which I see as quite compatible with much else in Dummett is nicely
encapsulated by Tyler Burge when he says:
Languages depend on the experiences, usage, and psychological
structures of individuals. (Burge 1989, pl76)
In asking what a speaker knows when he knows how to speak a
language and what his having that knowledge consists in, I see no reason
to think that Dummett can provide a satisfactory answer by appeal to
anything less wide-ranging.
What other objections does Dummett have? We may recall his worry
that a good deal of conscious knowledge is required for knowledge of
language. Indeed it is, as Chomsky would agree, since it is our conscious
knowledge "that expression such-and-such means so-and-so, or consists of
certain words and phrases but not others" (Chomsky ibid., p5) that he is
trying to explain. The question is how much of our syntax is 'visible' at
the conscious level?
Dummett has pointed out that from the fact that ordinary speakers
typically cannot formalise what they know about language, it is wrong to
conclude that their knowledge must be unconscious. The best we could
say is that it is non-verbal. So perhaps Dummett would advocate
conscious but non-verbalisable knowledge of syntax. This
"unverbalisable" condition seems very strong because surely the theorist
can verbalise his knowledge. But the reply might be that he could not
verbalise his unreflective knowledge because this consists in his having
certain phenomenological experiences of an auditory or visual kind; and
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he could only represent this obliquely and theoretically, but could not
express it. This suggests that the character of these experiences is non-
conceptual, and in fact this would be confirmed by Dummett's language-
first approach to our possession of concepts. For if it was conceptual the
speaker must be able to express those concepts linguistically. So if it is
unverbalisable information then it is non-conceptual. What is it like have
such an experience of syntax? I think the best we could do is to say that it
would occur when we had experiences of hearing a sentence uttered as
structured as opposed to knowing that it was structured. We can think of
this non-conceptual experience as analogous to "hearing a sound as from
the left". These experiences of the ordinary person would not require him
to conceptualise the structure (or the direction of the sound). But what we
need to know is whether the experience of hearing a sentence as
structured amounts to grasp of structure? But can we go that far without
this entailing the subject's being able to conceptualise the structure heard?
Perhaps all that can be claimed here is that he has a structured experience
of grasping something linguistic. But is an acoustically structured grasping
of a sentence a grasp of its structure? It is just not clear how structure in
the perception of speech makes available to the subject of the perception a
detachable syntactic property of the sentence itself; a structure to be found
in other bits of speech and which guides linguistic production.
I cannot explore this any further, but the suspicion is that even if a
clear notion of 'hearing a sentence as structured' can be made out, it does
not seem to give us enough sight of the syntax. For instance, traces are not
phenomenologically accessible (heard), nor is the relation of c-command,
nor is the tighter syntactic configuration of government, and yet these
notions all play a key part in securing generalisations in Chomsky's
highly explanatory paradigm. What is Dummett to say about them? Flow
much syntax can he reserve for unverbalisable conscious thought? Not
enough, one suspects, to explain all our conscious and conceptualised
intuitions about the data; nor enough to substantiate the incontestable
psychological reality constituent structure has for speakers. This last claim
can be confirmed by eliciting speaker's intuitions about the positions
where they can interpolate parenthetical items like "I think" in whole
sentences. It turns out that they can only insert it at major constituent
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boundaries. This conscious reflection experiment reinforces the argument
for unconscious recognition of constituent segments in acoustic
perception where subjects are asked to say at what point in a sentence they
are listening to they hear clicks occurring on the tape. Mostly all subjects
tend to re-locate the clicks they hear to the constituent boundaries in a
sentence. (Fodor and Bever 1965).
Since it would be hard for Dummett to say how much syntax is
available phenomenologically, we might ask another question; namely,
how much syntactic structure does Dummett think we need in theorising
about language?
We saw above how knowledge of basic grammatical categories, like
when a word is a noun, matters to Dummett, along with information
about their syntactic compounding. But this information depends on
higher-order principles concerning the relations between those categories.
Already a substantial body of knowledge in involved and it is far from
obvious that Dummett can preserve it all at the (personal) level of
experiential states with unverbalised contents. Surely he must concede
that some of it belongs at the sub-personal level? However, he is reluctant
to do so, and this is certainly not what he means by "implicit knowledge".
He would not consider implicit knowledge of syntax to be a matter of sub-
personal psychological states so much as a theoretical description of
certain complex abilities of speakers manifested in their observable use of
the language. If their abilities fit the requirements and shape of the theory
then we may describe those abilities as constituting implicit knowledge of
the information the theory describes. But not every externally imposed
description of these abilities represents them correctly. So what
restrictions can we put on them? One restriction might be that our
descriptions should not stray too far from observable behaviour, but in
the case of syntax we see two good reasons why they should. The first is
the innateness claim and involves the poverty of the stimulus argument.
There is just not enough in the observable behaviour of speakers to
uniquely determine a choice of one correct grammar for their language.
But if we allow the evidence to range beyond their behaviour, to
comparisons across languages, to psycholinguistic data, to intuitions we
can construct theories that are descriptively and explanatorily adequate.
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But these descriptions are not recoverable from observation of the data
available to the child, and are vastly more complex than anything the
child could discover by making successive inductive steps. The best
explanation for the child's acquisition of language is that he already
possesses certain information which he automatically brings to bear on
the data. The data he is exposed to are said to trigger the growth of his
linguistic competence. If we specify some initial principles we can tell an
empirically well-motivated story about the acquisition of a language,
which requires the learning of a vocabulary and the setting of parameters
in situ. It is this innate structuring in which a person's 'knowledge' of the
principles of universal grammar consists. The second reason for diverging
from behaviour is that we cannot capture generalisations without
resorting to underlying levels of syntactic organisation which could not be
read-off that behaviour.
What Dummett needs to embrace is the idea that both personal and
sub-personal level states feature in explanations of the properties of
linguistic expressions and what the mature language users' knowledge of
syntax consists in. These appeals to sub-personal states in partial
explanations of our linguistic abilities are quite compatible with
Dummett's outlook, for mental representations of things like traces
although unobservable entities are 'possible causes of change' in a
speaker's behaviour and so therefore legitimate posits, (cf. Dummett 1973,
p490-l)
I suspect that the only thing that prevents Dummett from taking this
step in the case of syntax is his prevailing view of language as a skill
which conflicts with Chomsky's view of language as an internal structure.
If we call the complex skill of using and understanding a language, a
speaker's language mastery, and we call his knowledge of language his
linguistic competence, then the dispute between Dummett and Chomsky
is a matter of whether linguistic competence consists in language mastery,
or whether linguistic competence consists, in part, in the speakers
possession of sub-personal and personal level states that are causally
responsible for his language mastery. If Dummett thinks that a theory of
linguistic competence is just a "systematisation of facts open to view"
(Dummett 1981, p6) then the case of syntax proves him wrong.
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His other worry will be about manifestation. Dummett's allegiance to
Wittgenstein commits him to the Publicity Principle which we can
formulate like this:
All that can be communicated is all that we can be known to mean;
and all that we can be known to mean is all that we can mean.
This principle does not have to be cast without reference to our means
of knowing and the cognitive embodiment of syntactic information. But
Dummett thinks that what knowledge of language consists in either is, or
coincides with, what manifests that knowledge in observable use.
If these concepts of syntax are not manifested in our use then what
makes us think they apply to cognitive structures we have in our heads?
There are two possible responses here. Either they are manifested to one
who has the relevant cognitive equipment (that of human language user):
that is there is no recognising that someone is saying that sentence
without sub-personal reception of the correct structural description for
that surface string conceived as the utterance of a sentence of our
language; or the other story we could tell would simply broaden the
notion of manifestation to possession conditions. This is quite compatible
with Dummett's requirements that we should be prepared to say what a
speaker's having knowledge of his language consists in; that it should be a
full-blooded account; and that whatever it does consist in the fact of
someone's having that knowledge is epistemically confirmable. This can
be achieved with the one important alteration that our being able to
recognise the facts about someone's having knowledge of his language
just by observing his use of it would not be due to what was observable on
the surface of his behaviour (and thus being duped by Turing-Test worthy
AI programs that simulate natural language conversations), it would be
due, in part, to our having the internal configurations - facts discovered
and described by the theorist - that enable us to put a construal (possibly
mistakenly) on another creature's speech. Of course, if we began to doubt
that the other was making sense in the way we do there would be ways to
investigate this further, as we can see in the case of language pathologies.
Facts about linguistic competence lie deep as well as on the surface, and it
is in virtue of satisfying these facts that someone is able to do what
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constitutes his having mastery of the language. The proper construction
we are able to put on an utterance we hear in our language depends not
just on what falls within our cognitive environments but also on the
character of those cognitive environments: it is this which differentiates
us from the non-language user. The notion of a cognitive environment
will include information to which the speaker's cognitive system is
sensitive as well as what is phenomenologically salient. The first will be
partly responsible for the presence and character of the second.
Dummett's reluctance to acknowledge any underlying levels as
entering into explanations of language mastery has a great deal to do with
his conviction that meaning is use. If one see things in that way where
else could meaning (and grasp of meaning) reside than in (grasp of) a
pattern of observable use? Dummett drives not only meaning, but also
knowledge of meaning into the public domain of observable use. And
therefore a theory of meaning which serves as a theory of our knowledge
of meaning is entitled, he believes, to focus on aspects of our use of the
language and ignore substantive details about our cognitive states:
A theory of meaning of this kind is not intended as a
psychological hypothesis. Its function is to present an analysis of the
complex skill which constitutes mastery of a language, to display, in
terms of what he may be said to know, just what it is that someone
who possesses that mastery is able to do; it is not concerned to
describe any inner psychological mechanisms which may account
for his having those abilities. (Dummett 1976, p70)
There is something right in the thought that meaning should be
revealed in behaviour, for where else could it be revealed if it is to be
recoverable from observing people's ways of behaving? This is all that
they can show us. But what matters here is what gloss the linguistically
competent speaker can put on that behaviour. I am reluctant to conclude
with Dummett that the knowing minds who do the observing, and who
transmit and receive linguistic messages, have themselves to be flattened
out onto that observable use. How does the behaving subject know of the
significance of its own and other's behaviour? By interpretation? This
does not seem a very rewarding answer. Instead I suggest that we look
closely and in detail at the mind that inquires after other people's
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meanings. We can only recover from behaviour what others reveal in it if
we are sufficiently equipped as language users to recover it. For that
reason a substantive account of our linguistic competence should look at
the antecedent facts about our ability to retrieve syntactic and semantic
information from, and embody it, in linguistic behaviour. Meaning can be
revealed in use, but those uses are behavioural manifestations of
cognitive capacities and can only be fully appreciated as such by those with
sufficiently similar capacities. Meaning is still epistemically available in
observable behaviour. But it is the cognitive characteristics of the observer
that enable him to know it.
However, Dummett supposes that the facts about our linguistic
competence, not merely our language mastery, are available on the
surface of our behaviour. It is this view of meaning and knowledge as
fully present in use that gives rise to the following suprisingly
Wittgensteinian claim:
If a Martian could learn to speak a human language, or a robot be
devised to behave in just the ways that are essential to a language-
speaker, an implicit knowledge of the correct theory of meaning for the
language could be attributed to the Martian or the robot with as much
right as to a human speaker, even though their internal mechanisms
were entirely different. (Ibid.)
Dummett needs to make clear what is meant here by internal
mechanisms, for at one level, namely the physical, this is true. However,
it is highly improbable that a sufficiently adequate syntactic description of
the use of a language like English could be given without explicit
commitments to the internal structured states of its speakers. The claim
Dummett is making is that if any two speakers are sufficiently similar in
their behavioural properties then they count as speakers of the same
language. We have seen reason to think this is false in the case of the
syntactic properties of their language. So what we need is to define an
equivalence relation on "internal mechanisms" in terms of which we can
define preconditions for a speaker speaking a language which satisfies that
syntactic description. In this way we should be able to say which
differences in internal mechanisms were irrelevant to one's linguistic
abilities and which ones were essential. The relation we want here is
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between a grammar and a speaker, and the one I have in mind would be
this: for a grammar G and a speaker S, if S speaks a language described by
G then there is a causal systematicity in the cognitive processes of
comprehension and production in S with respect to the patterns of inputs
and outputs described by G. Two speakers could qualify as speaking the
same language only if they their cognitive processes are causally
systematic with respect to the patterns laid down in G for the structures of
sentences. This is an internal constraint on the cognitive architectures of
speakers and not merely a behavioural requirement. It does not commit
one to the claim that the internal mechanisms have to involve states that
explicitly represent the principles of grammar, but it does insist that if
those principles are to be followed by computational mechanisms that
produce the correct linguistic inputs and outputs they will have to
involve syntactically structured inputs and outputs for those processes to
engage with.
Of course things will be a little trickier than that since no two speakers
will share exactly the same grammars; the grammars of idiolects shows
marked variations. But the principle is clear enough. To determine the I-
languages of individual speakers is a matter of hypothesising the pattern
with respect to which their language faculty is causally systematic. This
will probably be causal systematicity with respect to the patterns that relate
utterances and the individual speaker's judgements. The syntactic
structuring these generalisations would require in the inputs and outputs
would have to refer to sentences' S-structures, at which information
about empty categories and projected lexical properties are represented.
There should be enough overlap of idiolects amongst a community of
speakers to abstract general properties of the grammars that describe their
individual I-languages to find out what speakers of that public language
need to know, and what states they have to be in to be described as
speakers of that language. Notice, incidentally that Chomsky thinks that
very little empirical weight attaches to the notion of a shared language (an
E-language) but he comes to this conclusion for very different reasons
from those that lead Davidson to abandon talk of languages.
Now we have an answer to Quine-Lewis type worries about how we
tell whether a community (or its members) speak a language for which G
303
Chapter Eight
or G' is the grammar. The answer can be given in term of the equivalence
relation between grammars and speaker's states. But this is not a matter of
behavioural differences, it is a matter of internal cognitive structuring.
I see no reason why Dummett cannot take this point and accept a
corresponding revision to the notion of linguistic competence. Of course,
the result will mean that the "cosily collaborative" picture that Wright
suggests will be less cosy than Wright thinks. An account of what
knowledge of language a speaker has will involve empirical research at
the theory construction stage. But it is none the worse for that. It would be
the right move to make here in the face of what a full-blooded account of
our grasp of syntactic structure commits us to.
What of syntax and interpretation theory; can the Davidsonian expect
to be so easily comforted? I think that the answer must be no and that the
interpretation theorist has every reason to be discomfited by the fact that
his best total theory of a speaker's behaviour cannot be reconciled with
what we know empirically about our grasp of syntactic structure. Let us
look at how this incompatibility emerges?
On Davidson's picture, what every speaker knows is what every
interpreter knows, and what every interpreter knows can be stated
explicitly in interpretation theory. So any part of what the speaker grasps
must be accounted for at the most explicit theoretical level. But what
resources can the interpretation theorist call upon? We have a pretty good
idea by now: the raw behavioural data as physically described, the a priori
normative principles of interpretation, and the two specific constraints on
truth theory: systematicity and the propositional attitude constraint. A
theory of language constructed on this basis can be seen as:
....warranting systematic imposition of interpreting descriptions on
the range of potential behaviour, which constitute speech in the
language, thought of as describable, in advance of receiving the
interpreting descriptions, only as emission of noise. (McDowell
1977, pl47)
But the concepts available to the interpreter, in constructing his
interpreting descriptions, must be the "everyday linguistic and semantic
concepts" that are "part of an intuitive theory for organising more
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primitive data", according to Davidson. (T&I, pl43). We have seen
enough now, I think, to know that this course is hopeless: the concepts of
S-structure, empty categories, c-command and so on are not everyday and
intuitive concepts. What is more, there is every reason to think that to
describe patterns of behaviour as complex as a natural language demands
that we resort to something with as least as much expressive power as
Chomsky's Government /Binding theory. Even if one does not subscribe
to this theory, the only alternative paradigms that approximate to meeting
the descriptive adequacy conditions for natural languages, namely, Lexical
Functional Grammar and Generalised Phrase Structure grammar, both
employ the notion of traces and other empty categories. Structure-
dependency is an absolute property of language and to capture this we
need to resort to means of description that go beyond "the relevantly
similar sound-patterns of the speaker". Phonetic properties and surface
structure are misleading as to interpretation, and the only way round this
is to apply to behaviour concepts that go far beyond the "everyday" and
"intuitive".
The trouble is that Davidson considers two realms about which we can
make constitutive claims: the mental and the physical. When we offer
descriptions about one or another of these domains he speaks of us
having to stand ready to adjust our concepts to the constitutive principles
of the physical in the one case and the constitutive principles of the
mental in the other. But what he cannot tell us is where we should place
the concepts that feature in the constitutive claims of linguistic theory.
Claims about knowledge of syntax are neither matters of reasons nor
causes. He only speaks in a vague way about a speaker's linguistic abilities;
but he is, at least, forthright about the options on offer here:
Described psychologically, a speaker's linguistic ability is a complex
disposition. Described physically, it is not a disposition, but an actual
state, a mechanism. (T&I, p255-6)
Davidson is deliberately blind to any level of description between
these. But we might say he simply gets the first one wrong. Being blind to
the level(s) of cognitive organisation, he misconceives the internal
mechanism as physical and on that basis concludes that empirical
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investigation could turn up no "law-like correlation between the
workings of the mechanism and speech". Perhaps this is true, but when
we turn to cognitive mechanisms, which can be described and examined
at a level that prescinds from their variable realisations in speaker's
physical states, we find increasing evidence of some such law-like
correlation. Unable to recognise this level, Davidson rightly shuns the
search for "the physical correlates of meaning" but now must hope to find
everything he needs to describe language on the surface of behaviour seen
through the eyes of the interpretation theorist. But as we have already
discovered, the theory of syntax is not a theory of behaviour. It is a theory
of the internal workings of the mind, at some level of cognitive
organisation remote from the ordinarily intentional level, and at some
remove from the details of physical implementation.
If the concepts of formal syntax characterise part of our knowledge of
language and Davidson cannot admit these notions as embodied in the
substantial cognitive states of speakers, then he is forced to leave these
notions out of his claims for language and our knowledge of it. The result
of this is disastrous. He claims that radical interpretation begins at home,
and that we can find out whether someone is speaking our language only
by interpreting them; where "interpretation" is used here in the sense of
the encompassing project. Davidson thinks this shows why "an empirical
theory of meaning does not stand alone" and why the linguistic
assignments we make must be squared with a theory of the speaker's
beliefs, and why change in the meanings we ascribe to him, must lead to
revisions in our attributions of belief. Now given the total evidence
available Davidson is forced to admit to this:
It is not strange that we can take the same person to be speaking
different languages, provided we can make compensatory
adjustments in the other attitudes we attribute to him. (T&I, p239)
Unlike the attributionist's position, the cognitive theorist of language
has got substantive and detailed proposals about the language a person
actually speaks. The case for syntax will show Davidson that there are less
degrees of freedom than he thinks. Noise emissions are correctly re-
described as linguistic actions not just by reference to a speaker's
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propositiorial attitudes but also by reference to the syntax of his language.
But with just an a priori theory of beliefs, desires and meaning, given
empirical application by its imposition on physical behaviour, Davidson
cannot accommodate this very important fact: Davidson's minimalist
project has simply nothing more to offer.
The only alternatives to minimalism for the attributionist are
instrumentalism and modesty. As I have said, instrumentalism can tell
us nothing of how these important generalisations are sustained in so
many cases, and cannot extend to new cases when we describe the
phenomena at that lower level. If the causal account of our speech and
understanding must draw upon the syntactic structures I have
mentioned, and must explain not only what is produced but why certain
options in linguistic behaviour are ruled-out or absent, then it cannot
avoid resorting to the rich descriptions of cognitive structures and
mechanisms that the Chomskian alludes to. This is an empirical matter.
McDowell, who has provided a stout defense of modesty in many
places, would have to admit that the concepts appealed to in the structural
descriptions given in GB cannot be presupposed as everyday concepts
antecedently available to the ordinary language user; nor do they have to
be antecedently grasped by anyone who can understand the theory. GB is a
full-blooded theory of syntax which provides one with explanation of the
concepts involved! But it would be hasty on this basis to conclude that
McDowell falls foul of the same meagre resources objection as Davidson.
For there are at least two more ideas that McDowell brings to his
discussion of language understanding. One has to do with the claim that
the ability to comprehend heard speech is an information processing
capacity, the other has to do with the distinctive phenomenology of
language understanding conceived as a kind of direct perception. Let us
look at both of these.
Despite declaring a preference for the resources of ordinary intentional
psychology nearly all of the philosophers under discussion here admit the
existence of an actual mechanism in the speaker that carries out the task
of processing and producing speech; perhaps Wittgenstein is the only
exception. In describing such a mechanism in terms of an information
processing capacity it gives rise to, McDowell shows more sensitivity to
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how things stand with the speaker than is shown by Davidson in his
reference to purely physical mechanisms. We saw that with only rational
psychology or physics to turn to, Davidson has difficulty accommodating
syntax. And yet, for all his talk of understanding as an information
processing task, McDowell faces similar problems. The facts about syntax
will have to be isolated either by the causal explanatory story or found in
the rational explanations of linguistic behaviour. Whatever takes place in
our linguistic information processors they can be described in only one of
these two very distinct ways. The input to output transitions are re-
described at the higher level in terms of an interpretation theory. So
either the syntactic concepts are intentional concepts within the grasp of
the interpreter already, or else it has to be shown that they are just
elementary rearrangements of the physical facts, phenomena that arise as
a matter of the way the world works. The trouble is that if syntax is
relegated to this lowest level of causal interactions then it becomes hard to
explain the information contained in the mental representations of S-
structures, not every part of which is a physical property of perceptible
sound-patterns. Also, it becomes hard to explain how these facts about
physical structuring give rise to the phenomenological facts about
syntactic structure - hearing a sentence as structured, or showing the
relevant sensitivity to the insertion of lexical material, or (mis-)perceiving
the locations of clicks - which surface in a speaker's experience. The
thought would have to be, that somehow, or other, these early processing
mechanisms operate to put us in a state of awareness in which our
rational activities can begin to get to work on aspects of the observable
behaviour of others, presenting it as being organised in a distinctively
linguistic way.
But this will not do. In the official story, the two types of explanation
are kept distinct: there is no psycho-physics of speech processing. Either we
must consider the information processing story in the hearer without
benefit or illumination from the intentional notions; or else we must stay
within the domain of interpretation theory that re-describes these lower
level facts by imposing higher level concepts on them. And here is the
rub. Interpretation theory by itself is supposed to effect the transition
between the lower and the higher levels; it alone can justify our
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imposition of semantic and psychological concepts on behaviour,
physicalistically conceived. In interpretation theory any evidence for
making intentional descriptions must itself be described in such a way as
to render it part of the constitutive claims about meaning or mental state
ascription. Facts about information processing seem quite irrelevant.
So what can the appeal to information processing show, and what
relation is there between the processing capacity and the high level
intentional theory? As we saw above, McDowell envisages something like
the following. Subjects who are party to a linguistic act of utterance
receive certain low-level information, impinging on their perceptual
apparatus, such that the information is shared across their perceptual
fields, or overlapping cognitive environments (ie. what is cognitively as
well as phenomenologically salient): certain further information arises for
those of them who understand the spoken language. We need a theory of
language which will explain how that noise is comprehended by native
speakers.
McDowell says of this:
Such a theory, then, would have the following deductive power:
given a suitable formulation of the information made available to
both the possessor and the non-possessor of the state of
understanding on any of the relevant potential occasions, it would
permit derivation of the information which the possessor of the
state would be distinguished by having. The ability to comprehend
heard speech is an information-processing capacity, and the theory
would describe it by articulating in detail the relation, which
defines the capacity, between input information and output
information. (McDowell 1977, pl47)
This is on the right lines and presciently anticipates Marr's hierarchy
of levels. On McDowell's reading of the situation level 1 theories would
be explanatory prior to, and one-way independent of, theories at level 2.
So this provides another example of the "cosily collaborative" picture of
Wright.
But given that this is a level 1 theory of what is actually achieved by
speakers' linguistic processing, we need good reasons at level 2 to believe
that they are indeed computing the function identified at level 1. Level 2
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psychological theories describe a range of algorithms for computing the
function specified at level 1. What is needed from McDowell is an
independently convincing reason to think that speakers are processing the
structured contents he would be inclined to ascribe to them. But what
would show this? When McDowell speaks of "articulating in detail the
relation, which defines the capacity" he is not talking about a
psychological explanation in terms of the computational mechanisms in
speakers. He is talking about how we should specify the function-in-
extension that defines a set of ordered input-output pairs. The
"articulation" McDowell has in mind involves specifying the logic of this
relation in terms of a structure-imposing deductive theory. Why should
we expect these details of structure to belongs at level 1, how are these
claims for the structure of an actual speaker's knowledge to be
substantiated, or better, justified at that level . In addition, we also need to
know whether syntax belongs at level 1 too, or if McDowell intends to
relegate it to the details of the sub-personal processing story. If it is the
former, we need some level 1 justification for the concepts found there,
and some way to integrate them with the normatively governed notions
of belief, desire and intention. If it is the latter, McDowell seems to believe
that this can be no more that a story about brute causal mechanisms. But if
that is so, the suspicion will be that the interpretation theory whose task it
is to conduct the transitions between the levels of mere noise and
meaningful speech will be deprived of the concepts of syntax it needs to
complete the theoretically insightful re-descriptions of a speaker's
behaviour. Neither of these possibilities look very promising.
I suspect that it becomes very important to know which bits of sound
emission the information processing capacity goes to work on; ie. which
of the ambient sounds do we process as speech sounds, by successfully
returning a linguistically useful identification as output for an acoustic
signal as input. For if mastery is information processing, it is processing
dedicated to a proprietary domain of inputs. But since McDowell has
made it the task of interpretation theory to negotiate every step of the
transition between levels; that theory alone must identify the sounds it
includes in the range of behaviours which it tries to make sense of. But
not every bit of behaviour produced verbally can count as speech. So the
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interpretation theorist need not strive to incorporate all of a speaker's
mouthings in a rational and consistent pattern of his meanings and
attitudes. Certainly the interpreter needs to know which speech
behaviours are intentional acts. But before this he needs to know which
behaviours count as speech. But without empirical investigation of the
inputs and outputs it seems highly problematic to suppose that
interpretation theory should state in advance what it is likely to be able to
treat as data for a linguistic theory. But perhaps this point is only telling
on the reading of the project of radical interpretation which regards it as
having a heuristic value, in showing us how the facts of meaning can be
grounded in (supervene upon) the facts about behaviour. On this reading,
it shows us no such thing unless it tells us how it selects its inputs for
conceptual incorporation.
This is an important issue for McDowell, for if there is such a thing as
a speaker's being in accord with, or going against, a rule on any occasion
in his use of his own language, then we cannot simply try to make any
way of going on consistent with our erstwhile interpretation of him. But
what are the constraints here? If there is something about a speaker using
a language which makes matters of use correct or incorrect, then one
should not attempt to revise one's interpretation in the case of all
variations and departures from it. I would want to claim that our mastery
of syntax provides one type of condition on what it is to accord with or
depart from the use of one's own language. To depart radically from this
aspect of one's own language is to cease to be causally systematic with
respect to the syntactic patterns described in the input-output pairings of
utterances and grammatical judgements. This amounts to loss of grasp of
their structure and grammatical relations. Aphasia patients may be
diagnosed in just this way. But it is not obvious how an interpreter is to
explain this strand of underpining in linguistic competence.
If the concepts of syntax are among those which guide the interpreter
in finding interpretations of speakers, then we have to be told how the
interpreter's understands those concepts. Modesty is not enough for
unlike the case where meanings can be assumed to be already in the grasp
of the language user being described, there are no rational explanatory
grounds for attributing the concepts of theoretical syntax to ordinary
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thinkers. Unlike McDowell's claim for manifestation of meanings, the
ordinary speaker cannot be said to grasp the configuration of c-command
as a result of knowing that someone is asserting a sentence exhibiting that
configuration. No such grounds for ordinary intentional attribution exist
in the case of the ordinary interpreter.
Does this mean the theorist must be non-modest about these notions;
ie. that he must introduce them by means of a theory that explains them
rather than supposing that they were familiar everyday notions for
ordinary speakers? McDowell certainly wants to resist this if he can. There
is just one avenue left open to him: his account of the epistemology of
understanding as a form of perceptual knowledge. With this direct
perceptual account of understanding we can avoid the detour through the
interpretation theory and ask what those perceptual states involve.
Do we bring syntax to what we read and hear? Perhaps modesty in this
context means that we have to impose the syntax of our own language on
the languages of those we interpret, just as Davidson thinks we read
quantificational logic into the meanings of their sentences. Perhaps this is
what David Wiggins means when he talks of seeing meaning through
syntax. Speaking about the misleading properties of surface structure, he
says:
Surely the surface can only mislead those who misperceive (or
misread) it. How much you can see in a place depends on what you
know. If we take this thought seriously, then we may even find ways
to re-direct Davidson's good question 'What are these familiar words
doing?' and train it upon what is actually visible in language (visible
to a knowing eye, that is.) (Wiggins 1986, p303)
With all of this I entirely agree. But Wiggins uses this to suggest that
deep structure need no longer be seen "as the province of an utterly
mysterious sort of speaker's knowledge" What I fail to see is how these
tantalising remarks about what can be seen on the surface by a properly
equipped speaker can lead Wiggins to the conclusion that "we shall have
no need for the rudimentary ideas of 'grammar' and 'surface structure'
that sustain our present distinction between the surface and the depths"
(Ibid, p304). On the contrary, we shall have need for the idea that the
resultant insight into the surface of speech demands a fusion of all of the
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notions that take place at different processing stages and which jointly and
severally play a crucial part in sustaining the speaker's 'vision'.
Neither Wiggins nor McDowell give us a way of characterising what is
perceived vis-a-vis syntax. But we know that McDowell has always
insisted upon there being a distinctive phenomenology of understanding:
there is something it is like to perceive another as utterring a speech act
with such and such a force and such and such a meaning. We need to
know whether these perceptions include hearing the sentence as
structured. McDowell's answer to this question is very important, for
unlike Dummett, he believes that the whole of a subject's experience
must be conceptualised by the subject: there are no non-conceptual
experiences. (Personal communication. Also see Strawson 1966, p272-3).
And what a subject knows in this conceptual sense must be something
that can be ascribed to him by an interpreter and so, a fortiori, it must be
something that can be recorded in an interpretation theory. But we have
already seen the hopelessness of any modest construal of the syntactic
concepts we need to make use of at that level. So it looks as though
McDowell owes us an account of what we know of syntax let alone what
our knowledge of it consists in.
Certainly, interpretation theory cannot explain the concepts of syntax
in terms of the ordinary notions drawn from mental life, so it looks as if
those concepts are ripe for explanatory relegation. At one point McDowell
acknowledges that to have the capacity whose input-output relation is
described by the theory, one does not have to know any such theory, at
least not in any ordinary sense of "know" (McDowell 1977, pl47). This is
his cue to look elsewhere, though because of his views of the mental he is
forbidden from taking it. It is not an ordinary sense of "know" it is a
special sense of know for which we need a 'special science', like
individual computational psychology. We do not really 'know' the
theory but we do have some way of encoding this information. The
theory describes certainly crucially relevant states that participate in our
ability to produce and comprehend meaningful speech. So instead of
supposing that the theoretical representations characterise linguistic
abilities fully displayed in behaviour, we should suppose that theoretical
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representations characterise the states and mechanisms causally
responsible for the behaviour that reveals linguistic competence.
It is not strictly correct to say that we grasp the concepts of syntax; at
least not if grasp is taken to mean everyday concept mastery. And yet we
want at least to ascribe grasp of syntactic structure to speakers of the
language. How should we describe this? I think the trouble is that the
notion of grasp is a place holder for various notions that show the varying
grades of intentional involvement of the subject of experience. It may be
that the notion of grasp and what we grasp spans the personal/ sub-
personal divide. Certainly a theory of grasp of meaning will have recourse
to notions like our grasp of structure and will refine the analysis of what
constitutes grasp or possession of linguistic knowledge without heeding
the personal/sub-personal division between kinds of cognitive state. But
perhaps we need a detailed account of what this grasp depends on and
consists in. This would require what linguists call a cline from
informational reception to registration, recording, re-identification, to
representation and all the way up to knowing. What, I think, the notion
of linguistic grasp excludes is the concept of belief.
What all of this comes down to is just the problem we find with the
notion of a speaker's knowledge of language. The complexity of that
concept emerges when we try to satisfy two different requirements on it.
The first is to make sure it encompasses all the things we take to be
pertinent to a speaker' mastery of a given language, while at the same
time trying to obey philosophical standards on what counts as a genuine
state of knowledge. It seems to me that we should hold onto the idea that
there is a large and complex property of knowing a language which may
span different senses of 'know', and whose precise character it is the task
of the philosopher of cognitive science to determine. This is preferable to
simply missing the target of what we are trying to describe by insisting on
a priori stipulations on what is to count as knowledge in the case of
knowledge of language. Problems with the cherished analytical concept
arise whenever we work on the notion of knowledge of meaning, rules,
concepts or contents. Just to take one example, if grasp of the concept of an
F is thought to involve knowledge of what it is for something to be an F,
that knowledge had better not be give in purely propositional terms,
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involving either the concept itself - for that is tightly circular - or those in
terms of which we can give an analytic definition of the concept F - for
this leads to a regress. This example alone should convince us that we
need some more sophisticated tools. For this we must turn to full-blooded
cognitive theories.
Lastly, there is the cognitivist or explanatory theorist's approach to
syntax. This should be 'visible' already, but let me just draw one or two
things together. Chomsky tells us that we should take the relational
analysis of 'Jones know a language L' to be about the relation between a
speaker and his I-language. This is a complex function that enables the
speaker to interpret arbitrary expressions of the language of his
community; the sort of function that McDowell hoped to characterise by
the interpreter's theory of the information processing capacity. Chomsky
tells us:
The I-language is intensional in that it is a specific characterisation
of a function, considered in intension; it is internalised in that it is an
element of Jones' mind, namely an element abstracted under the
relational analysis [ie. Jones knows L ] of the steady state of the
language faculty. (Chomsky 1987, pl81, my parentheses)
The steady state is attained from the initial state of the language after a
period of maturation which involves learning vocabulary and setting
parameters. The theoretical linguist's account of this already involves
reference to internalised structures:
Taking a grammar as the theory of the I-language, the statements of
a grammar as statements of the theory of mind about the I-language,
hence statements about structures of the brain formulated as a certain
level of abstraction from mechanisms Statements about I-
language or the statements that Jones knows I-language gE are true or
false much in the way that statements about the chemical structure of
benzene, or about the valence of oxygen, are true or false. (Ibid.)
Chomsky has no doubt about the linking principles for the theory of
syntax; they relate the theoretical notions to cognitive properties of
individual speakers. So he is committed to giving an account of both what
we know and what our having that knowledge consists in. In my sense,
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he is providing part of a theory of our grasp of what we know when we
know how to speak a language.
Some will want to give a Marr level 1 account of the objects of
knowledge which is also an account of our grasp of what is known. But at
what level of the Marr hierarchy should we expect to find an account of
our grasp of sense? Surely a theory of the computed function-in-
extension cannot provide the right level of description of our knowledge
of it. And yet McDowell, for example, would see himself as giving a level
1 theory of sense. It is not clear how this can be a theory of the actual
knowledge of native speakers. It gives us no idea of how speakers possess
the knowledge of the formal structures in the semantic theory. To do this
it would also have to be a substantive theory of grasp. A substantive
theory of grasp is more constrained than a formal theory of what is
purportedly grasped by us. However, we should not straightforwardly
assume that a theory of grasp is a level 2 psychological theory of the actual
algorithms by which we arrive at an understanding of sentences. The case
is clearer in syntax where a distinction is made between the grammar and
the parser. People who may be said to have the same internalised
grammars may still show differences at the psychological level of their
individual algorithms for processing sentence structure. One may parse
sentence structure from left-to-right, while another works from the
middle out. Someone maybe following a top-down parsing strategy where
one is looking for certain configurations and trying to match parts of the
sentence against particular structures described by the grammar, while
another may be using a bottom-up parser, resolving larger and larger
constituents of the phrase structure described by the same grammar. Other
issues in parser design involve whether we process in parallel, by trying
all options at once when confronted with alternatives, or process in serial
with backtracking when an option fails. All of these options suggest that
while different parsing strategies are modelled by different psychological
algorithms but they can all apply to the same grammar. The grammar
does not fix the parser, hence the need for a grammar/parser distinction,
and the need for a distinction between the theoretical level at which
grammars are specified and the level at which we give psychological
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theories of the algorithms for parsing. This in turn argues for the need to
locate these notions at different levels in the speaker's cognitive system.
A theory of our grasp of syntactic structure, if it does not reside at level
1, and it needs to unite different algorithms at level 2, would have to be
located at some inter-level. This is what Christopher Peacocke has
supplied in putting forward his proposal for a Marr Level 1.5. (Peacocke
1986b) This can be thought of as an equivalence class of algorithms. Level
2 algorithms are equivalent at level 1.5 if they all draw upon the same
information represented by a level 1.5 theory. At the same time, there can
be different level 1.5 realisations of a level 1 theory; for example, the
finitely axiomatised and the listiform (theorems as axioms) versions of a
semantic theory for a finite language. Level 1.5 is the level at which to
locate theories of grasp. Anachronistically, we can say that this is what
Frege was after in his enigmatic remarks about a theory of our grasping
being neither wholly psychological nor logical. Peacocke's level 1.5 seems
to do the trick.
We can now use this notion to describe the first of two accounts of
what it would mean to say that a grammar G is psychologically real.
Peacocke puts it like this:
Take any statement q of grammar which is derivable in G from
rules Rl,....Rn; then not merely is it true that q, but the fact that q
holds for the subject's language has a corresponding explanation at
level 1.5 by some algorithm or mechanism in the subject, an
algorithm or mechanism which draws upon the information that
pi, upon the information that p2,...and on the information that pn.
(Peacocke 1989, pi 15)
This will do for the grammar of individuals but when linguists
propose principles of grammar they are offering substantive universal
claims about the mind. Peacocke has thought of this too:
...for a proposed principle of grammar to be psychologically real is
for it to give a specifically linguistic content drawn upon, or a
specifically linguistic transition-type used, in the individual's




This provides a constitutive account of what it is for a universal
grammar to be psychologically real. Only linguistic states of subjects with
these linguistic contents can play a part in claims for the psychological
reality of principles of UG.
Peacocke's criteria show how specifiable grammars can enter
psychological explanations. But before they can be empirically tested, what
is urgently needed is an account of what it is for an algorithm to "draw
upon the information given" for that notion has to be resolved before we
get a definition of the equivalence classes of empirically testable level 2
algorithms. The right notion lies somewhere between the two extremes of
having to have the principles, rules and structures explicitly represented
in the system at one end, and it merely being the case that these rules
describe the inputs and outputs of the system (ie. merely that they are true
of them). Neither of these is quite right, for the notion of the information
drawn upon cannot always be fully represented, some of the rules will be
merely part of the computational architecture of the system, transitions it
is the system's function to carry out which are not explicitly represented.
Whereas to say that some system is drawing upon certain information in
its functioning just because that information is true of it is too permissive
to count as a condition for 'mental representation'. For as James
Higginbotham points out (1986): an algorithm that computes x2-l on
input x could be said in this weak sense to draw upon the information
that x2 -1 = (x-1) (x+1), since it relies upon this being the case for it success,
without the algorithm representing this information, or transforming the
problem into that of multiplying (x-1) by (x+1). I suggest that what we
need here is a distinction between an algorithm 'relying upon
information being the case' and it 'relying upon that information for its
successful operation'. We need a substantive account of that second
notion which does not insist on all the information being explicitly
represented in the system. More needs to be said but Peacocke has
introduced an important level of computational explanation and a
promising explanatory notion. This is the notion we need if the internal
organisation of a theory of syntax and the deductive organisation of a
truth theory are to give rise to empirical hypotheses about the
psychological explanation of speakers' competence.
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The other account of psychological reality is the application of Davies'
notion of causal systematicity to the notion of our knowledge of linguistic
rules. Davies defines the latter in terms of the former and thus provides a
constitutive account of tacit knowledge. The account would go like this.
When there is a causal systematicity relative to patterns brought to light
by high-level syntactic-theoretical description of the input-output states of
a processing system then that system has tacit knowledge of the
generalised rule that describes the pattern. The inputs can be mere
emissions of noise and the output states can be recognitions of well-
formed sentences (grammaticality judgements). So, for example, when we
come across sentences with the form of our example wh-sentence:
(S) Who did Bill see?
as inputs, and we always get as output states describable as having the
same form as knowing that "who" is the displaced direct object of "see",
then, if an individual's linguistic processing system is causally systematic
with respect to the rule of wh-movement on objects, then the system
embodies tacit knowledge of the rule of wh-movement. And as we know
this does not require that wh-movement be explicitly represented in the
system; it only requires that there be states of the individual which encode
the structures the rule describes. Perhaps the claim that certain internal
states of competent speakers have a syntax is all that is meant by the
Language of Thought Hypothesis. As Fodor puts it, programs can be
inexplicit, but this does not show that everything else can be too. A parser
which embodies the rule wh-movement and which transforms D-
structures to S-structures for sentences like (S):
...can't compute without representing these structures because
representations of structures are what it computes on The
moral: programs needn't be explicitly represented, but
computational domains (roughly, data structures) have got to be. So
its computational domains, not programs, that make the argument
for the language of thought. (Fodor 1987, p75-6)
This would mean that there has to be a system of internal structures in
the agent, structures which belong to a cognitive level of description of
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the agent, which mediate linguistic inputs and outputs, which are not
conceptualised by the subject, and which somehow come to acquire
content, perhaps by means of certain complex relations between the
subject and his environment and community. In such a system, it may be,
as Davies says, that a component of the processor is responsible for our
standing knowledge of a rule such as wh-movement. (Davies
forthcoming)
Whichever notion of mental representation we chose to adopt, these
psychologically relevant accounts have the virtue of incorporating claims
about the internal cognitive organisation of the language user into claims
about the grammar the individual possesses. In addition, they show
claims about the psychological reality (or tacit knowledge) of grammars to
have empirical content. So if it is one's aim to construct a grammar for
the speakers' languages that comes closest to capturing the actual syntactic
properties of the language they actually speak, then one is embarking on a
psychologically relevant project. One is making empirical psychological
claims. Patterns of breakdown, specific lesioning of states, and so forth
could show how competence breaks down with respect to particular rules,
or particular words, thus showing that there is a common empirical
explanation underlying our understanding of a particular word or certain
constructions. To avoid irrelevancy and false claims about speakers'
knowledge of words and knowledge of semantic and syntactic structure
one should pay heed to the available empirical theories of languages and
cognition for those speakers.
Although I have suggested that grasp of structure may span the
personal/sub-personal divide, involving both what is consciously, or
phenomenologically, accessible and certain processing states we can be in,
we have to respect the distinction for philosophical purposes. Davies'
notion of tacit knowledge picks out states of a subject that differ from
ordinary propositional attitude states in several important respects.
Firstly, the contents of states of tacit knowledge are not conceptualised by
the subject in those states. Linguistic rules may provide important
shaping constraints on linguistically expressible thoughts, they
themselves are not contents of our thoughts. Another important
difference is that whereas propositional attitudes are inferentially
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integrated, tacit knowledge of the principles of grammar have their own
proprietary domains of application: the syntactic structures of sentences
and expressions. Consciousness has often been used to differentiate states
of tacit knowledge and states of belief, but consciousness is itself too
imprecise an instrument to help us much with our characterisation.
There are at least two quite different notions of the unconscious, one
involving an essential subjectivity, the other failing to incorporate any
conception of the subject's point of view. These must be kept distinct. It is
unclear whether the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual
information will do service here since it is unclear whether we should
describe the first notion of the unconscious in terms of propositional
attitudes at all. These unconscious states seem to be involved in actions;
they can share features of both belief and desire and yet lack the logical
structure of either, (cf. where wishing something is to imagine it is true.)
This suggests that there are many different kinds of cognitive state to
consider, some of which are more, and some of which are less, complex
than beliefs and desires, some of which that are both more and less
complex than beliefs and desires along different axes. Among both the
Freudian and the information-processing notions of an unconscious state
there will be some that show the structure of belief but remain
inferentially unintegrated, giving rise to no other beliefs and insulated
from the effects of changing our beliefs about the information they
contain. A proper understanding of our cognitive lives would demand a
large scale study of this variety of cognitive states and the differences
between them. What is important about this notion of cognition is that it
includes much more in the domain of the mental than the Davidsonian
philosopher of mind's restriction to the propositional attitudes. We have
seen the explanatory pressure towards the introduction of the broad
domain of cognition, and although I have offered no detailed
philosophical psychology here, there are still one of two morals to be
drawn.
One of the important things to remember when working with a
personal/sub-personal distinction is that sub-personal properties must not
be ascribed to the subject, nor should personal level properties to ascribed
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to the cognitive subsystems. McDowell confuses these quite frequently in
"The Sense and Reference of Proper Names" Consider the following:
In order to acquire an information-processing capacity with the
right input-output relation, it would suffice to know the theory;
then one could move from input information to output
information, on any of the relevant occasions by explicit deduction.
(1977, pl47)
It is not obvious that this is true. One may have reflective knowledge
of a theory of some computational task without being able to perform that
task. Presumably, a blind person could read David Marr's account of
visual processing in Braille without thereby gaining the capacity to see.
We are not required to bring to bear a theory, although somehow
unconsciously in understanding a visual scene; rather, we are required to
possess the information wrought by certain processes which apply
internally represented information to the raw input. To have structured
vision of a scene we don't have to know a theory of the states of the
visual processing system, we have to be in them.
Similarly, if the theory of language has to incorporate the details of our
cognitive grasp of structure, it might be far from clear that knowledge of
the theory conferred the capacity upon us. Though it is clear that without
having the capacity already one could not understand the theory. But that
is not to say that knowing the theory is a way of acquiring the capacity.
The upshot is that understanding the theory entails having the capacity to
understand the spoken and written language in which the theory is
expressed. But it is far from clear that knowledge of the theory suffices for,
in the sense of conferring upon the knowing subject, possession of that
capacity. Instead we should say that anyone who understood the concepts
used in the theory would already have rather than could gain the capacity.
Once again, we don't need a theory of the capacity, we need the capacity.
Another example is provided by McDowell's inability to see what is
intended in Dummett's insistence that there be a way of meaning
something which is not a matter of interpretation. McDowell thinks that
the only way Dummett can resist the interpreter's position is to suppose
that speakers have knowledge of the psychological mechanisms by which
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they arrive at an understanding of an utterance. But Dummett is
supposing that people might possess, say recognitional capacities, not that
they should know how they work. Failure to see this leads McDowell to
criticize the more explanatory accounts as if they were erroneously
providing theoretical details that a speaker/thinker had ordinarily to
know to use language and to make sense of other speaker/thinkers. But
this is ill-conceived. Speakers meaning what they do, or thinking what
they think, is not a matter of the speaker/thinkers knowing the facts of
how they do this, but it is a matter of there being certain facts true of them,
or their being in certain states. These are facts which can be objects of
theoretical knowledge for the explanatory theorist, but not for the
ordinary subject. It is just this point that McDowell misunderstands, and
which leads him to make the following misconceived criticism of
attempts to construct richer, cognitivist conceptions of what speaker's
knowledge of meaning consists in:
One can have the ability to tell that a seen object is the bearer of a
familiar name without having the slightest idea how one
recognises it. The presumed mechanism of recognition might be
neural machinery - its operations quite unknown to its possessor.
(Ibid. pl47)
The answer to this supposed criticism, whether we are considering
"neural" or cognitive mechanisms is simply, 'Of course!'
We have reached the conclusion that as far as our grasp of syntactic
structure is concerned an account of what we grasp must go beyond the
familiar concepts ordinary speakers can be presupposed to have just in
virtue of speaking a language. This has the consequence that a theory of
our knowledge of syntax must be non-modest, and we saw that a full-
blooded theory of syntactic knowledge would involve more than a theory
of patterns in our behaviour. A full-blooded theory of syntactic knowledge
is a substantive theory of the character of certain task-specific processes
and structures; it is a theory of speaker's cognitive states.
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I have now completed a part of what I take to be a much larger project:
to determine the nature of the collaboration between philosopher and
cognitive scientist in the study of language. The task here has been to
discover the extent to which empirical considerations bear on the concerns
of the theorist of meaning.
I have argued that any theory of language that serves as a theory of
speakers' knowledge of language must include a psychological theory of
the linguistic abilities of speakers. In this work, I have concentrated on the
motivation for such an account in the case of syntax. It was argued that
any descriptively adequate theory of language must include a grammar
that postulates 'empty constituents' and syntactic configurations belonging
to the underlying structure of sentences. These are phonetically unrealised
elements belonging to structures in the syntax that carry information
about grammatical relations within a sentence and they are motivated in
the theory by the gap between what an utterance, or inscription, itself
makes available, and what is necessary for determining a unique semantic
content for the sentence heard, or read. However, they are not observable
aspects of the surface of linguistic behaviour, nor are they known explicitly
by speakers of the language. I then gave an argument from best
explanation for ascribing speakers tacit knowledge of these posited
syntactic structures, offering corroborating evidence for the psychological
reality of syntactic forms with traces which showed their causal efficacy
and perceptual impact on the production and reception of speech. I
concluded that such syntactic elements are part of what is involved in
understanding which sentence has been uttered on a given occasion, and
in deciding what meaning it can be given.
The philosophical points to be drawn from this can be brought into
focus by returning to Wright's remark that it it is a platitude to say that:
if someone understands the vocabulary and syntax of a significant




Platitude is left behind when the antecedent of this conditional is
taken to describe an ulterior state of information which enables a
subject to understand the sentence. (1987, p208)
I have taken an explanatory approach to matters of understanding and
argued that we need to develop the resources of a theory of cognition both
to discover the facts about a speaker's internally represented grammar and
to determine the role they play in explaining someone's linguistic
mastery. The case I have made out, and the arguments advanced, are
principally concerned with the motivations for the explanatory approach,
and I have been able to offer only the briefest of sketches here of the
foundations of a satisfying model of psychological explanation.
The arguments motivating the explanatory approach proceeded by
highlighting the inadequacy of alternative approaches; in particular,
pointing out that without explanatory details of actual speakers' linguistic
competence they were unable to recover well-attested facts about actual
languages. The issue turns on the question Wright asks when faced with
talk of 'ulterior states'; is there any project which avoids recourse to the
notion of speakers' tacit knowledge for which a compositional theory of
their language is required? I could see just two (very different) cases to
consider: the interpretive stance, and the descriptivist stance. I assessed
each approach with respect to the nature of actual speaker's knowledge.
The former position was founded upon a particular a priori conception of
the nature of minds and their place in the world, which I referred to as
attributionism. According to this view, an account of what makes
knowledge of minds possible tells us all there is to know about the mind;
and so by reflection on the everyday nature of psychological ascriptions we
arrive at a constitutive thesis about what minds are. This renders the
mind an attributed property in the eye of the interpreter. This leads the
interpreter to say that the beliefs and meaning he attributes to other people
are products of his attempt to rationalise their behaviour. This theorist has
an answer to Wright's question which shows that there is no need on
such an account to motivate a compositional theory of meaning by
ascribing tacit knowledge of semantic theory to speakers. Instead the
semantic structure in a language is imposed on it by the exigencies of
conducting radical interpretation in a systematic way. But to accept this
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solution one would have to embrace its attributionist conception of the
mental. I gave a full account of what such a conception involves.
Minds, as Davidson conceives them, turned out to be causally inert;
and thus while Davidson may be a realist about propositional attitudes, he
is not, like Fodor, a causal realist about such states. However, the realism
about beliefs did not extend to concepts; Davidson turned out to be an
instrumentalist here. Like the words which express them, concepts are just
posits internal to the theory which have no empirical significance.
Furthermore, the only real claim to conceptual structure is based on the
structure of language, and this is the externally attributed property due to
the project of radical interpretation. Finally, there is extensive
indeterminacy in the mental due to the availability of equally adequate
alternative schemes. We can ascribe beliefs but it is unclear precisely
which beliefs we have. This position, which claims to adhere to
commonsense more closely than any envisaged scientific psychology in
the end proves highly revisionary of our ordinary views of the mental.
Caveat emptor.
I showed that although there was no way to account for the success of
radical interpretation and a speaker's susceptibility to the interpreter's
descriptions of his language and mind, no such explanation was necessary
on the attributionist picture. My worry was that this essentially third-
personal account of the mental could not accommodate the notion of
actual speakers' knowledge of language satisfactorily. And while it could
be said that this was unnecessary since the interpretation theory attributes
such knowledge, there was no satisfactory account of the interpreter's
understanding of the language of the theory. To explain this by appeal to
the possibility of being interpreted from the third-personal stance is not to
explain the actual capacities of the speaker/interpreter.
In the end, my objection to such an approach was not that it left it
unexplained and surprising that physical creatures should satisfy these
high-level intentional descriptions; quite the contrary, I argued that to
make these incontestable claims about our intentional activities certain
empirical generalisations have to be true of us already, and it is a mistake
to suppose that these can be left out of the account of what we do and say.
In this respect, it is syntax which constitutes the most serious problem for
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the Davidsonian. For if there is no notion of a speaker's knowledge of his
own language, we must suppose that syntactic information about a
language, like semantic structure, emerges from the project of radical
interpretation. I pointed out the implausibility of supposing that it could
be the radical interpreter who engaged in detailed syntactic theorising
about underlying levels of structure. For he is supposed to be engaged in a
project that begins once he has made an initial identification of the
sentences held true by the speakers he interprets. We are given no very
clear indication of how he does this, beyond his being equipped to
recognise certain linguistic forms already. However, there is enough
evidence to show that if he had to extract the sentences of the language of
the studied community, he would have to frame highly sophisticated
hypotheses about the phonological, morphological and syntactic structure
of that language; and for this he would need a medium in which to record
his conjectures. This merely presupposed an antecedent grasp of (a good
deal of) syntax, and fails to tell us anything about the ordinary speaker or
the language learner's knowledge of language. Worse still, the interpreter
is limited by two important restrictions: he can only observe the surface of
another's behaviour, his assents and dissents; and he can only use
materials minimally richer than those available to the ordinary speaker. It
is to be doubted for the reasons offered above that any such account could
succeed without embarking on an empirical inquiry that would oblige
him to provide an explanatorily adequate grammar of a speaker's
language; ie. one that postulated empty categories and called upon them in
describing the psychological operations causally responsible for linguistic
competence. This caused trouble for the radical interpreter in two ways.
Firstly, as an attributionist about minds and meanings, he believes them
to be properties externally attributed to speakers on the basis of their
behaviour; this makes the postulation of internal psychological states
deeply problematic. Secondly, even if the radical interpreter were to pick
out the causally relevant states of speakers by an external attributed
syntactic description, these ascriptions would not be specifiable by, or
answerable to, the a priori constraints of rationality; on the other hand,
they are not obviously descriptions of merely physical mechanisms. So the
trouble for the radical interpreter is that he has no motivation for
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providing a descriptively adequate syntax; and without one, he has offered
us too little reason for thinking he can effect the transitions from the
physical to the semantical level.
Against the attributionist interpreter I have argued that we need to
recognise other levels of cognition, intermediate between physics and folk
psychology and reducible to neither. This is necessary since our grasp of
syntax is neither a matter of reason nor causes alone. Pace the radical
interpreter, to make initial identifications of someone's sentences, if they
are correct, is to have entered the mind of the speaker already. It is to
identify states of linguistic understanding that presume upon the
cognitive organisation required for speech.
The same challenge is faced by one who seeks to describe the actual
facts about a speaker's understanding in a way that falls short of explaining
linguistic competence. It is unclear what the descriptivist's conception of
mind is. If it is an a priori conception like the attributionist's, the two
positions collapse. If it is some other a priori conception then we have still
to be told a good deal more about what such a position might look like. A
fully worked out picture of Wittgenstein's conception of mental life might
serve here; but I have not tried to examine that suggestion in this work. I
suspect that the descriptivist's alternative to attributionism tries to
establish facts about minds as being revealed in language, which it then
seeks to describe without appeal to inner states or empirical
underpinnings. For this theorist there must be a non-attributionist
account of the facts which constitute a speaker's competence in his native
language, it is then the task of the meaning theorist to describe these facts
as faithfully as he can. Typically, these will be conceived as facts about the
speaker's use of a language, and the meaning theorist will aim to provide
"an extended description of what that use consists in" (Dummett 1973,
p681). But to characterise the knowledge involved in language-mastery,
the theorist's description of use must not merely amount to a summary of
the unvarnished facts about a speaker's behaviour. The theory of meaning
for a language must be a theoretical representation of its speakers'
knowledge. But if speakers do not themselves know such a theory what
does their knowledge consist in? As we saw, speakers are ascribed implicit
knowledge of the theory in the form of a complex ability to use and
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understand the language. The meaning theorist then appeals to the
structure of the theory to articulate that complex ability into its component
parts. The descriptivist's claim to be describing the actual structure of a
speaker's linguistic abilities, and thus the structure of actual knowledge,
rests on the claim that the speaker can manifest these pieces of knowledge
in his use of particular sentences and expressions. However, we saw
reason to doubt that a full-blooded theorist who wanted to describe
episodes of behaviour as the manifestation of grasp of structured
meanings could both maintain his non-attributionist stance and avoid
adverting to the psychological structure of these linguistic abilities. In a
similar vein, I questioned Wright's entitlement to suppose that there is a
set of structured abilities standing at one remove from the behaviour in
which they are conjointly manifested. To justify this claim one must
either be an attributionist theorising about the form and content of
linguistic abilities, or else be prepared to give a substantive account of
them on the model of our cognitive psychological abilities. Certainly, in
the case of syntax much more must be said about the structure of our
linguistic abilities if we are to substantiate claims for an internal structure
to sentences, and if we are to be able to describe a speaker's behaviour as
manifesting his grasp of the underlying structures. In the end, I concluded
that the descriptivist is trying to occupy an unstable middle position. And
since I have given reasons for thinking that the interpretative stance fails
both to recover what speakers actually know about their language and
ascribes to them theoretical knowledge they don't have, I have advocated
the adoption of an explanatory approach to language mastery.
In the larger project there is much is left to do. So far we have only
considered conceptual structure and syntactic structure; next one must
turn to semantics. In the first two cases I argued that we can think of
conceptual and syntactic structure as being in the head. But when we turn
to meaning we cannot argue by analogy to a similar conclusion. There are
just too many differences between meaning and grammar to allow us to
do this. Unlike syntax, the referential properties of expressions relate them
to the world. The notion of an expression's meaning has normative force
for one who grasps it: he must keep faith with the meaning he attaches to
it. All these differences between the cases concern the content of
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expressions and not their form. So I suggest that we should think of a
semantic programme as involving two parts; one dealing with semantic
structure, and the other concerned with lexical semantics. The first
component of this programme could be treated on analogy with the other
cases. For unless we were to recapitulate the systematic relations between
meaning and grammar once again, outside the head, there will be a
problem of how to describe the interface between grammar and semantic
structure. Moreover, it would be quite wrong to ignore the close relations
between these different notions of structure, and quite false to persist in
believing in the autonomy of syntax claim. Contemporary syntactic
theories have long since abandoned the idea of completing a syntactic
description of a language independently of its semantics. We saw in
Chomsky's GB that he makes use of Binding Principles which govern co-
reference relations, and appeals to a level of Logical Form as a level that
records a partial representation of meaning including information about
the scope of quantifier phrases. These are genuinely semantic parts of the
grammar: a fruitful area for investigation of the relations between syntax
and semantics.
If semantic structures along with the other notions of structure are in
the head, then the form of a theory of meaning would be (in part) an
empirical hypothesis. For I have been keen to stress the empirical nature
of these structures and the fact that they are susceptible to ordinary
standards of scientific investigation. To confirm the correct form for a
theory of meaning for a set of speakers one would need to know
something about their internal cognitive organisation. In particular one
would have to appeal to a causal explanatory structure of content-bearing
states underlying their competence in the language; and in particular, one
would have to find out whether there was a uniform explanation for all
speakers who hear a sentence as containing certain singular terms and
predicates or having a certain semantical structure. However, these
considerations cannot explain the substantive issues about semantical
content. For this we need another sort of account.
Beyond the issues of grasp I have been concerned with lie questions
about the particular nature of contents grasped. Like Dummett, I would
favour a molecularist construal of the theory of meaning. I have not
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argued for molecularism here, but if one were to do so, the argument
would have to be based on Dummett's progressive acquisition thesis
which "allows for the arrangement of sentences and expressions of the
language in a partial ordering, according as the understanding of one
expression is or is not depending on the prior understanding of another"
(Dummett 1976, p79) This is a partial ordering with minimal elements,
and since the linguistic minimal elements are recognition statements,
which, I argued, must have components corresponding to the components
of a recognitional capacity, we have to retreat to the theory of thought to
account for the conceptual content expressed in such statements.
I have not argued explicitly for molecularism, but there is still an
important conditional claim to be made here. If one wants to adopt the
position of a semantic molecularist, then one must provide a non-
attributionist account of what our knowledge of the meaning of
individual sentences consists in which makes room for the internal
structure of basic statements. Also, an account that establishes the
psychological reality of individual sentence meaning will offer strong
grounds to contest the Davidsonian holist's claim that the attributed
notions of individual belief and sentence meaning have a merely
theoretical status within interpretation theory. To contest this one must
find a level of cognition at which to locate the particulate facts of sentence
understanding. At the level of thought it will be possible to describe a
network of recognitional capacities that make up our cognitive map of our
environment. The recognitional capacities will be more than just nodes in
a network. To engender conceptual contents, satisfying Evans' Generality
Constraint, they will have to be treated as structured abilities involving
the exercise of component abilities which can be exercised in different
combinations.
A full account of the structure and content of recognition based
thinking is required to arrive at the correct account of the contents of the
base class for progressive acquisition of language since Dummett appeals
to recognitional capacities as an account of our understanding of
statements in the base class. And as he says, the theory of meaning "ought
to be modelled on our actual practice in coming to recognise statements as
true". (Dummett 1973, p591) To account for the actual practice it is
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necessary to give an account of the content of recognitional judgements.
The faculty of recognition operates to deliver knowledge-states whose
contents are re-describable in truth theory at the level of output theorems,
so if we want to know whether a truth theory ascribes the correct truth
conditions to statements - the truth conditions speakers actually grasp -
then we must give some reason for pairing each knowledge-state with a
theorem of a particular truth theory. As Wright acknowledges, what
counts here is not the manifestations in behaviour so much as the
manifestable abilities in which possession of that knowledge consists. But
there seems no way to work out what contents those cognitive capacities
generate if we do not examine the elements involved in the recognition-
based thoughts they support.
The recognitional capacities have a pivotal role in linking the
individual speaker's use of language to the world and to other speakers.
Both of these links are vital if one is to grasp the content of items in a
public language. They provide a model of how knowledge of meaning is
housed within an individual in terms of his possessing a capacity to detect
certain observable circumstances, so if we could relate these recognisable
circumstances appropriately to the semantical details on the one hand and
to the cognitional details on the other, we might effect a hook-up between
the truth theory for his language and the psychological states of the
individual language user. But this is only one strand in the notion of a
recognitional capacity. The other strand has to do with the social aspect of
language use. Facts about meaning depend on facts about the communal
standards of use. But should we suppose that in his unthinking use of
these recognitional capacities a speaker is somehow appealing to these
public standards to regulate his own linguistic use? At first it might seem
difficult to accommodate both strands. But both are a necessary part of
providing an answer to the question: 'How does a speaker's possession of
certain recognitional capacities make it possible for him to have a grasp of
the meanings of words and sentences in a public language?' For this
reason we shall have to consider both individual and social aspects of
language mastery. Without the psychological antecedents a speaker could
not develop the abilities to make recognition-based statements; but
without the linguistic community in which he finds himself, he would
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not acquire those very recognitional abilities which equip him to speak
and understand the public language. In the course of linguistic
development we have our recognitional capacities honed to the categories
of perception and salience relevant to the needs and interests of our
linguistic community. The task of mastering one's native tongue is that of
tuning one's innately specified grammar to the parameter settings for
one's community and tuning the references of one's terms to the
references they have in the public language. The latter is achieved by
acquiring the correct recognitional and inferential abilities, and trading on
the finer discriminations of experts. The study of grammar in use and
knowledge of reference is the largest part of the study of language mastery.
It is a study involving both the social aspects of language use and the
individual psychologies of language users. It shows both what equips one
to participate in a practice and what shaping influence the practice has on
what is acquired. We can settle for nothing less than this if we seek to give
a substantive account of understanding.
Wright has written that for the antirealist:
...there is to be in the notion of understanding as little theoretical
residue as possible in excess of what is necessary for description of
the essential skills of the language-master. (1987, p276)
Given what I think has to be included even to describe the essential
skills of the language master, is this account compatible with antirealism?
I have not argued for antirealism, but I see no way in which what is said so
far rules it out, so I take myself to be offering a position consistent with
antirealist's views. There is no hidden appeal to knowledge of
undetectable states of affairs, and no way in which semantical realism is
assumed as a background assumption. All I insist upon is that the realism
- antirealism issue should not be begged without considerations of our
actual linguistic abilities. Since I have argued that these have to be
illuminated by the psychological structure within an individual and
conceptual elements described in the theory of thought, it is important
that the move to the level of thought should not beg questions on the
realist - antirealist issue either. But it doesn't. In fact, it is only at the level
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of thought that one can see the differences in the way the realist and
antirealist conceive the truth conditions for the basic statements.
At the level of language use the realist and antirealist seem to coincide,
but the contents grasped by a speaker have to do with his conception of the
recognisable state of affairs that make those statements true. It is here that
the realist is obliged to say how the judging subject can recognise not only
that such a state of affairs obtains but also what it would be for that state of
affairs to exist undetectably; and the antirealist will reserve the right to cast
doubt on any account of thought which confers grasp of this extra element
on the thinker. Realists like Evans and Peacocke can only establish this
extra ingredient of the judgement by illicit appeals to realist assumptions.
So for a basic statement like "That block is cubic", Evans sees a
fundamental level of thought lying behind the the antirealist's
fundamental level of recognitional thinking. At this level the subject
thinks of the block from no point of view (1982, pi52) The antirealist is
likely to find "the view from nowhere" unintelligible, but he can still
provide his own account of a more objective mode of thinking about
objects in the world by reference to "the view from anywhere". A different
suggestion which attempts to respect these cognitive limitations is offered
by Peacocke who gives a realist account of what it is to grasp the objective
truth conditions of the the thought that the block is cubic at time t in
terms of a spectrum of canonical commitments the thinker undertakes to
accept that from any position from which one were to perceive the block at
t in normal conditions, it would look cubic or look as a cubic object would
look from that position. To judge the thought is to accept these conditions,
and the acceptance conditions determine the objective truth conditions of
the judgement that that block is square at t. (see Peacocke 1986a, ppll-27)
However, Peacocke establishes the extra ingredient for realism by means of
the universal quantification used in specifying the canonical
commitments; for he is quantifying over an infinite number of positions
from which one could survey the block. However, no such infinite
generalisation is necessary since the only relevant positions for these
supporting expectations in perception are the ones which are cognitively
discriminably different from one another to the human subject. Again no
case for realism has been made out at the level of thought for the grasp of
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a basic statement's truth conditions. So I conclude that the issue of
whether to be realist or antirealist about the content has to be disputed at
the level of thought; merely moving to this level is not to concede the
point to the realist.
One can now see how the account of language mastery I am advocating
departs from Dummettian antirealism: it includes elements from the
theory of thought in a theory of language; and it makes essential appeal to
psychological facts about language users. I see these modifications as
causing no disturbance to the main thrust of Dummett's position in the
theory of meaning and as a necessary step for him to take to relieve his
difficulties over the recognitional capacities. Appeal to the theory of
thought does not replace the theory of language. There is no reversal of
priorities here. Even the psychological component in this account cannot
provide for the significance of speech of its own; it is merely there to
illuminate the conditions on being the user of a public language.
The recommendation of this position is that Dummett needs to
acknowledge not only the epistemological component in the theory of
meaning, but also the psychological component. To date, Dummett has
been unwilling to do this, and for largely Fregean reasons. It has been a
salutary part of Dummett's enormous contribution to the philosophy of
language to remind us that:
...the general contention that Frege wanted to extrude everything
epistemological from logic or from the theory of meaning is quite
misconceived: he wanted to extrude everything psychological.
(Dummett 1973, p240)
However, once we have divested ourselves of mental images, private
sensations and the methodology of introspectionism, it is important to
stress that the theory of meaning should not extrude everything cognitive
psychological just because it should extrude everything psychologistic. Our
grasp of the syntactic structures and categories of the underlying levels of
syntactic representation are not objects for private study, for they are not
items for personal inspection at all. They belong to the sub-personal
domain and we have this information in virtue of certain cognitive states
we are in. With the need to account for the individual, social and
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psychological aspects of language mastery, we need to locate our account
against a background conception of mind that accommodates the first-
personal, third-personal and sub-personal aspects of mental life. For this
we need a mature cognitive science.
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